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Abstract
This thesis addresses some of the extant gaps in law and literature 
criticism using an historical cultural criticism of law and literature that focuses on 
the Jacobean female legal subject in cases of divorce and adultery. It examines 
the intellectual milieu that constructs law and literature in this period to contribute 
to research on female subject formation, and looks specifically at how literature 
and law work to construct identity. This thesis asks what views Jacobean 
literature presents of the female legal subject, and what do those views reveal 
about identity and gender construction?
Chapter one offers some essential historical contexts. It establishes the 
jurisprudential conditions of the period, defines the ideal female legal subject, 
touches on recent historical scholarship regarding women and law, explores how 
literature reveals law’s artificiality, and links the Inns of Court to the theatres.
Chapter two focuses on women and divorce. The first sections discuss the 
theology and ideology which impacted on divorce law. The latter sections 
examine Elizabeth Cary’s Tragedy of Mariam, ca. 1609, and two manuscript 
accounts of Frances Howard’s 1613 divorce trial, William Terracae’s poem, A 
Plenarie Satisfaction, ca. 1613, and The True Tragi-Comedie Formarly Acted at 
Court, a play by Francis Osborne, 1635. These texts reveal the legal construction 
and frustrations of married women, and illustrate a gendered divide in attitudes 
towards women’s legal position.
Chapter three examines women and adultery law. It then juxtaposes 
representations of women justly accused of adultery, like the real-life Alice 
Clarke, and the fictional Isabella in John Marston’s The Insatiate Countess, 1613, 
and unjustly accused, like the virtuous wives in Marston’s play. This chapter 
reveals how male anxiety creates the stereotypes that constrain the female legal 
subject within systems of patrilineal inheritance.
As a whole, this thesis uses literature to explore the Jacobean female legal 
subject’s relationship to her husband and to the law, and, in some cases, it 
challenges the assumption that women were effectively constrained by legal 
dictates which would keep them chaste, silent and submissive. Literature, in 
some cases, works alongside law to sustain constructed identities, but radical 
literature can undermine law by challenging the stereotypes and identities law 
works to maintain.
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Introduction, law, literature and the female legal subject
Jurisprudence Fetishist 
Gets Off On Technicality
see LIFESTYLE page11B 
(Siegel, The Onion)
But where would Edmund be nowadays? . . . The gods are just. No 
doubt. But their code of law is dictated, in the last resort, by the 
people who organize society; Providence takes its cue from men.
(Huxley, Brave New World)
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Cultural criticism of the law was cited at the 1999 London colloquium on law
and literature as the most recent theoretical branch to come out of the law and
literature debate (Binder 86). This debate attempts to answer the jurisprudential 
question “what is law?” by using an interdisciplinary approach to law and literature,
and until 1999 it consisted of two main schools: law as literature and law in
literature. A cultural criticism of the law attempts to address the obvious gaps in the 
two traditional schools by recognising that law and literature come out of the same 
intellectual milieu, and that literature therefore plays an important role in analysing 
law, culture and the legal subject.
Literature, as a realm of the imaginary in which potential and multi­
dimensional legal subjects can be realised, provides inroads that help us to 
understand how law, a seemingly extra-human institution, arbitrarily creates, sustains 
and normalises social subjects. This thesis is an historically-based cultural criticism 
of the law using representations of the female legal subject in selected Jacobean 
texts.1 Of necessity it engages in feminist jurisprudence, the legal theory that 
interprets law as part of a male-dominated power structure, because any cultural 
criticism of Western law, literature and the female legal subject must consider how 
law constructs women within a patriarchal system. I focus on the Jacobean period 
because, during the reign of James I, society became more litigious than it previously 
had been, unprecedented numbers of women were appearing in the courts to contest 
or bring suits, and jurisprudence began to shift in tangible ways away from pure 
theories of law toward more modern practices such as precedent and interpretation.2
' Although the Jacobean period is the specific area of interest for this thesis, I will often refer to the 
early-modern period as a whole. This is simply because the culture and laws which existed in the 
early seventeenth centuiy did not simply spring into being with the accession of James 1, and, 
necessarily, they are placed within the historical context that shaped them.
2 All these cultural dynamics are discussed and evidenced in the ensuing chapters.
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I. CULTURAL CRITICISM OF THE LAW: JURISPRUDENTIAL ENTERTAINMENT OR 
SUBJECT-FORMING DISCOURSE? THE NEWEST BRANCH OF LAW AND 
LITERATURE
Maria Aristodemou, an advocate of the cultural criticism of law, and the first 
to produce a book on this newest area of law and literature, defines its methodology 
as “a return to interdisciplinary enquiries, contextuality, and perspectivism in a bid to 
put legal doctrine back in the cultural context in which it belongs and from which it 
was divorced by positivist methodologies in legal studies (10).” She argues that a 
cultural criticism of law “will help broaden our understanding of law as part of our 
culture, a culture that it shares with literature; at the same time it hopes to enhance 
our understanding of ourselves as subjects of language, law, and culture (10).” 
Traditionally, law and literature as a theoretical discourse, has been firmly grounded 
in university law departments and the colloquium mentioned above was 
predominantly attended by law professors. This may explain why the two previously 
existing branches of law and literature often misinterpret the role literature plays, or 
can play, in society and in relation to law. It is perhaps difficult for law professors to 
turn literary critics, and the emphasis that is placed on the legal aspects of law and 
literature is most likely due to the debate being grounded in legal, not literary, 
discourse. Cultural criticism of the law attempts to address the significant 
shortcomings of the two historical branches of law and literature, law as literature
and law in literature.
Law as literature, otherwise known as the hermeneutic project (Baron and 
Epstein 665), argues that law, like literature, is “a system of texts ... a vehicle for 
creating and conveying meaning (Morawetz 452).” It is based on the Derridean 
understanding that language is an arbitrary vehicle for social construction. It accepts
13
that the processes of law are fundamentally interpretive (Derrida 204),3 and that law, 
like literature, is made up of a series of connotative signifiers which sustain and 
reflect logocentric systems of power. These systems maintain prevailing social 
structures through the words subjects have at their disposal to describe and to relate 
to their lived experience.
The law as literature project views legal texts as a discourse that can be read 
as literature because, like literature, law is in a state of interpretive flux. Legal texts, 
like all texts, are “alive” and subject to continuous reinterpretation by the readers 
(lawyers and judges) who utilize them. Ian Ward argues, in Law and Literature, that 
“[l]aw is already literature . . . and thus the reading of any text is always an act of 
‘creation’ and of ‘translation’ between communities of discourse (53).” The 
hermeneutic school thus focuses on the interpretive malleability of law, and the 
common linguistic roots that law and literature share.4
The shortcoming of the hermeneutic project, describing law as literature, is 
that it runs the risk of misunderstanding the practical difference between the effects 
of legal and literary interpretation. Although it is true that law is an interpretive 
process, legal interpretation carries with it the power of incarceration and public 
punishment. Thus law, as a mandate of social order and control, affects how people 
interact in the public and private spheres. Even though “relations of power are 
interwoven with other kinds of relations (production, kinship, family, sexuality) for 
which they play at once a conditioning and a conditioned role,” and “these relations
3 For further discussion see also Ward 28-42.
4 The line between law and literature is blurred further by the fact that some trials, like the marriage 
annulment hearings of Frances Howard in 1613 (Lindley), the rape trial of the Earl of Castlehaven in 
1631 (Herrup), or, much more recently, the televised proceedings of the O. J. Simpson murder trial in 
the United States, can so easily become popular events. Certainly, “few social practices are so readily 
transferable to a literary setting and so well suited to the literary depiction of conflict as the trial 
(Posner 22),” which bolsters the hermeneutic project’s stance that law and literature can often be 
conflated to the same end - in this case, the entertainment that can be found in case resolution.
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don’t take the sole form of prohibition and punishment, but are of multiple forms,” 
law is what Michel Foucault refers to as the “primitive” answer to power relations 
(Power/Knowledge 142). In short, it defines relationships without admitting the 
subtle social complexities out of which they arise.
Literary interpretation, on the other hand, carries, at most, the power of public 
debate. While these debates can be stimulating, even antagonistic, they are not 
immediately associated with an impending prison term. Literature can suggest forms 
of social interaction, but it lacks the authority to make those suggestions immediately 
imperative. Thus, law shapes and constructs private and public subjects very 
differently than literature does, or even can, in an immediate way. Robin West, an 
opponent of the hermeneutic branch of law and literature, correctly points out that
adjudication is in fonn interpretive, but in substance it is an exercise 
of power in a way that truly interpretive acts, such as literary 
interpretation are not . . . Like the commands of kings and dictates of 
a majoritarian legislature, adjudication is imperative. It is a command 
backed by state power. No matter how many similarities adjudication 
has with literary linguistic activities, this central attribute 
distinguishes it. (93-4)
The hermeneutic project consistently fails to address the power differences that exist 
between legal and literary interpretation, and how those differences play out in the 
private and public spheres.
In failing to explore this discursive difference between law and literature, the 
hermeneutic project does not take its argument the necessary step further. It is not 
sufficient to say that language is an interpretive tool which structures and constructs 
reality and subjects. It must be recognised that different forms of language -
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different discourses - are used by society in different ways for different purposes. In 
practical terms that affect subject representation and construction, law is not 
literature and literature is not law, even though both are based in interpretable 
language.
The second traditional approach to law and literature is law in literature, 
described by its proponents as the “moral uplift” project (Baron and Epstein 664). It 
“perhaps got its start in 1908, when John H. Wigmore published A List of Legal 
Novels, a ‘legal’ novel being . . . simply a novel in which a lawyer, most of all, ought 
to be interested (Baron and Epstein 663).” This branch of law and literature focuses 
on how “literary texts depicting human encounters with the law raise fundamental 
questions about the role of law in society and the moral responsibilities of lawyers 
(Baron and Epstein 663),” and how such books are useful teaching tools for law 
professors.
E. Perry Hodges, a proponent of law in literature, argues that the way in 
which law students are educated leads them to perceive law as an “independent 
rational structure” divorced from social pressures and human experience (638). Law 
in literature theorists believe that “literature . . . can do something that law never can, 
at least not in the classroom. It can present ethical dilemmas which demand 
resolution not by ‘lawyers’, but by people (Ward 25);” and that literature depicts “a
real-life situation” which forces law students to “concentrate the mind on the realities
of case-resolution (Ward 24).” This approach argues that literary narratives re­
humanise, through characters who confront the legal machine, a system which can 
otherwise appear, with its “apparently arbitrary and undeniably coercive character 
(Posner 22),” to be operating outside the human condition. Literary narratives, law 
in literature suggests, provide access to other perspectives which ideally reinforce for
16
law students the integrity of the human subject within the legal framework, somehow 
making the students better people and, presumably, better lawyers.
The specific shortcoming of the moral uplift project is that it is used simply to 
remind law students that their clients are people, and that legal proceedings can often 
be frustrating and confusing endeavours. It does not go the necessary step further to 
consider how or why literary representations of the legal subject often portray the 
law as arbitrary and wrong. In failing to do so, the moral uplift project does not 
delve into the more subtle nuances of literary texts. It fails to understand the impact 
such texts could have on society, how they work as forms of representation, and it 
fails to satisfactorily explore why the subjects represented respond the way they do to 
the laws and legal system imposed on them. Although well-suited to do so, 
surprisingly this branch of law and literature is not used to question the law itself, or 
the power relations which exist behind law (to do so might be a dangerous exercise 
in a first-year law class, anyway) and thus it fails to either understand that literary 
representations of the legal subject often do lead inexorably to the conclusion that 
law is arbitrary and wrong, or to analyse that conclusion in any meaningful way.
A cultural criticism of the law attempts to redress the insufficiencies and gaps 
of the hermeneutic and moral uplift projects in law and literature. It asks the further 
questions the two historical schools of law and literature do not, and this perhaps 
makes it a more suitable discourse for literary critics. It sees an interdisciplinary 
approach to law and literature as a way of illuminating the social pressures and 
torsions which impact upon the legal subject, and in doing so, revealing the social 
values and codes embedded in a culture’s practices and history. It argues that 
subjective identity is the product of social conditioning, and any defence to be made 
of normalising institutions must recognise that the parameters of those
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institutionalised norms are based on “the kind of identities they will cultivate rather 
than their protection or accurate representation of existing personalities (Binder 88).” 
It accepts that law and literature are different discourses which nevertheless arise out 
of the same social framework. They are “artificial constructs, concepts, or 
abstractions like time or identity, aiming to create, and especially in law’s case, to 
impose, order out of chaos: to write on the bodies and very souls of the subjects and 
fulfil as well as replace their unfulfillable desires (Aristodemou 1).” Cultural 
criticism of the law understands that, while law is interpretive, statutes are an 
imperative mechanism for arbitrary social order and control, and thus they play a 
very different discursive role within society from literature itself.
Law is recognised as a discourse which is insinuated into a community by the 
rulers and colluding members of that community, in order to assert mastery over the 
populace and to pretend a social naturalism which does not exist. Law is the written 
(legislated) form of plastic social power relations which are constantly being shifted, 
remolded and challenged. Law gives the illusion of stability and trans-historicality 
because society complies with, and thus perpetuates, the myth that law is somehow
natural or extra-human.
Given this, literary representations of legal subjects signify more than an 
individual’s struggle against the State (as the law in literature branch would have us 
believe); they imply a myriad of power relations that exist within the culture that 
produces specific laws and literary texts.5 Fictional representation of the legal 
subject “can stand for various institutions that use coercion, and it can also stand for 
the ways in which persons work together in institutions to realize their shared goals
5 Vilhelm Aubert argues that legal norms mark “the distinction between compliance and 
noncompliance, but with a more or less empty space inside the limits of acceptable behavior. This 
focuses the attention upon borderline problems, upon ambiguities, uncertainty, and transgressions 
(35).”
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and values (Morawetz 451).” Therefore, literary representation provides inroads 
which help us to understand how law is situated within the society that it attempts to 
control, and how it impacts and is impacted upon by that society.
The cultural criticism of law argues that we can analyse a legal subject, and 
that subject’s social position within the legal structure, because any legal structure is 
not an autonomous, external force brought to bear on society. The structure which is 
perceived to be external, the legal system, is actually based on arbitrary social codes 
and signifiers (Giddens 162-3). Adhering to a cultural criticism of the connections 
between law and literature, this thesis is concerned with legal identity construction - 
specifically the female identity in the Jacobean period - the artificial subject that law 
tries to create, and how that artificiality is revealed, challenged, or coerced by 
literature. Firstly, however, in order to explode literary representations of the legal 
subject, it is necessary to define what is meant by legal and literary subjects.
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II. THE LEGAL SUBJECT: LAW AS REPRESENTATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL
Law is an institution created with the overt aim of maintaining social order. 
Because of this, it implies a certain subject who will bolster society. Law attempts to 
constrain subjects by defining, regulating, and sustaining social norms. It is 
“governmental social control ... It is, in other words, the normative life of a state 
and its citizens (Black 1-2).” The implied subject of legal dictates is the subject who 
follows the rules of law and lives harmoniously and crime-free (as either a 
perpetrator or a victim) within society; a subject who, for the good of society, accepts 
law as a dominant discourse, and whose actions are governed by the civic identity 
that the legal discourse attempts to create. Law defines “normal,” “acceptable” 
behaviour by categorising “the meaning of an act by which a certain behavior is 
commanded, permitted, or authorized (Kelsen 5).” The legal subject is thus the 
imagined subject of both the lawmakers and the society which accepts that law works 
for the greater good. Of course, this ideal legal subject - the subject who obeys all 
laws, always, unquestioningly - is nothing more than a stereotype of legal fantasy, 
and is often absent from lived experience.
Because law defines people by codifying “normal” behaviour (Gabel and 
Feinman 507), courtroom decisions seem to constrain people in overly-simplified 
binary positions of good or bad. This is because law will always protect, first and 
foremost, other institutions of social order, like the family unit, property ownership, 
systems of inheritance, etc., that bolster the status quo, over the complex psychology, 
history and motives of the individual.6 What the law protects with a final judgment 
of “guilty” or “innocent” is a product of the culture in which it is made, because the
6 Foucault argues that early legal theory saw “the necessity of punishment solely on the basis of the 
interest of society or the need to protect it {Ethics 27).” I am also heavily indebted to my former 
colleague, Bob Cosburn, LL.B., head of Cosburn & Associates, for many fun and fruitful discussions 
about the role of law in society.
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hierarchical importance of traditional social institutions is an arbitrary social 
construction. Legal judgments often “achieve results that popular will would reject 
as irrational (Binder 84),” because they overtly protect traditional institutions of 
social order, and in doing so often force legal subjects into shallow, easily codifiable 
positions.
The legal processes which support a universalised codification across an 
otherwise very diverse culture “often fail to reflect - fail to represent - the 
experiences, interests, and needs of the full variety of human beings (Minow, “From” 
17).” This explains why law, even today, often returns to myths and stereotypes in 
trials. It explains why, in 1991, Mr. Justice Harman denounced the use of the 
signifier ‘Ms.’ for women litigants in his English courtroom by apparently saying, 
“there are only three types of women: mothers, wives and whores (H. Kennedy 53).” 
Legal interpretation in courtroom cases adheres to stereotypes and myths because 
they are convenient, a fact which is especially relevant to the Jacobean texts I discuss 
in the ensuing chapters. To admit a complex legal subject would mean admitting to a 
complex society, which it is the sole purpose of law to control by essentialising into 
easily-identifiable categories. Law exists specifically to reduce social complexities 
into easily manageable (and punishable) categories of right and wrong.
Furthermore, the legal definition of appropriate social behaviour is 
inextricably interwoven with social relations and power relations (and it is arguable 
that the two are easily conflated). It is a discourse that governs the way in which
7 For example, in a society where euthanasia is legal, doctors who perform assisted deaths and the 
patients who opt for them are simply exercising their legal rights. In a society where euthanasia is 
illegal, it is practised covertly and surreptitiously, and doctors who are discovered are brought up on 
charges, labeled “bad doctors,” even murderers, by law. The patients are seen to be suicide cases, 
whose exertion of agency over their own deaths challenges both the law and socially accepted views 
of death. The legislated determination of right and wrong social behaviour creates, for the doctor and 
patient above, two very different subjective positions depending on legislation. In one cultural 
instance, they behave in an acceptable, normal manner, and are therefore properly functioning 
members of society; in another culture they are not, and are punishable.
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people interact with each other (Thou shall not kill), with their environment 
(vandalism of public property is an offence), and even with themselves (you may / 
may not have access to abortion). Law thus shapes public and private lives by 
regulating social interaction. However, it is important to remember that law is not a 
free-standing discourse: it is a system of social coercion (Baron and Epstein 673). 
Ideally, law is an institution that regulates and protects society; but whom the laws 
actually protect is controlled by the lawmakers themselves. Laws are, in effect, the 
written mandate of the status quo, and they protect the desired cultural and social 
characteristics of a community - desired, that is, by those who hold power within 
that community. Generally, in market-driven economies the majority of the power to 
legislate lies with the wealthiest, and in most countries with men.
Thus the seemingly extra-human machine known as “The Law” or “The 
Legal System” does not regulate human behaviour from an isolated position. In 
truth, “the judgment that an act of human behavior ... is ‘legal’ (or ‘illegal’) is the 
result of a specific, namely normative interpretation (Kelsen 4).” Judge and jury in a 
courtroom must interpret actions within the confines of laws which are created for a 
specific social agenda. The cultural criticism of law recognises that because people 
make laws, and must interpret and judge whether behaviour is “normal,” and 
therefore acceptable, or not, legally sanctioned norms are social constructions.
Literary representations of the legal subject explode this specific weakness in 
law. They highlight the construction and artificiality of law, and they challenge the 
perception that law is the objective, equitable and just final word for conflict 
resolution. Law will protect society, or what legislators have deemed right for 
society, at the expense of the individual. It will, in many cases even now, ignore the 
complex nuances of an individual subject for the “greater good,” and for ease in
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sentencing. Often, this makes law appear to be crude or naive, but this appearance is 
deliberate. In order to make claims to universality (the same law will apply to all 
subjects because all subjects are somehow the same) law must perform an 
essentialising and reductive role. There is very little room for a grey area in law, 
which works to remove ambiguities.
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HI. THE LITERARY SUBJECT: POSSIBILITIES AND PRESSURES IN
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE LEGAL SUBJECT
Literature, on the other hand, can be fraught with grey areas. It is free to 
explore as many subtle nuances of the legal subject as it wants to, simply because it 
performs a different discursive role in society than law does. Literature can 
challenge the law, it can humanise the law, it can “articulate new imaginaries which 
may in turn become laws (Aristodemou 11)” - laws which, because they “reside in 
the worlds of dreams or possibility rather than in the so-called real world make them 
more, rather than less, important for enabling us to map and envision new selves and 
new conditions (Aristodemou 11)” - and it can overturn legal decisions in a safely 
fictional manner on the page or the stage. Literature and drama, because they are 
arenas of the imagination, are able to offer readers or audiences a world that could 
be, a different world than the one people experience in everyday life - The Globe, 
made up of countless imagined realities which contribute “to our sense of what is 
natural, common sense, and inevitable (Aristodemou 6).”8 Literary representation is 
a cultural discourse that has the power to impact upon its auditors, albeit from a less 
imperative position than law.
Legal proceedings and jurisprudence appear as the basis of plot and theme in 
literary and dramatic works from Geoffrey Chaucer’s Man of Law in the Canterbury 
Tales to William Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure and The Merchant of Venice 
(to name but two), on through to more modern texts such as Charles Dickens’ Bleak 
House and The Trial by Franz Kafka. The fact that authors can use law in their 
fictions signifies the destabilisation to which law is susceptible as a discourse that is 
constantly in flux as a result of being manipulated and re-manipulated (Julius 8). It
8 Of literature and drama, the latter, performed in a public space, has more potential to echo the 
processes of the law, making it an ideal discourse in which to examine law within its cultural setting. 
The courtroom can easily metamorphose into a theatre, with characters and dialogue, and the trial 
works towards a denouement, or resolution.
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is therefore easy for writers to challenge and subvert the dominant legal discourse 
specifically because the perception that law is stable, omniscient and omnipresent 
must be accepted and maintained by society.
Thus, literary texts, which represent a world in which everything and 
anything is possible (Derrida 36-8), are a perfect “medium for jurisprudential debate 
(Ward 9).” Ward writes that any literary text is “everywhere political, and moreover 
that it is political in a way which invariably reinforces the established social 
structures (39).” Although I do not agree with Ward’s final statement - certainly 
literature can be subversive as well as coercive - the representation of the legal 
subject in literature, the literary subject, is often a metaphor for politically-produced 
(legislated) power structures. Because literature can suggest different social orders, 
characters are often more multi-dimensional than subjects constructed by law. 
Literature is “more likely than law to challenge received ideologies, values, and 
prejudices (Aristodemou 9),” through its characters’ words and actions. Therefore, 
the legal subject in literature or drama is represented as being much more complex 
than law represents its empirical counterpart. S/he often questions the status quo 
which affects her or him by challenging legal precepts, concepts of justice, and 
courtroom proceedings. How fictitious legal subjects interact with legislated 
hierarchies is what makes literature worthwhile to a cultural criticism of the law, 
because the values approved of in law “may well differ very considerably from day- 
to-day practices (Belsey, Shakespeare 6),” which are more easily represented in
literature.
Despite the claims of law in literature, literary representation is not a mimetic 
re-creation of the “real” world. It is a series of imagined worlds which can “convert 
the given confines of the here and now into an open horizon of possibilities (Kearney
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2).” These worlds, in turn, enable their auditors “to edit and improvise social roles 
off stage - roles of all kinds, dominant and subjected alike (Whigham 4).” Wolfgang 
Iser explains:
the bracketed world of the novel is not only to be seen as if it were a
world, but it is also to be seen as a world that does not exist
empirically. Consequently there will be continual oscillation between 
the bracketed world and that from which it has been separated. The 
former therefore becomes a medium for revealing what has remained 
concealed in the empirical world. (220-1)
In simple terms, when the reader compares the empirical reality she knows with the 
represented world of the novel or play, she is made aware of new possibilities in the 
empirical world by the ways the empirical world is challenged or sustained by its 
fictional re-ordering. Thus, “[t]he text itself becomes a kind of junction, where other 
texts, norms, and values meet and work upon each other (Iser 219),”9 and literature 
and drama can create hypothetical new worlds that have the potential to disrupt the 
social structures taken for granted in day-to-day life.
Therefore, literature in which the legal subject appears creates a space where 
the legislated social policies of the ruling body or group of people (law), and the way 
society either resists or reinforces such legislation (power relations), can be 
examined. The political agenda of legislation, Posner writes, “makes law a superb 
metaphor for the random, coercive, and ‘unfair’ light in which the human condition - 
‘life’ - appears to us in some moods (22).” But law only seems random and coercive 
- it is actually “a human institution frequently perceived as external to man, like a 
natural phenomenon (22).” Law creates subjects and it is created by men (here I use
9 See also, for example, Judovitz 91-3.
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the term specifically) to pursue and enforce a social and economic agenda. To 
represent the legal subject in a fictional text or drama is to address the cultural and 
historical politics and power relations that surround and produce that subject. 
Because it is “safely” fictitious, writing about law offers a way of questioning the 
status quo, accepted power relations, the culture which creates that law, and the 
ideology that shapes the legal subject in a way that is acceptable to those at the top of
the hierarchical structure.
nIV. THE FEMALE LEGAL SUBJECT
Because the top of the hierarchical structure in most countries is and has been 
predominantly male, laws, unsurprisingly, shape a specific legal subject who bolsters 
a patriarchal status quo, traditional patriarchal institutions, and traditional patriarchal 
power relations (Olsen 701). This leads to a legal system that impacts on women and 
men in gender-specific ways. For example, historically in England, a woman could 
be charged with being a “common scold,” an offence “legally of the feminine gender. 
A man may be a common bore, of course, but this, though a nuisance, is not an 
indictable nuisance (Parry, Drama 145).” Feminist criticisms of the law “identify 
law as part of the structure of male domination . . . and condemn law for being 
therefore ideologically oppressive to women (Olsen 700).” Legal dictates “are not 
neutral or universal, but biased in favor of the dominant culture, at the expense of all 
others (P. Smith 303).” If legal interpretation protects traditional institutions of 
social construction, feminist jurisprudence asks, “how could it be objective? If not 
objective, how could interpretation be impartial; and if not impartial, how could it be 
fair? . . . how could it be fair to the marginalized and despised (Binder 71)?”10 
Feminist jurisprudence admits that law cannot be fair because it is not objective; that 
laws work as patriarchally-biased contributions to gender construction, because 
gender difference is an important pillar supporting the traditional patriarchal social 
institutions that law will protect over the individual.
Thus, law is “symbolic, playing an important role in the internalising of ideas 
about what is right and natural . . . The law constructs beliefs about roles of men and 
women in the home and at work which feed back into generally held attitudes about
10 For an engaging account of one of the central issues in feminist jurisprudence, the difference 
between male and female communication and how this difference is detrimental to women at law, see 
Abrams 44-9.
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women (H. Kennedy 31).” Furthermore, the stereotypes and myths to which law 
often reverts in the courtroom do not help women. Helena Kennedy, a practising 
lawyer, admits that a “mere hint in court that a woman might be a bad mother, a bit 
of a whore or emotionally unstable, and she is lost (22),” simply because she plays 
into masculine stereotypes of the “bad woman.”
Feminist jurisprudence, like the cultural criticism of law, believes that all law 
is fundamentally and inescapably political; law supports the social constructions of 
the patriarchal status quo and does so in the guise of objectivity, fairness and 
neutrality. By attacking traditional jurisprudence, feminist jurisprudence attempts to 
create a wider understanding of the ways in which law interacts with women and 
v/ce versa. Taub and Schneider explain that “[m]ale control in the public sphere has 
often been consolidated explicitly by legal means. The law, however, is in large part 
absent from the private sphere, and that absence itself has contributed to male 
dominance and female subservience (329).” A cultural criticism of law and literature 
from a feminist perspective argues that literary representations of the female legal 
subject can undermine empirical legal practices and jurisprudence. As Helene 
Cixous points out in one of her many discussions on subject formation:
[t]he repressive machine has always had the same accomplices: 
homogenizing, reductive, unifying reason has always been an ally of 
the Master, of the one Subject, stable and socializable; and it is here, 
at the base of it all, that literature has already been striking blows, 
where the theses and concepts of Order imposed themselves, by 
denouncing them on the level of the signified. (32)
Although Cixous is referring to structures of language, her analysis could apply to 
any signifier, whether it be a word, a gesture, or the representation of a subject - the
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signified legal subject - who appears on the page or the stage to be held up to and 
compared with the empirical legal subject. Because law “aims to preserve the 
illusion of order, consistency, and inevitability, to obscure the fact that its history, 
decisions, and stories could have developed in a different manner, taking in other 
experiences, other views, other voices (Aristodemou 26),” it is easily undermined by 
literature, a medium which is able to give scope and play to the Others often silenced 
by law. For the purposes of this thesis, the Others it gives voice to are the “silent” 
women of the Jacobean period.
My thesis concerns itself with the construction of the female legal subject in 
Jacobean England. Because the role of women in Jacobean England, and hence the 
way the female legal subject is constructed, is closely linked to ideas about the 
family and sexual reproduction, I have chosen to focus on divorce and adultery. It is 
in these contexts that the woman’s status as a legal subject, defined in relationship to 
her husband, becomes most complicated, because here women are most easily 
confined by the legal stereotypes that protect those all-important institutions of 
Western social order: the family unit and patrilinear inheritance. Furthermore, it is 
within this relationship that the wife, as a political subject who either chooses or does 
not choose to accept her subjectivity, is in a position to challenge or sustain extant 
legal and political paradigms.11 In marriage, women’s bodies become loci of legal 
tensions “because they are a site of biological reproduction and hence of legal 
dilemmas such as inheritance (of property and disease), illegitimacy, adultery (Smart 
93).” In order to historically situate the literary and non-literaiy texts I will consult, 
Chapter One discusses theories of law in the early-modern period and reveals how 
those theories specifically affect women. In doing so, I attempt to define, as best as
11 For an engaging discussion of female coercion and consent within the early-modern marriage, see 
Kahn, “Duty” 247-250.
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can be done from the distance of four hundred years, the female legal subject in 
Jacobean England. Chapter One also draws attention to the connections between the 
Inns of Court and London playhouses, a fact which draws law and literature even 
closer together.
Chapters Two and Three consider divorce and adultery respectively. They 
are set out in a parallel manner, first using non-literary, and by that I mean non­
fictional, theological and social writing of the time to gain an understanding of the 
patterns of thought that were impacting on litigation, creating statutes and helping to 
construct the female legal subject in the courtroom, the home and the street, with 
regard to divorce and adultery. The latter sections in each of the two chapters set 
literary texts against the non-literary discourses to illuminate the broader, cultural, 
subject-forming discourses that are often hidden by conservative law and the 
institutions which bolster it (and which it bolsters in turn).
Literature presents fictional subjects which also help to define, regulate and 
sustain, but can alternatively act to subvert, social norms. The literary 
representations in the last two chapters are an important reminder of the social 
undercurrents in both cases - sometimes in unexpected ways. Literature does not 
always imply that the law is unreasonably strict, sometimes it argues that judgment 
in a case is too light, or that it fails to address the real issue, or that it fails to fulfil 
social expectations of what the ruling should have been. Whether it is represented as 
being too strict or too lenient, however, the implication is often that law fails to 
adequately reflect social values.
The literary representations I discuss in Chapters Two and Three go a long 
way to fleshing out the legal subject described in Chapter One and the earlier 
sections of those chapters - making her more accessible, understandable and human;
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alternatively, sometimes they vilify her in much more complex ways than the law 
can. Literary texts and legal texts “coexist and overlap . . . raising the question, what 
view of man, woman, and the world is offered by these texts (Aristodemou 7).” 
More specifically for the purposes of my thesis, what views of the female legal 
subject in the Jacobean period are offered by these texts, and what do those views, 
from the position of a feminist cultural criticism of the law, tell us about identity and 
gender construction?
Chapter one. jurisprudence, the female legal subject and legal 
DRAMA IN A JACOBEAN FRAMEWORK
[Law] tendreth the weakenesse and debilities of others; As of / Men 
out of the Realm, or in prison, Feme Covert (and therefore 
favoureth them for their dowers) infants, men unlettered, Idiots 
out of their right minde, or without all understanding, as those 
that are borne dumbe deafe, and blinde, or having other 
imperfections.
(Finch, Law, or a Discourse Thereof)
It is the law, not I, condemn your brother.
(Shakespeare, Measure for Measure)
And to conclude the Law is like a Laborinth, you may enter in, but 
it is hard to find the way out againe.
(Anonymous, Witts Tearme)
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In order to effectively analyse the female legal subject in Jacobean England it 
is necessary to expand on the underlying jurisprudences of the time - the theories 
that affect legal interpretation and statute creation, the discourses which are 
essentially theories of government and social interaction - because it is often these 
“deeper patterns of thought and discourse that have guided our understanding of the 
nature of men and women (Kramer 280).” Section one of this chapter is an overview 
of the three major forms of early-modern law - natural, divine and positive. Entire 
theses could be written on each of these subjects alone, and I do not presume that one 
sub-section in a chapter is an in-depth encounter with prevailing theology and 
philosophy. Rather, I intend to bring to light the most generally accepted 
interpretations of these legal discourses from writing of the time, in order to outline 
the jurisprudential superstructure in which early-modern women found themselves. 
In this way, an analysis of the female legal subject can be carried out with 
knowledge of the empirical discourses that were impacting on women outside the
fictional text.
The second section of this chapter discusses some examples of the female 
legal subject, places the Jacobean female legal subject in the courts, and draws 
attention to Sir John Dodderidge’s work, The Lawes Resolutions of Womens Rights: 
or, The Lawes Provision for Woemen, published in 1632.1 The third section 
illustrates the strong connection between lawyers, authors and playwrights, a crucial 
point to bear in mind when analysing dramatic or literary representations of the legal 
subject in the Jacobean period. Firstly, I will outline the connections between, and 
jurisprudence of, different Jacobean legal systems.
1 The work is attributed to Dodderidge by Elizabeth Darracott Wheeler (81). The STC also cites 
Dodderidge as the potential author of this text, and I accept for the purposes of this thesis that John 
Dodderidge is the author.
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I. NATURE, GOD AND THE KING: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL LAW, 
DIVINE LAW AND POSITIVE LAW
Like any discourses that exist at the same moment in time, theories of law in 
Jacobean England unavoidably reflect, refract and connect with one another. 
Edward Coke, noted barrister and Chief Justice (Knafla 146), lists “law of the 
crown,” “[I] ex et consuetudo parliamenti [law of parliament],” “law of nature,” 
“common law of England,” “[s]tatute law . . . established by authority of 
parliament,” “customs reasonable,” “law of arms, war, and chivalry,” “ecclesiastical 
or canon law,” “civil law,” “forest law,” “law of marque or reprisal,” “merchant 
&c.,” “laws and customs of the Isles of Jersey, Guernsey, and Man,” “law and 
privilege of the Stannaries,” and “laws of the East, West, and Middle Marches, 
which are now abrogated,” as the laws existing in England in the early seventeenth 
century (Coke 8-9). All three forms of law, divine, positive, and natural, are evident
in his list.
These multiple jurisdictions are seen to be necessary in the early-modern 
period because they command different facets of duty, often divided along secular 
and religious lines - body I soul, earth / heaven, justice I conscience - which early- 
modern jurisprudence insists exist. It should be noted that the dualities listed here 
are not meant to convey polar opposites; jointly, they encompass the two 
components of the early-modern individual - the body and the soul, the life on earth 
and the continued afterlife. It should also be noted that despite listing three major 
forms of law, I have here drawn a distinction between only two (i.e. earth / heaven). 
The reason for this is that natural law does not stand as a separate jurisprudence from 
divine or positive law. It exists as a component of both, and is often used to justify 
the existence of both. In effect, it bolsters the jurisprudence of God’s law and man’s
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law; it is the theory behind the theories. Section IA of this chapter discusses natural 
law as it underpins the divine and positive legal structures that were regulating 
people’s spiritual and corporeal well-being.
It was not doubted in early-modern England that both structures of law were 
necessary. Pierre Viret writes, in A Christian Instruction, 1573, that
as the true Church doth acknowledge the ministers of the Gospell, as 
the true ministers of God, ordeyned by him. For the administration of 
spirituall things, even so doth she acknowledge the magistrates as 
ministers of his justice, ordeyned by him for the conservation of the 
publique peace, and therefore she doth willingly submit hir selfe to 
them, in all thinges for God. (53 [actually 52])
People’s rights, as the above arguments make clear, exist in two fields: “Divine, of 
which God is the Author. Humance [sic], of which Man is the Contriver (Ames 
100).” The “two principall brethren the Magistracie and the Minis ter ie” are both 
necessary for a well-ordered society:
the one with the word, the other with the sword, the one spiritually, 
the other corporally, doe so much further and availe to the publique 
and private good of all, that the two eyes, and the two hands of the 
body naturall and organicall, cannot bee thereto more beneficiall and 
necessarie, then are those two to the state and staie of the body 
politicall and mysticall, and of the life civill and spirituall. (Eburne 
32)
2 Here I use the word (man) specifically. Women were not involved in the law-making process of 
early-modern England.
3 The word “right,” Ames explains, “is derived from the Latine word Jussus, because it implies a 
Power of some Authority, commanding this or that to be done (91),” and is directly linked to law.
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How both impact upon the female legal subject will be discussed in sections IB and 
IC of this chapter. First, however, I will turn to natural law - the law which 
structures all legal discourses of the time because it is seen to be inextricably a part
of all laws.
IA. NATURAL LAW
In Biathanatos, John Donne pens the frustrations he feels when he tries to
define natural law:
this terme the law of Nature is so variously and unconstantly 
deliver’d, as I confesse I read it a hundred times before I understand it
once, or can conclude it to signifie that which the author should at 
that time meane. {Selected 64)
It is true that natural law in either its theological or philosophical forms is hard to pin 
down;4 in jurisprudence, however, natural law is the faculty that shapes human 
understanding of right and wrong. As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, 
it is misleading to argue that natural law exists as a wholly separate jurisprudence. 
What is important is to define natural law and the law of nature within a legalistic 
framework, and point to the ways in which it justifies, and is often justified by, 
divine law and positive law. This is necessary because the term “natural law” and 
the idea that human behaviour is somehow “natural” or “unnatural” often appears in 
early-modern writing about women and the law. It is crucial, therefore, to show how 
natural law exists within the legal practices of divine and positive courts, in order to 
successfully interpret writers’ allusions to it in fictional and non-fictional texts.
4 R. S. White asserts that natural law in the early-modern period is a “plethora of descriptions, hazy 
lines drawn between reason and ‘natural’ passion, dispute over its jurisdiction and applications, and 
even to skepticism about whether it can ever operate in a fallen world (xiii).”
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The difference between natural law and the law of nature could be the source
of much confusion, so it is with this distinction that I will begin, before moving on to 
discuss natural law within divine and positive law paradigms. William Perkins, 
writing in 1597, explained that natural law is “that order which God set in every 
creature by the creation,” whether they are Christian or not {Salve 2). It is, John 
Weemse argued in 1632, “the Law that all men are bound to walke in . . . therefore 
all men shall be judged by it; but with this difference, the Heathen and Pagans shall 
be judged, onely by it, as it is the Law of nature {Exposition 7).” Thus, the 
difference between natural law and the law of nature is that the acceptable social 
mores demanded of Christians are both inherent and specifically defined by the 
Decalogue and Gospels, whereas in a Pagan society, natural law manifests itself as 
an innate, “natural,” instinctive knowledge of right and wrong.5 Simply put, in a 
Christian society such as that of early-modern England, God created nature, thus
natural trends reflect divine will, and nature is therefore beholden to divine law.
However, because natural law also provides an instinctive knowledge of right 
and wrong in all people, and is, as Finch argued in 1627, “that soveraigne reason 
fixed in mans nature, which ministreth common principles of good and evill. .. That 
men must live peaceably together: That we are not to do unto another that which we 
would not have done unto us: That Justice is to be done to all men, and such like (3- 
4),”6 it is inherent in positive law as well. In this context, natural law is the first and 
final source of all laws, systems of justice and comprehension of rights and duties.
5 Because of the close jurisprudential links between natural law and the law of nature, I will refer 
solely to natural law for the remainder of the thesis. In doing so, I adhere to the early-modern 
understanding that, in legal terms, natural law and the law of nature are the same thing - instinctive 
knowledge about right and wrong actions, thoughts, and desires - with different manifestations in 
Christian and Pagan societies.
6 Tubbs argues that “reason underpins common law, and reason is that which is available through 
natural law (111).” See also: Ames 105; Bodin, Six 4; and White 4.
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Natural law, present in both divine and positive law is “[t]he form therfore of 
government which by God . . . was established” using “the instinct of nature, for the 
one; and the supply which was given by the written law, for the other (Bunny, 
Scepter 3).” Constance Jordan explains that “[t]he ability to apprehend natural law 
was . . . deemed innately and intrinsically human, a feature of human nature as it was 
divinely created,” and thus “[p]ositive law was valid only if it did not violate the 
general principles of natural law (and therefore by implication divine law) (65).” 
Richard Capel argued in 1633 that “God can hate nothing but what is against his 
nature and will, and whatever is against his nature and will is sin (11),” and breaches 
divine law. Following these assertions, natural law is an inevitable part of any 
discussion about divine and positive law in Jacobean England; the difference lies in 
whether something is natural because it reflects and adheres to the commandments 
and Gospel, or because it uses reason to access an instinctive knowledge of right and
wrong.
The fact that different courts were set up to deal with these two 
interpretations of natural law implies that early-moderns felt it was necessary to 
police heavenly and earthly duties as separate parts of the same whole - like the 
body which is both “politicall and mysticall” and the life which is both ’‘‘‘civill and 
spirituall.” I will now turn to the courts responsible for divine law, the jurisprudence 
of those courts, and how that jurisprudence affects the female legal subject.
IB. DIVINE LAW
One legal jurisdiction Coke mentions in the list I cite at the beginning of this 
chapter is “ecclesiastical or canon law.” This type of law falls to the responsibility
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of the ecclesiastical courts, which function to ensure that God’s law is obeyed.7 
Divine law governs ecclesiastical and canon law, and, as a legal discourse, has a 
debilitating effect on the female legal subject. As I explained in section I A, 
jurisprudence of the Jacobean period often conflates divine and natural law, because 
“early Church writers would . . . refer to rules of nature which express divine will 
(Bix 225).” Divine law is seen as a form of natural law because when God, 
described as the “great Prince of nature” by Bodin (Six 4), created man (I use the 
term specifically) he “wrote in his heart an eternal Law, the Law of nature; and 
placing man in Paradise, gave him a positive law, the law of Abstinence from the 
tree of good and evill (Eburne l).”8 Legal theory therefore supposes that men are 
naturally aware of divine law requisites. As Thomas Taylor explains in Regula Vitae, 
“[t]he Law in the substance is the expresse idea or representation of the Law of 
nature written in our hearts in the time and state of innocency (21);” it is, he asserts,
the natural manifestation of God’s law.
Divine law9 is imperative. It is “the morall Law of God . . . not fitted that
way to the estate of men; but all men must fit themselves to it (Weemse, Exposition 
3).” People who “resiste the same, resist the ordinance of God, & do set up 
themselves against him (Viret 53 [actually 52]).” The ten commandments and the 
Gospels are the written form of divine law imprinted on man at creation (Elton 1), 
and these must be followed if people are to follow God. In a Christian society, the 
commandments and Christ work in tandem to define divine law, and people’s
7 That people uphold the Sabbath, for example, or do not commit adultery. All the laws commanded 
by the Decalogue, as well as the laws of the Gospel fall under the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical 
courts.
8 This is true for the most part. However, it is important to bear in mind that some “theorists such as 
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Hobbes,” advocated “a secular idea of human nature, including the natural 
desire for self-preservation, rather than divine law (Kahn, “Duty” 243).”
Also known as Royal Law, Christ’s law and Moral Law.
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responsibilities and relationship to it, and the Gospel explains how Christ eased the 
severity of the Decalogue, while still asserting the primacy of Old Testament divine 
law (T. Taylor, Regula 40).10 Although the severity of divine law is mitigated by 
Christ’s death, in order to be good Christians, people must learn God’s law, and 
actively obey it, through what some early-modern theologians describe as choices of 
free will (Veron Aviiv-Aviiir), throughout their lives.11 Thus, while Christ’s death 
softens the law’s condemnatory aspects, it does not nullify the law itself.
Christ’s teachings also introduce the concept of equity,12 a rule closely 
associated with natural law because “that rule of asquitie . . . God hath printed in the 
hart of mankind generally ... by his written word (Bunny, Scepter 2).” To enable 
the proper use of “free will” and equity (that is, to make decisions that would best 
fulfill God’s law), early-modern theorists argue that people are endowed with 
conscience, a tool
10 Perkins, Salve argues that “by the vertue of the death of Christ, it ceaseth to be a plague or
punishment, and of a curse it is made a blessing, and is become unto us a passage or mid-way 
betweene this life and eternall life (5).” Old Testament law is interpreted as a plague or a punishment 
because under it everyone is revealed to be a sinner. It is impossible for people, conceived in sin and 
born in sin, to traverse a lifetime without breaching God’s law. Thus, people labour under a system of 
law which inevitably condemns them, despite their best efforts. Christ, however, fulfilled all the 
demands of the law and died an innocent (in part because he was immaculately conceived and did not 
inherit Original Sin [Clarke and Richards 35-6]); therefore, those who believe in Christ can 
appropriate his righteousness and stand in grace, despite God’s law. However, in order to be a good 
Christian, they must still choose to follow the ten commandments. I, as a non-practising Jew, am 
heavily indebted to Pastor Tim Burns for taking the time to explain how Christ redeems humanity 
from Old Testament law, as well as Cilla Jackson from the University Library Special Collections, for 
putting me in contact with him. For early-modern writing about this process, which so confused me 
in the first place, see: Dawlman 18; Foxe 17‘; Hinde 17; Howesoun A6r; Rogers 42; T. Taylor, 
Regula 3; and Viret 27. .
11 See, for further discussion, Preston A2r. This idea would later become the legal theoiy that defines 
law as a system of coercion in which people must actively choose to give up certain freedoms for the 
good of society - in short that they must exercise free will and agency to bind themselves (see for 
example Foucault, Ethics 59; and Kahn, “Duty” 246-7).
12 Ames explains: “[t]he Roote of Justice and the whole foundation of /Equity ... is comprehended in 
this: Have a care, you doe not that to another, which you would not willingly have done to your selfe 
(105).” See also Eburne 26-32.
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to judge of the goodnes or badnes of things or turnes done ... a parte 
of the minde or understanding in all reasonable creatures: 
determining, judgeing, decerning, and giving sentence of all their 
particular actions, thoughts, words or deedes, eyther with them or 
against them ... a naturall power, facultie, or created qualitie: from 
whence judgement & knowledge doe proceede as effects. (Howesoun 
A7V)
Conscience becomes disturbed when people sin, thus alerting them to breaches of 
the commandments. They can then take the necessary steps to clear their conscience 
before being judged by God after death.13 Gervase Babington explains that people 
know the “greatnesse” of their sin, or illegal transgressions, “by the law of GOD 
rightlie understood, the summe whereof is contained in the ten commandements 
(19). 14 Therefore, although belief in Christ and the use of conscience can help 
people to live in a state of grace, they must still adhere to the commandments in
order to do so.
The commandments taught men (again I use the word specifically) to believe 
that “the Law was . . . hierarchical (Schoeck 220),” because it was handed from God 
first to men’s hearts in Paradise, and later from God through Moses to the people 
(Exod. 19-23). The very process by which these first laws came into being 
“inevitably allude[s] to a social hierarchy that was generally accepted as a reflection 
of the hierarchy of creation, an order in nature or of nature, instituted not fortuitously 
but providentially, and therefore not subject to alteration by human beings (Jordan
13 For further discussion, both early-modern and modern, see Ames 4; A Treasurie of Calechisme, or 
Christian Instruction 5-33; Brinsley A4V; H. Burton 1-2; Howesoun A4V, B6r, C3‘; Preston A3r; 
Rogers 40, 46; Weemse 7; and White 3.
14 See also Cotton, Direct 10.
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21).”15 God gave people law, Viret explains, so that they “shuld enterprise nothing 
of their owne head, in such matter, he himself wold give them a law & rule, by 
whiche he hath shewed them, howe they should rule and governe all their affections, 
and all their wordes, and all their works, to frame them all to his obedience (22).” 
This first imposition of government and social duty (T. Taylor, Regula 230), is an 
important foundation-stone for the hierarchical social theories of early-modern 
England.
Not only the process by which they were handed down, but the
commandments themselves, sustain hierarchical social relations. The fifth
commandment, in particular, “Honour your father and your mother (Exod.20.12),” is 
interpreted in early-modern England to mean “honour those to whom you are 
subordinate.” For women, this interpretation plays an important role in their 
construction as legal subjects under divine law because it was carried through in the 
later writings of St. Paul, which had enormous theological influence. Furthermore, 
because God’s curse on the first woman, Eve, was that her “desire will be for [her] 
husband, / and he will rule over [her] (Gen.3.16),”16 women were considered to be 
hierarchically beneath men, like a child to a parent, divinely commanded to be men’s 
subjects.
Thus, Paul instructs wives to “submit to your husbands as to the Lord. For 
the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his body, of 
which he is the Saviour (Eph.5.22-3),” a metaphor which is picked up by John 
Milton in 1658, in Book 4 of Paradise Lost, when he describes the creation of Adam
and Eve, “He for God only, she for God in him (299),” and later in Book 8, when
15 Original text reads “allude.” For a comprehensive layout of the English social hierarchy see 
Camden, Britannia ccxxxiii-ccl.
16 Original text reads “your” and “you.”
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Adam recognises Eve’s inferior status (540-3), and the Angel Raphael tells Adam 
that Eve “will acknowledge thee her head (574),” if Adam successfully performs his 
role as an hierarchically-superior husband.
Paul’s writings, the influence of which is so evident in the later work of 
Milton, and in many other texts throughout the early-modern period, constructed the 
law as part of the “natural” hierarchy that exists between husband and wife. 
Therefore, if a woman does not accept her subordinate position, or challenges her 
husband’s authority, she “breaches . . . Gods law (M. W. Perkins 30),” and brings 
down on herself “the curse of the law which went with death, namely the 
unspeakable wrath and indignation of God (W. Perkins, Salve 5).” Because “the 
Law is a reveiler of duly, so it is a reveiler of sinne too (T. Taylor, Regula 230),” and 
by not fulfilling her duty to honour her husband (and “honour” often meant “obey” 
in legal practice) the woman finds herself at the centre of familial and social discord. 
Robert Pricke, in The Doctrine of Super iorite, and Subjection, explains:
[t]here was never any disorder and outrage, in any family, Church, or 
Commonwealth, from the beginning of the world to this day, neither 
can be: but it proceeded from the breach of the 5. Commandeme[n]t. 
For how is it possible that there should be any disorder in the family, 
if the wife honour her husband as she ought? (A6r)
The fifth commandment “stressed the rights and duties of station (Schochet 78),” 
and Old Testament divine law falls hard on women because it “presupposes an 
absolute moral order (Kelsen 68),” in which the law exists outside human desires 
and designs, is universally and morally correct, and is therefore unalterable.
Under this jurisprudence, proponents of divine law could argue that “[t]he
least sinne . . . which is a breach of the least law, is worse than the destruction of the
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world (Goodwin C2r),” because the least sin transgresses all that is naturally, morally 
correct, and defies God’s will. In the ecclesiastical courts, whose duty it was to 
uphold divine law, women’s rights suffered under the hierarchical, naturalised and 
divinely ordained fifth commandment, Paul’s writings, and God’s curse that she be 
subject to her husband.
IC. POSITIVE LAW
While the ecclesiastical courts ensure that God’s law is obeyed, the positive 
law courts protect the public good. Positive law is “an Art of wel ordering a Civile 
societie (Finch [1]),” because civil laws protect what is good for the 
commonwealth.17 In section IA, I made a connection between positive laws, natural 
laws, and divine laws. To some early-modern theorists, the difference between these 
laws, not their shared roots, distinguishes them. Ames derides civil law, so 
necessary, others argue, for the maintenance of peace, because,
[t]he imperfection of the best Civill Law consisteth in this.
First, In regard it containes not in its compasse the whole Law
of Nature, but so much of it, onely as such or such men have 
approved and thought appliable to their owne manners.
Secondly, in respect it hath no eye at all upon the inward 
affections, but onely upon the outward Actions; for it doth not 
suppresse absolutely all vices, but those onely, which may seeme 
likely to disturbe the peace and quiet of the Common-wealth, neither 
doth it enjoyne all acts of all vertues, but those onely, which are 
opposite to the inconvenient vices.
17 See, for example, Weemse, Exposition 6.
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Thirdly, In that it doth not principally make good men, but 
onely good Subjects or Citizens.
Fourthly, In that upon occasion it may admit in many things of 
addition, detraction or correction. (106)
Ames implies that the problem with civil law is its amenability to human 
interpretation, and the human biases that lie behind those interpretations. It is 
precisely positive law’s susceptibility to interpretation, however, that makes it more 
open to women as active legal subjects.
Edward Coke outlines the three branches of positive law: “1. the common 
law, which is the most general and ancient law of the realm ... 2. statutes or acts of 
parliament. . and 3. particular customs ... I say particular, for if it be the general 
custom of the realm, it is part of the common law (10).” The positive law courts are 
divided into those which function under common law or the law of particular 
custom,18 and those which hear cases subject to statutes. The courts of equity, 
Chancery and Requests, were positive law courts that used a jurisprudential 
approach based on Christ’s teachings (“do unto others etc.”) to decide cases. These 
courts were most sympathetic to women bringing law suits in the Jacobean period,
and will be discussed further in this section.
The different jurisdictional forms of positive law are exceedingly 
complicated. Richard Eburne wrote in 1616 that “[I]here bee in Ihe common Law 
diverse contrarie Reports and Presidents: and this Corruption doth likewise 
concerne the Statutes and Acts of Parliament, in respect there are diverse Crosse 
and Cutting statutes, and some so penned, as they may be taken in divers, yea,
18 Because the law of particular custom changes from town to town, and divorce and adultery fall 
under the much larger jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts or courts of equity, the law of particular 
custom will not be dealt with in this thesis.
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contrarie senses (41).” Eburne’s argument implies that interpretation, always 
subjective and therefore often “contrarie,” only contributes to labyrinthine legal 
proceedings in the positive law courts.
The two areas I focus on in this thesis, divorce and adultery, are dealt with by 
ecclesiastical courts under divine law, and also in the courts of equity (Chancery and 
Requests) because of overlapping jurisdictions. As such, I will not devote much of 
this section to a discussion on English common law. Suffice to say that common 
law, which “emerged in the twelfth century from the efficient and rapid expansion of 
institutions which existed in an undeveloped form before 1066 (Baker, Introduction 
14),” protects the hierarchy that places wives in subjection to their husbands, and 
therefore does not afford them much legal redress.
Under common law, women become femes coverts, or hidden women, “legal 
nonentities unable to sell, sue, or contract without the approval of their husbands or 
other male relatives (Taub and Schneider 330),”19 because when they
chose to many, they immediately lost all their financial independence 
and were forced . . . into the fold of housewifely. For until the 
Married Women’s Property Act came into effect in 1883, a wife had 
no civil status apart from her husband’s. According to common law, 
her property passed into his hands as soon as they exchanged their 
vows. (Davidson 197)
Husbands, as the divinely ordained and customary heads of the family, have “control 
of the property belonging to that family, including the property of wives (Jordan 4).” 
William Gouge, writing in 1622, explained that
19 See also: Laurence 228.
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a wife might not make a vow without her husbands consent: whence 
it followeth as an argument taken from the greater to the lesse, that 
she may not dispose the goods without his consent. Yea, the Law 
further expresly saith, that though she hath vowed, yet her husband 
hath power to disanull her vow. (294-5)
Because common law “restricts all legal activities to men, a man in the position of 
patriarch has a most efficient means of exercising his prerogative (Jordan 4).” When 
scholars address women’s legal status in early-modern England, they often highlight 
the debilitating effects of common law on women, and how it was gaining in 
popularity (Murray 67), without taking into account the role that the courts of equity 
played in undermining static common law tenets.
Equity, as I pointed out in section IB of this chapter, is founded in Christ’s 
teachings (specifically, “do unto others as you would have done unto you”),20 and as 
a legal concept it influenced the courts of Chancery and Requests in ways which 
were very important to the female legal subject. Nicholas Breton pointed out in 
1606 that if a judge rules equitably, “God in imitating his course of justice, will 
surely regard and reward” him (D2r). Eburne, published in 1616, explained that
this principall and notable Ground of humane lawes, that Royal Law 
propounded unto us, and enacted for us by Christ himselfe, to open a 
way to vertuous and godly mindes, how to examine their actions, and 
conforme their lives some-what answerable to that integritie which 
the lawes both of God and Nature, doe require at their hands (2);
and further described equity as:
20 Schoeck also points to Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea, Book V, as a source of equity in the early- 
modern period (226). Most often, though, early-modern authors support theories of equity with 
theology not philosophy.
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[tjhis Law of Christ, is a president or patterne, by & according to 
which the lawes of men ought to be formed & made . . . according to 
this patterne, their lawes ought to be briefe and plainc, necessarie and 
equall . . . they must be equall and indifferent. And this as well in 
respect of the persons, indifferent to all, not easing some and grieving 
others. (33-4)
The mandate that equity treat all people as “equall and indifferent,” and not work to 
remedy some people’s problems and not others, opens the door to suits brought by 
those who may otherwise have been without legal redress under the more strict 
jurisprudence of divine and common law.
Thus, like the teachings of Christ which soften divine law, “there were 
popular views that equity mitigated the rigour of the law, and that Chancery was a 
‘court of conscience (Schoeck 226),”’ simply because, as Ames explains: “[ljegall 
Justice taken strictly, considereth the words just as they are written, but Equity 
considereth the End, scope and intent of the Law, and so hath more in it, then Legall 
Justice, when taken strictly (111).”21 The tensions produced by a jurisprudential 
conflict between the written law and the interpretations of that law is best illustrated 
in the literary world by Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, in which Angelo 
accepts written law as the final word on case resolution (II.ii.82), whereas the Duke 
softens that law using equitable judgment (V.i.392-532).
This “court of conscience,” Chancery, and the “poor man’s Chancery,” 
Requests, were often frequented by women (Stretton, Women 7). Overlapping 
jurisdictions meant that divorce and adultery cases which would normally belong in 
the realm of the ecclesiastical courts could be heard at Chancery and Requests. By
21 Kahn adds passion to the conscience in her examination of Milton’s Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce and newly-emerging ideas about equity in 1644 (“Duty” 252).
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1559, “the fact that the secular state was taking responsibility for matrimonial and 
other matters once the preserve of the church, and treating them as it did any other 
legal problem (Harding 162),” was due to competing court systems which shared the 
same locale (Baker, Introduction 148).22 Because Chancery and Requests worked 
on the premise that laws must be equal and indifferent to all people, they were places 
where women were more likely to have coverture excepted (Stretton, Women 26), 
and could therefore potentially bring suits.
The jurisprudence underlying the proceedings in these courts provides “a 
system ideally suited to the poor and to women because they could come directly 
and freely to the Court of Chancery, whereas common law was prohibitively 
expensive, lengthy, rigid, and obscure (White 47),” and divine law courts offered 
them little redress whatsoever. Because “the doctrine of equity of the statute serves 
in the sixteenth century as a justification for avoiding a rigid, literal statutory 
interpretation (Tubbs 127-8),” women were able to take legal advantage of the 
flexibility this less rigid form of jurisprudence offered.
ID. CONCLUSION: WOMEN IN SHIFTING JURISPRUDENCES
The jurisprudence of equity was a source of relief for women who suffered 
under divine law and the positive law of custom: the “[arguments based on either 
God’s command or on society’s conventions [that] appeal to authority - the former 
the authority of a higher power, the latter the authority of the society expressed in a 
collective judgment (Fletcher 143. My addition).” Under these forms of authority, 
the legal constraints on women were multitudinous: “wives, daughters, and female
22 By the end of the fifteenth century, for example, “the King’s Bench was receiving a stream of 
actions brought on the Statute of Winchester against parties who had sued in ecclesiastical courts 
concerning matters which overlapped the jurisdictional boundaries (Baker, Introduction 151).” This 
problem was only exacerbated in the sixteenth century by the Reformation.
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servants [were] . . . under a double set of obligations, those required by positive law 
and those derived from divine and natural law (Jordan 4. My addition).” The courts 
of Chancery and Requests, however, would, and did, hear suits brought by women.
The tension between systems of law which, on the one hand, presuppose a 
divine or customary authority and, on the other, attempt to define social actions 
within the boundaries of equity, is at the heart of the female legal subject in the 
Jacobean period. As Thorne admits, “both subsisted side by side, incompatible and 
essentially irreconcilable, waiting, in the case of one [custom], further emancipation 
from tradition, or in the case of parliament, a resolution dictated by the turn of future 
events (10. My addition).” Equity gave women a better chance to enter the legal 
arena, thus redefining the female legal subject by allowing her to become someone 
who was not invisible or covered, but very much in the legal foreground. The way in 
which the female subject vacillates between a jurisprudence that denies her all rights 
under divine law and laws of custom, and one that tries to deliver justice through 
indifference and equity is often the focus of dramatic and literary representations, 
because the implication is that neither system of law adequately reflects social 
values. The existence of these seemingly contrary systems implies a period of 
transition between the traditional jurisprudence of divine and common law, and the 
newer jurisprudence of legal humanism, evident in equity and the use of precedent.
Women, like men, were caught in this period of transition, of overlapping 
jurisdictions and contrary values. For women, unlike men, the transition is fraught 
with the tension of having no legal rights under one system, and being able to access 
the law to protect themselves and their property under the other. Neither system of 
law defines the female subject completely; women were controlled by and exposed
23 A jurisprudence which tries to place the litigator in his or her historical and active contexts through 
the use of precedent.
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to both systems of law. As such, their lived experience as legal subjects cannot be 
confined within binary terms either of prohibitive laws or more equitable laws, since 
they were under the command of both.
The next section of this chapter is an historical examination of how women 
were interacting with the law, and the law with women, by the time of James I. I 
have chosen to frame this section with Sir John Dodderidge’s Lawes Resolutions of 
Womens Rights because it is an important early work devoted to women’s legal 
rights in England. The fact that it was published at all, and the questions raised by 
the existence of such a text, only highlights the jurisprudential tensions surrounding
Jacobean women.
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II. CONSTRUCTING THE JACOBEAN FEMALE LEGAL SUBJECT
As I explained in the Introduction to this thesis, feminist jurisprudence, in 
conjunction with a cultural criticism of the law, unravels assumptions about the 
absent, invisible and silent female legal subject in the Jacobean period. Lisa Jardine 
notes: “[i]t is one thing to suggest that, textually, female figures are deprived of the 
power and authority to control the interpretation and evaluation of their actions ... it 
is quite another to continue to sustain the traditional historical view that the lived 
experience of women down through history has been as objects (“Why” 19-20).” 
The methodology of feminist jurisprudence considers how legal norms are 
constructed by theology and ideology, and how the English legal system has 
“operated directly and explicitly to prevent women from attaining self-support and 
influence in the public sphere, thereby reinforcing their dependence on men (Taub 
and Schneider 334),” and keeping them firmly within the home.
Feminist jurisprudence argues that the absence of law in the private sphere 
implies that “women simply are not sufficiently important to merit regulation (Taub 
and Schneider 333).” By challenging the notion that “the requirements of 
universality (applying to everyone) and generality (prevailing all the time) ... are 
essential attributes of well-formed laws (Fletcher 31),” feminist jurisprudence attacks 
the seeming ineluctability of a legal system that consolidates “[mjale control in the 
public sphere . . . explicitly by legal means (Taub and Schneider 329).” The ways in 
which law is denied to women through culturally-constructed norms is one of the 
subjects feminist jurisprudence attempts to redress, by attacking present-day legal 
practice, or, as in the case of this thesis, by claiming a place for women in legal 
history. Questioning the ways in which laws are created, how they are controlled by 
courtroom interpretations and how all these factors are affected by sexism (or, in the
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case of early-modern society, a divinely-ordained natural hierarchy), feminist 
jurisprudence attempts to expose and subvert the assumptions which lie behind legal
double-standards.
Inevitably, such an approach raises questions as to whether the female legal 
norm is acceptable, or even accepted, in a multi-faceted society; whether it 
adequately reflects the values of that society, or if the literary representations of 
women and the law I discuss in Chapters Two and Three imply that the definition of 
the ideal female legal subject falls short of social expectations and experience. In 
order to cany out this task effectively, in this section I will discuss the experiences 
women had at law - how the systemic manifestations of the legal theories discussed 
in section one of this chapter affected Jacobean women in practice, thus situating the 
female legal subject within her historical context.
IIA. AUTHORITY, POWER AND WOMEN’S LEGAL POSITION: THE CASES OF LADY 
ALLAN AND SARA GOUGH
Jacobean legal theories were shown in section one of this chapter to be based, 
with the exception of theories of equity, on a divinely ordained or natural human 
condition. To transgress laws based on these theories transgresses God or nature, 
and the legal discourse is therefore highly effective for controlling human behaviour. 
Adding to this, R. S. White explains that “the tradition of Natural law . . . was fairly 
implacably patriarchal, and all the commentators in both their language and their 
narratives tacitly assume its operation to be an exclusively male domain (xv).”24 
Natural law, present in both divine and positive law discourses, “was invoked to 
justify male supremacy and racial domination (White 6),” and as a consequence, “far
24 This could certainly be because nature’s creator, God, has traditionally been described in masculine 
terms. In the Old Testament, “images used to depict God are overwhelmingly masculine: God is the 
King, the Judge, the Shepherd, the Warrior (Clarke and Richards 27).”
54
from biology dictating social patterns, it is the social order that gives significance to 
biology (Sachs and Wilson 10).” Arguments that the female legal subject should be 
treated differently to the male have the power of divine, natural and common law
theories on their side.
The rights and duties of women is a popular topic in writing of the time, 
because these legal rights and duties, if performed, sustain the status quo. Constance 
Jordan, commenting on the conduct books which outline appropriate behaviour for
men and women alike, notes that
throughout all these works ... is a pervasive concern with questions 
of authority and subordination, that is, with the origins of the control 
of man over woman and its expression in prelapsarian history, and 
with the rights of the woman who is subject to the male superior . . . 
this authority is most often realized in situations that involve the 
administration of law and the possession of property. (3)
The premise for women’s legal position is quite simple: because woman (Eve) was 
not able to adhere to the first law (“don’t eat the apple!”) she proved that women, as 
a group, are inherently incapable of following mandates and managing legal affairs; 
because of this, they have no legal rights, and are denied the power and authority 
law-making entails and works to protect.
John Dodderidge’s The Lawes Resolutions of Womens Rights makes this 
clear in its third section, entitled The Punishment of Adams Sinne. Dodderidge 
writes that after “eating the forbidden fruit: for which Adam, Eve, the serpent first, 
and lastly, the earth it selfe is cursed,” woman’s “desires shall bee subject to [her] 
husband, and he shall rule over'" her (6).25 This is, he explains,
25 Original text reads “thy.” All Lawes Resolutions quotes are from the 1632 edition.
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the reason . . . that Women have no voyce in Parliament, They make 
no Lawes, they consent to none, they abrogate none. All of them are
understood either married or to bee married and their desires or
subject to their husband, I know no remedy though some women can 
shift it well enough. (6)
Those who can “shift it” are presumably the women I discuss later in this chapter, 
who were able to go to law.
The hierarchical placement of women below their husbands is of the utmost 
importance in the construction of the Jacobean female legal subject, because law 
worked as a doctrine of power that extended itself over women’s bodies making a 
wife’s possessions, including her self, her husband’s property in order to sustain the 
hierarchy. This approach is justified by divine law discourse because woman 
“sinned first, therefore she is humbled most; and ever since, the daughters of Sarah 
are bound to call their husbands Lord ... to take them for heads and governours 
(Dod and Cleaver, Godly P3V).” Early-modern theorists argue that “silence is the 
best Ornament of a woman and therefore the Law was given to the man rather than 
to the woman, to shew that he should be the teacher, and she the hearer (Dod and 
Cleaver, Godly G4V).” Donald Black, extrapolating on the hierarchy that still exists 
in modern legal systems, explains that “upward deviance is more serious than 
downward deviance ... At every stage, in every legal setting, a downward case is 
stronger than an upward case (22-3).” This means that the social hierarchy 
inevitably impacts on legal cases: poor people will be less successful at law against 
rich people; children will be less successful against adults; and women will be less 
successful against men.
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The hierarchically-disadvantaged woman of the early-modern era fell under a 
strictly coded social and legal system. She erred more if she dishonoured her 
husband than he did if he wronged her, and she was less successful at law against 
him. As the anonymous Ste. B. tells wives in his Counsel to the Husband, “if 
women will bring their case to the Law of Gods word (which either must rule them 
here, or else will rule and judge them, most fearefully elsewhere) they shall finde, 
first the man to have the prerogative (56).” Clearly, early-modern legal practice 
disadvantaged wives and gave husbands significant power.
The legal manifestations of the hierarchy goes so far as to enable the husband 
to define his wife’s public persona in terms of her being a “good wife,” if she fulfils 
what is required of her by law in her relationship to him, or a “bad wife,” if she 
disregards his authority. The legal prerogative held by husbands, founded in theories 
of divine law, natural law, and, for the most part, although I do refer to some 
exceptions in this section, common law, cannot be underestimated. A decision 
pronounced 21 June, 1632 in the highest ecclesiastical court, the Court of High 
Commission, bearing on the Lady Allen, shows to what practical legal extent a 
husband could influence his wife’s subjectivity. In the trial, brought by Lady Allen’s 
husband because she had failed to respect his authority in matters pertaining to her 
leaving the home,
it was said by Sr Henry Martin, that if a husband commaund his wife 
not to goe to such a man’s house, and yet she will goe and doeth; that 
she is to be thought a whore; that the will of the husband soe declared 
is sufficient to cause her to stay away and forbeare such an house or 
place. (Gardiner 310)
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The way in which Lady Allen moves from the position of wife to whore with a 
courtroom decision illustrates how ecclesiastical courts upheld a husband’s authority 
to a wife’s extreme disadvantage.
Political theory has no small part to play in a husband’s superiority. Jean 
Bodin argues in his Six Bookes of the Commonweale, that respect for different forms 
of power - in this specific case, the power structure in the private sphere - is 
essential to a well-ordered realm, and laws in the public sphere condemn those who 
do not defer to private authority. He explains that
[t]he power privat, consisteth either in the heads of families, or in 
corporations, or colledges, where all by a generall consent, or the 
greater part, commaundeth over the rest. But the domesticall power is 
of foure sorts: Fzz. The power of the Husband over his Wife, the 
power of the Father over his children, the power of the Lord over his 
slaves, and the power of the head of a Familie over his mercenarie 
servants. And for as much as the right and lawfull government of 
everie Commonweale . . . and Familie dependeth of the due 
knowledge of commaunding and obeying; let us now speake of every 
part of commaunding in such order as is by us before set downe. {Six 
14)
He goes on to argue that regardless of “what change or varietie of lawes soever in 
such diversitie of Commonweals, there was never law or custome that exempted the 
wife from the obeysance, and not onely from the obeysance, but also from the 
reverence that shee oweth unto her husband (19).” Bodin’s work echoes the 
jurisprudential influence of Paul’s writings and the fifth commandment. As I argued 
in section IB, the fifth commandment went a long way to denying women legal
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rights under ecclesiastical law, and, as the decision in the Lady Allen’s case 
illustrates, women could be forced by legal means to assume their place in the 
hierarchy.
The female legal subject in the early-modern period is thus defined through 
her relationship and duties to the men who wield legal power over her: first her 
father, and later her husband. While the case of the Lady Allen is an extreme 
example of how ecclesiastical law could impact on a woman’s public persona, the 
quitclaim of Sara Gough shows how a woman is affected by marriage under common 
law - how she, as a legal subject, is refracted through her role as a wife. The 
document, dated 1610, is a one page quitclaim settling a dispute over a debt between 
Zachary Dow, a London draper, and Sara Gough. Sara is the “late wife and 
Administrator of all and Singular Goods Chattells Rights and Debts which late were 
of Edwyn Babington (Dow),” her deceased husband. Zachary Dow had borrowed a 
sum of money from Babington before his death, a sum which Sara “by vertue and 
force of the Administration aforesaid, made clayme as her right, to the said wryting 
in the nature of a Receipt, and to the somme of money mentioned in the same.” 
Sara’s claim fell through, the quitclaim being exactly that, because of “the invalidity 
of the said writing,” and she and her new husband, John Gough dropped the suit 
against Dow. The legal document is signed by both Sara and her new husband.
On the face of it, this is a fairly mundane form registered to settle a financial 
dispute. In terms of the female legal subject, however, the textual evidence in this 
document displays the effects of marriage on women’s legal agency. Sara Gough is 
the undisputed administratrix of her late husband’s property when she makes the 
initial claim “as her right.” She is a property-managing widow, and under such 
circumstances the legal system regards her as an autonomous subject. She does not
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need a husband to register her initial claim. With her new marriage, however, she 
again becomes a feme covert and falls under an husband’s legal auspices. She is no 
longer Sara Babington, making a legal claim for an amount of money she believes 
rightfully belongs to her, but the second signatory, “Sara wife of the said John 
Gough.” Although her name appears on the legal document, it is from the subjective 
position of wife, now the former administratrix of her late husband’s goods; her right 
to deal solely with his property annulled by her remarriage; and her identity shifts
from administrator to wife.
The examples of Lady Allan and Sara Gough illustrate how easily a woman’s 
subjective position could change under a system of law that disables the wife by 
supporting hierarchical social roles. In both these cases, the female subject is at the 
mercy of legal dictates. However, not everyone accepted the role assigned to them 
by divinely-influenced legal doctrine. The London preacher, William Gouge, attests 
that “much exception was taken” to his preaching that “the common goods of a 
marriage were wholly at the husband’s disposal, and to what had been said . . . about 
the ‘particular duties’ of wives” in one of his sermons (Collinson 71). In these 
moments of dissent, the social tensions surrounding the construction of the female 
subject defined at law become apparent. Some women, Gouge’s statement implies, 
did not internalise the doctrines forced upon them. It is perhaps these types of 
women who contributed (despite a hostile legal and social environment) to the 
growing female litigation in the Jacobean period, to which I will now turn.
IIB. THE LAWES RESOLUTIONS OF WOMENS RIGHTS: WOMEN IN THE ENGLISH 
COURTS
Despite the bleak situation for women under ecclesiastical and common law, 
tensions between power, authority and equity gave some members of the legal
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profession the leeway to consider women as legally active, rather than passive. 
Comensoli explains that “[c]ritical theoiy and practice that takes woman as a central 
category has often disempowered women by representing them merely as victims of 
patriarchal law (25).” Because of this, “[t]he woman-as-victim paradigm has ignored 
oppositional discourses and the numerous historical instances of feminine denial and 
transgression (25).” In order to gain a more complete picture of the female legal 
subject in Jacobean England, these instances of denial must be considered in their 
larger jurisprudential framework, because bringing these women to light works to 
frame the real and represented women I analyse in Chapters Two and Three.
Here I will return to The Lawes Resolutions of Womens Rights, the positive 
law of Jacobean England, and how law was being transformed through two forces: 
antiquarianism and Protestantism. A straight reading of early-modern divine, natural 
and positive law theories set out in section one would suggest that Jacobean women 
have no legal rights whatsoever: that unmarried women, as the legal wards of their 
male guardians have no recourse to the law; that married women are “one Person in 
law” with their husbands (Coke K2r), and are “disabled to sue without [their] 
husband (Coke K3r);”26 and that a widow has legal rights only if she is lucky enough 
to have been predeceased by a husband who, during his lifetime, granted her his 
tenements to hold in fee simple after his death (Coke K2r).
However, if it is true that women had no legal power or rights, then why did 
Sir John Dodderidge, one of the judges appointed to the Court of King’s Bench in 
1618 - described by his contemporaries as “timid and nervous,” as well as a man 
whose “cowardice was veiy great (C. Johnson 59)” - write a book entitled The 
Lawes Resolutions of Womens Rights: or, the Lawes Provision for Woemen? The
26 Original text reads “her.”
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text “remained in print for at least a quarter-century after its first publication (Prest 
83),”27 and was obviously both popular with buyers and lucrative for its printers.
Dodderidge’s work is evidence that the relationship between women and law 
was shifting. I will return to it often throughout my thesis, because, as a legal source 
on women, it offers significant insights into the machinations of Jacobean law and
sets out what women’s rights were at the time. No full new edition of this work is as 
yet available, leaving researchers only the 1632 black-letter edition to work from. 
Small excerpts of the work have been published in anthologies and sourcebooks,28 
but none engage with it as extensively as is required for the purposes of this thesis.29 
Extracts of the work, pertinent to the areas of law I will be covering in Chapters Two 
and Three, are transcribed and appear as the Appendix to this thesis.
Dodderidge writes that his book is a response to the legal double-standard 
that exists between men and women,
of which division because the part that wee say hath least judgement 
and discretion to bee a Law unto it selfe, {Women onely Women} then 
have nothing to do in constituting Lawes, or consenting to them, in 
interpreting of Lawes, or in hearing them interpreted at lectures, leets 
or charges, and yet they stand strictly tyed to mens establishments, 
little or nothing excused by ignorance, mee thinkes it were pitty and
27 Prest attributes the work to Thomas Edgar (180). The confusion may arise because there are two 
potential authors of the work - the first is the author of the preface, who signs himself T. E., the other 
is the author of the main body of the work, edited by the author of the preface, and the main section 
has been attributed to Dodderidge.
28 See: Aughterson 152-157; and Klein 31-61.
29 Extant writing, which does not sufficiently examine, or transcribe to the length required for this 
thesis, on The Lawes Resolutions, is by: Gowing, “Language” 26, in which she makes brief reference 
to the introduction; Henderson and McManus 72 and 79, make fleeting reference to the early part of 
the work; W. Johnson published a facsimile of the 1632 edition; Maclean, Renaissance 72, 77 and 80, 
has a sentence referring to it; J. Sharpe, “Women” 121, where it is referenced in the footnotes; 
Shepherd 33, references it in two paragraphs; Stretton, “Women,” where it is referenced in the 
footnotes; and Wheeler 81, who notes that it was published posthumously.
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impiety any longer to hold them from such Customes, Lawes, and 
Statutes, as are in a maner, proper, or principally belonging unto 
them. (2)30
Extant criticism as to the purpose of the text is divided. Although Dodderidge writes 
he will “handle that part of the English Lawe, which containeth the immunities, 
advantages, interests, and duties of women, not regarding so much to satisfie the 
deep learned or searchers for subtility, as woman kind, to whom I am a thankfull 
debter by nature (3),” Tim Stretton argues that with its technical terminology in 
Latin and legal French and its references to obscure cases and treatises, the book 
“seems to have been aimed more at lawyers than at women themselves (Women 
47).” But this raises an interesting question: if women were legal non-subjects, why 
would English lawyers in the early seventeenth century need a handbook on
women’s law cases?
The other side of the argument, articulated by Ian Maclean, interprets the 
running title of the book, “[t]he woman’s lawier,” as a reference to the book itself. 
This side argues that the book “is a manual intended for the use of women 
(Renaissance 80).” Again, the question is raised as to why women, unentitled to 
legal recourse, would need a self-help legal manual. In order to answer these 
questions I will place “timid” Dodderidge’s book in the context of two trends 
affecting English lawyers, judges, and hence jurisprudence: antiquarianism and 
Protestantism. In doing so, I will shed light on how it was possible for women to 
actively enter the public sphere of the courtroom, and how Dodderidge’s book was 
a timely contribution to the changing court practices. As Louis Knafla argues,
30 Some other writers argue that women should appreciate their legal position. Capel argues that legal 
disempowerment should be seen as a blessing to women, because “they serve not in Juries grand or 
petty, they are not brought in Courts, to take oathes in Homages and the like; they serve not the office 
of Church-wardens, and so are not sworne and deposed any thing so often as men (282).”
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[a]lthough most English historians have ignored any serious 
consideration of the legal humanists of the Continent, the 
Englishmen of the sixteenth century did not. Young Elizabethan 
scholars such as . . . John Dodderidge, knowledgeable in the 
philological, legal, and historical studies of Continental jurists, began 
to apply that expertise to an examination of the origins and 
development of their own native laws and institutions. (69)
It is partly in the early influence of Continental jurisprudence, then, that the seeds of 
English legal reform are lain.
Paradoxically, it was thus that a French lawyer pointed the English in the 
direction of their own history. In 1561 Francois Baudouin, celebrated judge, 
lawyer, and historian of the French court, wrote that “[historical studies must be 
placed on a solid foundation of law, and jurisprudence must be joined to history 
(Kelley, Foundations 117).” Donald Kelley, in 1970, pointed out that “this formula 
not only expressed the basic doctrine of the historical school of law, it forecast the 
future trend of legal humanism {Foundations 117),” in which interpretation based 
on precedent is an important defining factor.31 The study of Continental 
jurisprudence by “young Elizabethan scholars” led to reforms in the Inns of Court 
“in early Tudor England [towards a] more pure knowledge, humanist, approach 
(Knafla 7).”32 The legal system thus began to undergo changes based in part on 
Continental jurisprudence, so that by 1602, “precedent, a word which appears first
31 Barbara Shapiro argues that legal humanism on the Continent spurred the humanist movement 
itself, because
[t]he association of law and history with rhetoric ... was reaffirmed with the revival 
of classical studies . . . [ijndeed, it was the lawyers and notaries, whose professional 
work linked them with the Roman past, who took the lead in reviving and 
developing humanist studies. (163)
32 Original text reads “to.”
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in 1557, was becoming a small but recognizable part of judicial technique (Thorne 
22).” What makes Continental legal humanism so important for the English female 
legal subject is specifically the introduction of precedent to legal procedure. *
Significantly, Baudouin employed his historical theory to justify the rule of 
Catherine de Medici by using the ancient Roman law of France at the same time 
that Lord Burghley was casting around for ideologies to justify Elizabeth I’s reign 
and legitimise the Church of England (Trevor-Roper 123). Burghley was
concerned that
the rule of Elizabeth . . . must appear as the natural, organic 
continuation of a robust, uncontested, ancient monarchy. Equally, the 
Elizabethan Church must not appear as a whimsical and heretical 
innovation, an ephemeral political compromise, doomed to founder in 
the stress of ideological war: it must appear as the true and legitimate 
continuation of that first Christian Church which had been planted in
■ I
England centuries before the upstart Bishop of Rome had taken it over 
and corrupted its purity. (Trevor-Roper 123)
Following the successful example set by France, Burghley wanted England, too, to 
look to the past. To further his end, he commissioned William Camden, who was the 
Headmaster at Westminster School from 1593 and an Oxford antiquarian, to produce 
Britannia, a comprehensive history of the British Isles, which would provide the 
historical precedents he sought (Trevor-Roper 123).
In terms of the legal status of women (and, in part, the successful reign of 
Queen Elizabeth I), the antiquity movement introduced two crucial concepts: firstly, 
it argued that women had been allowed to own property in Anglo Saxon times and 
thus provided a case for female inheritance (Camden, Britannia 1: xiii); secondly,
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linking law to history authorised the power of precedent. Thus, if it is accepted that 
women do have legal rights (and antiquarian studies argue that they do), and women 
choose to exercise those rights (as they did in increasing numbers between the time of 
Elizabeth I and James I), they in turn create new precedents involving women. As 
judicial practices accepted the legal power of precedent, and more cases were taken 
up by women, it would have become easier for women to enter the courtroom or 
solicitor’s office. This meant “that by the early seventeenth century women had 
evidently become a significant minority among the suitors transacting business before 
the superior central courts, particularly but not exclusively those conciliar or equitable 
jurisdictions which used English-bill rather than Latin writ procedures (Prest 182).” 
Antiquarianism’s introduction of precedent thus provided the loophole througli which 
women could slip and re-emerge as legally viable subjects.
Although the law still statutorily impeded women’s recourse to litigation, a 
growing number of precedent cases were developing in which women were suing and 
being awarded their suit. Part of the reason for women’s success was the heated 
discussion about law reform “in the second session of 1605 (Knafla 78).” The 
argument centred around questions of equity, particularly whether or not magistrates 
had the right to interpret statutes as to their intention, rather than follow their exact 
wording (Knafla 80). The debate implies that pure theories of law such as those 
described in sections IA and IB were giving way to the more humanist approaches 
which allowed for precedent and equity. Furthermore, if a magistrate has the power 
to interpret statutes, the theoretical foundations of divine, natural and common law 
become destabilised - suddenly law is not law because it is universal, general and 
morally correct, but because it is also recognised to be a mandate of power that is in 
flux with the needs and priorities of the culture that uses it. During and after the reign
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of Elizabeth I, that culture included women who had a potential right to legal agency, 
because the statutes and even common law were beginning to be amenable to 
interpretation. When that interpretation was coupled with theories of equity, 
women’s right to bring cases to the courts became even more acceptable.
Like antiquarianism, Protestantism also augmented a change in perception 
about women’s legal rights because it, too, encouraged the search for native
• 'I'X • • •traditions. As I set out in section one, in any system of law based on a pure theory 
such as divine ordination, “[rjeligious values, directly or through the conduit of 
moral sensibility, obviously influence legal traditions (Dane 113).” Because law and 
religion are so tightly interwoven in early-modern England they interact with each 
other and with society in ways that are often seen as natural. This naturalisation 
occurs when preaching from the pulpit justifies a law governing appropriate female 
behaviour, and when society, including women, colludes with the law and religion, 
accepting that legal controls are right, justified, and natural, because they are part of 
God’s will. Religious works written “about women, marriage, and family life attest 
not only to how men publicly regarded women, but also to how women were taught 
to think about themselves (Comensoli 22).”33 4 Thus, the shifts in religious doctrine 
that were brought on by the Reformation affected religious writing, the laws which 
were closely tied to religious theoiy, and women’s own perceptions of their identity 
and legal ability.
33 As Burghley’s use of antiquarianism to justify Protestantism illustrates.
34 Foucault calls this process coercion - a power-relation entered into by subjects when they surrender 
a part of themselves or their power for the good of society as a whole. However, as with socialisation, 
which often occurs at an unconscious level, he rightly argues that in order to understand power 
relations, “one would need to inquire how relations of subjectivication can manufacture subjects 
{Ethics 59)” Although in the latter statement he is introducing a discussion on war, the same question 
applies to micro-relationships as well - the subjectivication not of nations, but of individuals.
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I will not argue that Protestantism effected a sweeping change in the status of 
women. This minefield has been well-planted by theorists on both sides of the 
debate.35 However, Protestant writing that outlines woman’s social role and rights is 
a rich source of information about the female subject, regardless of the debate that 
presently surrounds it. Companionate marriage endorsed by Protestantism, described 
by Lisa Jardine as “the reformed Church’s contribution to progressive household 
management (“Companionate” 234),” could have been a factor affecting the status of 
the Jacobean female legal subject, as it filtered from religious doctrine into courtroom
decisions.
A Godly Forme of Householde Government, 1612, is a Protestant treatise 
written by John Dod and Robert Cleaver. Instead of a construction in which the 
husband is the indisputable head of the family and the woman naturally fulfills her 
submissive, subservient role, Dod and Cleaver represent the wife as a potentially 
active agent. Although the father is the “helping hands to Magistrates and Ministers 
(A4r),” thus firmly situated outside the domestic sphere, implying that the wife still 
remains inside it, we also see in Dod and Cleaver’s piece references to the wife as the 
“fellow helper (D5V)” of the husband; the family is “a little Commonwealth (A7r)” in 
which “the wife is like a Judge, which is joyned in commission with her husband to 
correct (01v),” and she therefore holds authority, even potential power, in the home.
Dod and Cleaver’s outline of a good Protestant family, as opposed to one of
“Papists, atheists, Turks and infidels (A4r),” implies a shifting perception of women’s
role in the home. They argue that “there are two sorts in every perfect familie. 1.
The governours. 2. Those that must be ruled (A8r).” Unconventionally, Dod and
Cleaver cite both mother and father, mistress and master, as the governors of the
35 See, for example: Collinson 63, and Schochet 71 as examples of arguments for this trend, and 
Jardine, Still 49, 58; and Laurence 196 for some arguments against it.
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household (A8' v), flying in the face of more traditional doctrine which endows only 
the husband with domestic authority. They submit that a wife “is a free Citizen in 
[the husband’s] house (O2r),”36 and they even suggest that women have the right to 
usurp their husband’s power and run the family if they deem him unfit to fulfill the 
duties of a good Protestant parent (F3r). ,
The position of the wife in Dod and Cleaver’s work is less that of a chattel and 
/ or possession and more of a person. Specifically, more of a person with rights and 
some power, because she is the axis upon which the state of the household turns. If a 
husband keeps his wife happy, and treats her in a way that will cause her to love him, 
his household will run smoothly; conversely, “the husband that is not beloved of his 
wife, holdeth his goods in danger, his house in suspition, his credite in ballance, and 
also sometimes his life in perill (L3r).” Dod and Cleaver still point out that “silence is 
the best Ornament of a woman (G4r),” and they admit that the patriarch has the right 
to abuse his family as he sees fit to maintain domestic order (D5V). Despite this, their 
work implies a strong role for women within the home, and potentially, the public 
sphere as well, if she chooses to unseat her husband for his lack of Protestant piety. 
More importantly, the dichotomous subject they describe, the meek and silent wife 
who usurps authority, reflects the tensions existing outside the work - the women in 
church who took exception to Gouge’s sermon about their social duties, discussed in 
section IA of this chapter, and the legal non-subjects who went to law despite their
covert status.
Antiquarianism and Protestantism allow women’s position in the traditional 
legal hierarchy to shift, and could very well have contributed to increasing female 
litigation of the time. Recent historical scholarship shows that cases in the Court of
36 Original text reads “thine.”
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Chancery involving women rose from 25% in Elizabeth’s reign, “to 40% during the 
reign of James I. The proportion of women plaintiffs commencing suits (on their own 
or with others) rose over this period from 17% of cases during Elizabeth’s reign to 
almost 26% during the period 1615-1715,” and “in the Court of Requests numbers 
rose from 12.4% during Elizabeth’s reign to 18% of litigants in 1624 (Stretton, 
Women 39-40).” The only exception to this rise in female litigation was by widows 
in the Court of King’s Bench and the Court of Common Pleas, where “in 1603 the 
figure was 6 per cent, [but] by 1624 it had fallen to 4.5 per cent (Stretton, Women 40. 
My addition).” Viewed overall, however, the evidence shows that the numbers of 
women taking part in litigation were rising rapidly in the Jacobean period.37
Part of this rise in numbers is due to the fact that, contrary to popular 
perception, “in the eyes of the law, single women and widows had full legal capacity 
(Stretton, Women 101);” it was only the married femes coverts who were statutorily 
denied access to the courts. However, exceptions could be made to this rule of law as
well. If a woman’s husband had been banished, or if she were deemed abandoned, 
she could plead on her own behalf (Coke K3r). Stretton points out that although “the 
legal system was certainly hostile in the sense that the crown, judiciary and 
parliament each accorded women fewer rights than men . . . these bodies never denied 
women rights altogether, and female litigants went to court in their thousands 
(Women 216).” Furthermore, the fact that women were using the law at all 
undermines the promulgated hierarchies to which they were expected to adhere, and 
in which they were constructed as being “naturally” submissive to the systems of 
authority that governed them.
37 Literary representations reflect the growing numbers of women going to law: “female characters at 
the mercy of the law were joined for the first time by those who used the law, women who accused 
others not just answered accusations themselves. In short, Jacobean dramatists presented women not 
only as victims, but as customers, of the legal system (Stretton, Women 58).”
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It was during this vigorous trend of female litigation that The Lawes 
Resolutions of Womens Rights appeared in published form. As a text which sets out 
the public perception of Jacobean women and law, it is invaluable to our 
understanding of women’s role in legal society, regardless of whether the book was 
used by women themselves, or the lawyers who represented them. That such a book 
was written by Sir John Dodderidge, a judge more likely to leave his brother judges to 
bear the brunt of the battle, while he slunk over into the ranks of the courtiers, than to 
propose radical, sweeping reform (C. Johnson 59), shows the extent to which 
women’s interaction with the law was becoming more commonplace. As Dodderidge 
himself states in his speech to the House of Lords shortly before his death: “I have 
sat in this court fifteen years, and I should know something. Surely if I had gone in a 
mill so long, dust would cleave to my clothes (Qtd. in C. Johnson 60).” Suffice to say 
that women were becoming more litigious, and Dodderidge’s book, whether for 
lawyers or litigants, reflects a trend of his time; a need which was driven by the 
women who were accessing the legal system in increasing numbers.
IIC. DANGERS OF FEMALE LITIGATION: THE HONESTIE OF THIS AGE AND THE 
PARLAMENT OF WOMEN
The rising numbers in female litigation paint a rosy picture for feminist 
critics. They are, however, only part of the Jacobean legal picture, and contributed 
to social tension and anxiety about women’s power and its potential threat to cultural 
stability. The freedom women experienced was challenged, as, “[fjaced with 
unprecedented social mobility, the English authorities sought to inculcate the respect 
for order in the population by appealing to traditional notions of stability and 
hierarchy (Comensoli 10).” The sanctification of the family so evident in Dod and 
Cleaver’s work “was only partially rooted in religious idealism; it was also a
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political response to the shifts in and challenges to the social and moral foundation 
of society (Comensoli 20).” A large part of this backlash landed on women because 
of their perceived responsibility for ensuring the safety and security of the home.38
The strict hierarchical social code, strengthened through natural and divine 
law, implies that “[mjen and masculinity were threatened both by the very nature of 
early-modern thinking about gender division, and by women’s insubordination 
(Amussen 216),” simply because if a wife could be insubordinate, her actions flew in 
the face of assumptions about “natural” female behaviour. Women who left their 
housewifely responsibilities to enter the public sphere and claim legal power could 
be seen, and often were described, as insubordinate in the extreme.
Barnaby Rich’s ironically titled tirade against social evils, The Honeslie of 
This Age, published circa 1616, makes specific reference to women’s use of the legal 
system. He excludes the usual suspects: women who conform to the categories of 
wife, virgin, and biblically-precedented goodness are safe from his censure. Those 
who stray from these categories, however, are vitriolically attacked, including 
women who go to law. “How shall we be now able to judge of an Harlot?” he asks,
especially if she bee rich, & hath ability to bring her accuser to the 
Comissaries Court', we must not co[n]demn her by her outward show 
. . . her Proctor will make you to understand a little Latine'. if you be 
not able to prove rem in re, you have slandered her . . . you must cry 
her mercy. (14-5)
Rich is highly critical of the increasing numbers of women accessing slander and
38 There is often still this knee-jerk political reaction today, when right-wing leaders of Canadian 
political parties blame women entering the workplace for the perceived breakdown in social order, for 
example.
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defamation laws to their benefit. Certainly, “the central courts at Westminster 
regularly processed cases involving knowledgeable women who were neither 
submissive nor deferential (Stretton, Women 216),” and antagonists of women were 
quick to draw links between the public speech that going to law entails, and women’s
sexual nature.
As Patricia Parker points out, “the loud and ‘babling’ complaint of 
Shakespeare’s Mistress Quickly that her legal ‘action’ is ‘entered’ and her ‘case so 
openly known to the world’ not only opens what should be silent and closed but 
activates a long-standing link between legal case and female ‘case (106).’” Thus 
masculine anxiety about women’s legal power is situated partly in a sexualised 
fantasy, wherein the woman who goes to law upsets patriarchal inheritance and uses 
what is legally the property of her husband, her body, in ways that potentially deny 
him primogeniture. Like Rich’s Honestie, The Parlament of Women, published 
years later in 1640, continues to illuminate masculine social unease about female 
litigation. The subtitle of the work promises it will reveal
the merry lawes by them newly enacted. To live in more Ease, 
Pompe, Pride, and wantonnesse: but especially that they might have 
superiority and domineere over their husbands: with a new way 
found out by them to cure any old or new cuckolds, and how both 
parties may recover their credit and honesty againe. (frontispiece)
The fantasy runs rampant.
The woodcut on the frontispiece of the work shows the terrifying spectacle of 
a man standing in the dock before this women’s parliament. The female power, even 
supremacy, over men that the image depicts, reveals that masculine anxiety about *
39 For comprehensive discussions on women and slander see: Gowing, Domestic, Gowing, 
“Language;” and J. Sharpe, Defamation.
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women’s litigation in the Jacobean period could lead to the conclusion that women 
would unseat male authority altogether, if given the chance.40 The tract bawdily
Fig. 1. Women's parliament, woodcut from The Parlament of Women 
(London, 1640) frontispiece.
plays on the connection between “open cases” and legal cases when the women
decree that men “shall know that we have the Law in our owne hands, and in our
owne Cases wee will be our owne Lawyers and plead our owne rights. For wee have 
tongues to tell one our owne Tales, and our tales shall be heard and handled (A3r).” 
That the women's “cases” will be their own, dangerously implies that their sexuality
40 The date of this pamphlet, situated at the eve of the civil war, is perhaps not insignificant in its 
representations of topos, or a world in which the hierarchical social order is turned upside down, 
where women rule over men and make laws. Christopher Hill explains that in medieval society 
“Shrove Tuesday, the Feast of Fools, All Fools Day and others” were occasions when “the social 
hierarchy and the social decencies” could be ignored and extravagantly subverted, which made the 
social order “that much more tolerable (16-7).” By the date of The Parlament of Women, however, 
this disruption in the social order was beginning to be seen in a different light: “[wjhat was new in 
the seventeenth century was the idea that the world might be permanently turned upside down (Hill 
17),” and in the case of this specific pamphlet, in a way that threatens the foundation of the status quo 
- the social hierarchy.
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is the property of no man, thus questioning a husband’s right to his wife’s body and
patrilinear inheritance. The pun on “tales” implies that the women will be putting
forth that part of their bodies for anyone wishing to “handle” it. ;
The work goes on to plumb the depths of masculine anxiety even further, 1
dangerously alluding to castration. One of the items the Parliament passes states
•J
“that a man which promises a pritty mayd good turn, and doth not perform it within
three moneths shall loose his what do you call them (A6V).” The implication in this r
item, for the masculine reader,41 is that powerful women lead to emasculation in the i
most absolute sense. The fact that castration works its way into this otherwise light
and ribald work, shows just how deep-rooted the Jacobean male fear of female f
power could be. The represented women who wield choice over their own bodies
J-
and make men pay the highest price for disrespecting them signify the destruction of <■
the hierarchical social order, the destruction of a man’s rights to his wife’s property, J
including her body, and potentially the eventual destruction of the human race if men
do not amend their treatment of pretty maids. Because the tract was sold at the Old
Bailey, it stands to reason that it was a work in which judges and lawyers would be
most interested, and that the topic of women’s litigation was one of much legal, and
satirical, interest.
These examples illustrate that the number of women going to court was «
engendering anxiety and social adversity in some quarters. For women who engaged *
in divorce or adultery litigation the blast from opponents was even more severe
because, as I show in Chapters Two and Three, in these specific types of cases the
tensions that lie behind representations of the otherwise absent female legal subject |
41 The perspective of the woodcut implies that most readers would have been male. The gaze of the
reader is shared by the man in the dock, and it is with this character, therefore, that the viewer is
meant to sympathise - both the reader and the man face the women’s parliament.
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are especially revealed. The invisible woman, who should according to law be under 
the dictates and authority of her husband, as Lady Allan and Sara Gough are, 
suddenly steps to the foreground to undo the socially and legally binding relationship 
that erases her - marriage. In doing so she undermines her husband’s authority, 
directly challenges theological precepts which give “order for preserving the honour 
and dignity . . . bestowed upon every one, especially upon every Superior (Brinsley 
62),” and is guilty of transgressing the will of God. Presumably, divorce and 
adultery cases play most deeply on male anxieties about female litigation simply 
because suits that set wives directly against their husbands (even if the husband is the 
Claimant) completely undermine assumptions about the social hierarchy and 
women’s natural role as wife and mother. If the role were natural, neither divorce 
nor adultery could exist.
IID. CONCLUSION: THE WORLD OF JACOBEAN WOMEN’S LITIGATION
The legal world for women described in the sections above is not entirely the 
realm of the naturally silent, chaste and submissive housewife. Historical evidence 
reveals that despite the law’s attempts to silence and categorise women as absolute 
subjects to their husbands (and, in many cases, it was able to do precisely that) part 
of the Jacobean experience included a world in which women sued and were sued; in 
which women travelled to London in order to attend the courts of Chancery and 
Requests; and in which the court records reflect an unprecedented level of legal 
actions by women.
Furthermore, female legal action was not confined to the upper classes.42 
Research reveals that
42 As has been assumed by some members of the audience at two papers I have given over the course 
of writing this chapter.
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the gentry and aristocracy were in a minority, and many litigants 
came from the middle ranks of society. Even quite poor litigants 
waged law in these courts [of equity], petitioning to be allowed entry 
in forma pauperis, by which they would receive free representation by 
legal counsel and have their costs waived. (Stretton, Women 5. My 
addition)43
It is a legal setting in which there were “women fighting contests against men, and, 
for a while at least, more poor women challenging their rich neighbours (Stretton, 
Women 217).” While this legal environment “may have offered inspiration to 
playwrights and satirists, it may also have contributed to more general feelings of 
unease about women’s independent behaviour (Stretton, Women 217),” as evidenced 
by Rich’s work and The Parlament of Women.
Certainly the fact that some men (such as Rich and the anonymous author of 
Parlament} insist “upon a system of order based on female subordination indicates 
that women did not always conform to the roles prescribed for them (Comensoli 
21).” These discursive tensions make an easy and absolute definition of the female 
legal subject difficult. No doubt many women would have obeyed the mandates of 
church, “nature” and law. No doubt many women suffered at law because of their 
inferior status - the women I discuss in Chapter Three certainly do. However, the 
experience of these women is tempered by the experience of those who were 
successful at law, and both types are evident in literary representations that help to 
define, question and sometimes subvert the legal norm that the evidence cited in this 
section shows did not always exist.
43 Anne Laurence points out that although women from different socioeconomic strata were using the 
courts, the “familiarity with the courts and their procedures was much greater in the town than in the 
country; urban women were more independent and there were fewer informal mechanisms for 
arbitration (263).” This may have created an urban / rural divide not closely examined by Stretton.
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III. IMAGINARY AND LEGAL REALITIES: DANGEROUS REPRESENTATIONS, THE 
INNS OF COURT, AND THE FEMALE AUDIENCE
The former section may seem to have ended on a rather high note. How, the
modern theatregoer may ask, can dramatic representation define a legal norm?
Specifically, how can drama presume to impact on legal subjects and the law itself—
discourses which, in the modern world, seem to stand well-distanced from popular
theatre? Any historical cultural criticism of the law must take into account how
representation and the imaginary are perceived in Jacobean England. It must also
consider what connections exist between law and literature in an historical context to
folly appreciate the role literature, drama and the imaginary could play to structure 
and define society on a legal level. In effect, a cultural criticism of the law must 
examine how plays were able to have the discursive power to make them much- 
maligned as dangerous, both physically and spiritually, to their Jacobean audience 
and participants alike, and how drama and the law interacted in ways which make the 
present-day law in literature movement seem essentialist and naive. This section 
explores how the represented realities on the stages of Jacobean England had the 
potential to impact powerfully on lawyers and theatregoing women that is often not 
recognised.
I will first unveil the fears generated by represented worlds in anti-theatrical 
tracts - a sure sign that the early-modern appreciation of the imaginary saw 
representation as something that could be sinister. I will then highlight the strong 
connection between law and literature, or more specifically, lawyers and 
playwrights, or the Inns of Courts and the playhouses of London, to demonstrate how 
some of the fears voiced in section IIIA are justified, before I turn to the women 
seated in the Jacobean audience, watching and hearing scenes and words which 
could bolster or subvert the legal discourse that bore down on them, to explore how
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representation potentially affects the values and ideologies associated with and 
internalised by its female audience.
As with the first section of this chapter, each of these subsections could be a 
thesis in its own right, and in no way do I presume to give them the full attention 
they could receive under other circumstances. The purpose of this chapter is to 
highlight different aspects of the historical context in which the women I discuss in 
Chapters Two and Three find themselves, in order to better understand what extra­
textual legal, theological, Continental and dramatic trends impact on both the 
empirical and represented female legal subject. If all the world is a stage, I will now 
draw back the curtain on the early-modern world of theatregoing, to show how the 
alternate realities on the bankside of the Thames could challenge, structure, bolster, 
define, or strike fear in the hearts of their audience.
IIIA. ALTERNATE REALITIES DANGEROUSLY IMAGINED: EARLY-MODERN 
PERCEPTIONS OF REPRESENTATION
Theatre and literature, as I explain in the Introduction to this thesis, are 
mediums through which other worlds are created; worlds where new social orders 
can exist, or the existing ones be ratified; worlds where different value systems and 
unfamiliar social codes can compete with the familiar. Because drama can be either 
coercive or subversive, “[tjhe public and private theatres of early-modern England 
reflect the heterogeneity of early-modern culture, each fostering modes of 
representation which sometimes promote and sometimes challenge dominant 
political, religious, and social systems (Comensoli 11).” Thus, these represented 
realities are worlds where the plurivocity and artificiality of society is laid bare; 
compared to the extant dominant discourse that moulds, shapes, and assigns static
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duties they seem other-worldly,44 but imaginary dialogue is dialogue that always 
potentially exists in the empirical world.
In legal dramas involving women, those whose voices are supposed to be 
muffled to the point of background whispers and obscurity can literally take centre- 
stage, forcing the private sphere into the public before hundreds of watching eyes, 
and demonstrating the potential for female legal agency - a potential the numbers of 
litigious women discussed in section IIB shows was not unknown during the time in 
question. For critics of women’s litigation, such as Rich and the anonymous author 
cited in the previous section, “legal” plays with strong female leads dangerously 
reveal “the instability of the early-modern household, together with the passions, 
rivalries and ambivalence attending early-modern theories of order (Comensoli 16).” 
The tracts I referred to in section two by Dod and Cleaver, Rich and others, would 
have been “read by both the dramatists and their audiences and the ideas contained in 
them are the ideas held by the majority . . . [t]he dramatist, then, can reflect, 
reinforce, or question these assumptions (M. Johnson 26),” because drama has the 
ability to refract or restructure the assumptions made in more academic forms of
discourse.
As Kevin Sharpe argues, “in no age is good theatre the mere reflection of 
social change; it helps to discern and even direct it... in short help[s] to make social 
change itself real by staging what contemporaries had scarce begun to perceive 
(Remapping 420-1).”45 Thus, theatre “valorized as well as symbolized profound 
changes in ideology as well as social relations (K. Sharpe, Remapping 421).”
44 Aristodemou notes that within such a context, “[o]ne of the aspirations ... of law and literature 
analyses, is that the construction of literary texts may throw light on the construction and fictionality 
of the so-called real world, including that of the legal world, its values and conventions and ourselves 
within it (25).”
45 Original text reads “helped.”
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Dramatic representations of the female legal subject and the legal system could, 
therefore, signify ideological shifts that were threatening the hierarchical ethos of the
status quo.
As Iser explains, “[literature reflects life under conditions that are either not 
available in the empirical world or are denied by it . . . literature turns life into a 
storehouse from which it draws its material in order to stage that which in life 
appeared to have been sealed off from access (227).” Appears to be, but perhaps is 
not. Drama can challenge social stability because it proposes that “there is no one, 
ultimate, totally determining ground, no ground of all grounds - neither in history, 
society, nor politics (D. Carroll 70).” Therefore, “[t]he text itself becomes a kind of 
junction, where other texts, norms, and values meet and work upon each other (Iser 
219).” The many voices which can be represented on the stage give speech to those 
who are supposed to be silent, and undermine doctrines that assert a static, natural 
homogeneity.
Further exacerbating the way in which the social order could so easily be 
challenged by fictional voices, was, White explains, “[t]he Renaissance imaginative
writer,” who,
in creating fictions, thought of literature as performing the function of 
God . . . The writer is controlling deity of a constructed world of 
human beings who make, obey, and break their own laws within that 
world, and must stand judged and often condemned by themselves, 
their fictional peers, readers, and audiences. (8)
Not to waste space on the obvious blasphemy that playing God would entail, the fact 
that the imagined world is recognisable as a representation of the extra-textual world
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that early-modems accepted as divinely created, calls into question the truth, or 
perhaps Truth, of representation.
Truth in the early-modern period is defined by its relation to divine will. 
William Burton, in his Certaine Questions and Answeres, Concerning the 
Knowledge of God, answers the question “What is that truth which is in things,” by 
explaining that “[a] 11 things are called true things so far forth as they agree with the 
forme and patterne set downe in the minde, which forme and patterne in God is 
nothing els, but his divine foreknowledge and eternall decree (32r).” In short, “to lye 
is evill (Rainolds, Overthrow 9),” thus an actor dressed as a king, for example, 
commits a sin because firstly he upsets the divinely-ordained hierarchy, and secondly 
he represents “the deformitie or corruption of the action, that is, when the action doth 
decline from the rule of Gods law (W. Burton 42v).” He is not a king, and by 
adopting kingly signifiers he suggests the artificiality of those signifiers in the 
empirical world.
Acting is therefore not simply “make-believe:” it deforms the person and the 
system it represents; it declines to adhere to God’s law because it presents something 
that does not exist; and in the early-modern understanding of world creation and 
divine will, if something does not exist, has not already been created by God, then it 
is not meant to exist.46 Furthermore, players who represent someone other than 
themselves dangerously challenge the mandate that everyone is required to “live in 
strict conformity with the self [God] has bestowed on us, and that in the most minute 
particulars (Barish 92),”47 which is, essentially, the foundation for the early-modern 
social hierarchy.
46 Barish argues that “[pjlayers are evil because they try to substitute a self of their own contriving for 
the one given them by God (93).”
47 Original text reads “he.”
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Thus the query, “[w]hat saye you then to vaine pastimes, as Lord of misrule, 
stage players . . . which tende to lewde and unchast behaviour, with surfeiting, and 
rioting, &c.f is answered simply by W. Burton: “[t]hey are not beseeming the 
dignitie and majestie of the sonne of God, nor the profession of Christians, but they 
are rather for such as knowe not GOD, nor his Sonne Christ (13v).” Presumably this 
is because, as Jonas Barish puts it, “plays lend themselves too readily to the mockery 
of those in authority (4),” because stage players can represent a reality that overturns 
the divine precepts controlling social roles, duties and gender division. Significantly, 
“[t]he stage provokes the most active and sustained hostility when it becomes a vital 
force in the life of the community (Barish 66).” Therefore the heightened backlash 
against the stage is a backlash against the power it has to reconstruct and reconfigure 
social truisms through its representations.
Boy actors dressed as women caused no end of anxiety,48 because as well as 
blurring gender signifiers, “the putting of womens attire upon men, may kindle 
sparkes of lust in uncleane affections (Rainolds, Overthrow 34)” in male audience-
members. That these same male audience members would have known that the
women on stage were really boys in costume, implies that when players of the early- 
modem period distort the boundary between the imaginary and the real,49 they do not 
simply impersonate people who stand hierarchically above or below their social 
station, or who are a different gender. Rather, the actors are transformed from what
48 See: Amussen 215; J Shorte Treatise Against Slage-Playes 14, 17-8; Ste. B. 42; Grantley and 
Taunton 24; and Rainolds, Overthrow 8-19.
49 The shock of recognition and revelation in the 1990s film The Crying Game suggests that confusion 
so easily caused by altering gender signifiers like clothing, make-up and hairstyle is not a problem 
confined to early-modern society - of course, early-modern theatregoers would have known that the 
women on stage were actually men, which makes the question of representation here one of 
transformation as opposed to disguise. I am concerned that 1 may be approaching this argument from 
an assumed heterosexuality on the part of male audience-members. I take my lead from the 
implications in Rainolds’ statement: that it is the female signifiers, not the male actors, to which some 
audience-members might be attracted.
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they should be according to God’s law, natural law, and even positive law (in this 
case, boys),50 into something they decidedly are not (sexually attractive women).51
Rainolds argues that any feigned transformation is not only dangerous to the 
audience, but to the actors themselves, because
[sjeeing that diseases of the minde are gotten farre sooner by 
counterfeiting, then are diseases of the body: and bodily diseases may 
bee gotten so, as appeareth by him, who, faining for a purpose that he 
was sicke of the gout, became (through care of counterfeiting it) 
goutie indeed. So much can imitation & meditatio[n] doe. 
(Overthrow 20)
His argument illustrates how acting is not only dangerous because it overturns the 
extra-textual social structures that are protected by law, but because it can also affect 
the body and even the soul of the actor.
As well as the unnatural transformations which take place in the imaginary 
world created by the playwright, if an actor’s role requires him to play a sinful 
character, “they will bring with them not onely appearance of evill, but evill it selfe 
(Shorte 14),” because a sin in thought is still a sin, let alone a sin in thought, 
rehearsal and delivery in front of an audience. The audience that witnesses a 
character’s sinful (and therefore lawless) behaviour considers the sin, thus furthering 
the cycle of evil. Because of these factors, Turner, in 1607, described the activities
50 The Sumptuaiy Laws dictated not only what clothing was appropriate to which gender, but also 
what fabrics each level of society was lawfully allowed to wear, in order to make each person’s class 
position easily recognisable (Brundage 343, 353).
51 Orgel argues convincingly that the transformation caused by simply changing clothing is due to the 
early-modern consideration of gender fluidity, as a whole. The medical truism that women could 
“change” into men, implies the horrifying possibility that men could also “change” into women (18- 
27).
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on the south bank of the Thames in denigrating terms that emphasised the spiritual 
dangers its entertainments offered:
Shine hollow Caves, and thou celestiall round,
Droppe downe harmonious accents from thy sphears,
Let heaven and earth with merry noise resound,
The Flagge hanges out to day thei’i baite the beares,
For how to spend my time I could not tell,
Cause al the whores of Lambeth, be in Bridewel.
Thus idle Libertines consume their lives,
In some detested sinne, some horrid vice,
Ravishing maides, dishonesting mens wives.
At tavernes, bawdy houses, playes, whores, dice,
They that have libertie, do thus abuse it,
Cursed, nay all most dambd, are they that use it. (B1v)
Given this context, it is unsurprising that an anonymous early-modern author writing 
against plays boldly declares that “[s]tage-playes are repugnant to the written Word 
and Will of Almightie God . . . dangerous to the eternall salvation both of the actours 
and spectatours (Shorte 3),” because they reject God’s will and commandments by 
presenting a world which does not exist empirically; ultimately, they overturn nature
and extra-textual natural and divine laws.
While the sight of an actor dressed as a king or a woman may dangerously 
imply to an audience the artificiality of divinely-ordained constructs, legal dramas 
overtly play with the structure that protects natural and divine mandates, the legal 
system that protects those mandates, and the social systems they regulate. In the 
early-modern period legal dramas cany with them the weight of the relationship
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between the playhouses and the Inns of Court, which may have only furthered 
anxiety about the potential extra-textual instability of the commandments and law for 
theatre antagonists.
IIIB. THE INNS OF COURT AND THE LONDON PLAYHOUSES: LAWYERS, 
PLAYWRIGHTS AND LEGAL DRAMA
The law in literature movement, which focuses on the use of fictional legal 
scenarios in the education of law students, would have a field-day with the 
relationship that existed between the theatres and the Inns of Court in the Jacobean 
period. White argues that law and literature are closely connected because both are 
“institutional (the existence of the Inns of Court and their practices) and professional 
(shared reliance on rhetoric and fictions) (8).” A cultural criticism of the law 
explores the connection in a much broader and in-depth way. While it is true that 
both share “rhetoric and fictions” it is insufficient to highlight this as the main point 
of intersection between them. The social relationship between the Inns of Court and 
the London playhouses meant that lawyers interacted with the fictions of plays and 
plays themselves in much more complex ways than the modern-day law student does 
whilst reading The Merchant of Venice.
In the Jacobean period, dramatic representations of law are much more than a 
humanising exercise in legal education. During the sixteenth century, the Inns of 
Court grew to such an extent that by 1612, Sir George Buck described them as “[t]he 
third University of England (Qtd. in White 73).” This growth led to a rapidly 
expanding institution for the education of young men:
[b]y Elizabeth’s time there were four Inns - Inner Temple, Lincoln’s 
Inn, Middle Temple, and Gray’s Inn. To each was attached one or 
more Inns of Chancery (eight in all) which were considerably less
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prestigious . . . There were also . .. fourteen ‘houses of students in the 
common law’ and two Serjeants’ Inns. The key to these institutions 
lies in the fact that they were not solely, nor even primarily, organised 
to teach law, but rather they were societies or guilds, existing not only 
with the authority to call to the bar, but also to instil a sense of 
community amongst men who might or might not become lawyers or 
influential figures at Elizabeth’s court. (White 73)
During the early-modern period, “the Inns housed, at one time or another, all the 
significant writers of the second half of the sixteenth century (White 74),”52 which 
led to the their “long-entrenched associations with the drama (A. Cook 108).” 
Students at the Inns would often engage in playwriting and “[djrama written and 
performed by members of the Inns eventually gave way to professional presentations 
(A. Cook 108),” ensuring strong ties between Inns’ productions and public plays.
This meant that “no gentleman who went up to the Inns could avoid exposure 
to drama any more than he could in grammar school or the university. Plays formed 
an intrinsic part of his life and education (A. Cook 110).” In part this was due to the 
educational practice of declamation and the Inns’ Revels, into which “was poured 
academic learning such as an educated gentleman might be expected to recognize 
(Elton 5).” The Revels thus acted as both a form of entertainment and an 
opportunity to practise rhetorical, courtly and legal skills through
fustian- and mock-orations; misrule and mock government; mock- 
trials, arraignments and sentencings; mock-counsellings; courts of 
love; processions and progresses; challenges, barriers, trials-by-
52 White’s statement is somewhat erroneous. Shakespeare and Marlowe, for example, were not Inns’ 
members.
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combat, jousts and mock-duels; mock-proclamations and edicts; 
mock-prognostications; pageants, masques and plays. (Elton 1)
In fact, “[l]aw students were trained not only through moots, bolts . . . , and similar 
exercises, but also through compulsorily attended Inns of Court Revels (Elton 135),” 
which could certainly explain why “[t]he drama of this age was inextricably infused 
with the law, with perhaps one third or more of Elizabethan and Jacobean plays 
including a trial, an arraignment or a law suit (Stretton, Women 64).”
R. J. Schoeck’s research on early-modern theatre attendance shows that, in 
general, “[t]he average theatregoer . . . would have had personal experience in 
matters of marriage and wills, with a smattering of ignorance in contracts, and all 
would have had a layman’s nodding acquaintance with such essentials as the 
marriage law of the church (220),” and would therefore have been able to engage 
with the underlying precepts of legal drama. The group of men associated with the 
Inns, however, who made up a large percentage of the audience (Gurr 119), could 
have had at least a passing acquaintance with the plays’ authors, if not in fact being 
the playwrights themselves. Legal dramas in the Jacobean period are thus imbued 
with a jurisprudential authenticity often not recognised by modern critics, and 
representations of women and the law could well, therefore, have been contributing 
to extant debates among lawyers, judges and law-makers about the rights and 
abilities of the female legal subject.
53 Stretton, Women, points out that the relationship between the legal system and playwrights was a 
dynamic one:
Webster involved himself in civil suits, as did Middleton, who perhaps was inspired 
by the litigiousness of his mother and stepfather. Lodge, another active litigant, 
sued his own brother in a debt action. Ford, Middleton, Dekker and Rowley were 
all sued for libel in Star Chamber . . . Ben Jonson was twice imprisoned for 
offending figures of authority with his plays . . . while Christopher Marlowe, who 
had to appear before the Privy Council, seemed to make a hobby out of being 
arrested. (65)
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The strong tie between playwrights and lawyers thrusts any examination of 
legal representation in the Jacobean period into a much more complicated field of 
reference. While those responsible for the law had to work to normalise society and 
to control perceived deviancy, they would also have been exposed throughout their 
education at the Inns and in the Revels to representations of legal values which ran 
contrary to legal doctrine - they may even have had a hand in imagining, writing and 
performing in these representations of difference. Therefore, a plot that engages 
with law and jurisprudential conflicts can, in this context, be seen as a court away 
from the courts, a place where arguments about justice, legal interpretation, and 
rights could occur in sometimes radical ways, safely disguised as fantasy and fiction. 
As Iser explains:
[ejach text makes inroads into extra-textual fields of reference and by 
disrupting them creates an eventful disorder . . . thus each one is being
reshuffled in the text, and takes on a new form - a form which
nevertheless includes, and indeed depends on, the function of that 
field in our interpreted world. (218)
A legal drama that represents the extra-textual legal world is a safely fictional arena 
in which influential law-makers and interpreters could be exposed to legal 
conundrums or could explore the practical problems that arise when statutes stand at 
odds with lived experience or ideas about justice.
The possibilities that stage plays, closely related to the Inns of Court, offer 
for legal argument, suggest that representations of the female legal subject are much 
more than a stance for or against women’s legal rights by an author ignorant of the 
theories structuring the empirical legal system. Some of the people working with 
women in a legal capacity - the judges who hear the cases, or the lawyers who act on
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a woman’s behalf - would have been exposed to such representations during their 
education, would potentially have interacted with playwrights writing about women 
and the law housed at the Inns, or could have taken part in writing and acting 
(perhaps even as a woman) in Inns’ productions.
The inference is that if the law-makers and administrators themselves are
actively questioning, or are at the very least, exposed through the dramatic processes 
that took place at the Inns to characters and plotlines which undermine the absent 
female legal subject, this would only contribute to the ideological inroads being 
made by antiquarianism and Protestantism into legal practice. The fact that plays 
challenging pedantic forms of jurisprudence exist at all suggests that the imaginary 
world of Jacobean legal drama was opening avenues of thinking about women and
the law - avenues which could lead to the conclusion that the law either falls short of
adequately providing for women’s needs, does not reflect social values in its 
treatment of them, or does not reflect how women were able to use the law despite 
impediments. The connection between law and literature in the early-modern period 
implies that some men attached to the Inns would have been thinking about the 
relationship between law and women, and may have been using drama to explore 
ideas about justice and women’s legal position,54 topics which, for the most part, 
would have been inappropriate to raise within the rigidly structured courtroom
environment.
The concern from some quarters that fictional representation had the power to 
challenge God’s will and reshape society was therefore perhaps not unjustified. The 
imagined legal world of the stage was not always merely suggestive of how the law 
could be different; it could also be pointing to how the extra-textual world was
54 See, for example, the play I discuss by John Marston in Chapter Three.
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changing in ways that would disrupt traditional views about social roles, gender and 
hierarchy, and how law works to protect them; how the law-makers themselves, or 
those in close proximity to them, may not have accepted prevailing jurisprudence 
and were using the stage as a medium to explore different legal identities and 
subjects.
IIIC. CONCLUSION: REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE-MODELS AND FEMALE
AUDIENCE-MEMBERS
If plays can be seen as teaching-tools for lawyers, these same plays can most 
certainly be seen as instructional for a more general audience. Comensoli explains 
that Jacobean drama “was not a monolithic institution which passively and 
equivocally bolstered dominant moral or political orthodoxies (8).” Sentiment in the 
“pro- and anti-theatrical tracts . . . attests to the instability of the theatre as an 
institution for the inculcation of moral or social codes or precepts (8).” Specifically 
for the purposes of this thesis, I am interested in the social codes and precepts that 
may affect women in the Jacobean audience, and what the imaginary realm is able to 
suggest to them as empirical subjective possibilities. Helene Cixous rightly points 
out that the dynamic social properties of drama are dangerous to a highly structured 
society. She describes dramas as “great destroyers” which “are also great givers of 
strength, and of forms: through this shaking of the literary ground, those who crack 
it open pull off amazing effects, glimpses of ways out (33).” Out, one assumes, from 
restrictive social forms which contain and constrain the female subject in the off­
stage world.
Historical research by Paul Merchant reveals that in the early-modern period,
theatregoing was
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[pjerhaps the most influential form of entertainment . . . where wives 
could be seen in their new-bought jewels . . . and could watch the 
performances of women as dynamic as Middleton’s roaring girl . . . 
characters drawn from the world of the audience, intelligent, 
resourceful women, capable of dominating a whole play. (4)
Gurr’s historical evidence supports Merchant’s, noting that in the early seventeenth 
century, “women from every section of society went to plays, from Queen Henrietta 
Maria to the most harlotry of vagrants (57),” and there would have therefore been a 
high level of female exposure, across the social spectrum, to the agency shown by 
women characters on-stage. Furthermore, the high percentage of female audience 
members “meant that the success of any play was significantly dependent on the 
receptiveness of women; and this in turn means that theatrical representations - 
whether of women or men or anything else - also depended for their success to a 
significant degree on the receptiveness of women (Orgel 10-1).” Thus any 
representations of legally active female subjects must have been an acceptable 
cultural representation of the female legal subject in order for it to work as a viable
dramatic character.
In this way, it is possible that plays “were important contributors to the 
debate on the changing status of women, and may well have initiated some terms of 
that argument (Merchant 4).” Plays “repeatedly focus on issues, such as gender 
relations, and institutions, such as marriage, that were at a point of crisis during the 
early-modern period ... the representation of women repeatedly produces a 
disruption in these scripts (Loomba 95),” simply because represented women could 
behave in ways that actively challenge the dogmatic underpinnings of gender and
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marital construction. Ania Loomba states that critics of early-modern women and
drama
should consider why the drama becomes increasingly preoccupied 
with the disorderly woman; why woman can no longer be presented 
as a stable entity; and why the stories themselves become deeply 
contradictory and contestable. The individual author may not be 
‘feminist’, but the ideological effects of his fragmented female 
protagonist are radical precisely because she is presented as a 
discontinuous being. (95)
Like the female legal subject who evades easy definition because she both can (if she 
accepts the subjectivity placed on her by law) and cannot (if she chooses to ignore 
her prescribed role and go to law) be absent and silent, unstable representations of 
women reflect the instability experienced by all subjects. However, because they are 
women characters, they also reveal her own constructed subjectivity to a female 
audience-member. If, as noted in section IIB of this chapter, more conformist female 
characters were “joined for the first time by those who used the law (Stretton, 
Women 58),” then it is not unlikely to suggest that some women in the audience 
might have seen these new, represented, roles as ones which they could embody in
real life.
The fact that plays were so closely linked to the world of law in the Jacobean 
period, and that representations of women interacting with the law occur despite 
strict legal doctrines that commanded the contraiy in the so-called real world, implies 
that some members of the legal institution felt that women could safely embrace a 
more active legal identity. Certainly those who worked with the women discussed in 
section IIB of this chapter must have felt so. The furore surrounding the dangers
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plays posed to the divinely-ordained hierarchy and traditional social roles supports 
the suggestion that theatres had the power to disrupt traditional social practice. In 
terms of women, strong female characters were given a voice by playwrights who 
may have been associated with the Inns of Court, thus further implying a shifting 
jurisprudence in the legal institution itself. Potentially, these strong female 
characters could be internalised as role-models by female audience-members as well, 
thus furthering the play’s impact on extra-textual legal practice and procedures.
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IV. THE SHIFTING CONTEXT OF THE JACOBEAN FEMALE LEGAL SUBJECT
In this chapter I have attempted to historically contextualise the female legal 
subject in her relationship to the courts, to prevailing legal practice, and to the 
theatre. Central to this process are Continental trends which impacted upon 
women’s ability to use the law, and the close connection between lawyers and 
playwrights. What has become apparent throughout this chapter is the number of 
conflicting discourses which were impacting on and attempting to define, or 
redefine, the female legal subject.
In any society where numerous discourses converge upon, confront, attempt 
to disqualify, support or denounce each other, subject definition cannot be contained 
securely within any single discourse. I have drawn attention to this because, in the 
ensuing chapters, there will be points of contradiction. This contradiction is 
inevitable, given the fractious properties of the discourses I highlight in this chapter. 
It is at these points of rupture that the artificiality of the static female legal subject 
comes to the fore: some women went to law, some did not; some discourses 
supported women’s litigation, some did not; some arguments attack law for being too 
unyielding, some for its pliancy. All these forces must be borne in mind in the 
following chapters because they contribute to the ideological torsions that the female 
legal subject endured, and inevitably work their way into literary representations of
her.
I will now turn to the areas of divorce and adultery respectively: areas which, 
for reasons briefly mentioned throughout this chapter, expose litigious women to the 
highest level of commentators’ scrutiny. These commentators include playwrights 
who represent women and the law in their plots, as well as religious and political 
tract-writers. How women are represented in the controversial areas of divorce and
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adultery reveals where the points of legal discourse that attempt to control women 
are most unstable. Whether the author argues for or against the way in which law 
deals with the specific women I will be discussing, Jacobean writing reveals that the 
legal crisis embodied by women who went to law is a crisis of relationships: the 
relationship between law and the people; the relationship between husband and wife; 
and the relationship between authority and women.
Chapter two. unnatural division and uncivil destruction: divorce 
LAW AND THE REPRESENTED FEMALE LEGAL SUBJECT
A Familie is the right government of many subjects or persons under 
the obedience of one and the same head of the family; and of such 
things as are unto them proper. The second part of the definition of a 
Commonweale by us set downe, concerneth a Familie, which is the 
true seminarie and beginning of every Commonweale, as also a 
principall member thereof.
(Bodin, The Six Bookes of the Commonweale)
Come, let us to our death: are we not bless’d?
Our death will freedom from these creatures give:
Those trouble-quiet sowers of unrest,
And this I vow, that had I leave to live,
I would forever lead a single life,
And never venture on a devilish wife.
(Cary, The Tragedy of Mariam)
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This chapter explores how literature that represents women and divorce law 
reflects the public pressures which were exerted on the female legal norm; how 
extra-textual values created tension between the female legal subject and women’s 
fictional voices; and why female characters on the stage or page who approached the 
legal system were often wrapped in a cloak of notoriety. As Vilhelm Aubert argues, 
norms in general
present social and behavioral activities as a map with clear borders 
marking the distinction between compliance and noncompliance . . . 
This focuses the attention upon borderline problems, upon 
ambiguities, uncertainty, and transgressions, often upon rather 
hypothetical or rare cases of doubt. (35)
The female legal subject who engages with divorce law oversteps the normative 
boundaries set for her and offers up for consideration questions about women’s role 
in the “natural” hierarchy, while also providing good raw material for dramatic
treatment.
Inherent in this chapter is the question of definition - how the female legal 
subject is defined by her relationships; how she is defined by the authority that exerts 
itself over women’s bodies; and how she is defined (although, significantly, not by 
herself, but by those who hold the authority to define her) by her actions within, or 
reactions against, the legal system. Theological and ideological underpinnings of 
early-modern divorce law define the female legal norm, and I discuss these 
influences in the first two sections of this chapter, in order to situate the characters I 
analyse in the later sections. The third section sets out divorce law by the time of 
James I, when the literary works I analyse in sections four and five were written.
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Any critique of legal systems using a cultural criticism of law and literature 
understands that public values and laws impact on one another because, as Roger 
Shiner explains, “the morality of a society is the set of customary norms by which 
the members of the society regulate significant social and private behavior,” and “a 
legal system is an institutionalized normative system (442),” set up to ensure 
behaviour regulation can occur in a very public sense. However, Jules Coleman and 
Brian Leiter, in “Legal Positivism,” point out that “[t]he legality of moral norms is 
not a function of their morality, but their validity under the rule of recognition; the 
rule of recognition in a particular community asserts, in effect, that certain norms are 
law provided they meet the demands of justice, or that they cannot be law unless 
they do so, and so on (251).” Thus, while law-makers do have the power to legislate 
a social agenda, legislation must be accepted by the public it controls as necessary, 
plausible and right in order to work effectively as a system of control.
Kevin Sharpe aptly notes that “while the organs of state education and 
discipline have formed subjects who have interiorized codes of order, authority also 
responds to the desire of subjects {Remapping 417).” Law and public opinion impact 
on one another time and again because, Guyora Binder argues, “the coercive force of 
the state must be justified by consent: the consent of individuals to public 
arrangements or the consent of populations to public policies (83).” Although “[i]t 
only makes sense to criticize law for inaccurately representing individual or 
collective preferences ... A more sophisticated and less fragile critique recognizes 
that social will may not be independent of its legal representation (Binder 84).” A 
cultural criticism of the law can presume, therefore, that while laws may work 
against individuals in ways that seem unjust, they reasonably reflect public opinion, 
or at least the dominant discourse. Because the law-makers in the early-modern
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period are (with the exception of Queen Elizabeth I) upper-class men, the laws they 
make must be supported by other forms of discourse, such as religion and ideology, 
in order to be internalised as right by the general public. Chapter One described how 
law and other discourses of the period are interwoven, so I will not spend time on 
that here. In the same way, literature, which plays with social values and norms, can 
also be seen to reasonably reflect some aspects of public opinion. However, 
literature often does this by giving voice to opinions that exist on the margins - it can 
reflect the public opinion that is not obviously represented by the dominant 
discourse. The interplay between law and society leads, in colloquial terms, to a 
chicken-and-egg scenario in which it is easy to become confused as to whether 
public opinion directs law, or law directs public opinion.
Law, however, will always claim authority in this structure because it “cannot 
simply reflect but must also help compose society and its characters (Binder 85),” in 
accordance with the morality and beliefs of the most influential members of society. 
In this way, the social system and its institutional structures are protected by those 
who control it (in the early-modern period a very select group), and those whom the 
law frustrates are left with little opportunity to make their voices heard. The literary 
works in this chapter are chosen because they illustrate how law structures society 
and how a specific segment of society structures law in return.
Elizabeth Cary’s Tragedy of Mariam The Fair Queen of Jewry, is a drama 
most likely written “after her marriage and probably before the birth of her first child 
. . . in 1609 (Weller and Ferguson 5);” the unpublished poem by William Terracae, A 
Plenarie Satisfaction, Out of the Holie Scriptures, Cannons, and Civill Lawes 
Authorised, housed in the Northamptonshire Records Office, is about the Frances 
Howard marriage annulment which took place in 1613; and the play The True Tragi-
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Comedie Formarly Acted at Court, attributed to Francis Osborne (1593-1659 [L. 
Potter ii]), is most likely an early, unpublished, slightly different version of The True 
Tragicomedy Formerly Acted at Court (1635), also about the Frances Howard trial. 
Because the female legal subject in the early-modern period is, for the most part, 
denied many forms of self-definition, both the law and social values (in this case, 
patriarchal values) mould and shape that subject to their benefit, and these works 
reveal how that process is subverted by and also influences literature.
The early-modern period is important to literary representations of divorce 
legislation and the female legal subject because tensions between law and reform 
were causing social antinomies and legal power struggles. By the time of James I, 
these struggles were beginning to manifest themselves in tangible ways that affected 
jurisprudence and, most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, the female legal 
subject. While humanist philosophers and some Protestant writers were redefining 
the individual’s relationship to marriage law, state and church legislation continued 
to maintain strict control over public expression and social function. For reasons I 
will discuss in section two of this chapter, many legal arguments focused on the 
definition and significance of marriage, and people’s rights to annul an unhappy 
union. Because the familial matrix was so important to early-modern philosophy, 
many aspects of the marriage argument were represented and challenged in literature
and drama of the time.
To combat the potential unrest that representations of divorce or 
revolutionary ideas about women’s rights in marriage might spark in an audience, 
“all plays had to be approved by the public censor as politically and religiously
inoffensive, and such censorship both implies that there is dissent from orthodox
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beliefs and induces ambiguity and obliquity of expression (Posner 17);”1 oblique 
expression which was necessary for an institution “[p]atronized by courtiers and 
under the control of city magistrates,” and therefore “closely connected to 
government (Sharpe, Remapping 422).”2 As I argued in the Introduction and 
Chapter One, literature and drama present an arena in which otherwise dangerous 
expressions of legal emendation can safely clash with empirical legislation.
Frank Whigham explains that the “radicalizing power [of the theatre] derives 
precisely from the freedom of the professional actors from full dominance by a 
censoring of State, from the access to a deniability that comes with speaking words 
as dramatic characters (4. My addition),” thus situating it firmly in the realm of the 
imaginary. Because, often, characters’ responses to law are represented as the 
radical and dangerous ranting of subversives who set out to challenge the natural 
order of society, writers can safely present any criticisms as the words of an 
antisocial, even evil, person, whilst also successfully projecting those words into the 
public arena for audience consideration.
Sections four and five of this chapter examine three literary works that 
represent the impact of extra-textual pressures on the female legal subject and 
divorce, and explore how literature can work as a critique of the dominant legal 
discourse. Cary’s play depicts three women confronting an unsympathetic legal 
system and their perspectives on marriage and divorce law within the dominant legal 
discourse are telling. How Cary’s characters oppose the law and the legal system, 
the arguments they use and the types of women they are, implies the backlash of
1 See also, for example, Clare, 'Art' ix-xii, 5, 9-13, 15-21; Clare, “Censorship” 20-1, 25-6, 28-9; 
Clegg throughout; Dutton 51-5; Hadfield 1-3; and Longstaffe 31.
2 He goes on to explain that “Henry VIII and Thomas Cromwell saw the potential value of theatre as a 
forum of propaganda and recruited John Bale and Richard Moryson to write antipapal, and later 
Protestant, plays (422).”
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public opinion against women who speak out against the constraints of marriage and 
divorce, or who simply consider the option of divorcing, their husbands. Cary’s 
work reveals the frustrations women could feel in a legal system that favours men in 
general, and a man’s right to a woman’s body in marriage in particular.
Surprisingly, for a text in which the law figures so prominently, very little 
extant analysis of Cary’s play addresses the law, how it affects women and how the 
female characters are obviously knowledgeable about the legal matrix that binds 
them.3 4Most analyses focus on Cary’s life and why she chose the subject material 
she did for Mariam? It is sufficient to point out that Cary, in later years, was one of 
the many women who engaged with the legal system; “when her husband immured 
and half-starved her . . . she took her case to Privy Council and obtained an 
allowance of £500 a year (Sommerville 93-4).” She may therefore have been 
thinking critically about women’s role and rights in marriage when she wrote this 
play shortly after her own arranged wedding. Because so much extant work on 
Cary’s private life has already been carried out, I will not make her the focal point of 
my analysis. Instead, my focus will be on how the law and public opinion impact on 
and define the characters Cary creates, as well as how the growing extra-textual
3 Critics tend to focus on the family-as-state metaphor (See Purkiss, “Blood” 30-1, 38; and Raber 321­
43); the politics of martyrdom (See Beilin 171-2; Purkiss, “Blood” 38-40; Weller and Ferguson, 
Introduction 37-9); patriarchal authority (See: Beilin 151-76; Belsey, Subject 174; Lewalski 179; and 
Quilligan 224); the link between women’s silence and chastity and the biographical, potentially 
Catholic / Protestant, elements of the play that reflect Cary’s own life (See: Dunstan; Krontiris; 
Purkiss, “Blood” 27, 30, 40-1; Purkiss, Introduction; Raber 322-3; Shannon 135-6; Walker; Weller 
and Ferguson, Introduction; and Wright). Interestingly, the most widely accepted date of production 
for the play (1609) is fifteen years earlier than Cary’s conversion to Catholicism and consequential 
falling-out with her husband (N. Miller 354). This makes any criticism that figures Cary as the 
unhappily-married Mariam, or Mariam as a symbol for Catholic faith within an oppressive Protestant 
framework suspect. Iwansziw overcomes the anachronistic elements of the majority of this criticism 
by arbitrarily giving the play a new production date of 1612 (112), to illustrate how it may have 
supported Catholic recusants (113-4).
4 See for example introductions to new editions and textual criticism by: Dunstan; Krontiris; 
Lewalski; Purkiss; Walker; Weller and Ferguson; and Wright.
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litigation by women is overtly implied by a work in which all the female characters 
either know the rules of law or have been exposed to it.
Section five analyses Terracae’s and Osborne’s fictional accounts of the
scandalous Frances Howard divorce trial of 1613. Little is known about William
Terracae, but it is likely that he was involved in the court of King James I, because 
his poem is addressed to James’ favourite, Robert Carr, and Frances Howard at a 
time contemporaneous with the annulment proceedings. Francis Osborne is best
known for his Advice to a Son, 1656, and seems not to have been involved in the 
court at the time of the trial (Lee 42: 286-9). I have consulted the manuscript 
version of Osborne’s play because the first published edition appears nineteen years 
after Howard’s second trial, the 1616 arraignment for the murder of Sir Thomas 
Overbury, and there are a number of differences between the published version and 
the manuscript.5 The version I use was written nearer the time of the trials, and I 
hold it as the more authoritative of the two for the purposes of this thesis because I 
feel it is important to capture the literary moment at which the real-life Frances 
Howard is fictionalised by Osborne during her second trial, when she was found 
guilty for her part in Overbury’s murder. It is important to bear in mind that 
Terracae’s work was most likely written in the period between the divorce and the 
murder trial, and his treatment of Howard is therefore much more sympathetic than 
Osborne’s account of her separation, which was written after she had been confined
to the Tower.
The most notable modern work on the Howard trial and the two manuscripts I 
consult is provided by the historian David Lindley, in his Trials of Frances Howard: 
Fact and Fiction at the Court of King James. Lindley, however, makes use of the
5 Alterations in dialogue and character names are the most apparent differences.
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later, altered, published edition of Osborne’s play. Furthermore, he uses Terracae’s 
and Osborne’s works to illustrate court corruption by focusing on how court women 
are stereotyped as lascivious, and how the manuscripts and later accounts have 
swayed historical inteipretations of the divorce trial and of Howard herself (Lindley 
44, 57 and 112). He does not explore how Frances Howard’s divorce trial indicates 
torsions in the female legal subject in general, nor how the jurisprudence of divorce 
law affects women in Jacobean England.
Terracae’s poem and Osborne’s play are important vehicles for exploring 
representations of women and the law because, with the real-life annulment suit as 
their backdrop, they illuminate public opinion about women who sued for divorce. 
Osborne’s play is inevitably affected by Howard’s even more scandalous second 
trial, when public opinion could openly turn against her. In terms of divorce law, the 
works reveal a bias against women who reject their husband’s authority and the 
submissive role that they are “naturally” supposed to perform. They are ideal 
illustrations of how the represented worlds (that of the poem and the play) interact 
with the empirical world (the legal subject Howard was expected to embody). The 
Howard section (section five) of this chapter examines how literature can contort and 
distort empirical evidence for political purposes; specifically in this case, the politics 
of gender, and how those with authority can use literature to protect their position 
and to justify the social system itself.
A cultural criticism of the law recognises that
not only do literary and legal texts reflect the belief systems that 
inhere in their historical moments, they also participate in shaping 
those belief systems and those historical moments. Thus, fictive and
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legal texts alike . . . provide particular sets of documents for studying 
both cultural ideas and social change. (Baron and Epstein 673)
The fictionalisations of Howard and her trial reveal how one (law) can provide the
subject matter for the other (literature), as well as how the fictionalised portrayal of a
real-life person impacts on a readership’s or audience’s perception of the source i
material (the legal subject who goes to law and what happens to her). i
- J
Although Cary’s play and the Frances Howard material deal with different 
time periods (Biblical Judea and the seventeenth centuiy), the women in all three }
works are familiar with divorce law, and their interactions with the legal world run 
contrary to the ideal female legal norm. Although the subject matter in all three 
works is heavily indebted to the relationship between law and women, there has been ,«
J
little extant analysis done on the connection between divorce jurisprudence and
women as it appears in these texts. Nor have there been any connections made
between the texts themselves, despite their similar themes and their shared point in i
J
history.
While there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the publication of Cary’s 
play was instigated by the Howard trial, it is certainly plausible that this was the *
case. The Tragedy of Mariam “evidently circulated for some years in manuscript 
(Weller and Ferguson, Introduction 6),” before it was published in 1613 (Weller and 
Ferguson 179), the same year as Howard’s divorce proceedings. The Howard 
divorce was a popular, scandalous affair. Given the excitement and debate it 
provoked, it is not hard to imagine that a play written by a woman, in which marital 
duty and divorce figure as main themes, could well have been seen by its seller,
Richard Hawkins (Weller and Ferguson, Chronology 179), as a lucrative publication 
investment. Literature is not, of course, isolated from the extra-textual world, and
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the publication of Cary’s play may well exemplify how contemporary events (in this 
case, Howard’s divorce trial) influence a text’s public dissemination.
Kevin Sharpe and Steven Zwicker, arguing for an interdisciplinary approach 
to early-modern literature, state: “[t]o isolate literature is not only to deprive its 
language of the power of these associations [with other discourses] but also to deny 
the political its highest polemical mode (2. My addition).” The publication of The 
Tragedy of Mariam could have come about precisely because other categories, such 
as the legal system and the extant Howard case, as well as the potential political 
interest in a play representing the female perspective on divorce and marriage laws, 
impacted on the printing market of the time. Cary’s play, contemporary with 
Howard’s trial, often challenges the sentiments in Terracae’s and Osborne’s works. 
In doing so, it challenges the legal power of the dominant male discourse. It 
suggests that the law, by limiting itself to policing the wants and needs of a select 
social group, fails to reflect the plurivocity of society or adequately to protect those 
outside the most influential coterie. Furthermore, Cary’s play suggests that not 
every member of the general public internalised the laws governing them as 
appropriate control mechanisms.
These works have been chosen because they interact in revealing ways that 
show the tensions that can occur when two systems of authority - law and public 
opinion - are confronted by one of the very things they try to control - in this case, a 
woman who is meant to be subordinate to her husband but is not. The Cary text 
reveals an often discredited side of public opinion (one conspicuously absent from 
the Howard manuscripts and most non-literary treatises of the time), the perspective 
of women who were using legal knowledge to fight in the courts or the home against 
their husbands. Cary’s play, as I have argued, is significant because it portrays
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different legal bonds on women and the ways women loosened those binds or 
struggled against them. The Howard material is important because it would not exist 
if Frances Howard had not sued for a marriage annulment. Ironically, the woman 
vilified in the works provides their impetus because she is able to overthrow the 
social hierarchy using legal means, despite legal and social pressure to the contraiy.
All three literary texts in sections four and five represent challenges to 
legislated social policy by subversive women; dramatic and poetical evidence, 
perhaps, of the growing female litigation referred to in Chapter One. The texts often 
overtly suggest that the social values inherent in the mandates of the legal system 
and laws do not adequately represent empirical values and public opinion. Douglas 
Bruster argues, in Drama and the Market in the Age of Shakespeare, that an 
important component of the popularity of early-modern plays lies in “the 
attractiveness of change as a model with which to enfigure the meaning (and 
instability) of personal relationships” which the plays offered up for audience 
consideration (13). Read in juxtaposition, the texts imply that no system which tries 
to define and control normative behaviour can adequately reflect public opinion and 
practice, because opinion and practice in the empirical world is so widely varied that 
it denies easy classification and representation.
Before turning to the works themselves, it is crucial to analyse the theological 
and ideological assumptions that influenced divorce law in order to read the literary 
representations correctly. Divorce, for all the obvious reasons, depends on being 
married, and early-modern marital philosophy led to difficulties in obtaining divorce 
and reforming divorce law. First, then, I will discuss some of the theological and 
ideological underpinnings that impeded progressive moves towards divorce reform, 
and locked women into highly constrained legal positions. I will then outline the
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state of divorce law up to the time of James I in order to properly contextualise the 
literature I discuss in the final two sections.
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I. IN THE BEGINNING, GOD CREATED MARRIAGE
According to 25 Hen. VIII, c. 19, 1533, the church courts and canon law 
maintained jurisdiction over marriage annulment, so long as they did not work 
“contraryaunt or repugnant to the Kynges prerogatyve Royall or the customes lawes 
or statues of this Realme (Statutes of the Realm).” This legislation, ratified roughly 
four years after Henry’s first divorce and England’s break from Rome (A. F. Pollard 
26), upholds the absolute power of the monarch whilst ensuring support from the 
Church by leaving its jurisdiction, on the surface anyway, untouched.
It is surprising that a monarch who was himself divorced at the time the 
statute was created, would not alter the law that had impeded his own efforts to annul 
his marriage to Catherine of Aragon. Ironically, even after breaking from Rome to 
obtain the divorce he wanted, the Church of England’s stance on separation remained 
such that Henry was forced years later, in his annulment suit against Anne of Cleves, 
to argue on the ecclesiastical grounds “that her physical appearance was such as to 
render him impotent,” when he could not lawfully dispose of her with a treason 
charge (Phillips 77). Possibly, her physical appearance was also the source of 
“duress” entered in his plea (Baker 563). This is a question better left to historians, 
but it is possible that the law was worded in such a way as to pacify a religious 
system left in upheaval after the Reformation.
As A. F. Pollard points out, “never was revolution more skilfully draped as 
reform (26),” and part of its success may rest in the fact that components of the old 
system remained in place. In the post-Reformation legal system, “[cjanon law was 
allowed to remain in force in the ecclesiastical courts, although its authority was 
restricted and its study at the Universities was forbidden (Kitchin 174).” Another 
reason divorce law remained vested, in policy, with ecclesiastical courts that upheld
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the Roman law of marriage indissolubility was perhaps because of the influence 
hundreds of years of Catholic doctrine exerted on Anglican theology, as well as on a 
populace indoctrinated in those Catholic beliefs before the Reformation. Thus, the 
roots of marriage, the role of women within marriage, and the rules of divorce were 
still controlled, in policy, by restrictive theological doctrines, making theology the 
obvious starting-point for any discussion about early-modern divorce law and the 
female legal subject.
Protestant theology thus maintained the Catholic doctrine that bound the 
married couple together in a near-impenetrable knot. Godfrey Goodman argued in 
1618 that although humans are defective, “there are instruments and tooles 
appoynted to supplie our defects (A4r),” and one such “toole” is marriage.6 
Protestant doctrine taught that “marriage was ... a state divinely ordained for the 
procreation of children, the avoidance of fornication, and the mutual society, help 
and comfort of the couple (M. Ingram 128),” and a number of recurring themes 
appear in writing of the time to consecrate the matrimonial bond. All of these 
arguments form the foundations of the canon law jurisprudence that defines a wife’s 
legal rights in matters of divorce. This section illuminates the three main theological 
themes that affected divorce jurisprudence, and then illustrates how they interact 
with the female legal subject.
IA. EVE THE WIFE
The most widely accepted source of marriage in Christian theology, from 
Augustine to Agrippa and on to the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century 
writers they influenced, is the union between Adam and Eve. In the Garden of Eden, 
“[tjhe sacrament of matrimony, being most ancient, and fyrst after that man was
6 Taken from the writings of St. Paul (1 Cor.7.1-8).
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made, even at the begynnynge of all thynges, was ordeyned and commanded of god 
(Agrippa, Commendation Bir).” Marriage came about because “God himselfe 
delivered in the beginning; It is not good for man to bee alone, let us make him a 
helper meete for him. Therefore doth hee make him a helper (Abbot 44-5),” and 
woman was created. For this reason, Agrippa argues,
god the maker of al thynges, wold this most holy bonde so to be knit 
with indissoluble glewe, and persever, that the husbande in his wife, 
and the wife in her husband, shuld alwayes bothe lyve and abyde, as a 
bone of bones, a fleshe of fleshe. For this was the fyrst 
commaundement of god, institutynge matrimony. {Commendation 
Bi’-Bii1)7
Such belief creates an institution in which the man, and the needs of the man, are the
firm theological foundation.
When Gouge described in his sermon of 1622 the first meeting between man 
and woman, he revealed both the centrality of the husband to the marriage power- 
structure and the role assigned to all women who marry: “at the first making of this 
Law the woman was brought to him to see how he would like her: and having cast 
his affection on her, he was to be bound hereby to continue that good liking towards 
her: as also because of the preheminencie which man hath above his wife (111).” 
The husband’s needs are clearly first and foremost in this matrix, and as Abbot 
explains, the creation myth puts all power, even the power to define the woman 
herself, in the husband’s hands:
7 Agrippa’s argument is akin to, and probably influenced by that of St. Augustine, who writes in “On 
the Good of Marriage:” “a marriage once for all entered upon in the City of our God, where, even 
from the first union of the two, the man and the woman, marriage bears a certain sacramental 
character, can no way be dissolved but by the death of one of them (406).”
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[u]pon this framing of the woman the man pronounceth, This is now 
flesh of my flesh & bone of my bone: she shall bee called nuw, ishah, 
woman, because she was taken out of VZX; ish, the man: for this cause 
shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, 
& they two shall be one flesh. (Abbot 47)
Thus, Eve, who was created to be a wife, is the precedent for women’s relationship 
to men. It is perhaps for this reason that all women “are understood either married or 
to bee married and their desires or subject to their husband (B3V),” as Dodderidge
states in The Lawes Resolutions.
Because, as I show in Chapter One, women legally cease to exist as 
autonomous individuals when they marry, the viable corporeal body of the couple 
belongs to the husband. Therefore, although God instructed Adam not to eat from 
the tree of knowledge (Gen.2.3), “yet was it also to be observed by Eve, for as they 
were conjoyned in nature, so were they not to be separated in regard of their precept 
and grace (Salkeld 147).” As the wife of Adam, Eve was subject to the same legal 
dictates, whether she was specifically instructed in them or not. For this reason, 
when she broke the law, going against God and severing her bond with her husband 
by acting autonomously, the resulting punishment was, from a theological 
perspective, the most dire - expulsion from Eden and a life of pain and suffering 
(Gen.3.16).
Thus this first wife put in motion the earthly marital hierarchy which would 
legally constrain women, and as an analogy, she worked to the benefit of those in 
authority wanting to maintain the status quo. As Elizabeth Clarke and Herbert 
Richards write in their sourcebook on women and religion, “Eve, strangely enough, 
does not function as any kind of female symbol in the Old Testament. It was, rather,
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the early church fathers who understood what a useful service she might render as a 
prototype of female sensuality, stupidity, and treacherousness (29).” Thus, by the 
time of the early-modern period it was believed that women must be submissive to 
their husbands because God had commanded it at the Fall, and that the responsibility 
for their subordinate position generally rested with women themselves. The Eve 
argument has the power of tradition, divine will, and woman’s own fault on its side, 
and helps to shape not only women’s legal position in marriage, but the perception of 
women in general in the early-modern period. Furthermore, the early connection 
between bodies - that woman came from man and is metaphorically reunited with 
him after marriage - led to the second major trope used to argue against divorce.
IB. CONJOINED ORGANISMS: PEOPLE AND PLANTS
In John Donne’s Elegie XVI, “On His Mistris,” he describes his separation 
from her as akin to “all paines, which want and divorcement hath {Poems 99).” On 
one hand, he conjures up the emotional trials love wreaks on its participants; on the 
other, describing divorce as a physical pain, he alludes to the view, asserted by the 
creation myth, that men and women become one body when they fall in love and to 
separate them is to metaphorically destroy an organic whole. The two recurring 
metaphors for this in the early-modern period are either a conjoined body, or plants 
growing together to form a hybrid whole with two separate root systems - the early 
form of the family tree. In both cases, the underlying message is the same: in 
marriage the separate man and woman become one.
Because woman is made from man (Gen.2.21-2), once married, she returns to 
being flesh of his flesh. Being physically conjoined after marriage makes divorce 
problematic because as Thomas Gataker explains, “[i]t is easier glewing againe of
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boards together, that have beene unglewed, than healing up the flesh that is gashed 
and divided (Gataker 4).” Writing a year earlier, Gouge argues that
[t]he first, highest, chiefest, and most absolutely necessarie common 
mutuall dutie betwixt Man and Wife, is Matrimonial! Unitie, whereby 
husband and wife doe account one another to be one flesh, and 
accordingly preserve the inviolable union whereby they are knit 
together. (214-5)
These arguments illustrate the importance of conjoining in marriage indissolubly, 
and echo Agrippa who argues that divorce is unlawfull “bycause it is laufull for no 
manne to departe from him selfe, nor no man to leave him selfe (Agrippa Biir-Biiir).” 
Separation in the early-modern period is not seen as two individuals going their own 
ways, but as the metaphorical destruction of a single person, who, in legal terms, is
defined as the husband.
While heavily impacting on women, the conjoined body metaphor works 
against the husband as well, to the extent that he becomes responsible for his wife’s 
behaviour because she becomes a part of him. Gataker explains:
[h]e that hath an evill wife, is as one that hath an evill soule, a guilty 
conscience, that evermore sticketh by him, that every where 
accompanieth him. . . For what is said of the one, is as true of the 
other, the relation betweene them being alike. (6)
Any falling out between the couple reflected badly on the husband because “[i]t is an 
effect of Gods anger to light on a bad Wife: He that God is angrie with, shall fall 
(into that snare, or) into that pit (Gataker 61).” Thus, the early-modern wife who 
mistreats her husband recreates the pain, suffering and wrath of God that Adam 
experienced at the hands of Eve. In this way, she becomes locked in an argument
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that sustains the Eve myth by continually invoking it as the source of female 
insubordination and male suffering.
Because the creation myth transmogrifies husband and wife into the legally 
viable husband, women are subject to their husbands and are encouraged to learn 
their place. Whately writes that
[t]he whole duty of the wife is referred to two heads. The first is, to 
acknowledge her inferiority: the next, to cany her selfe as inferiour .
. . If shee stand upon terms of equality, much more of being better 
than he is, the very root of good carriage is withered, and the 
fountaine thereof dryed up. {Bride-Bush 36)8
He invokes the growth metaphor in his argument that sees husband and wife as the 
roots of the same organic system. This root system, however, is easily gendered to 
the exclusion of the wife. John Donne, in “Love’s Growth,” uses the organic 
metaphor to describe love growing like “grass” in the spring {John 4), but in this 
poem, “love’s awakened root {John 20),” from which “Gentle love deeds, as 
blossoms on a bough, / ... do bud out now {John 19-20),” is associated with the 
penis. Thus, although the growth metaphor does indeed illustrate the intertwining of 
two loves, the “roots” from which that love grows can have decidedly masculine 
connotations, thus firmly situating the power of regeneration with the husband, not
the wife.
The frontispiece of John Wing’s The Crowne Conjugall or, the Spouse Royall 
illustrates the separate organic roots of the husband and wife intertwining above 
them to form a single growth system, while they face one another holding a burning
8 He goes on to instruct the wife to tell herself: “I will not strive against GOD and nature. Though 
my sinne hath made my place tedious, yet I will confesse the truth, Mine husband is my superiour, my 
better (36).”
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heart in their joined hands. The illustration implies that husband and wife stand on 
equal footing, but the words under the woodcut delineate the parameters of their 
roles - the husband is the wife’s head, and the wife is the glory of her husband (so 
long, Wing goes on to explain, as she is subservient [S2v-S3r]). Legally, because the
The Hui band is the Wiucj head fcph.j. if. 
The Woman is <he glory of the Man, iCor. 11.7
Fig. 2. Husband and wife, woodcut from John Wing, The Crow tie 
Conjugall or, the Spouse Royall (Middleburg, 1620) frontispiece.
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husband is the woman’s head and they become one after marriage “[a]ll she hath is 
her husbands (42),” including herself, simply because she was created from man and
beholden to him after the Fall.
IC. THE SACRED MARRIAGE BETWEEN CHRIST AND HIS CHURCH
Adding to the solemnity of the physical union between husband and wife is 
the analogous connection between Christ and the Church. The wedding sermon
117
preached by R. Abbot in 1608 is a typical example of this tenet. In social 
relationships, he argues,
the society betwixt the husband and the wife ... is the roote and 
foundation of all the rest, most neere & strait in bond, most lovely in 
pleasance, most commodious in benefit and use; so specially serveth 
in holy scriptures to describe and set forth that conjunction betwixt
God and man ... to note the union and bond of amitie which is
betwixt God and us; God making himselfe the bridegroome; his 
church and people the spouse and bride. (Abbot 44)9
This argument makes the bond between husband and wife analogous to the bond 
between God and the people, Christ and the Church. As the anonymous Ste. B. 
explains,
[n]either is there any estate, wherein we may more lively behold, or 
sensiblie taste and feele, any sparckle or jot of the Lord our God, his 
etemall love to us, then in that united estate of man and wife; wherein 
two persons become but one, which still are two; and mutually owe to 
other severall dutie [sic]. (1-2)
Thus, the married state is “a lively paterne of more heavenly things (2),” or, the 
signifier of heavenly love unattainable on earth. As such, “man and wife be the 
mistery of god (Agrippa BVr),” and the union between them is given the respect such 
“mistery” deserves.
The covenant between husband and wife is sacred “because God is the author
& witnes of it, in his name it is made, & he shall require the performance of it
’Although Abbot uses the term “God,” this can be taken to mean “Christ” in concurrence with other 
theological texts of the time. This line of reasoning is an extension of St. Augustine’s argument that 
“the first natural bond of human society is man and wife (399).”
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(Abbot 49),”’0 as he requires the union between Christ and the Church, and Himself 
and the people. If marriage is argued from the pulpit to be the same as people’s 
relationship with God, in the model commanded by God, then the dissolution of the 
marital bond implies the destruction of the love between God and the people, Christ 
and the Church. Such an analogy places the highest level of condemnation on 
separation, because it creates an atmosphere in which marriage is a point of 
transcendence, metaphorically connected in a profoundly religious way to the 
metaphysical.
For women who wanted to exert themselves in the legal sphere, the Christ / 
Church analogy is inhibitive. It sustains rigid, pre- and divinely-ordained 
hierarchical roles in the marriage relationship. John Dove preaches that
[t]he man is the womans head, as Christ is the mans head, and God is 
Christs head, the woman is but the Image of the man, as the man is 
the Image of God. But there needes be more perfection in the head 
wherein are all the senses, vegetation & understanding, then in the 
bodie which hath but vegetation & one only sense, that is feeling; in 
the body, then in the shadowe; in the archetypus or first forme, then in 
the Image of the same. (57-8)10 1
This sermon, echoing St. Paul, Eph.5.22-3, as Milton does in Paradise Lost, Book 
Four when he describes the creation of man and woman, makes the wife’s place 
clear: her husband is her head in all things; her desires are subject to him as the 
desires of the body are subject to the head; and her subordinate role requires that she 
reverence and respect her husband as “unto the Lord,” in thoughts, deeds, and words
10 See also Gouge 204.
11 See also Gouge 16, 31.
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(and not too many of the latter, at that). Thus theologians could allege that “it were 
better to dwell in the comer of an house top, yea in the wildernesse, most desolate 
and solitarie: and as another saith, with dragons & beares, or other cruell beasts, 
then with the contentious and fro ward wife (S. B. 4).” Such a wife overturns the
divine will of God and undermines the hierarchical foundation on which the familial
matrix is based.
Within these pre-ordained roles Gouge argues it is important that
notice be taken of the particular callings wherein God hath set us, and 
of the severall duties of those callings, and conscience be used in the 
practise of them. He is no good Christian that is carelesse herein. A 
bad husband, wife, parent, childe, master, servant, magistrate or 
minister, is no good Christian. (16-7)
These teachings are the foundations of social expectations and divorce law 
jurisprudence. Everyone had their place, and if they were good Christians they
would adhere to it.
For women, subordination is an integral part of Christianly behaviour. The 
wedding sermon preached by Ste. B., however, implies that not all women meekly 
accepted the role foisted upon them. He argues that “[i]t standeth not in what man 
and wife shall conclude upon, that there may be peace & quietnes, but what order 
God hath prescribed them, to bee obeyed in their places (42),” and sternly advises
wives to:
look unto the hand of God, which made her the wife, and not the
husband, the weaker vessell, and not the stronger? the bodie, and not 
the head? to obey, and not to rule? that is, not to rule without
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obedience. To grudge hereat, is not against the husband, but against 
God withall: to governe otherwise, is not to rule, but to usurpe. (50)
He goes on to reason with his audience, asking, “can this be counted slaverie, or 
servill subjection? must there not be in some subjection? Can al (in a nation bee 
kings? Can all in a family bee fathers? can all be wives? can all be every thing (49- 
50).”12 The desperate tone of his rhetoric implies an uneasiness which could well 
have been fuelled by the obvious legal empowerment (and non-servile attitude) that 
litigious women were embodying by the time of James I.
ID. THEOLOGY OF DIVORCE
The three recurring metaphors described above - Eve, conjoining, and Christ 
and his Church - create the foundation for canon law divorce jurisprudence and seem 
to be highly restrictive for women. The arguments from the pulpit lead to a complex 
theological grounding for marriage law: parallels are drawn between marriage and 
the pre-lapsarian relationship between Adam and Eve; parallels are drawn between 
the relationship between husband I wife, God / man and Christ / church; marriage is 
seen to be the divine ordinance and will of God; and because man and woman 
transmogrify into the same flesh when they many, “our Saviour giveth us to 
understand that the breach and separation betwixt the husband and the wife, because 
they are but one flesh, is a thing unnatural as is the renting and sundring of one 
member of the bodie from another (Abbot 47).” Thus, Gouge can confidently preach
12 No closing parenthesis in text. He is not the only preacher whose work implies insubordination on 
the part of women. In fact, women who transgress the role urged upon them appear often enough in 
writing of the time to suggest that it was seen as a serious problem in the early-modern period. For 
evidence of this, see also: Caussin 475, 499 (although Caussin was French, his translated work found 
its place into the English-speaking market across the waters, and enjoyed four reprints, the last being 
in 1638, after its first publication in 1626 [Pollard and Redgrave 1: 218]); The Court of Good 
Counsell C2r, Dlr; Dillingham 10v; Gataker 15; Gouge 282, 286-7; T. Taylor, Good A2r; Whately, 
Bride-Bush 25-6, 38-9.
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in 1622 that a spirit of discord between a wife and husband “is a plaine diabolicall 
spirit, contrary to that spirit which is from above; and if it be not cast out, it will cast 
those whom it possesseth into the fire of hell (Gouge 227-8).”13 14It is seen to undo 
God’s intent; it directly thwarts God’s will and is implicitly the work of the Devil. 
Given this, it is not surprising that divorce was difficult to obtain from the church
courts.
As I mention in the introduction to this chapter, however, tensions existed 
between hard-line theological doctrine and attempts to reform the system that the 
doctrine sustained. These reform movements in turn imply that some theologians 
were willing to question the terms of the tenets set out against divorce. Although the 
marital hierarchy makes a woman’s desires subject to her husband’s, there are 
indications in early-modern writing to suggest that women were not entirely 
relegated to social, or even legal, invisibility.
Abbot preaches that the scriptures “teacheth the wife to remember her selfe, 
as not made of the foote to be troden upon, so neither of the head to be as a master or 
commander, but of the side; and as though as a companion, yet inferior to her 
husband (58).” The woman is “of the side” of the man for the simple reason that she 
was created from his rib: “[f]or they are joined one to another side by side, who 
walk together, and look together whither they walk (Augustine 399). 4 The image
13 See also Whately, Bride-Bush 3-4.
14 The locus of woman’s creation, the rib, plays an important function in understanding the 
relationship between men and women. John Salkeld explains that
the woman was not made neither of the most prinicipall, nor of the most base parts 
of man: not of the principal^ lest shee should be too impudent; neither of the baser, 
lest shee should be too much debased; shee was therefore created of the ribbe, and 
of that ribbe, which was next to the heart; the one to signifie the mediocritie of her 
condition; the other to insinuate the esteeme and respect, which both shee should 
have towards Adam, and Adam towards her; as also to signifie the heart, love, and 
fidelitie, which he should beare unto her, who had her being from so neere his heart. 
(173)
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of husband and wife, side by side yet still hierarchically distinct, is a recurring 
argument in Protestant literature. On the Continent, Calvin’s work for early 
Protestant reform stressed equality between husband and wife “in issues of sexuality, 
especially, for both husband and wife have equal conjugal rights and responsibilities 
and an equal right to divorce or remarry (M. Potter 726).” The Geneva Marriage 
Ordinances of 1561 asserted that a woman could divorce and remarry if her husband 
were convicted of adultery (Douglass 304).15 Like the frontispiece to Wing’s Crown 
Conjugall, the early Continental reforms imply an equality between the husband and 
wife, but only within specifically defined parameters. Although these reforms were 
not accepted in England, some of the philosophy was accepted in Protestant doctrine; 
thus, an English woman should no more behave as the head of the family or marital 
unit than she should a servant or slave, which strata would be associated with the
“feete” of the social hierarchy.
This “side-by-side” argument makes both husband and wife responsible for 
maintaining the marital union. Agrippa argues that
a wyfe is the mistery of god. & I thinke that he can not be with 
sufficient punishment vexed, which was so hardy to flee his helpe, 
comforte, and succour, and his companion to lyve with, gyven to hym 
by god, wicked agaynste the holy, a defyler of nature, and injurious to 
god. {Commendation Diiv)
Dove, writing in 1601, concluded:
This doctrine defines the sort of subjection women to owe men. Because she is made from man, she 
is subordinate to him, but “let us remember what subjection the wife must yeeld: politique, not servile 
and slavish subjection: as she was not made of the head of Adam, so was shee not made of his feete 
(100.”
15 Despite these efforts to reform divorce on the Continent, “with the exception of Henry VIII and a 
few other cases among the nobility, the liberal attitude towards divorce in Europe did not make its 
way to England (Auchter 49).”
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[h]e which loveth his wife, thinketh the lawe of divorcement 
superfluous and very needlesse: but where advantage of lawe is 
required for the undoing of marriage, there hatred appeareth; but 
where there is hatred of a mans wife, there is also fornication. (A6V)16
Unlike the pressures on the husband to remain married, however, for the wife the 
pressure is twofold - she rebels not only against God, but against the will of her 
husband whom she should obey in all things.17
Some women, however, did manage to divorce their husbands despite heavy 
opposition, because not all theologians accepted woman’s legal position in marriage 
as de facto based on the canonical teachings. This inevitably impacted on canon law 
jurisprudence. Certainly some of Agrippa’s writing supports the early-modern 
reform movement. He notes that the familial power structure is not based on 
inherent religious truths, but rather the arbitrariness of canon law:
all offyces belongynge to the common weale, be forbydden [women] 
by the lawes ... it is not permitted to a woman, though she be very 
wise and prudent, to pleade a cause before a Juge. Furthermore, they 
be repelled in jurisdiction, in arbiterment, in adoption, in intercession, 
in procuration, or to be gardeyns or tutours, in causes testame[n]tary 
and criminall . . . But the unworthy dealyng of the later lawe makers 
is so great, that breakyng goddes commaundemente, to stablysshe 
theyr owne traditions, they have pronounced openlye, that women 
otherwyse in excellency of nature, dignitie, and honour most noble, 
be in condicson more vyle than all men: And thus by these lawes the
16 He goes on to state very clearly that “no divorcement is lawfull” according to the teachings of 
Christ (1).
17 As Eve acknowledged in Paradise Lost when she tells Adam that he has sinned “Against God 
only,” whereas she has sinned against God and him (Milton 10: 931).
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women being subdewed as it were by force of armes, are constrained 
to give place to men and to obeye theyr subdewers, not by no naturall, 
no divyne necessitie or reason, but by custome, education, fortune, 
and a certayne tyrannicall occasion. (Nobilitie 368v-369v)18 19
He reveals the canon law to be a socially constructed institution designed to create 
and sustain power structures, and marks how it influences the creation of the female 
legal subject. Dove, who preaches that men and women who divorce are dishonest 
fornicators, also unexpectedly argues for the ability to remarry after a separation has 
been granted, because,
with a restraint from a second marriage, men and women are caused 
to burne in lust, and defrauded of that benefit which God hath 
appointed to be a remedie against fornication: and therefore by it, 
chastitie is not preserved, and by a consequent adultery is committed. 
(A7r)
These counter-arguments led to an environment of reform for divorce law in early- 
modern England, the most notable contribution to which was Archbishop Thomas 
Cranmer’s Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum.^ Although no legislation came of 
the reform proposals, the fact that they exist shows that despite hard-line dogma 
from the pulpit, not all theological arguments accepted the role of women laid out in 
the canons as the final word on the female legal subject and divorce law, and that the 
canon law was being reinterpreted by some in ways which could lead to rulings in
favour of women in the courts.
The reformist counter-arguments could have created an environment in 
which, despite heavy opposition, women were able to utilise the legal system in
18 Original text reads “theym.”
19 The Reformatio will be discussed further in section three of this chapter.
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matters of divorce, or, as Cary’s Mariam suggests, were able to obtain knowledge 
about their legal rights and responsibilities in marriage. The growing numbers of 
women involved in litigation by the time of James I indicate that not all women took 
urgings from the pulpit to heart, and some of them subverted the canon laws which 
attempted to constrain them as silent, chaste and submissive and which tried to erase 
them entirely as legal subjects through coverture. In many cases, the body rebelled 
against the head, and, as in the case of Frances Howard, won, despite legal 
impediments.
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II. FAMILY AND STATE: NATURAL POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF WIVES IN EARLY-MODERN ENGLAND
It is perhaps a miscalculation to separate ideology and theology in examining 
the beliefs that led to the legal circumstances of women in the early-modern period. 
Religion is intricately embedded in the social ideas and political movements of the 
time, and therefore this section will at times unavoidably intersect with the previous 
one. However, there are some early-modern social truisms which, while they are 
related to the theological foundation of a divinely-ordained hierarchy, are 
transformed to the extent that they move away from theology. These, too, deny easy 
access to divorce. In this section, I outline the social convictions that, along with 
theology, made up the cultural and intellectual milieu contributing to early-modern 
jurisprudential expectations of normative female behaviour.
IIA. THE LITTLE COMMONWEALTH
By far, the most prevalent social theory impacting on divorce jurisprudence is 
the analogy between family and State. Couples were advised to “love, respect and 
cherish grace one in another (T. Taylor, Good 9),” because the husband and wife are 
the primary social unit of the family, the ultimate foundation for the commonwealth. 
In general, “the family based on the conjugal couple was the primary matrix of 
procreation and of the socialisation ... of the young,” and “the family household was 
... a vehicle for the accumulation and transmission of property, and ... the 
fundamental institution of social order and political authority (M. Ingram 125).” The 
authority the family institutionalised in the early stages of socialisation is that of the 
king and the patriarchy.
Law, like the “natural” family unit, and the power structures that lie therein, 
was also seen as a “natural” part of society, ‘“like the nerves of the body physical’ . .
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. because it was ‘caused’ by the spontaneous generation of popular usages in the 
course of time, and because it was established by ‘common consent’ and confirmed 
by ‘common interest’ (Kelley, Human 169).” This legal theoiy is tied veiy closely to 
early-modern theories of State which subscribe that “people . . . under lawful and 
kingly governance, [take] the form of a ‘body mystical’ analogous to the ‘body 
natural’ described by Aristotle (Kelley, Human 169).”20 The law, like marriage, is 
an image of the State - both of which are based on an organic metaphor.21 This 
organic imagery supports the argument that the State functions in a natural way, that 
the roles of people within the State are naturally predetermined, and that legal 
machinations are extra-human, a product of natural social growth, and influenced 
heavily by divine will.
Of course, customs, collective habits and social patterns are not natural but 
the social constructions which sustain the status quo. As Martin Ingram points out, 
“royal and patriarchal authority were mutually validating reflections or natural 
manifestations of a divinely ordered hierarchy (125),” and the family, both a part of 
and a microcosmic manifestation of the natural, divinely ordered hierarchy became 
analogous with the State itself - “a little Commonwealth, by the good government 
whereof, Gods glorie may be advanced, and the commonwealth which standeth of
severall families benefited; and all that live in that familie receive much comfort and
20 Original text reads “takes.”
21 Grantley and Taunton inadvertently explain the prevalent use of this metaphor for State, law and 
marriage:
an interest in the human body might be considered a natural product of humanist 
interest in the material and philosophical realities of terrestrial existence. 
Renaissance humanism quite understandably propelled the contemplation of the 
human body to the centre stage of early-modern culture, whether in respect of the 
human form in art, or the body as material for self-fashioning, as a source of 
metaphor, as a contention over sexuality, as a source of political or magical power, 
or as a signifier of otherness, to name but a few facets of this potent focus of 
cultural discourse. (5)
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commoditie (Dod and Cleaver, Godly A7r).” The social roles attributed to members 
of the family were considered natural, “for our particular places and callings are 
those bonds whereby persons are firmely and fitly knit together, as the members of a 
naturall body by nerves, arteries, sinewes, veines, and the like, by which life, sense 
and motion is communicated from one to another (Gouge 16),” and out into the 
larger “body” of society itself.
Patrick Collinson explains that in the early-modern period the connection 
between church, State and home “was more than a telling analogy. It was believed, 
for example, by mid-Tudor statesman Sir Thomas Smith, that complex social and 
political structures had their origins in the family (60).” Therefore, if the family 
were challenged or disrupted, the hierarchical propaganda of the State it was 
supposed to represent would have been undermined. Simply, “[t]he reasons of this 
doctrine are cleere; for the family is a seminary of the Church and common-wealth . . 
. for in families are all sorts of people bred and brought up: and out of families are 
they sent into the Church and common-wealth (Gouge 17).” Essentially, from a 
good or bad family come good or bad church-members and citizens.
It is therefore important that the family functions effectively as a unit which 
will, ideally, instill in its members the beliefs and values of the model citizen; thus 
“[mjariage is a kind of publike action: the well or ill ordering thereof much tendeth 
to the good or hurt of a family, Church, and common-wealth. For by mariage
families are erected, and Church and common-wealth increased and continued
(Gouge 204).” These theories suggest that if the family were to disintegrate, two 
things could ensue: first, the metaphor for a well-functioning State and 
commonwealth would be undermined; and second, because of this, society would 
perceive the children of a dissolved family as being unfit to contribute to a well-
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ordered State. Thus, to divorce could be considered an uncivil act, because it 
destroys the very foundation on which society is built.
IIB. THE LIEUTENANT WIFE
In order for a marriage to contribute sound and civil members to society two 
things were considered necessary: first, the marriage had to be good, and, as Gouge 
is quoted as arguing on page 119, the key to a good marriage lies first in the 
individuals maintaining their prescribed roles; and second, perhaps more 
importantly, the wife has to be a good person (as defined by the prevalent patriarchal 
ideology and theology), because her role in lieu of her husband as ruler of the small 
kingdom, the private sphere,22 is recognized to be of the utmost importance for 
raising children and maintaining a happy home.
The good relationship between wife and husband was critical to sustain the 
“little commonwealth wherein, there are divers societies and degrees, reciprocally 
relating, and mutually depending one upon another. The highest degree or societie is 
between the husband and the wife; and this is as the first wheele of a clocke, that 
turneth about all the rest in order (S. B. 40).” The wife’s role in the microcosmic 
state was to govern the home “to the honour of her husband (S. B. 44),” or, more 
plainly, in the way he would have wanted it governed. In fact, according to William 
Crompton, the fifth duty of a wife is “in governing her little Kingdome; like a well- 
ordered Army, every one furnisht, hath his place of employment assigned; Lawes 
enacted (Crompton 4).” The language Crompton uses indicates the close ideological 
connection between family and State, and highlights a jurisprudentially active role 
for the wife, who can try and punish under her “lawes,” the household rules.
22 As Dillingham writes, “the mans calling is to handle things abroad; her calling is to deale with 
things at home (9V).”
130
It is the duty of the wife to run the home because “[tjouching the other 
dueties of wives, as to abide at home, whence she is called an houswife, & to keep 
chastity, they may well bee included in these two; for shee that is a right helpe, shee 
will remaine at home, and keepe herselfe chaste (Dillingham 10v).” She is relegated 
to the private sphere and, in jurisprudential theory at least, that domain is the only 
place in which she is allowed to wield power (under strict guidance from her 
husband). In the ideal husband / wife relationship,
[h]ee must instruct, she must learne; he must guide, she must follow, 
he must admonish, she must hearken; he must allow her cheerefully 
out of his estate, she must conforme her selfe contentedly to his 
estate. He must not straiten her, and she must not undoe him: he
must trust her, and she must not deceive him: he must not be bitter,
and she must not be stout. In a word he must ever account her for his
Love, and shee must ever esteeme him as her head. (Hieron 24)
Thus, a woman must conform to the standards which society, in the body of the 
husband, sets for her, because society determines what behaviour is best to raise
ideal citizens.
The ideal woman, so important to a happy marriage, “is like a starre with five 
rayes, which are the five vertues, of Devotion, Modesty, Chastity, Discretion, and 
Charity (Caussin 485).” A woman who steps outside those “five vertues” does not 
fulfill her role as a good wife. Such women are dangerous because “[tjhere are noted 
to be in the hart of a woman the passions of a Tyrant, and should they continually 
have wheeles and gibbets at their Commaund, the world would become a place of 
torture, and execution (Caussin 479)” - a world to be avoided indeed! Tellingly,
women who do not conform to social ideals are described as
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able to give a lesson to the greatest Lawiers in matter of processe, so 
well are they versed therein: they know all the tearmes of Litigious 
pleadings better then ever did Labeon or Tribonius, and they so 
cunningly make use thereof, that they tyre the strongest patiences by 
the trickes, and flexibilityes which they invent. (Caussin 475)
The implication is that the bad wife will know about the law, despite impediments,
and will use it to undo the men around her.
Although writers acknowledge that despite best efforts some women will rule 
over their husbands, they agree that if it is done prudently, and carries with it an air 
of subjection, it is not to be considered wayward behaviour, because “those women 
know how in time and place to be obedient to their husbands {Court Dlv).” 
However, “there are some such shameles women, that they will not at any time be 
commanded, but by their exclamations, scolding and brawling, continually: alwayes 
with-standing their husbands wills and make a mock at them {Court Dlv).” It is the 
latter sort of wife who undoes the foundation of society by destroying her marriage, 
and this sort of woman is to be constrained or avoided. Contrariwise, the virtuous 
wife, who is “like well-tuned Virginals, her life is perfect & Musicke: no harsh 
sounds, nor jarrings strings on her brest: if she intreat, it is with humility; if she 
complaine, it is with teares, if she chide, it is with smiles: how can she displease, 
whose harmlesse thoughts are still intent to please (Crompton 6),” is ideal and is to 
be sought out. As an anonymous author wrote in 1621, “there are foure things that 
deceive a man out of his owne house, smoke, fire, a rotten roofe, and a churlish wife
{Discourse 79).” The pressure such ideology places on the wife creates a legal 
paradox. On one hand, she ceases to exist, on the other, she is the keystone to a 
successful, smoothly-running Commonwealth.
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These social expectations impacted heavily on the female legal subject. As a 
feme covert, the woman was supposed to be “hidden” not just metaphorically by 
becoming one with her husband after marriage, but also literally by staying indoors 
and keeping silent. As Aristodemou argues, “[mjarriage in this context becomes less 
an institution for ensuring mutual love and cooperation than a tool for reproducing 
patriarchal authority behind the guise of love and consent (98).” Thus, according to 
ideology, the legal female subject would be no subject at all. Unseen and unheard, 
she would raise her children and manage her household in accordance with her
husband’s wishes and with the State’s best interests in mind. A woman who
oversteps these boundaries would confront society as an autonomous, existing, 
exposed individual, and would subvert and challenge the social assumptions that 
work to keep her closeted. Furthermore, women who go to law successfully 
challenge the metaphor for the Commonwealth, in which everyone contributes by 
happily maintaining their “naturally” predetermined role, because they throw into 
question a woman’s relationship to her husband and her “natural” place in society.
Despite theological decrees to the effect that “there is no Societie more neere, 
more entire, more needfull, more kindly, more delightfull, more comfortable, more 
constant, more continuall, than the Societie of Man and Wife; the maine Roote, 
Source and Originall of all other Societies (Gataker 28-9),” and social theories that 
uphold the family as the primary unit of public life, marriage was not always heaven 
on earth. As Ste. B. wrote in 1608,
this Image of Gods love, and of our eternall and most happie 
conjunction with Christ, (he the head, and we the members; hee the
husband, and we the wife; hee, our welbeloved one, and we his aswell
133
beloved) is not to bee found in everie conjunction (as wofull 
experience giveth cause of complaint to many). (4)
Thus, although most theological and ideological rhetoric condemned separation, 
canon law did allow for marriage annulment in certain circumstances.
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III. DESTROYING THE WHOLE: EFFECTS OF THEORY ON DIVORCE LAW
Separation in early-modern England had three main avenues: the first was 
private separation which was “thought to be very common in the later sixteenth and 
early seventeenth centuries, and may well have outnumbered those decreed by the 
courts (Houlbrooke 118);” the second was the practice of wife-selling, restricted 
mainly to the lower classes, in which
sales were often pre-arranged, taking place at market or in a pub in 
order to publicize or validate the exchange. The woman was 
supposed to give her consent; often she was disposed of to a lover . . . 
Sales were often accompanied by legalizing actions, including the 
payment of a market or turnpike toll, the statement of a minimum 
price, the presence of witnesses or even the drafting of a written 
agreement (Menefee 2) . . .
and the third was a legal separation granted by the courts. While the first two 
methods were accepted for the most part as valid (at least until the reign of James I 
when they were strictly outlawed which, in turn, may have led to the increasing 
numbers discussed in Chapter One using the formal court systems), this thesis 
focuses on the legal doctrine of divorce and the shaping of the empirical and literary
23 In fact, they outnumbered court separations so much by the time of James I, that he enacted I Jac. I, 
c. 11, which legislated extreme punishment for private separations:
[f]orasmuch as divers evil disposed persons beinge maried, runne out of one 
Countie into another, or into places where they are not knowen, and there become 
to be maried, havinge another husband or wife livinge, to the greate dishonour of 
God and utter undoinge of divers honest mens children and others; Be it therefore 
enacted by the Kings Majestie, with the consent of the Lordes Spirituall and 
Temporall, and of the Commons in this present Parliament assembled, That if any 
person or persons within his Majesties Domynions of England and Wales, beinge 
maried, or which hereafter shall marie, doe at any tyme after the ende of the Session 
of this present Parliament, marrye any person or persons, the former husband or 
wife beinge alive, and then everie such offence shalbe Felonie, and the person and 
persons so offendinge shall suffer death as in cases of Felonie. (Statutes of the 
Realm)
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female legal subject. Therefore, I will examine court-based separation practices 
only.
Officially, there were two types of separation given by the church courts.24 
The first was divorce a vinculo, which considered the marriage “a nullity from the 
beginning, and no legal proceedings were needed to make it so (Baker, Introduction 
560).” This type of divorce could be claimed in marriages where the parties were 
married before the age of consent,25 for precontract,26 for close blood relationships 
(consanguinity) which could include any number of degrees of separation, as Figure 
3 below shows, for close relationship through marriage or other physical 
connections,27 for impotence, for physical disability, “if the woman be infected with 
a contagious disease, that hee [the husband] cannot doo the office of an husband 
without manifest daunger of his life (Dove 29. My addition),” or present marriage to 
another (Gouge 180-6).28 If any of these criteria were met, it meant that the marriage
24 Given the sanctity of marriage these two avenues were often seen as theologically inviable. Dove 
writes that “the first [a vinculo} he [Christ] saith may not bee, because it is contrary to the institution 
of marriage; the second [a mensa et thoro}, if unhappily it followe, that for the incontinencie of the 
one partie, the other partie be grieved and cannot be reconciled unlesse they depart, yet that departure 
be but for a season, until they can be reconciled againe, and that is no divorcement (28. My 
additions).”
25 The ages considered too young were under 12 for girls and under 14 for boys. See: Cranmer 92­
99; and Baker, Introduction 560-1.
26 This was the one condition which underwent emendation during the early-modern period. 32 Henry 
VIII, c. 38 (1540) stipulates
mariages being contracte and solemnised in the face of the church and consummate 
with bodily knowledge or ffute of childerne or childe being had therin betwene the 
parties so maried, shalbe by auctoritie of this present parlament aforesaid demed 
judged and taken to be lauful good juste and indissoluble, notwithstanding any 
precontractse or precontractis of matrimony. (Statutes of the Realm)
This statute was repealed by 2 & 3 Edward VI, c. 23 (1548), however, because it relieved persons of 
precontract, and by Edward’s time, too many people, “after the making of it, very dissolutely come 
from their first vowes, and, as it were in spight of conscience and Ecclesiastical! censure, coupled 
themselves bodily with such as they newly fancied, slipperily leaving their former Contracts 
(Dodderidge, Lawes 69).”
27 See also Dodderidge, Lawes 66 and 71 for a list of the prohibited degrees of marriage.
28 See also Dodderidge, Lawes 65-6 and 68-70.
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had been invalid ab initio (from the beginning). The couple were not considered to
be legally man and wife, and there was no impediment to remarry because in the
view of the law there had been no marriage to begin with.
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Bullinger, The Christen State of Matrimony (London,
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The second form of separation which could be granted by the church courts 
was divorce a mensa et thoro (from board and hearth). This judicial separation could 
be sued for in cases of “adultery, cruelty, sodomy, and heresy, or for fear of future 
injury (Baker 562),” and was the early-modern equivalent of modern divorce law,
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with the exception that neither of the parties had the right to remarry afterwards - 
their bodies were still considered one under law.29
These rules of divorce were so well known that playwrights were able to 
make good use of them. The most notable literary instance is Ben Jonson’s 
Epicoene, the only comedy of the time to end in a divorce. Because “the canon law 
affords divorce but in few cases (V.iii.67-8),” Morose, the unlikable uncle of the 
protagonist, Dauphine, is left only with the option of pleading manifestam 
frigiditatem, or impotency, in order to divorce his new wife a vinculo (V.iii. 158). 
Epicoene, his wife, refuses to allow the divorce to go through, however, saying she 
will “take him with all his faults (V.iv.59-60).” Dauphine’s allies, Clerimont and 
Cutbeard, are correct when they announce: “Why then, ’tis no divorce, Doctor, if 
she consent not. / ... No if the man be frigidus, it is parte uxor is, that we grant 
libellum divortii in the law (V.iv.62-4).” Only if a wife complains about her 
husband’s impotence can a divorce bill be granted. In the end, Dauphine reveals 
Epicoene to be a boy dressed as a woman, and the divorce is easily granted on the 
grounds of error personae (V.iv.189-191), or contract “to one person thinking her 
another (V.iii.82).” Jonson’s characters adhere to the rigid mandates of the 
ecclesiastical courts, and that his final Act is able to go into the legal detail it does
29 See also Dodderidge, Lawes 64. Dove outlines the seven exceptions for granting a separation a 
mens a et thoro\
if the woman be inforced by violence not giving consent, as Dinah was: if by 
plaine and simple oversight shee bee deceived, taking one for an other ... if the 
woman by great presumptions in lawe, and the generall view of the world, 
supposing her husband by his long absence to be dead, doo by publike allowance 
without guilt of conscience marry an other: if her husbande himselfe be consenting 
to her adultery, as Sara gave her maide Agar to lie with Abram, for then it is his 
fault as well as hers: if hee by refusing to accompany with her hath abused her 
weaknesse and so given her occasion to fall, he cannot with a good conscience be a 
plaintive against her: if he knowing his wife to bee incontinent to beare with her for 
the present time, hee ought not afterward to complain, because lawe doth suppose a 
reconciliation & forgivenesse of the crime, and after forgivenesse there ought to bee 
no punishment. (29-30)
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indicates that his audience would have been versed well enough in legal language, or 
at least the principles of divorce, to enjoy his scenes.
The state of divorce law thus seems rather straightforward, but, of course, the 
jurisprudence of divorce, and divorce practices, were not as simple as is laid out in 
the legal texts (or Jonson’s play). The tensions that existed behind the law must be 
examined in order to carry out a cultural criticism using Jacobean literary 
representations. The next section sets out to describe divorce law as it stood by the 
early seventeenth centuiy, not just the written law, but the way that law was put to 
practical use, and how a wife’s rights (or lack thereof) were impacted upon under
that law.
IIIA. PROBLEMS WITH JURISDICTION: THE CANON AND THE STATUTES
The state of divorce law and the courts during the early-modern period was 
complicated, to say the least. The divorces of Henry VIII
had bastardised two future queens of England: Mary, the daughter of 
Katharine of Aragon, and Elizabeth, the daughter of Anne Boleyn. 
Needless to say, each of them upon her accession restored her 
legitimacy by act of parliament, and in so doing demonstrated more 
finally than their father had done the sovereign power of parliament 
to interfere with the laws of marriage . . . Parliament had begun to do 
what the medieval Church had considered the exclusive province of 
God. Even so, the legislation at first interfered only with the 
interpretation and application of the rules to particular cases, not with 
the rules themselves. (Baker, Introduction 564-5)
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This shifting power-base did affect the rules, however, during the reign of Edward 
VI, when the Marquis of Northampton introduced a new precedent to divorce law. 
He had been legally separated from his wife and wished to remarry, but because 
canon law disallowed remarriage, he did not receive permission to do so from the 
ecclesiastical courts. He disregarded the ruling, married anyway, and then applied to 
Parliament for legal validation. His new marriage was allowed by a Parliamentary 
bill (Strype 2: 44-5).
This precedent meant that any theological principle disbarring remarriage 
after separation “could be dispensed with ad hoc by parliament; and it bore hard on 
those who could not afford the dispensation (Baker, Introduction 566).” The shifting 
power paradigms within the State and laws led to a system in which the problems 
inherent in overlapping jurisdictions were complicated by struggles between 
reformists and conservatives, and the outcome was an entanglement of 
parliamentary and church courts attempting to uphold marriage annulment laws that 
were not themselves clearly enough defined in the first place to allow uniform 
application across the various court jurisdictions.
The noted barrister Edward Coke writes that “[tjhe law spiritual, is the 
ecclesiastical laws allowed by the laws of this realm . . . which are not against the 
common law . . . nor against the statutes and customs of the realm (B5V).” Thus, 
although ecclesiastical laws still vested solely with the church courts, these courts
30 The new laws clashed with the laws of the traditional canon, and were sometimes lambasted by 
theologians:
[d]o not tell me of mens new lawes concerning divorcement, but of Gods olde lawe 
concerning marriage, for God at the day of judgement shall not judge thee according to the 
lawe which man hath devised, but according to that which his selfe hath commaunded. But 
the positive lawe which God prescribed to man in his creation was this, that hee should 
during his life cleave unto that wife which he hath at the first taken unto him. And that lawe 
of marriage is by so much more auncient then this of divorcement, as innocencie is before 
sinne. (Dove 32-3)
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had to acknowledge both common and statutory law. If the church courts worked 
against these latter two forms of law, parties could access other court systems for 
redress if they had the means. Because the church courts denied access to 
remarriage, “[t]he only legal way to divorce one spouse and marry another was by 
Act of Parliament - a difficult, expensive, and uncommon procedure (Sommerville 
194).” For women, with little or no legal access to independent funds, the situation 
was exacerbated. Thomas Heywood’s literary representation of Luce in The Wise- 
Woman of Ilogsdon, 1638, offers a female perspective hard to find in non-literaiy
texts.
When Luce’s secret husband intends to marry another woman publicly31 she 
argues with her father:
To claim a public marriage at his hands 
We want sufficient proof, and then the world 
Will but deride our folly, and so add 
Double disgrace unto my former wrong.
To law with him? He hath a greater purse
And nobler friends. How, then, to make it known? (IV.ii. 121 -6)
Her lines give voice to the oft-neglected lower-class women who could find 
themselves in such a position of thwarted precontract.32 Literature, in this case, 
gives a much broader view of the system than legal tracts alone can provide. Luce 
vents her frustrations at a system that effectively bars those who do not have the 
money and influence to access the Act of Parliament which would give them 
conjugal rights. Wives, who lost all right to real monies after marriage, would have
31 Possibly pursuant to 32 Henry VIII, c. 38 which allowed church weddings to take primacy over 
unsanctioned precontracts.
32 The anonymous Parlament of Women refers to this problem as well, and attempts to redress it by 
castrating men who do not honour precontract.
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found it very difficult to pursue a divorce and get permission to remarry through the 
Parliamentary system. These impediments, as I explain in the next section, were 
hotly contested by legal reformers of the period.
IIIB. THWARTED REFORM: THE REFORMATIO LEGUM ECCLESIASTICARUM AND 
WOMEN’S MARRIAGE RIGHTS
Because of the problems that overlapping jurisdictions created for separations 
and remarriages in the time of Henry VIII, theological reformers “believed that the 
marriages made possible by divorce [remarriages] would contribute more to the 
totality of morality, just as enforced celibacy and separated men and women [who 
did not have the legal right to remarry] detracted from it (Phillips 94. My 
additions).” There was, therefore, a pressing theological need to allow remarriage 
after divorce because “many innocent parties among the laity had been interpreting 
these sentences of separation from bed and board as de facto grants of permission to 
remarry (Stone, Road 304).” The right to remarry became “a great question 
depending among the citizens (Strype 2: 44),” and new legislation was required in 
order to avert ecclesiastical charges of mass bigamy. To further this end, Henry VIII 
appointed a Commission of sixteen spiritual and sixteen temporal persons “to draw 
up such laws ecclesiastical as should be thought by the king and them convenient to 
be used in all spiritual courts (Strype 1: 295).” The product of the Commission, 
headed by Archbishop Thomas Cranmer, was the Reformatio Legum
Eccl esiasticarum.
Unfortunately “all this great and long labour of the archbishop came to no 
effect by reason of the king’s untimely death, and, it may be, the secret opposition of 
papists (Strype 1: 298).” Despite never being ratified, however, the Reformatio 
clearly lays out ecclesiastical law as it stood at the time of the Commission, and
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highlights points of legal contention - the points which Cranmer and his Committee 
suggested be reformed to better suit, or reflect, the needs of the populace. It is 
therefore a crucial text for any cultural criticism of divorce law, because it overtly 
suggests the ways in which laws were seen to be working against the good and the 
will of society.
The Reformatio proposes that divorce be granted for adultery, desertion, long 
absence, deadly hostility, and prolonged ill-treatment (99-104). It proposes that the 
“innocent, if desirous, shall be allowed to proceed to a fresh marriage” and the guilty 
party shall be “condemned to perpetual banishment or committed to prison for life 
(100).” What is most striking, besides the new mandate that remarriage be 
allowed, is that for the first time divorce could be granted for abuse. A husband who
showed “excessive violence” towards his wife “must be considered his wife’s mortal
enemy and a danger to her existence. Wherefore she, in her peril, must be helped by 
the remedy of divorce, no less than if her life had been openly attacked (103).” The 
proposed change indicates that wife-abuse was beginning to receive recognition in 
the early-modern period,33 4 and was a radical step away from the doctrine which 
advocated patience and taught that “an unhappy marriage was to be borne as a cross 
(Phillips 106).” In short, it implies a shift in the definition of the rights of the female 
legal subject, which would inevitably bear on the construction of the female subject
herself.
33 The problem of remarriage after divorce, as 1 have discussed already in this chapter, would be 
dubiously solved under Edward VI by Northampton’s new precedent.
34 Popular songs of the time, particularly those by Martin Parker, often blame the husband for 
mistreating his wife and show sympathy to women who found themselves in dangerous or unhappy 
marriages. See, by Parker: Bonny; Cooper; and Married-Womans. Women were urged to choose 
their husbands carefully, lest they end up in a dire situation from which it was legally difficult to 
extricate themselves.
143
This is not to say that there was a huge change concerning the physical power 
men were allowed to wield over women; the Reformatio, which offers the most 
progressive suggestions for legal reform, is quick to point out that the proposed 
changes do not abrogate the power of husbands when it comes to “restraining wives 
in whatever ways are necessary, should they be rebellious, obstinate, petulant, 
scolds, and of evil behavior, provided that the husband does not transgress the limits 
of moderation and equity (103).” What constituted “moderation and equity” was at 
the discretion of the judges hearing each particular' case.35 Although the Reformatio 
did not become law because Henry died before he could ratify and legislate it, during 
Edward Vi’s and Elizabeth I’s reigns divorces were
granted by the ecclesiastical courts in accordance with the Reformatio 
Legum ... at any rate on the ground of adultery, and no one 
questioned the right of parties to re-marry until near the end of 
Elizabeth’s reign in 1601, when the Star Chamber, presided over by 
the then Archbishop . . . declared that marriage was by English law 
indissoluble. (Kitchinl80)
The fact that the Reformatio exists at all, however, is a clear indication that some 
people in positions of power within the law-making system saw divorce law, as it 
stood, to be an inadequate reflection of the needs of the populace. Unlegislated, the 
Reformatio did not have a far-reaching effect on legal practice, and divorce 
continued to be difficult for men and women alike. For women, however, the 
process was exacerbated by their prescribed social role within the hierarchy.
35 The infamous Rule of Thumb springs to mind.
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IIIC. THE WIFE FOREVER: DIVORCE CONSTRAINTS ON THE FEMALE LEGAL 
SUBJECT
Because, as I explained in section IB, the only viable legal body in marriage 
was the husband’s, husbands simply had more legal rights. Even if a woman were 
prepared to undergo an arduous court annulment, “under English common law an 
annulment barred the woman from her dower rights (declaring that the union had 
never constituted a true state of marriage) and bastardised any children born of the 
union (M. Ingram 145).” Given this state of affairs, the potential legal consequences 
of marital discord weighed more heavily on women than on men. In fact, 
Houlbrooke points out that “such strife was a major cause of anxiety, especially to 
women, among the patients of Richard Napier [astrological physician, 1559-1634] in 
the early seventeenth century (114. My addition),” because inside and outside the
courtroom, it was the wife who most often bore the brunt of social blame for marital 
breakdown.36 Women were more often answerable to society because in marriage 
the wife’s duty is “[fjirst, that she reverence her husband. Secondly, that she submit 
herselfe, and be obedient unto him (Dod and Cleaver, Godly O3V).” Therefore, if the 
marriage were unsuccessful, it was more likely to be the wife’s lack of obedience 
than the husband’s inability to guide her (which could, in the end, be blamed on her 
lack of obedience, anyway) that caused the breakdown.
The prototype for marital hardship is, not surprisingly, the Fall, in which 
“discord and unhappiness . . . had entered marriage with the . . . beginning of sin 
(Phillips 99).” The Fall is traditionally attributed to Eve who accepted the apple 
from the Devil, and “just as the serpent used Eve’s weakness to tempt Adam to sin, 
so the devil did his work of matrimonial destruction through the wife (Phillips 104).” 
In short, “domestic discord . . . was the devil’s work . . . [and] it was the neglect of
See for example: B. 55-7, 59, 92-3; Gataker 14,20, 61; and Gouge 27-9, 277,281-82.
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duties by women upon which most of the immediate blame for the marriage 
breakdown was placed (Phillips 102-3. My addition).” The early-modern 
stereotypes of women, which set them up as inherently weak and irrational led 
inevitably to the idea that they were easily-appropriated vessels for demonic means.
Fig. 4. Wife stabbing her husband with the Devil at 
her back, woodcut from The Unnaturall Wife (London,
[1628]) frontispiece.
The frontispiece woodcut to The Unnaturall Wife (Fig. 4 above) shows the devil at 
the wife’s back, influencing her as she stabs her husband. Women do not work 
autonomously, the picture implies; the devil lies behind their destructive actions.
The presupposed purveyors of all that went wrong in a marriage, wives were 
not supported by divorce laws of the time. Stone argues that, ‘"most suits launched 
by a wife were in reality blackmail devices to improve the financial terms of a 
separation which had already physically taken place,” unlike the “uncontested or 
nominally contested suits brought by a husband [which] were usually part of a 
collusive arrangement by which both parties conspired together to prepare the
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ground for a parliamentary divorce (183. My addition).” In the latter case, although 
the wife may have been amenable to the separation suit, it was the husband who 
more often than not brought it before the parliament,37 and although Stone does not 
cite any vehemently contested suits, some certainly must have existed in the society 
described by John Strype, where
[njoblemen would very frequently put away their wives, and marry 
others, if they like another woman better or were able to obtain wealth 
by her. And they would sometimes pretend their former wives to be 
false to their beds, and so be divorced, and marry again such whom 
they fancied (2: 182),
thus robbing the wife of any financial claims on him, her dower and illegitimising 
their children. Such was the state of divorce law for women by the time of James I - 
the time when Mariam of Jewry, Salome, Doris and Frances Howard stepped out 
onto the public stage for the audience’s scrutiny.
37 This most likely had to do with the financial constraints marriage imposed on women that I 
mentioned earlier in this chapter.
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IV. MARIAM, SALOME AND DORIS: READING THE FEMALE LEGAL SUBJECT
As evidenced in the previous chapters and sections, Jacobean women who 
overstepped the boundaries of social customs and theological expectations were seen 
to be working against statutorily defined power structures, sometimes even in 
conjunction with the Devil. Elizabeth Cary’s play, The Tragedy of Mariam, is 
concerned, in part, with representing the female legal subject - how that subject is 
shaped by the discourses that impact on divorce and marriage law, and how women 
can potentially (while safely fictionally) respond to those discourses, legal and
otherwise.
Cary’s closet drama, one of twelve such plays produced under the influence of 
Mary Sidney, the Countess of Pembroke (Shannon 144-5), is a genre ideally suited to 
legal criticism. This form of drama is neo-Senecan, and its content was influenced 
by the French playwright Robert Gamier, who “frequently used historical events to 
comment on current developments, including the debate among Protestants and 
Catholics about the limits of resistance to unjust laws or bad (irreligious) kings 
(Shannon 144).” It was produced for primarily private circulation amongst a courtly 
coterie. Closet drama is therefore a form of subversive writing, like a circulating 
court rumour, that challenges the very group it takes as its audience, it is “a vehicle .
. . for political dissent;” a form of drama with “oppositional or at least critically 
reflective connotations (Shannon 146).” The publication of Cary’s manuscript in 
1613 does not negate its original purpose; certainly “the associations of the closet 
drama with political or governmental critique are central to the philosophical, 
constitutional analysis that structures Mariam (Shannon 144).” Thus, Cary’s play, 
written by a woman about women, is a crucial starting-point for any cultural 
criticism of divorce law and the female legal subject in the Jacobean period. Her
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characters give voices to wives, or ex-wives, who are haunted by the spectre of the 
law, wherein other discourses are legitimated and ultimately empowered by state 
sanction - powers which the Pembrokean closet dramas were produced to critique.
As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, it is quite surprising that most extant 
criticism of a play so overtly concerned with divorce does not examine divorce law 
in relation to the represented female legal subject in any meaningful way. The 
notable exceptions to this are articles by Laurie Shannon and Susan Iwanisziw. 
However, while Shannon refers to themes that “address the impossibility of moral 
stability or purity when an authority creates laws whose ‘justice’ operates to the 
detriment of those to whom the law applies;” the “debates on tyrannies and the issue 
of obedience to unjust laws (136);” “the ultimate incompetency of Moses’ law to 
achieve and maintain civil order (147);” and the introduction of “the law as a 
counterpoint and potential force of resistance to the destabilizing actions that set the 
tragedy in motion (149),” she fails to bring these observations to any useful 
conclusion. Her article, despite glimpses of the law and legal subject, reverts back to 
the well-trodden paths of female chastity and male friendship. Iwanisziw’s article 
briefly highlights divorce as a component of the play’s plot, and mentions the two 
forms of divorce allowable in the Jacobean period (112, 117-8), without using these 
extant legalities for an in-depth analysis of Cary’s characters or text. No critics, in 
the course of my research, consider the role law plays in shaping the female subjects 
represented, nor how the portrayal of that legal subject ultimately works in a cultural 
criticism of law and literature. This section attempts to remedy that gap.
Although Cary’s play is set in pre-Christian Palestine (Cary, Argument 67), it 
reflects Jacobean legal norms. Mariam, Doris and Salome are legally constrained in 
ways similar to Jacobean women, and the attitudes expressed by the play’s characters
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and Chorus have the mark of Jacobean social discourses. As Shannon points out, 
despite the differences between Moses’ and the New Testament’s laws on a number 
of dictates, in divorce law “there was no new dispensation, no amelioration of any 
kind - not during the early Christian period and not in seventeenth-century England. 
Thus, to the extent Cary raises the issue of law specifically, she is referring to an area 
of law that the coming of Christ never altered (141).” The restrictions on divorce 
were such that, even by 1643, John Milton argues in “The Doctrine and Discipline of 
Divorce” for more lenient separation rulings. In fact, Milton lauds the Old Law of 
Moses as a superior, more equitable, system (257), to that created by later canonists 
(247).
With easier access to divorce, he argues,
peace and love, the best subsistence of a Christian family, will return 
home from whence they are now banished; places of prostitution will 
be less haunted, the neighbour’s bed less attempted, the yoke of 
prudent and manly discipline will be generally submitted to; sober 
and well-ordered living will soon spring up in the commonwealth. 
(252)
The situation in the seventeenth century was obviously not much improved over pre­
Christian Palestine. Cary’s play is therefore an ideal vehicle for examining how 
divorce and marriage laws impact on the Jacobean female legal subject.
The three female characters I focus on in this section embody stereotypes in 
different stages of marital discord: Mariam is the unhappy wife who rails against her 
husband; Salome is the evil temptress who wants to put aside her husband; and Doris 
is the bitter and betrayed divorcee. The only other woman in the play involved in the 
marriage matrix in a meaningful way is Graphina, “the epitome of traditional female
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virtue,” who is “chaste, obedient and silent (Beilin 168-9).” Because she so totally 
conforms to the ideal female legal subject, she will not be discussed at great length in 
this section. Her relationship with Pheroras, Herod’s brother, is helpful to note, 
however, because it distinctly sets out the hierarchical power relations between men 
and women. Pheroras commands Graphina to “Move [her] tongue (II.i.41)”38 when 
she does not respond to him, illustrating a man’s right to control women’s speech. 
Her loving declarations to him: “You have preserved me pure at my request, / 
Though you so weak a vassal might constrain I To yield to your high will (II.i.61- 
3),” darkly reveal the sexual imperative men had over women of a lower social 
status; in fact, as the play on “weak vassal” and “weak vessel,” a term commonly 
used to describe women, implies, the power men had over women in general. The 
fact that Graphina, who so easily accepts and adheres to the social role prescribed to 
her, is a slave may not be insignificant in any feminist reading of this text.
The women I will be discussing, Mariam, Doris and Salome, represent not 
only hyperbolised norms, or stereotypes of women, but they also figure the three 
stages of marriage in which women can be outdone by law. Juxtaposed, they reveal 
a myriad of perspectives which are significantly lacking in other marital discourses 
of the time. They rail at the legal system that binds them for different reasons, 
implying that in veiy few instances of experience does the system adequately sustain 
women’s needs. In doing so, they challenge the power law has to regulate social 
interaction and question the way in which it forces subjects into shallow, easily- 
codifiable positions. The play reveals that law, the vehicle for social cohesion, 
creates a social paradox, and in doing so, fails to realise its mandates of order and
control.
38 Original text reads “thy.”
151
In jurisprudential terms, divorce and marriage law work to maintain order 
and unity in what, some argued, was the state’s most fundamental relationship, 
marriage. However, under special circumstances, it gave the husband the right to 
separate, but denied that right to the wife. Shannon argues that by treating women 
and men differently, “the law authorizes disorder and inconstancy on the part of men, 
and thus is ultimately inadequate to preserve order in the society (137).” 
Furthermore, in “authorizing inconstancy between the sexes by allowing husbands to 
divorce at will, the law thwarts both its legitimating purpose and its intended general 
effect (Shannon 151).” The chaos into which the play descends - Constabarus, 
Babas’ sons and Mariam die, Pherora and Graphina’s marriage is precarious at best, 
Herod seems to have gone insane with grief, and the only person who comes out 
unscathed is the evil Salome - only confirms the law’s inability to adequately control 
society or to reflect the needs of the people represented in the play.
This is precisely the way in which a cultural criticism of the law uses 
literature to question the extra-human, seemingly objective manifestations of the 
legal system. Cary’s play does not allow the law to stand apart, powerfully protected 
by the other discourses that surround it. Her characters question the ways law works 
to control relationships between men and women, and in doing so, they ultimately 
question the social and religious values inherent in Jacobean divorce law.
As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the fact that Cary’s play 
was published the same year as the scandalous Howard divorce, during a period 
when women were becoming more litigious, implies that the legal debates the play 
proposes were socially and jurisprudentially relevant. Salome, the most vocal 
character against the legal system, is vilified in the extreme, whilst Mariam and 
Doris are represented ambiguously. The fact that these women must be presented as,
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at worst, evil, or, at best, ambiguous, indicates the potential for a very real backlash 
against women whose actions overtly, or even implicitly, criticise the formal systems 
used to protect the status quo - specifically, in this case, the judiciary.
As well as the support offered by my background researches into 
jurisprudence and the law in previous chapters and sections, throughout my analysis 
of Cary’s play I will interweave non-literary discourses to highlight the ideology and 
theology which were impacting on the law-making process, and were contributing to 
the represented world of Cary’s play. Certainly, as Diane Purkiss argues, “we ought 
to canvass the possibility that Cary was just as caught up in these representations, 
these discourses (although perhaps differently caught up in them) as Webster or 
Shakespeare (28),” making Cary’s treatment of women and the law much more 
complex than the critical approaches that simply relegate it to proto-feminism give it 
credit for. As a product of early-modern society herself, Cary would have been 
aware, perhaps even indoctrinated in, extant rules for, and representations of, 
women: the good wife; the bad wife; the temptress; etc. Thus, extant theological 
and ideological systems, created and sustained for the most part by men, cannot be 
discredited in any reading of this play - despite the female author’s potential lack of 
participation in the male-dominated polemic - and can only augment interpretations 
of the play’s characters.
Why Cary’s play is important to the law and literature movement becomes 
apparent in the ensuing sub-sections. Like Thomas Heywood’s Luce, Mariam, 
Salome and Doris offer new inteipretations, new represented experiences, of a 
decidedly female nature, to the audience. These characters broaden the subjective 
scope of Jacobean legal discourse, showing how it defines its subjects as well as the
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potential effects it has on them. Mariam, the unhappy wife, is the first of the three
women to appear on stage.
IVA. MARIAM’S HUBRIS: LEGAL DISCOURSE AND THE PERFECT WIFE
Lawrence Stone points out that, in the sixteenth centuiy, “the ideal woman . . 
. was weak, submissive, charitable, virtuous and modest {Family 198).” Herod,
Mariam’s husband, indicates that Mariam fulfilled those criteria: “To see chaste 
Mariam die in age unfit. / . . . she pass’d them all / In eveiy gift, in every property 
(V.i.226-8);” and that “Upon [the female] sex’s forehead Mariam sat, / To grace you 
all like an imperial crown (V.i. 163).” The fact that he has her executed at the end 
of the play (IV.vii.498), however, and eulogises her with the above statements, 
makes Mariam a much more complicated figure than his late laurels suggest. For a 
Jacobean audience, schooled in the traits of an ideal woman, Mariam would not 
necessarily have embodied a good wife. In legal terms, she does not fulfill the 
subjective position required of her. Herod laments that “Her excellencies wrought 
her timeless fall (V.i.229).” The “excellencies” which “wrought” Mariam’s 
beheading are the manifestations of her “virtuous pride (IV.viii.663):” abstinence 
and open speech.
Mariam believes that abstinence in marriage is a virtue. She denies Herod 
intercourse because, she states: “I would not that my spirit were impure. / Let my 
distressed state unpitied be, I Mine innocence is hope enough for me (IILiii. 178-80);” 
and has sworn that “With purest body will I press my tomb (I.ii.201).” Not only 
does she not share her body with her husband, but she also declares: “too chaste a 
scholar was my heart, / To learn to love another than my lord (I.i.27-8).” However,
39 Original text reads “your.”
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Mariam’s notion of chastity is confused (as are the arguments of modern critics who 
accept her as a model for female virtue, given any historical reading of the text).40 
During the early-modern period, wifely chastity meant fulfilling a sexual debt to
one’s husband.
Not the chaste woman, therefore, but the sexualised marriage partner, follows 
the course of God’s work in the doctrine of post-Reformation England. Augustine, 
who heavily impacted on early-modern canonists, states that “the faithful are 
married, that they may be chastely joined unto husbands, but for this end the impious 
are virgins, that they may commit fornication away from the true God (403).” 
Remaining literally chaste is not the ideal. By refusing Herod her marriage debt, 
Mariam challenges God’s divine plan, and thus, theology teaches, not only rejects 
her husband but rejects God as well. Any claim she makes for her abstinence 
offering her easy access to heaven is completely undone by this theological tenet.
In terms of Mariam’s position as a legal subject, one of the legitimate reasons 
for marriage annulment was any impediment “which prevented the essential purpose 
of marriage, namely sexual intercourse (Stone, Road 191).” A husband would 
therefore have the right to divorce his wife for refusing his bed, simply because the 
dictate that couples “must lovingly, willingly and familiarly communicate 
themselves unto themselves, which is the best means to continue and nourish their
mutuall naturall love, and by which the true and proper ends of matrimony shall bee 
attained in best manner (Whately, Bride-Bush 43),” is reflected by the law. Marriage 
is for copulation, procreation and the avoidance of fornication, and Mariam’s 
chastity vow subverts her sexual responsibilities as a wife.
40 See for example: Dolan, “Gentlemen” 165-6; Iwanisziw 109, 112, 119; and Raber 322.
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Matthew Griffith, writing in 1633, described marriage as “a covenant of God, 
whereby all sorts of people may, of two, bee made one flesh; for; The Multiplying 
of an holy seed. Avoiding of fornication. Mutuall comforting of each other (A2r). 
This philosophy, common to conduct literature of the early-modern period, finds its 
roots in the Gospels,41 and later, as mentioned, in the writings of Augustine, who 
argues that couples owe each other “services mutually due from either sex, although 
the members of either be languishing and almost corpse-like, yet of souls duly joined 
together, the chastity continues the purer by how much it is the more proved.” 
Simply, he argues, because
in that very debt which married persons pay one to another, even if 
they demand it with somewhat too great intemperance and 
incontinence, yet they owe faith alike one to another. Unto which 
faith the Apostle allows so great right, as to call it ‘power,’ saying, 
‘The woman hath not power of her own body, but the man; again in 
like manner also the man hath not power of his own body, but the 
woman.’ (400)42
The marriage debt is therefore of the utmost spiritual importance. Although couples 
may “have intercourse also beside the cause of begetting children; although evil 
habits impel them to such intercourse, yet marriage guards them from adultery or 
fornication (Augustine 401).” This sexual “oneness” of flesh is critical to the 
marriage bond, “for hence subsists the propagation of the human kind, wherein 
friendly fellowship is a great good (Augustine 403).” I have already explained in 
preceding chapters how, as a feme covert, Mariam’s body would be the legal
41 Specifically St. Paul I Cor.7.1-9.
42 Quoting I Cor.7.4.
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property of her husband. To deny him use of that body directly thwarts one criterion 
of the female legal subject, as well as Herod’s legal rights as a husband.
A Jacobean audience, taught about a husband’s conjugal rights in church 
sermons and moral treatises, would have surely recognised that Mariam’s abstinence 
could have severe legal consequences. The play itself reveals that the pre-Christian 
world Mariam inhabits shared the Jacobean concern for physical conjugation in 
marriage. Sohemus, Mariam’s guardian, urges her to reconsider her position when
the news of Herod’s death turns out to be a rumour:
Sohemus. Be not impatient, madam, be but mild,
His love to you again will soon be bred.
Mariam. I will not to his love be reconcil’d,
With solemn vows I have forsworn his bed.
Sohemus. But you must break those vows.
Mariam. I’ll rather break
The heart of Mariam. Cursed is my fate:
But speak no more to me, in vain ye speak
To live with him I so profoundly hate. (IILiii. 131-8)
Sohemus knows what her role should be: he urges her to be “mild;” “more temp’rate 
(IILiii. 149).” His simple, matter-of-fact statement, that calls attention to itself by 
disrupting the rhyming pattern of the interchange, “But you must break those vows,” 
highlights the legal conjugal duties a wife owes to her husband; duties Mariam 
refuses to recognise, and which the Chorus, in its reiteration of the dominant legal 
discourse, is quick to point out: “Had Mariam scorn’d to leave a due unpaid, / She 
would to Herod then have paid her love: / And not have been by sullen passion 
sway’d (IV.viii.659-61).” Unlike Sohemus, who shows genuine concern for
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Mariam’s well-being, the Chorus is the moralising, faceless entity that comments on 
the play’s action and guides the reader’s or audience’s responses throughout the
drama.
As Iwanisziw explains, “the Chorus in Renaissance closet drama tends to 
follow its classical function in shoring up traditional social values (111).” The words 
of the Chorus can therefore be interpreted as the generalised response of the 
dominant discourse. In the circumstances of this play, Raber rightly points out that 
“[t]he chorus delineates an extremely narrow view of the domestic sphere women 
occupy, yet this view is culturally powerful and representative of much conduct 
literature and political writing on the subordinate role of women within marriage 
(327).” The Chorus, as the authority that decides whether a character’s actions are 
good or bad, can also easily represent, reading the text within a cultural criticism of 
the law, the legal system that seems to exist outside human influence, condemning 
and / or controlling a subject’s actions. My discussion in section two of this thesis’ 
Introduction covers this aspect of legal theory, so I will not allocate space to it here. 
It is sufficient to say that the Chorus, with its constant reiterations of dominant 
ideological paradigms and the authority it has to pronounce judgment on the play’s 
characters, reflects the structure and workings of the legal system.
The laws of marriage dictate whether Mariam is a “good” or “bad” wife, and, 
as the Chorus constantly reiterates, under those laws she falls short. She rails against 
her husband, she does not contribute to a happy home by recognising him as her 
head in all things, and, because of this, she does not fulfill her legal wifely 
obligations. The Chorus turns its displeasure on her for two reasons: her attitude 
towards her marriage debt, and her lack of reverence. Even at the end of the play, 
when it describes her as “guiltless (V.i.272),” the Chorus offers up two foreboding
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lines: “Had [Herod] with wisdom now her death delay’d, / He at his pleasure might 
command her death (V.i.283-4),”43 suggesting that Mariam is doomed to die, and not 
even Herod’s wisdom can redeem her from inevitable tragedy.
This may be because Mariam knowingly puts herself in danger, making her 
even less redeemable within the parameters of the Jacobean female legal subject. 
She knows that her life would be easier if she accepted the legal obligations of her 
marriage debt and showed her husband the reverence her legal position demands of
her. She tells Sohemus:
I know I could enchain him with a smile:
And lead him captive with a gentle word,
I scorn my look should ever man beguile,
Or other speech than meaning to afford.
Else Salome in vain might spend her wind,
In vain might Herod’s mother whet her tongue:
In vain had they complotted and combin’d,
For I could overthrow them all ere long. (Ill.iii. 163-70)
Furthermore, although she claims she has taken her vow of chastity “To be 
commandress of the triple earth, / And sit in safety from a fall secure (Ill.iii. 175-6)” 
- to safely enter heaven - she describes Herod as her “foe (I.i. 12)” and says that 
“rage and scorn had put my love to flight, I That love which once on him was firmly 
set: / Hate hid his true affection from my sight, / And kept my heart from paying him 
his debt (I.i. 19-22).” Hatred and anger, not piety, have led to her vow, further 
undermining her presumption that her abstinence signifies heavenly virtue. 
Regardless of how innocent Mariam perceives herself to be she openly hates her
43 Original text reads “he.”
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husband, and this makes her irredeemable to the Chorus throughout the play, and 
ultimately to Herod, who sentences her to death.
Mariam dies for choosing to disregard her legal position. In the end, she 
finally understands the gravity of her situation, and the power law (represented in 
this play by the Chorus and King Herod) has to punish those who step outside the 
roles legally required of them:
Am I the Mariam that presum’d so much,
And deem’d my face must needs preserve my breath?
Ay, I it was that thought my beauty such,
As it alone could countermand my death
Had not myself against myself conspir’d,
No plot, no adversary from without
Could Herod’s love from Mariam have retir’d,
Or from his heart have thrust my semblance out. (IV.viii.525-36)
Her words indicate a realisation that the road to happiness in marriage lies in 
fulfilling her legally binding wifely duties, duties which demand she give herself 
over “to wise subjection, to loving, and Christian reverence, to faithfull and dutifull 
obedience (S. B. 92).” As the Chorus points out, “’tis a firmer conquest truly said, / 
To win the heart than overthrow the head (IV.viii.633-4).” Mariam can certainly be 
seen to be thwarting her legal responsibilities by disregarding her subordinate 
position and consequently denying her husband conjugal rights, as the Chorus’ 
vilification of her constantly reiterates.
When the Chorus first accuses Mariam of “wavering,” however, its attitude 
seems misplaced. Although Mariam does not fulfill her legal duties in any absolute
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sense, Salome is clearly the more sexually “wavering” of the two women throughout 
the play, a term attached to her by Constabarus at I.vi.474 when he refers to her 
“wavering thoughts.” Even though Salome is the one involved in murder (I.iii.250, 
I.iv.286-8) and adultery (I.iv.266-70), the Chorus nevertheless accuses Mariam of 
possessing “a wavering mind (I.vi.498),” and warns:
To wish variety is sign of grief,
For if you like your state as now it is,
Why should an alteration bring relief?
Still Mariam wish’d she from her lord were free,
For expectation of variety. (I.vi.511 -8)
Variety, the vice of which the Chorus accuses Mariam, again seems to be a 
misplaced charge. Mariam is not looking for “variety” in male companions; she has 
sworn abstinence even from her husband. She therefore exhibits extreme constancy, 
the virtue which counters the vice. However, constancy on the part of a wife is 
sexualised in Jacobean England, and Mariam fails to realise this. In fact, the Chorus 
describes her as lascivious,44 thus signifying a different value system than one which 
accepts women to be whorish only if they crave or conquer a number of different
men.
In the Jacobean period, the audience would have recognised “wavering” in 
Mariam’s open and irreverent speech, the second “excellency” which leads to her 
death, and through which she contravenes her legal subjectivity. When Karen Raber, 
in her oft-quoted article, “Gender and the Political Subject in The Tragedy of 
Mariam,” asserts that “Mariam, the play’s protagonist, chastely and properly restricts
44 Like Augustine, cited on page 142, who argues that “the impious are virgins, that they may not 
commit fornication away from the true God (403).”
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her speech to her husband’s ear (322),” she is completely wrong. Mariam publicly 
denounces her husband when Sohemus tells her that Herod is not dead:
Foretell the ruin of my family,
Tell me that I shall see our city burn’d:
Tell me I shall a death disgraceful die,
But tell me not that Herod is return’d. (Ill.iii. 127-30)
A long interchange between them follows and precedes these lines. If, for some 
reason, this discussion is overlooked, Mariam says in the first two lines of the play, 
“How oft have I with public voice run on? / To censure Rome’s last hero for deceit 
(Li. 1-2. My emphasis);” Salome, speaking to Mariam, says, “Now stirs the tongue 
that is so quickly mov'd, I But more than once your choler have I borne: / Your 
furnish words are sooner said than prov’d (I.iii.227-9. My emphasis);” after the 
news of Herod’s death, Salome remarks “More plotting yet? Why, now you have the 
thing / For which so oft you spent your suppliant breath (I.iii.207-8. My emphasis);” 
and the Chorus derides her, announcing,
’Tis not enough for one that is a wife 
To keep her spotless from an act of ill:
But from suspicion she should free her life,
And bare herself of power as well as will.
’Tis not so glorious for her to be free,
As by proper self retrain’d to be.
That wife her hand against her fame doth rear, 
That more than to her lord alone will give 
A private word to any second ear,
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And though she may with reputation live,
Yet though most chaste, she doth her glory blot,
And wounds her honour, though she kills it not. (III.iii.215- 
20, 227-32)
Although Raber’s article does offer up a useful analysis of gendered politics, to 
discuss gender and the political subject without acknowledging that in a very 
significant, gendered, way Mariam contravenes the subject she is expected to 
embody, leaves Raber’s argument incomplete.
Clearly Mariam has spoken openly, caustically, a number of times in the 
presence of others. She is not, as Gataker would have wives, in 1623, “« wise a 
discreet woman: who is therefore ... a speciall Gift, as a principall blessing of God 
(7).” She is not a good wife, whose “heart must bee kept inwardly, in a dutifull 
respect of [her husband], and shee must regard him as Gods Deputy, not looking to 
his person but his place; nor thinking so much who and what an one hee is, as whole 
officer (Whately, Bride-Bush 37).”45 The finding in Lady Allen’s case, discussed in 
section IIA, Chapter One of this thesis, shows the extent to which a wife’s public 
actions could be controlled by law, and how a wife’s public speech, company and 
movements could be constrained by the legally superior assertions of her husband. 
By actively speaking out against “Gods Deputy,” Mariam again rejects the legal 
subject commanded of her, and sets herself up for disaster.
This is simply because the rigid marital hierarchy behind canon law defines 
the wife as subject to her husband and demands that she reverence him as her head. 
Gouge argues that a “wives [sic] outer reverence towards her husband is a 
manifestation of her inward due respect of him (277),” and the duties of wives, laid
45 Original text reads “him.”
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out in order of importance by Crompton, dictate that the sixth most important wifely 
trait is “wisedome and discretion; in speech she openeth her mouth with wisdome, 
her words are few, seasonable and weighty,” whereas “her piety” and fear of the 
Lord come last (5). Mariam’s speech, favouring piety over discretion, upsets the 
order of wifely duties, and directly challenges the laws which would keep her silent, 
chaste, submissive and deferential to her husband.
As Herod, the signifier for absolute patriarchal power in the play says to her: 
“I will not speak, unless to be believ’d, / This ffoward humour will not do you good: 
/ It hath too much already Herod griev’d, / To think that you on terms of hate have 
stood (IV.iii. 139-42).” Therefore, although Mariam presents legitimate arguments 
for hating Herod: he killed her brother, “Aristobulus, the [loveliest] youth / That 
ever did in angel’s shape appear (I.i.35-6),” and “His high ascent, alone . . . 
procur’d,” by killing her grandfather (I.i.44-6), if she accepted the legal subject 
defined for women, her primary allegiance would be to her husband, not her 
family.46
The entrapping effects of this legal paradigm only exacerbate her hatred for
Herod. She admits that
When Herod liv’d, that now is done to death,
Oft have I wish’d that I from him were free:
Oft have I wish’d that he might lose his breath,
Oft have I wish’d his carcass dead to see (I.i. 15-8),
simply because, denied the right to divorce, her husband’s death is her only recourse 
to freedom. In the above monologue, although she derides her husband, she is alone
46 Boyd M. Berry argues that the play depicts the shifting ideology of the early-modern (post­
Reformation) period from a marital system based only on lineal inheritance to one of companionship 
(258).
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on stage, and therefore her words can be considered safely private, despite audience 
presence. This is not, however, always the case, as has already been evidenced, and 
her open hatred for Herod complicates interpretations of her as the chaste wife who 
works as a dramatic foil to Salome.47
Dillingham wrote in 1609 that “whereas men are commaunded to love their
wives; wee must not thinke that wives must not love their husbands; for love them 
they must, and must in no case be bitter unto them (21).” Herod seems to fulfill his 
side of the marital contract: he calls Mariam a “rare creature (IV.i.10),” and his 
“best and dearest half (IV.iii.88).” Mariam, on the other hand, is certainly bitter.
When she hears that Herod’s death was a rumour, she announces to Sohemus: “Hate
doth appear again with visage grim: / And paints the face of Herod in my heart, / In 
horrid colours with detested look (IILiii. 158-60),” a prime example of both her 
inability to accept her subjective wifely role and her open, public speech.
While it could be argued that speaking to her guardian does not constitute 
public speech, as such, the fact that the butler in IV.iv knows about the discussions 
(169-70), demonstrates that no matter how closeted an interchange may be, court 
rumour and intrigue soon make any instance of private speech public knowledge. 
Thus, Mariam’s words, private though they may be by modern standards, directly 
challenge the canonical teachings that shape Jacobean jurisprudence. Gouge 
typically argues that
[a]s by gesture, so by speech also, must a wives reverence be
manifested: this must be answerable to that. For by words as well as
deeds, the affection of the heart is manifested, Out of the abundance
of the heart the mouth speaketh. A wives reverence is manifested by
47 As Raber supposes she is at pages 322 and 335-6. In fact, the foil to both women, and Doris, is 
Graphina, the chaste, silent, obedient slave.
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her speech, both in her husbands presence, and also in his absence. 
For this end in his presence her words must be few, reverend and 
meeke. (281)
Mariam openly attacks Herod throughout the play, and her monologue, “in his 
absence” in I.i, is neither “reverend” nor “meeke.”
Sohemus recognises the dangerous trap Mariam is setting for herself. He 
worries that she will be “by herself undone (IILiii. 148),” and admits that “Unbridled 
speech is Mariam’s worst disgrace, / And will endanger her without desert 
(IILiii. 183),” or, more correctly, with desert, as extra-textual teachings make clear.
He, like the Chorus which demands:
When to their husbands [wives] themselves do bind,
Do they not wholly give themselves away?
Or give they but their body, not their mind,
Reserving that, though best, for others’ prey?
No sure, their thoughts no more can be their own,
And therefore should to none but one be known (III.iii.233-8),48
understands the dangerous connection between an open mouth and open legs.
As the Chorus explains:
she usurps upon another’s right,
That seeks to be by public language grac’d:
And though her thoughts reflect with purest light,
Her mind if not peculiar is not chaste.
For in a wife it is no worse to find,
A common body than a common mind.
48 Original text reads “they.”
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And every mind, though free from thought of ill,
That out of glory seeks a worth to show,
When any’s ears but one therewith they fill,
Doth in a sort her pureness overthrow. (III.iii.239-48)
Extra-textual writing makes it clear that the “one” to whom a woman’s thoughts
should be known is her husband; Herod, in Mariam’s case, not Sohemus. As Patricia 
Parker rightly points out, “the long association in which a ‘public woman,’ and 
especially one who spoke in public, could only be called a whore (104),” makes 
women’s open speech sexually dubious, under any circumstances. A Jacobean 
audience would certainly have been aware of the theological and social pressures on 
wives to maintain their privately-speaking role within the marriage contract.
Although Belsey argues that “the play as a whole makes clear that what 
brings about Mariam’s death is not her openness with other people but her outspoken 
defiance of Herod himself (Subject 173),” her “unbridled” attitude with Herod makes 
his connection between her open speech with him and intercourse with Sohemus so
much easier. When the butler tells Herod that Mariam and Sohemus have been
talking privately, he charges, “Hell itself lies hid I Beneath thy heavenly show. Yet 
never wert thou chaste (IV.iv.203-4),” and accuses her of being a “fair fiend 
(IV.iv.213),” making the familiar connection between women, the Devil and 
unhappy marriage; laying the responsibility for marital breakdown squarely at his
wife’s feet.
Salome uses the speech I libido analogy to drive home Herod’s suspicions 
about Mariam’s infidelity:
Salome. She speaks a beauteous language, but within 
Her heart is false as powder: and her tongue
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Doth but allure the auditors to sin,
And is the instrument to do you wrong.
Herod. It may be so: nay, ’tis so: she’s unchaste,
Her mouth will ope to ev’ry stranger’s ear:
Then let the executioner make haste,
Lest she enchant him, if her words he hear. (IV.vii.429-36)
When Mariam ignores the subject position that law encourages her to adopt, she puts 
herself in grave danger. By challenging Herod’s position as her head, she enters the 
trap. The husband “must still be seene to bee the head and husband,” and if the wife 
does not accept that, it “were most uncomely, yea, her very shame and dishonour (S. 
B. 51);” if she will
not acknowledge her head & king, or will not use the fittest meanes 
for her rule and libertie; or having what shee would, cannot (or will 
not) use it to her husbands honor, & thus lay a foundation of 
contention and strife, Gods wisedome is despised, it camiot be well.
(S. B. 92)
For Mariam, it is not well.
When the Chorus derides her for speaking publicly, it “seeks to ensure that 
legal doctrine will extend into that place conceived of as the woman’s interior, her 
‘self figured as her mind (Raber 328),” specifically because, if she shares her mind 
with someone other than her husband, she challenges his ownership of her person 
and her loose speech becomes analogous to loose sexuality. It is this for which the 
Chorus attacks Mariam throughout the play, and which ultimately leads to her death.
Theology of the time would conclude that Mariam has no one but herself to 
blame. Laws of the time, based on that same theology, would conclude the same:
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Mariam does not conform to the legal subject position of a good wife; she refuses to 
become one with her husband and reverence him in all things; and in doing so, she 
refuses to perform the role that natural, divine and positive law insists on for women 
in both marriage and the broader spectrum of Jacobean society.
Wives who are “disdainfull, contemptuous, brawling, impatient, 
discontented, and disobedient” should “clamour not against thine husbands folly, 
exclaime not of his rashnes and hardnes; but condemne thy selfe before, and call 
upon God, to make thee feare and obey thine husband, as a Commander under him 
(Whately, Bride-Bush 48).” Mariam is unhappy because she does not accept the 
wifely role typically set out by Whately and other writers of conduct literature, and 
law of the time would give Herod the right to divorce her for her transgressions. In 
the end, Herod’s ability to separate from Mariam manifests itself in the extreme - her 
head is severed from her body (V.i. 14-5), perhaps implying the emotional severance
experienced between the “head” (Herod) and the “body” (Mariam) throughout their
• 49marriage.
The social dynamics of the characters overall, however, suggest a much 
richer reading of Mariam than that proposed by the narrow legal parameters 
reiterated by the Chorus, Sohemus and Herod, for which she ultimately loses her life.
In fact, the Chorus’ condemnation in Cary’s play achieves a two-fold task. On one 
hand, as I have already argued, it effectively reiterates and represents dominant legal 
discourse; on the other, its condemnation seems misguided, and it is here that the law 
is destabilised. For the Chorus to constantly attack Mariam when throughout the 
play Salome admits to murdering her first husband, causes the death of her present 
husband, commits adultery and plots Mariam’s demise (I.iii.247-50), is ridiculous.
49 A reading analogous to Diane Purkiss’ interpretation of the separation between “the state (body),” 
and “its ruler (Herod, the head) (38).”
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The Chorus’ very act of condemning implies that the social expectations used 
to define the female legal subject are too unforgiving; that patriarchal legal dictates 
are unjust and essentially impossible. Its misplaced blame suggests that society’s 
strong backlash against women who barely overstep the boundaries set by canon law 
is ludicrous. Boyd Berry argues that Herod and the Chorus signify the same 
dominant patriarchal discourse: “the Chorus persistently judges Mariam, just as 
Herod does, abruptly (263),” and “the patriarch is lunatic (259),” or, as Alexandra, 
Mariam’s mother, puts it, “raging lunacy (I.ii.124).” Mariam is executed by Herod 
and vilified by the Chorus because she speaks ill of her husband to people outside the 
marriage and refuses to have intercourse with him. That Mariam dies for speaking 
and abstaining, whilst Salome remains unscathed and uncondemned by any but her 
husband (who is silenced by his death at her hands), strains the credibility of the 
legal discourse that Herod and the Chorus represent.
It is true that Mariam oversteps the boundaries of wifely behaviour. 
According to legal coverture, the wife’s mind as well as her body belong to her 
husband, and only her husband, after marriage, “the womans speeches of the 
husband behinde his backe, must bee dutifull and respective. Shee must not call him 
by light names, nor talke of him with any kinde of carelesnesse and slightnes of 
speech, much lesse with despitefull and reprochfull termes (Whately, Bridge-Bush 
41),” and, as Dod and Cleaver argue, “she should seldome speake, but to her 
husband, or by her husband {Godly O7V).” However, as Raber points out, “Cary’s 
play exposes coverture as illogical ideology (327);” an illogicality born from the 
contradictions in the discourses impacting on the female legal subject. Mariam’s 
situation illustrates the paradoxical effects of the law for the audience, and, in this 
way, works to question the empirical legal discourse.
170
On one hand, law decrees that a woman’s mind belongs only to her husband, 
and Mariam’s execution implies that the husband is the only acceptable recipient of a 
wife’s social interactions. On the other, Whately’s quote above describes a society 
in which women are not silent, in which wives make “speeches of the husbande 
behinde his backe.” His sermon defines what the tone of those speeches should be, 
but accepts that they do, and will, exist. As Naomi Miller pointed out, in her 1997 
article, early-modern “women managed estates and carried out business decisions 
during the often frequent absences of their husbands, despite cultural prescriptions 
apparently limiting their roles to chastity, silence, and obedience (353).” This 
contradiction in discourses reveals a fracture at the centre of the legal subject herself 
- the legal definition of her would erase the wife completely; in her lived experience
she was often not erased.
Like Mariam, women could, and did, engage in speech outside the home with 
people other than their husbands, despite legal dictates and courtroom decisions 
which attempted to work the contrary. As Dolan argues, “[gjiven prohibitions of 
women’s self-assertion and public action, to represent them as speaking and acting is 
already to disclose a contradiction at work (“Gentlemen” 158).” The open speech of 
Cary’s Mariam exposes this legal paradox. The law is revealed to be not a 
mechanism for cohesion, but a patriarchal fantasy. In fact, the “[pjatriarchal dreams 
of control implode wholly” throughout the play (Berry 265): Mariam disregards the 
mandate for public silence and refuses to give her body to her husband; Salome is a 
husband-murdering adulteress; and Doris returns to destroy Herod’s and Mariam’s
children and to reinstate her and Herod’s son as the heir to the throne. The female
legal subject Mariam embodies is shown to be unstable, caught between the legal 
imperative for silence and the empirical experience of speech and action.
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Chapter One and section IC of this chapter demonstrate that many women did 
not blithely accept the constraints legal doctrine placed on them. The legal subject of 
the silent wife who accepts her subservient role is not sustained empirically, as the 
evidence of Chapter One and the introduction to this chapter show, and is not a part 
of this specific literary representation. Women did speak, some of them very loudly, 
and juxtaposing Mariam’s behaviour to Salome’s implies that there are far worse 
things a wife could be doing than railing against her husband and refusing his bed. 
Mariam’s story illuminates how unjust it is for society to punish women whose only 
real crime is public speaking, and reveals the contortions the female subject has to 
endure under a legal paradox. The suggestion is, of course, that legal condemnation 
of such behaviour is a misplaced social dictate.
What is overtly clear in the representation of the unhappily married wife in 
this play is her lack of choice and recourse to law. Her legal entrapment in a 
marriage to a man she hates ultimately causes her death. The only agency she can 
exert, denied access to divorce, to remedy her situation is through speech and 
abstinence. In the play’s opening scene, she says: “blame me not, for Herod’s 
jealousy / Had power even constancy itself to change: / For he, by barring me from 
liberty, I To shun my ranging, taught me first to range (I.i.23-6).” She describes her 
marriage as a “prison (IILiii. 151),” and she admits she was able to love Herod “when 
virgin freedom left [her] unrestrain’d (I.i.72).”50 Mariam’s position illustrates how 
marriage and divorce law work to constrain the female subject, to deny that subject 
entry into the public sphere, and to create an impossible legal situation for women; a 
situation in which the only way to fulfill law’s requirements would be to stay 
indoors, speaking to no one, preferably lying naked on the husband’s bed.
50 Original text reads “me.”
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Mariam, who is a good wife in comparison to Salome, shows the 
impossibility of women’s position within the narrow view of divorce law. Despite 
her manifest inability to live up to the ideal female legal subject, Mariam does follow 
the legal dictate on divorce - she stays with her husband, even though she hates him, 
and it is perhaps for this reason that, after her death, she is redeemed through him 
when he declares: “Her excellencies wrought her timeless fall (V.i.229).” In the 
end, Mariam must die to separate from Herod - she announces on the scaffold: “My 
soul is free from adversary’s power (IV.viii.570),” gratefully going to her death. 
Conversely, Salome’s husbands must die so she can separate from them.
IVB. SALOME THE TEMPTRESS: VILIFYING THE LEGALLY ACTIVE WOMAN
Like Mariam, Salome does not fulfill her wifely obligations. She openly 
engages in speech with another man, and her husband echoes the Chorus’ attitude 
towards Mariam when he discovers her in private conversation: “Oh Salome, how 
much you wrong your name, / Your race, your country, and your husband most! / A 
stranger’s private conference is shame, / I blush for you, that have your blushing lost 
(I.vi.375-8).” Like Mariam, Salome is not a wife who “m subjecting themselves 
aright to their husbands are subject to the Lord,” but rather one who “/« refusing to 
be subject to their husbands, refuse to be subject to the Lord (Gouge 29).” She is 
the kind of woman an anonymous author described in 1607 as “shameles . . . that 
they will not at any time be commanded {Court Dlv).” Like Mariam’s, her desires 
upset the early-modern divinely-ordained legal position of the wife.
Dod and Cleaver warn, in their treatise on the good Protestant family, that 
wives who rail against their husbands should “beware of disordering and perverting 
the course which god in his wisedome hath established: and withall let her
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understand, that going about it, she riseth not so much against her husband, as 
against God {Godly O8r).” Salome, like Mariam, is the type of wife who
was made for a helpe to prove not an helpe but an hurt: for her that 
was given for a blessing, to prove a crosse and a curse. As one saith 
of Eve, reast from Adam as a rib, and shot by Satan al him as a shaft’. 
bestowed on him by God to consummate his felicitie, but made by 
Satans flight and her owne default, the meanes of his exreme miserie. 
(Gataker 20)
As her husband, Constabarus, tells her: “Heaven knows that you have been my 
comfort chief, / Then do not now my greater plague appear (I.vi.381-2);” and, “Didst 
thou but know the worth of honest fame, / How much a virtuous woman is esteem’d, 
/ Thou wouldest like hell eschew deserved shame, I And seek to be both chaste and 
chastely deem’d (I.vi.391-4).” Like Mariam, the jurisprudential mandate for a stable 
hierarchy traps Salome in an unsustainable position, where she sees death (the death 
of her husbands) as her only escape. However, unlike Mariam, Salome ties to do 
something about her legal position: she attempts to use the divorce laws normally 
allowed only to men to escape her marriage, and perhaps for this reason, unlike 
Mariam, she remains unredeemed at the end of the play.
Her overt forays into the male-dominated legal system cause a strong 
backlash against her, and make her the play’s most exciting female character. As 
Iwanisziw rightly points out, “Salome’s highly successful intrigues, which drive the 
entire plot of Mariam, and her indomitable sexual ambition that in combination 
contrive the Machiavellian disposal of her husbands, render her a hugely diverting 
figure (111).” Weller and Ferguson, in their introduction to Cary’s text, argue that 
Salome’s appeal lies in her descent from “the Vice tradition of medieval drama . . .
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whose plots create the plot, whose malevolently inventive activity is the veiy 
mainspring of the play’s theatrical life (39-40).” In terms of the ideal female legal 
subject, “Salome successfully denies the patriarchal order, both domestically and 
politically, by recognizing its inconsistencies, refusing to allow any code to define 
and contain her (Raber 336),” much more aggressively than Mariam ever does.
Although an exciting figure in the play, there is no doubt that Salome’s plots 
are extreme - she does not necessarily have to murder the husbands she would leave 
yet her character is strangely sympathetic. I would argue that Salome, despite her 
murderous actions, is made less heinous through Cary’s use of revenge tragedy
motifs.
Like the tragic revenger, Salome is not “able to procure justice by law 
(Bowers 36),” and according to some early-modern writers, when “the Magistrate is 
absent; either for a time, and his stay be dangerous; or altogether, so as no helpe can 
be had of him, nor any hope of his comming. In this case, God puts the sword into 
the private mans hands (Perkins 293).” This “wild justice,” as Francis Bacon calls it 
in “Of Revenge,” is tolerable in situations “which there is no law to remedy (72).” 
Although private revenges had been outlawed by the time of Elizabeth I, “the idea of 
redress by private action was still very much alive (Bowers 16).” In James I’s reign, 
the tendency to private revenge increased with the arrival of many Scots in London, 
who followed James to his new seat of power, and who had been influenced by 
“[t]he weak state of the law in Scotland (Bowers 18),” which made private revenge a
common Scottish form of redress.
Because the right to private revenge for perceived injustice continued to play 
a strong role in the Jacobean social framework of the plays, “sentiment was on the 
side of the revenger (Bowers 10).” Although Cary does not strictly adhere to the
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revenge tragedy formula (Salome remains alive at the end of the play, for example), 
the audience could well have recognised the need for private revenge in her case. 
The law does not accept Salome’s suit, and importantly, it is only after she realises 
that she cannot access divorce legally that Salome plots the murder of her second 
husband, Constabarus.
Ironically, audience sympathy may also have been enticed by Salome’s 
gender. As Eileen Allman argues, “[f]emale characters [in revenge tragedies] are 
idealized not when they still their voices but when they raise them, when they cast 
off their presumed social subjection and assume authority (18-9. My addition).” 
When Salome calls for legal redress and finds she is barred from it because of her 
sex, she raises her voice very loudly indeed (to the ultimate demise of Constabarus) 
against a system that is biased in the favour of men, and that denies women the same 
legal rights to divorce as their male counterparts. Charles and Elaine Hallett surmise 
that “[t]he revenger, seeking to comprehend the meaning of his situation and 
frustrated by the seeming injustice of it, became for the playwrights an emblem of 
Man himself (6),” or in this case, Woman herself, facing the frustrations of a 
seemingly extra-human, sexist legal system. Although Cary does not adhere to the 
tragic revenge genre in any absolute way, the tragic revenger, who pursues justice in 
the face of an uncaring legal system, lurks behind Salome’s words and actions, 
potentially inciting some audience support for her extreme plots.
Salome gives voice to women’s frustrations in the face of a system that works 
against them, and her solution to her constrained position acts as a double warning to 
the play’s audience. Firstly, it can be read as a caution to wives who hate their 
husbands, an entreaty to bear their burden or be publicly condemned (Constabarus 
notes “How ill Judea’s mouth doth censure” Salome [I.vi.388]); secondly, however,
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it can be read as a warning to the law-makers and those who sustain it, a 
representation of the social chaos that can occur when a system denies rights to some 
of its populace, but gives those rights to others; the social breakdown that can happen 
when the law denies people a non-violent option.
Salome is overtly critical of the institutionalised ideology that entraps her. 
She rises up against her husband and the legal system; she demands equal rights; and 
she tries to use legal processes to free herself from marriage. In doing so, she 
represents not just a bad wife, or even a tragic revenger, but also the women who 
were knowledgeable about and active in Jacobean legal matters. Her portrayal 
reflects the extra-textual disruption of the female legal subject wrought by the 
women who were increasingly using the law between the time of Queen Elizabeth I 
and King James I. Salome’s straightforward approach to marriage and divorce laws 
(she denounces them as unjust and openly fights against them) makes her a less 
complicated character than Mariam, whose fatal flaw lies in misinterpreting the ethos 
of legal and social tenets.
Salome’s words are revolutionary; her actions extreme; and her appeal lies in 
these veiy qualities. However, her words and actions are less shocking when read 
within a cultural criticism of the law, which places representations of the legal 
subject firmly within the extant discourses that shape it. In such a reading, Salome 
figures the women discussed in Chapter One, section IIC who used law and were 
consequently attacked by writers of theological literature, sermons and conduct 
books. She also represents the changes to the legal system and jurisprudence, 
discussed in Chapter One, sections I-IC, which were affecting early-modern English 
legal practice.
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In terms of wifely duties, whereas Mariam dies for her open speech and 
irreverent attitude to the men around her, the least of Salome’s crimes is railing 
against her husband, who charges: “You have my patience often exercis’d, / Use 
make my choler keep within the banks (I.vi.405-6).” The litany of Salome’s 
transgressions puts Mariam’s to shame: she had her first husband, Josephus, slain so 
she could marry Constabarus (I.iii.244-56); she commits adultery with Silleus 
(I.v.329-38), whom Weller and Ferguson describe as a “blank, and more or less 
arbitrarily chosen, surface on which she can inscribe the shape of her desires 
(Introduction 40);” she is outspoken in her criticism of patriarchal legal values 
(I.iv.305-12); and she is responsible for Constabarus’ execution (III.ii.69-83 and 
IV.ii.83).
She is the kind of women who is dangerous to her husbands in the extreme, 
and even Silleus, her new lover, uses rhetoric that highlights her desire for 
domination. When he hears she will become his queen, he exalts: “Arabia, joy, 
prepare thy earth with green, / Thou never happy wert indeed till now: I Now shall 
thy ground be trod by beauty’s queen, I Her foot is destin’d to depress thy brow 
(I.v.345-8).” His loving words conjure up the image of a woman trampling on a 
man’s face, and evoke a world completely different from that in which wives stand 
silently below their husbands on the hierarchical scale. Because Salome would be 
expected to be subordinate, Silleus’ metaphor is inappropriate and only serves to 
make her less sympathetic by underscoring masculine anxiety about “mannish 
women.”51
Her violent actions make her demonic to her husbands, but surprisingly not to
the public voice of the Chorus. Iwansziw argues that “Salome’s activities fail to
51 The anonymous Hie Mulier: or, The Man-Woman reveals the anxiety aggressive, active, women 
could engender.
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evoke choral contempt because she embodies no virtue and her vices already 
exemplify female weakness (111).” Perhaps they also fail to evoke Choral contempt 
because of the revenge motifs that surround her. However, there is little need for the 
Chorus to comment on the evils that the audience can so plainly see for itself, and 
Constabarus does an excellent job playing the Chorus for her, commenting on her 
unwifely attributes from a position firmly within the dominant discourse.
He draws on many of the early-modern tropes I have already discussed to 
vilify her, and significantly these are the same stereotypes that law uses to justify 
female constraint. He associates her with demonic evil, raising the familiar woman / 
serpent / death metaphor, when he tells Silleus not to trust her:
She merely is a painted sepulchre,
That is both fair, and vilely foul at once:
Though on her outside graces garnish her,
Her mind is fill’d with worse than rotten bones.
And ever ready lifted is her hand,
To aim destruction at a husband’s throat:
For proofs, Josephus and myself do stand,
Though once on both of us she seem’d to dote.
Her mouth, though serpent-like it never hisses,
Yet like a serpent, poisons where it kisses. (II.iv.325-334)52
The connection between the serpent and marital discord would have been obvious to 
a Jacobean audience taught that the serpent I Devil was responsible for the first 
instance of marital disharmony (wrought though the woman) in Paradise, an act
52 Constabarus echoes Matt.6.19-33, which admonishes respect for earthly treasures and physical 
beauty. This is a common device in literary representations of the time, appearing, for example, in 
John Webster’s The White Devil (I.ii. 148-9, III.ii.62-7) and John Marston’s The Insatiate Countess 
(III.iv.85-6).
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which led to the Expulsion and the spiritual death of humankind. From a patriarchal 
perspective, women like Salome are in league with the Devil.
From her perspective, however, Salome transgresses social and legal taboos 
out of necessity, and it is here that the revenge tragedy motifs are most apparent. 
The legal subject she is meant to embody under early-modern law denies her the 
right to leave her husband and to remarry if he is still alive. As in Mariam’s case, 
death is the only way Salome can see to free herself. She says, “Salome, thy tongue / 
To Constabarus by itself is tied / And now, except I do the Hebrew wrong, 11 cannot 
be the fair Arabian bride (I.iv.277-80).” She knows that her marriage vow makes her 
person, including her thoughts and desires, subject to her husband. She also realises 
that unless she “does the Hebrew wrong” she will never be able to leave him.
Ironically, by using her agency to wed him, she has legally negated herself. 
Thus, Salome is not the foil, but rather “the active double of Mariam’s passive 
resistance to patriarchal power and to definition by the male (Weller and Ferguson, 
Introduction, 40).” Unlike Mariam, who fails to understand the legal ramifications 
of her behaviour, Salome indicates that she does understand the implications of 
rejecting her husband; she seems to be familiar with the tenet that a wife “must be 
with condition to submit herself unto him, acknowledging him to be her head, that 
finally they may so agree in one, as the conjunction of marriage doth require (Dod 
and Cleaver, Godly G'liy> - she acknowledges that her tongue is tied because she is
married.
She also knows the wider social expectations of wifely duty and obedience. 
She acknowledges that she transgresses when she does not remain faithful:
’Tis long ago
Since shame was written on my tainted brow:
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And certain ’tis, that shame is honour’s foe.
Had I upon my reputation stood,
Had I affected an unspotted life,
Josephus’ veins had still been stuff d with blood,
And I to him had liv’d a sober wife.
But shame is gone, and honour wip’d away,
And Impudency on my forehead sits. (I.iv.282-94)
Salome admits that she is trapped by “the principles of Moses’ laws, / For 
Constabarus still remains in life (I.iv.299-300),” that she is part of a legal system in 
which only her husband’s death will leave her free to marry, even if he chooses to
divorce her himself.
In fact, it is not Mosaic law that entraps Salome. If Constabarus were to 
divorce her, she would be free to remarry (Deut.24.2-3). The legal situation she 
describes is early-modern, not pre-Christian. In the time of James I, a husband and 
wife were bound together for life, even if they did successfully separate a mensa et 
thoro in the courts. However, as shown in section IIIA of this chapter, often men 
would apply to have a new marriage ratified, whereas wives, who could not afford 
the action, were unable to do so. Thus Salome is trapped not by the laws of Moses, 
but by the laws extant in Cary’s time, which worked to deny the wife access to 
remarriage, despite divorce.
Salome rants at the injustice of the difference between her legal situation and
Constabarus’: “If he to me did bear as earnest hate, / As I to him, for him there were
an ease; ! A separating bill might free his fate / From such a yoke that did so much
53 In practice, the legal constraints on people in the lower hierarchical strata were often simply 
ignored. Stiype bemoans the fact that “divorces increased much; yea, and marrying again without 
divorce; which became a great scandal to the realm (Stiype 2: 184).”
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displease (I.iv.301-4).” Constabarus makes his claim to legal superiority apparent 
when he fights Silleus and effectively divorces her, announcing: “I willingly to thee 
resign my right, / For in my very soul I do abhor her (II.iv.361-2);” he resigns his 
right to her self, body and mind, while conjuring up the right which is his to exercise, 
the right to keep her or to give her away. Although Salome claims the action as her 
own (at IV.ii Pheroras tells Herod that Constabarus is “from Salome divorc’d [79],” 
because “she was by her love to you enforc’d / To leave the man that would your 
foes relieve [81-2]),” in practice it is Constabarus who has the power to dictate the 
state of their union. Salome abhors him, as he does her (I.vi.416-9), but does not 
have any legal recourse to the remedy she seeks. The two-line ease with which 
Constabarus is able to dispose of her only highlights the discrepancy that exists 
between men’s and women’s legal prerogative.
Her murderous plots are thus represented as being born from the legal 
frustrations she experiences as a woman. She killed her first husband so she could 
many Constabarus, and now feels she must kill Constabarus to marry Silleus. She 
does tiy to use the law to solve her problems, but is denied access to it. When she 
tells Constabarus that “I from thee do mean to free my life, / By a divorcing bill 
before I sleep (I.vi.419-20),” his response is to reiterate the importance, the 
imperative, of the social order:
Are Hebrew women now transformed to men?
Why do you not as well our battles fight,
And wear our armour? Suffer this, and then
Let all the world be topsy-turved quite.
Let fishes graze, beasts [swim], and birds descend,
Let fire burn downwards whilst the earth aspires:
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Let winter’s heat and summer’s cold offend,
Let thistles grow on vines, and grapes on briars,
Set us to spin or sew, or, at the best
Make us wood-hewers, water-bearing wights. (I.vi.421-50. Editors’ 
addition)
His attack is a pat defence of the indoctrinated “natural” social hierarchy and the 
laws that sustain it, evoking images of the world turned upside-down, which “occurs 
commonly in English tragedy, ballad, complaint, satire, etc., from the earliest times 
(Donaldson 23).” Such a world, created by “strange cosmic upsets . . . reversals in 
the normal relationships between animals and men . . . [and] reversals in the normal 
relationships between people (Donaldson 22-3. My addition),” endangers the power 
bases of the natural hierarchy.
Law’s role in maintaining hierarchical power structures is important to 
Salome’s position. If the hierarchy does not “naturally” maintain itself of its own 
accord (and given the fallacy of a “natural” hierarchy this is bound to be the case), 
those who were most likely to benefit by its implementation (i.e.: upper-class males) 
could, and did, legislate women into subordinate legal positions. Salome derides the 
legal prerogatives men give to themselves, and questions the validity of a social 
discourse that denies agency to half the population. She directly attacks the 
legislated status quo, saying:
Why should such privilege to man be given?
Or given to them, why barr’d from women then?
Are men than we in greater grace with Heaven?
Or cannot women hate as well as men?
I’ll be the custom-breaker: and begin
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To show my sex the way to freedom’s door,
And with an off ring will I purge my sin;
The law was made for none but who are poor. (I.iv.305-12)
She further asserts, “Though I be first that to this course do bend, /1 shall not be the 
last, full well I know (I.vi.435-6),” to which Constabarus replies, “Till now that 
fourteen hundred years are past, I Since first the Law with us hath been in force: I 
You are the first, and will, I hope, be last, / That ever sought her husband to divorce 
(I.vi.435-6).” Salome wants, as Constabarus makes clear, to “[r]everse all order 
(I.vi.458).” Indeed, the way Constabarus describes it, she will bring chaos into the 
whole world through her desire to divorce her husband.
Salome is therefore perceived by Constabarus to be a monstrous, destructive, 
creature, “a kind of Monster in Nature” as Caussin describes assertive women (477), 
because in rejecting her wifely position she becomes “unnatural,” a creature who 
does not follow “nature’s” hierarchy. Jordan argues that “[w]hen a wife’s 
disobedience can be clearly established . . . her subordinate status and its political 
consequences are emphasized (293).” Constabarus’ vilification of Salome (as well 
as any acceptance of his arguments as valid) must employ the mandates of wifely 
duty and subordination in order to sustain its position. His misogynistic tirade before 
his execution against all women except Mariam, highlights why women are 
subordinate by law: “[y]ou giddy creatures, sowers of debate, / You’ll love today, 
and for no other cause I But for you yesterday did deeply hate; / You are the wreck 
of order, breach of laws (IV.vi.329-32).” He makes it clear that women who do not 
submit to wifely obedience, chastity and silence, transgress the law, and thus upset 
the social order law sustains. As Raber explains “[f]emale characters like Salome . . 
. become monstrous and unnatural precisely because they inhabit that gray area
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early-modern theories of absolutist patriarchal monarchy find so difficult fully to 
account for (337),” a grey area occupied not only by fictional women, but by extra-
textual women who went to law as well.
Furthermore, Salome’s “custom-breaking” speech remarks on the power of 
precedent and the machinations of the Jacobean legal system. There has been much 
extant analysis of this particular speech: N. Miller states that the “‘door’ for Salome 
seems to consist of skill at manipulating men rather than a resolve to stake out an 
alternative locus of authority (362);” Raber argues that “[m]ore disturbing to the type 
of paradigm for gender roles articulated by the chorus, however, is the series of 
propositions she offers, that virtue is skin deep, that women should be equal to men .
. . that freedom is for the rich only (336);” and Iwanisziw asserts that Salome’s 
speech “only highlights Salome’s acknowledged sinfulness, her indifferent piety, and 
her hypocritical claim to speak for other aristocratic women (112).” Unfortunately, 
these interpretations deny the text its connection to the empirical legal and 
jurisprudential framework of Jacobean England.
Salome clearly knows how the legal system works; as the sister of the King 
she has the funds to petition for a bill of separation, like the upper-class men who, by 
the Jacobean period, could afford to petition Parliament to have their separations 
ratified as divorces. While it is true that Salome easily embodies the stereotype of 
the manipulating, scheming, devilish woman, the “door” to which she refers has not 
been opened by a woman before, and, thus, her motives aside, she understands that 
creating a precedent for females to divorce would enable “an alternative locus of 
authority” for other women, who could then follow her to law.
Salome’s divorce plan offers “a strikingly direct alternative to Mariam’s 
careful (and finally unsuccessful) negotiation of conflicting moral [and legal]
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imperatives (Weller and Ferguson, Introduction 40. My addition).” Although 
Salome’s motives are suspect, her legal philosophy is not. She tells Constabarus “I 
mean not to be led by precedent, I My will shall be to me instead of Law (I.vi.453- 
4),” to which he replies, “I fear me much you will too late repent, / That you have 
ever liv’d so void of awe (I.vi.455-6).” This brief interchange highlights the 
philosophical contortions that the Jacobean legal system was undergoing: the 
jurisprudential shift from viewing law as an extra-human force, driven by divine and 
natural dictates that are to be accepted, unquestioningly to understanding that law 
can be controlled by interpretation, precedent and equity.
Salome, the legally-savvy woman, who will not “be led by precedent,” but 
will create her own, describes the new form of Jacobean jurisprudence. Constabarus, 
on the other hand, rallies behind the older, unquestioning, system of legal doctrine. 
The point of contradiction in their argument reflects extra-textual tensions that 
existed between the old system and the new, as well as between the competing 
jurisdictions of canon law courts, which upheld the law to which Constabarus refers, 
and secular, Continentally-influenced courts trying to rework legal practice, which 
Salome would prefer. The fact that she refers to the jurisprudence that made law 
more accessible to women, and is herself a woman wanting to use the law, may not
be a coincidence.
However, unlike some actual women, who did use the law courts to separate 
from their husbands, Salome is firmly trapped by a jurisprudence that favours the 
husband over the wife. As she explains to Silleus,
In this land we have an ancient use,
Permitted first by our law-giver’s head:
Who hates his wife, though for no just abuse,
May with a bill divorce her from his bed.
But in this custom women are not free,
Yet I for once will wrest it. (I.v.33-8)
Her ultimate inability to be “the custom-breaker” and “wrest it,” to provide the 
precedent for women who want to divorce, leads to private violence. In this case, 
the legal system creates its own monsters: with access to divorce, Salome’s 
representation might have been much different - a woman who simply avails herself 
of the legal rights available to her. In the early-modern period, however, this is not 
possible. The clause which binds married couples, “’till death do them part,” in the 
wedding contract, ensures that only her husband’s death will allow Salome to
remarry.
The fact that she calls upon the new legal philosophy of precedent, and is the 
only character who ultimately gets exactly what she wants without having to die for 
it, complicates any representation of Salome as an evil woman. Undeniably, her 
actions are specifically illegal and in that sense she is easily condemned. There is, 
however, a much more complex reading of her available within the text’s 
jurisprudential context. The tensions between old and new, traditional and reformist, 
conservative and progressive, which are suggested by the legal struggle between 
Salome and Constabarus, point to wider empirical tensions impacting on the extra­
textual legal system and the female legal subject. As I demonstrate in Chapter One, 
section IB, the new jurisprudence could be more lenient to female litigants and could 
allow them access, in a veiy active way, to a sphere otherwise reserved for men - the
courtroom. The fact that, in the end, Salome remains unable to exact a divorce on
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her terms, suggests that, as with Mariam, a legal system based on “nature” and “awe”
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in no way adequately reflects the needs of all society’s members, nor creates a 
female legal subject who is sustainable in practice.
The third main female figure in the play is Herod’s ex-wife, Doris. In the 
play’s source material, Josephus’ Jewish Antiquities, she “exists only by default on 
the margins of Josephus’ narrative, her position implicit simply in the historical fact 
that Mariam was Herod’s second wife (N. Miller 360).” In Cary’s play, however, 
she figures much more prominently, perhaps because in a play overtly concerned 
with divorce law and women, an ex-wife makes an important jurisprudential 
contribution. Doris represents women who have been divorced by their husbands, 
and the negative consequences divorce has for her rewrite the freedom Salome and
Mariam crave.
IVC. DIVORCED DORIS: SUBJECTIVE DIFFICULTIES AND THE EX-WIFE
Doris is first mentioned after Mariam’s speech in I.i. Alexandra, Mariam’s
mother, tries to understand Herod’s order that Mariam be killed if he does not return
alive from Rome (I.i.47-50), and suggests, “Who knows if he, unconstant, wavering 
lord, / His love to Doris had renew’d again? I And that he might his bed to her 
afford, / Perchance he wish’d that Mariam might be slain (I.ii. 127-30),” to which 
Mariam replies, “Doris! Alas, her time of love was past, / Those coals were rak’d in 
embers long ago I [Of] Mariam’s love, and she was now disgrac’d, / Nor did I glory 
in her overthrow (I.ii. 131-4. Editors’ addition).” The ease with which Herod was 
able to divorce Doris mocks Mariam’s and Salome’s sense of legal entrapment. But 
Doris, though free, reveals the dark side of the separations Mariam and Salome 
desire. Her representation suggests that if a wife does not agree with, or want, a 
separation, the legal consequences for her can be hard to bear.
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In this way, Doris marks yet another fracture in the construction of the 
Jacobean female legal subject. The author of The Court of Good Counsell argues 
that, in marriage, “if the woman see her husband faile in the love, which he oweth 
her, yet she must not do as he doth, but supply vertuously his default: Shewing to 
the worlde, that for her part, she beareth the crosse her selfe, which doing she shall 
have double reward of God (D2r).” But what sort of attitude must she adopt if her 
husband’s love fails to the point of divorce? In a society where wives are defined by 
their relationship to their husband, defined as women who no longer exist because of 
coverture, and who lose their possessions, name, mind and body to the man they 
many, how are they defined if their husband, their only permissible public persona, 
puts them aside for another woman? Through whom do they refract themselves in a 
system that demands women must figure themselves through some male figure, 
because they are not able to stand as autonomous individuals? How do they survive 
the disintegration of their social and subjective position?
Caiy’s Doris poses all these questions; she illustrates that the law, while 
easily defining a woman’s role as wife, has a hard time defining an ex-wife, and has 
an even harder time instilling the sense of “awe” necessary to keep that ex-wife from 
committing crimes. In this way, Doris also carries with her shades of the tragic 
revenger. She feels that the law has failed her, and she therefore sets out to enact her 
vengeance. How the law does not shape the legal subject of the ex-wife, and the 
effects that has on the subject herself, is Doris’ jurisprudential conundrum. The legal 
effects on her after the divorce are severe. At the time of the play’s action, she has 
returned to Palestine with her son, Antipater, to be revenged: “So long it is since 
Mariam’s purer cheek I Did rob from mine the glory, and so long / Since I return’d 
my native town to seek: / And with me nothing but the sense of wrong (II.iii.223-6).”
189
Her “sense of wrong” is wrought by the Jacobean legal tenets to which she adheres, 
not those of pre-Christian Palestine.
Although Mosaic law allows remarriage after divorce (Deut.24.1-4), early-
modern law does not. The Constitutions and Canons Ecclesiastical state in Article
CVII that in sentences for divorce, a “bond [is] to be taken for not marrying, during 
each others life (Church of England. My addition).” Cary’s play, so steeped in other 
legal representations that run parallel to those of Jacobean England, creates a 
conflicting jurisprudential locus in Doris. The play’s audience and readers may have 
known that remarriage after divorce was permissible in pre-Christian Palestine, but 
Doris’ rhetoric implies that the dictates she adheres to are all early seventeenth- 
century. Canon jurisprudence argues that
[a]s the Rabbines speak, The bone thou must gnaw, that is fallen to 
thy Lot. There is a knot of God betweene you, that cannot be unknit. 
God hath joyned her unto thee either in mercie, or in wrath; to be, as 
he saith of Rulers, either a Nurse to thee, or a Scourge. And Those 
that God hath joyned together, Man may not sever. (Gataker 17)
However, Herod divorces and remarries with impunity,54 and Doris’ and her son’s 
seventeenth-century perspectives clash with pre-Christian divorce law.
Antipater, Doris’ son, says that Mariam’s children “are but bastards 
(II.iii.277),” and that “foul adultery blotteth Mariam’s brow (II.iii.278).” Doris 
confronts Mariam in prison, telling her “Your soul is black and spotted, full of sin: / 
You in adult’ry liv’d nine year together, / And Heav’n will never let adult’ry in
54 Weller and Ferguson argue that Doris’ plight is an attack on Henry VIIl’s divorce from Catherine of 
Aragon. Doris echoes the feelings of many who felt Henry’s marriage to Anne Boleyn was not 
legitimate, and that the issue therefrom had no legal claim to the throne (Introduction 30-5). See as an 
example of the public reaction to Henry’s divorce, Harpsfield’s Treatise on the Pretended Divorce 
between Henry VIII and Catharine of Aragon.
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(IV.viii.576-8).” The discrepancy between the two forms of law, pre-Christian and 
Jacobean, come to a head when Mariam responds: “Was that adult’ry? Did not 
Moses say, I That he that being match’d did deadly hate: / Might by permission put 
his wife away,55 I And take a more belov’d to be his mate (IV.iii.587-90)?” Early- 
modern law states that remarriage after divorce (with the exception of divorce a 
vinculo) was illegal, and it is unlikely that Herod and Doris’ divorce met a vinculo 
criteria, which were for frigiditatis / impotentiae (Doris and Herod have a son), 
praecontractus or consanguinitalis (Coke 17r'v). The play does not make clear how 
or why Herod divorced Doris, but Doris and Mariam imply that he put her aside 
because he wanted Mariam, which would make the divorce, in early-modern legal 
terms, a mensa et thoro for which remarriage was not allowed. As for Mosaic law, a 
husband is allowed to divorce his wife if she “becomes displeasing to him because 
he finds something indecent about her (Deut.24.1),” and is allowed to remarry after 
divorce (Deut.24.2-3). Suffice to say, the attitudes expressed by Doris seem to be 
more in line with seventeenth-century thought than Judaic, and it is this form of law 
with which she engages throughout the play. Her double-barrelled attack emphasises 
how bitter she feels, how wronged she perceives herself to be, and makes her 
arguments more sympathetic within a seventeenth-century legal context.
From a Jacobean legal perspective, it is plausible that the play’s audience 
would recognise Herod’s remarriage as illegal, and would agree with Doris’ 
assessment that Mariam’s children are “baseborn heads / That were begotten in 
unlawful beds (IV.viii.617-8),” which would only undermine any interpretation of 
Mariam as a good woman. Furthermore, and importantly for the purposes of this
55 Mosaic law only gives this right to the husband, not the wife. She must suffer with the one she 
hates.
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thesis, Doris’ and Mariam’s differing perspectives on the law suggest its malleability 
and amenability to interpretation.
Because both women have interpreted the law differently, the audience is 
forced to engage with jurisprudential contradictions. The differing perspectives on 
the legal validity of Mariam’s marriage to Herod suggest to the audience that law is a 
flawed system of contradicting interpretations, not an ephemeral, extra-human 
manifestation of nature and God’s will. If it were “natural,” both women would have 
reached the same conclusion. That pre-Christian Palestine has one version of “God’s 
law,” and the early-modern period another (based on Canonical teachings), reveals 
the instability of legal discourse. While this is certainly an important aspect of 
Doris’ representation, because through it the text directly criticises extant legal 
norms, more interesting in terms of the female legal subject is the process through 
which she tries to rework her subjectivity - tries to refigure herself within the 
parameters legally allowed to her in Jacobean discourses.
Doris’ freedom is not a gift. As an ex-wife, she has lost everything - her 
social position, her dowager rights, her possessions - and she, like Salome, is bent on
murder:
Oft have I begg’d for vengeance for this fact,
And with dejected knees, aspiring hands 
Have pray’d the highest power to enact 
The fall of her that on my trophy stands.
Revenge I have according to my will,
Yet where I wish’d this vengeance did not light:
I wish’d it should high-hearted Mariam kill,
But it against my whilom lord did fight. (II.iii.247-54)
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The subject Doris embodies, that of the revenging, angry, spiteful woman, because 
she is denied access to wifehood, is far from legally normative, acceptable female
behaviour.
As a divorcee, she has no status and her child is illegitimate (implying that 
she herself is sexually loose). Her legal disempowerment spurs her to vengeance, 
and she is determined to see people suffer for what has happened to her. Donald 
Black discusses, in The Behavior of Law, how a system that negates subjects’ social 
positions causes the very behaviour it tries to dissuade: “[o]ne theoiy of deviant 
behavior holds that a person who is poorly integrated, or marginal, is more motivated 
to deviate . . . The unmarried, divorced . . . all, according to marginality theory, have 
a greater motivation to engage in deviant behavior (54),” because they suffer from 
social disintegration. Doris, cut off from all the relationships through which she was 
able to define herself before her divorce - her relationship to the patriarchy as a wife, 
to her society, to her husband, even possibly to herself if she accepted the dogma that 
would make her wholly subordinate - needs to find a way to reinvent herself, to find 
a suitable subjective position to occupy.
She feels betrayed by her husband, and more importantly, confused by his 
rejection. She asks Mariam:
What did he hate me for: for simple truth?
For bringing beauteous babes, for love to him?
For riches, noble birth, or tender youth?
Or for no stain did Doris’ honour dim?
Oh, tell me, Mariam, if you know,
Which fault of these made Herod Doris’ foe? (IV.iii.591-6)
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She cannot think of any way in which she has transgressed her wifely obligations, 
and as such, feels usurped by Mariam, as well as righteously angry at having lost the 
social position her marriage afforded her: “I am that Doris that was once belov’d, / 
Belov’d by Herod, Herod’s lawful wife: / ’Twas you that Doris from his side 
remov’d, / And robb’d from me the glory of my life (IV.iii.583-6).” Her repetition 
of Herod’s name and the rhyming of “wife” and “life” indicate that her entire sense 
of self was (and still is) dictated by her relationship to her husband, by Herod’s love 
for her, and by her position as his wife. With those defining referents gone, her 
identity is destabilised, her “glory” disappears, along with any meaningful way to 
construct herself as a female legal subject, or a female subject at all.
Doris enters Palestine, her former kingdom, unnoticed. Her bitterness
towards her former realm is evidenced in her words:
[You] royal buildings, bow your lofty side,
And [stoop] to her that is by right your queen:
Let your humility upbraid the pride 
Of those in whom no due respect is seen:
Nine times have we with trumpets’ haughty sound,
And banishing sour leaven from our taste,
Observ’d the feast that takes the fruit from ground.
Since I, fair city, did behold thee last. (II.iii.215-22. Editors’
additions)
Not only her place as a wife, but her status, have been destroyed by the divorce.
As her speeches above suggest, Doris is strongly affected by her separation
from Herod - she tells Mariam, “These thrice three years have I with hands held up, / 
And bowed knees fast nailed to the ground, / Besought for thee the dregs of that
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same cup, I That cup of wrath that is for sinners found (IV.viii.597-600).” She 
moves from being a good wife who was truthful, childbearing, loving, rich, noble, 
tender and young, to an evil, plotting sinner because she feels that the law has left 
her no choice; it has denied her everything she was before Herod divorced her. With 
no legal recourse to any compensation (or viable subjective position) for either 
herself or her son, she can only turn to sinful wishes of vengeance and plot against 
Mariam and Mariam’s children, to try to win back at least one aspect of her former 
self, her dowager rights and her position as a respectable mother.
Because the social roles for women were so limited during the Jacobean 
period - mother, wife, daughter, widow, temptress, whore - Doris has no other self 
to adopt after her divorce, no other cloak to wear, no legitimate role as an ex-wife. 
She therefore has no choice but to try to reinsert herself within the narrow 
boundaries prescribed to her. Because she is disallowed all options except mother, 
temptress and whore (no longer a wife and no longer a daughter - her father would 
have handed over guardianship at her wedding), she focuses on becoming the mother 
who will be recognised as socially legitimate, so long as she can reinstate her son’s 
legitimacy.
Although Mosaic law is unclear as to whether children of a divorce are 
legitimate (Deut.24.1-4), early-modern law is very clear on this point: “such 
divorces as dissolve the marriage . . . make the issue bastard (Coke 17v).” Doris tells 
her son, the original heir to Herod’s throne,
And thee, my boy, whose birth, though great it were,
Yet have thy after fortunes prov’d but poor:
When thou wert bom, how little did I fear
Thou shoulds’t be thrust from forth thy father’s door!
Art thou not Herod’s right begotton son?
Was not the hapless Doris Herod’s wife? (II.iii.227-32)
She has used conventional methods to fight for her son’s birthright, prayer and 
communiques with Herod, “to try / If thou before his bastards might be plac’d / In 
Herod’s royal seat and dignity (II.iii.255-7),” but to no avail. Law, embodied by 
Herod, dictates that “Mariam’s infants here are only grac’d, I And now for us there 
doth no hope remain (II.iii.258-9).” The only way to remedy a situation in which 
Antipater’s legal rights (and her own through him) are erased, is to “some subtle plot 
devise, / That Mariam’s children might subverted be, / By poison’s drink, or else by 
murderous knife, / So we may be advanc’d, it skills not how (ILiii.273-6).” Her 
situation is similar to Salome’s: she feels that the law denies her any non-violent 
recourse, any legal way to reclaim some of the dignity her former self was allowed, 
and she therefore turns to private revenge in order to legitimate her son.
Unfortunately, the play ends before Doris’ plot is realised, leaving only her 
early discussions with Antipater and her confrontation with Mariam for examination. 
The fact that her situation is not resolved, and that tellingly the Chorus makes no 
mention of her whatsoever when it recaps the events at the end of Act V (i.259-94), 
although it makes specific reference to all the other characters except the butler (a 
servant) and Silleus (a fool), suggests that the machinations of an ex-wife (like a 
servant or fool) are simply not important enough to merit comment. Not only does 
she no longer exist as Herod’s wife - as a woman who fulfills an appropriate 
subjective position - the Chorus’ omission implies that she does not exist at all in 
any meaningful social way, thus bolstering the dominant discourse that attempts to 
constrain women in a few acceptable roles, and censures, ignores or erases those on 
the margins.
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IVD. CONCLUSION: DIVORCE REFORM AND THE FEMALE LEGAL SUBJECT
All three women in Caiy’s play implicitly support the extant drives at divorce 
reform that had begun with Cranmer and his Commission. For two of the characters, 
death is the only way they can see out of an unsatisfactory marriage, and the one who 
has gone through the separation process is left in such dire straits that she is sworn 
on revenge and murder. The three women dramatically reinforce the women who 
did not keep their silence, despite the canonical mandate that they do so; the women 
who took legal action against their husbands and fought hard for dower and dowager 
rights after separation or widowhood.
The implication of Cary’s play is that the law does not adequately reflect 
social needs enough to keep women from breaking away from the legal subject they 
are expected to embody. The lack of women’s legal rights and their inability to 
access the law, makes all three women a form of “bad” wife, ex or not: Mariam
because of her public speech, because she cannot free herself from an unhappy 
marriage; Salome because of murder, to free herself from unhappy marriages; and 
Doris because of revenge, because she has lost everything through Herod’s suit 
against her. Their behaviour begs the question: how else does the law allow them to 
address their feelings of injustice? The use of revenge tragedy motifs throughout the 
play suggest that there are no viable legal avenues for the women to take, and that 
the women are left to deal with the injustice by private violence.
In a social climate of increasing women’s litigation, the arguments for 
divorce law reform in Cary’s play may explain some of the increasing statistics of 
legally-active women in the Jacobean period. The play might show, through 
dramatic representation, why women’s legal rights are so important from a female
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perspective. As Raber argues, “[wjhile Herod may have a legal right as a husband 
and monarch to dispose of his wife and sister, the play suggests that containing either 
is difficult and perhaps ultimately impossible (338).”56 What is beyond doubt, is that 
the literary representations of the female legal subjects in Cary’s play are bleak. 
They are fraught with sadness, anger, death and helplessness. Their “gendered 
conflicts in the play with reference to the stifling effects of patriarchal authority upon 
the female characters within marriage (N. Miller 354),” suggest that the empirical 
legal construction of women needs to be altered to take into account women’s desires 
and movements outside the home, and that extant jurisprudence creates an 
impossible subject who cannot exist within a lived human experience touched by 
passion, pain, desire and occasional irreverence.
All three characters speak powerful, dangerous, words for early-seventeenth- 
century women. Because they are fictitious creations, however, and all represented 
as “bad” wives, their contentious speech can easily be dismissed as the ravings of 
those who want to overthrow the status quo. In this way, the play can freely explore 
and question the empirical system that creates the female legal subject without 
actually having to challenge that system in court. As the literary representations in 
the next section prove, to do so may be legally fruitful, but leads to social disgrace.
56 Doris, absent from choral comment, is notably absent from most extant criticism, as well.
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V. “WHEN/WOMEN GIVE NOW THEIR BILLS, AND PLEA GAINST MEN (Terracae 
llv):” THE LITERARY CONSTRUCTION OF FRANCES HOWARD
Cary’s play illustrates one aspect of a cultural criticism of law and literature - 
her representations suggest a need to redefine the female legal subject to take into 
account women’s agency and desires, and reveals law’s inadequacy and artificiality. 
In doing so, the play challenges the dominant legal discourse and subverts the female 
norm which that discourse tries to create, it subverts the easily-codifiable stereotypes 
that women are expected to embody. The works discussed in this section also reject 
legal machinations, but do so in a significantly different way than Cary’s play. The 
literary works I will discuss, Terracae’s Plenarie Satisfaction and Osborne’s True 
Tragi-Comedie, are based on a contemporary, real-life event, the divorce between 
Lady Frances Howard and Robert Devereux, the third Earl of Essex, which took
place in 1613, the same year Cary’s play was published.
The Howard case has been of more interest to historians, like Lindley, who 
focus on the politics affecting the trial, if they focus on the first trial at all, than to 
literary critics. Most historical accounts are drawn to the second Howard trial, in 
1616, for the murder of Thomas Overbury,57 described as “one of the most 
‘Machiavellian’ and complicated of all Elizabethan revenges (Bowers 25),” an event 
which would haunt the reign of James I because of his involvement in the political 
intrigues which led up to it.
The Overbury case is well-known, and therefore I will not allocate much 
space to it here. A brief synopsis is, however, necessary, to situate Osborne’s text, 
written after Howard’s second trial, in which she was charged with Overbury’s 
murder. Sir Thomas Overbury (1581-1613) was a close friend of James’ favourite, 
Robert CaiT, the Earl of Somerset, who would marry Howard after her successful
57 See, for example: Bellany; Gibbs; Comte; Matter; and Somerset.
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divorce from the Earl of Essex. Overbury played an important role in the Howard / 
Somerset union, encouraging “the liaison, taking malicious pleasure in helping to 
prostitute the daughter of a Howard (Houston 46).” However, when Howard 
successfully divorced Essex leaving Somerset free to marry her, Overbury violently 
opposed the union, fearing that his influence with Somerset would be undermined 
(“Overbury” par. 3).
The Howard family was quick to put pressure on King James, who 
subsequently confined Overbury “to the Tower for refusing the King’s offer of a 
diplomatic posting abroad (Houston 46),” where he died “mysteriously, in 
September 1613 (Houston 46).” Two years later, when it came to light that 
Overbury’s “mysterious” death had been caused by slow poisoning delivered by 
Frances Howard and her allies, James ordered an investigation.
Howard pleaded guilty and Somerset pleaded innocent, but both were 
sentenced to death, then later reprieved by the King, remaining interred in the Tower 
until 1622 when they were released (Houston 51). Howard’s involvement in this 
ruinous affair would destroy her reputation for all time, and is certainly more than 
partly responsible for Osborne’s vicious, open attacks on her in The True Tragi- 
Comedie - an extremely biased account of the 1613 divorce trial.
The metaphors he uses to vilify Howard, however, are of extreme importance 
in reading the female legal subject in matters of divorce, because they point to extant 
ideological and theological stereotypes into which women could easily be slotted, 
and it is for this reason that his text is useful to my thesis, despite the extreme bias it 
carries against Howard for her murder plot. Terracae’s poem is of even more interest 
to the construction of the female legal subject in matters of divorce, specifically 
because it was written before Howard’s involvement in Overbury’s death came to
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light. Its representation of Howard is not, therefore, stained by the murder 
investigation.
Literary critics have been less drawn to Frances Howard as a subject than 
historians have been. This is possibly because literary works based on the Howard 
annulment are, for the most part, not by any of the “great” writers of the time and did 
not enjoy anything more than a first printing, with the exception of John Donne’s 
Epithalamion at the Marriage of the Earl of Somerset. 1613. December 26, and 
George Chapman’s Andromeda Liberata and A Free and Offenceles Justification, 
both ca. 1614. Despite the relative obscurity of Terracae and Osborne, the poem 
and play on which I focus in this chapter, situated within the historical events that 
background them, are important texts for a cultural criticism of law and literature.
While Cary’s play represents women who do not adhere to social dictates, 
implying the need for reform and a connection between her characters and extra­
textual, legally-active women, the Howard materials attach themselves to a single 
woman in a specific historical event. How these texts interact with the female legal 
subject they discuss illustrates how literature can support the dominant legal 
discourse; how it can create a subject, based on a real woman, the representation of 
whom affects and is affected by events outside the text; how literature can impact on 
the extra-textual legal subject in a way that law sometimes cannot.
Frances Howard was married to Robert Devereux on January 5, 1606 
(Lindley 13), to support the political machinations of her father (Lindley 15-6). On 
September 25, 1613, Howard was successful in her annulment suit against Devereux
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on the legal grounds of his impotence, in the court of High Commission,58 and 
married Robert Carr, James’ favourite, in December of that same year (Lindley 82).
Lindley argues that historical accounts of the annulment proceedings are 
influenced by what happened thereafter: Howard’s sentencing to the Tower of 
London in 1616 for her part in the murder of Sir Thomas Overbury (77), a scandal 
that Cuthbert Johnson, in 1837, described as “one of the black stains on the reign of 
James which time will never efface,” and about which he refuses to give the “filthy 
details (258).” However, there is strong evidence to suggest that textual 
representations of Howard show a significant negative public backlash to her divorce 
suit even before it became much easier to characterise her as a dangerous murderess 
in the post-1616 annulment accounts. The epithalamion written for her and Carr’s 
wedding by John Donne, for example, illustrates the impact court rumour was having 
on Howard’s reputation long before there was any hint of murder attached to her.
Many were convinced that Howard and Somerset had had an illicit 
relationship prior to her divorce from Essex. Such was the furore surrounding her 
swift remarriage to Carr that Donne makes a point of defending Howard’s virginity 
and the purity of the Howard / Somerset relationship. His reasons were most likely 
political - at the time he was working as Somerset’s secretary, and Carey argues that 
“[g]iven the character of the bride” Donne seems to have found writing the
58 Henry VIII had created these courts that “exercised by royal commission - on a statutory basis after 
1559 - the authority of the crown as supreme governor of the church in England (M. Ingram 37)” 
after the Reformation. They were created “to enforce royal policy in matters of religion (M. Ingram 
39),” but in reality, “exercised a summary jurisdiction” over other courts (Rowse 410), and “dealt 
with cases involving immorality and matrimony, including what were in effect suits between parties 
(M. Ingram 39).” Lindley states “a commission was appointed, headed by George Abbot, Archbishop 
of Canterbury (81)” to hear the annulment suit. Primary participants were not allowed to give 
evidence under canon law, because “they were hopelessly biased witnesses (Stone, Road 197)” and 
holding the annulment before the High Commission meant that both Howard and Essex could give 
evidence during the hearing. King James’ personal involvement in deciding which bishops were 
appointed to the commission proves that the ecclesiastical court in which the hearing took place was 
that most influenced by the monarch: that is, the Court of High Commission.
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epithalamion “ticklish,” but “[h]e does not scruple ... to allude to the scandal the 
affair had caused (86-7).” Although not the focus of this section, Donne’s work 
stands as a useful juxtaposition to Terracae’s poem - both men defend Howard after 
her remarriage, and both texts exhibit the same tensions between textual 
representation of the female legal subject and extant public opinion. Donne 
describes Howard as being “intirely” a picture of “starres . . . not so pure, as their 
spheares are (Epithalamions 156-8),” a dubious compliment that refers both to her 
“entire,” intact (i.e.: virginal) condition, and to the infamy that surrounded the new 
marriage spurred on by rumours that she was not so pure. Donne goes on to describe 
the nuptial scene, averring,
Their soules, though long acquainted they had beene,
These clothes, their bodies, never yet had seene;
Therefore at first shee modestly might start,
But must forthwith surrender every part,
As freely, as each to each before, gave either eye or heart. 
(Epithalamions 212-6)
Although he asserts that both Howard and Somerset were innocent of any physical 
relationship prior to their wedding, the previous stanzas show that he does so with
some reluctance.
The narrator of the epithalamion, Idios, has left the court because of the 
wedding, and argues:
I knew
All this [James’ involvement in the annulment and remarriage]; and 
onely therefore I withdrew.
To knowe and feele all this, and not to have
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Words to expresse it, makes a man a grave
Of his owne thoughts; I would not therefore stay
At a great feast, having no Grace to say. (Epithalamions 91-6. My
addition)
The official excuse is that he leaves because he does not have the words to express 
his joy at the affair, and therefore is embarrassed to be unable to celebrate it 
properly. The implication, however, is that the feast does not receive Idios’ grace; he 
does not have words to express his feelings because he cannot safely express himself 
and still stay in the King’s (or Somerset’s) favour. His words might dangerously 
reflect the extant public opinion that condemned the second marriage. The 
ambiguity in Donne’s Epithalamion and the other works produced before 1616 is 
rooted in something other than Howard’s indictment as a murderess, and in these 
earlier sources the creation of the female legal subject, and the overlap between legal 
and literary representation, comes into play.
VA. AMBIGUOUS INNOCENCE: DEFENDING FRANCES HOWARD
Like Donne’s Epithalamion, Terracae’s poem illuminates both the conflation 
of legal and literary subjective representations, and the difficulties inherent in 
sustaining a literary subject under oppositional empirical pressure. It is crucial to 
bear in mind the context of his work.59 Terracae’s poem is addressed
To the right noble Robert Earle of Somerset, Viscount Rochester, 
Baron of Branspeth, Lord high Treasurer of Scotland, Knight of the 
most noble order of the Garter & one of his majesties most Honorable 
Privie Counsaile of both the Kingdomes: And to his thrice noble &
59 Which is lodged at the Northamptonshire Records Office; Northampton was a strong ally of the 
Howards.
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accomplish’d faire Ladie, the Lady Frances his virtuous Countesse. 
(lr)
His political affiliations are clear: he dedicates his poem to Frances Howard and her 
second husband, Robert Can*, the Earl of Somerset. Because Terracae’s poem was 
most likely written before the murder trial of 161660 and stands firmly, with its 
Address, behind the decision of the court and Howard’s remarriage, one would 
expect it to be highly biased in favour of the “thrice noble & accomplish’d faire 
Ladie,” and he certainly tries to build an argument with which he can defend her.
He asserts that the legal annulment of the marriage guarantees the truth (or at 
least this is what he states at the poem’s beginning). What the court has ruled he
accepts,
ffor it is most sweet, that when ... the life of man ral’d to the Barre, 
for mattor of fact, or suppition, the Jurie disputing for a time the most 
pointes in the end cany yt, and so the Judited . . . sentence goes most 
just, and legally pronounced in the whole Juries name: the like being 
in all Judicatorie Proceedings . . . and this may force in any 
reasonable opinion to stop the Malice, or Ignorance. (2r)
The juiy system gives fairness to the trial, and sustains Terracae’s argument that 
Howard must be innocent because a court of her peers found her to be so. 
Furthermore, he confronts the issue of her right to bring the claim by asking “if the 
One, and other, had not right / And mutuall power alike? As exquisite, / And 
peremtorie Hers, the wifes; as His, / Over her bodie in marriadg offices (1 1v)?” Like
60 The Northamptonshire catalogue dates the poem at 1613-32, but it was acknowledged by a Records 
Office employee that this date is “a guesstimate,” and Lindley dates the poem as “probably completed 
before the marriage (124),” i.e: before December 1613. It was most likely written before the murder 
trial for the simple reason that it is unlikely Terracae would have allied himself with convicted 
criminals, particularly given that he chooses to define “truth” by judicial mandate.
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Salome’s plea for equal rights to legal redress, Terracae suggests that a wife has as 
much right to divorce her husband as a husband does his wife, because she shares his 
body as he shares hers. Not only has Howard been found innocent, Terracae argues, 
but she is completely justified in bringing her claim - a wife has claims to her 
husband’s body in marriage as well. Thus, although public opinion is against 
Howard, and although the text implies that Terracae recognises the rumours, he 
quickly establishes his definition of truth as that which the court decrees, “sweet” 
and “just.”
In doing so, Terracae attempts to dismiss any attacks on Howard’s character 
that are not grounded in legal fact. He places the subject in the hands of the legal 
process and creates an absolutist position: the court’s decision dictates the character 
of the individual. This makes Terracae’s poem a perfect example of how legal and 
literary representation can conflate. Howard, at the beginning of the poem, is the 
character defined by the courts, not that created by derisory public opinion. She is 
innocent and her claim good because she successfully separated from Essex because 
she was found to be virgo intact a at the time of the trial by the women who 
examined her (Lindley 66); her body proves his impotence; the court ruling proves 
her innocence. For Terracae, the court ruling shows that the rumours of a physical 
relationship between Howard and Somerset before the annulment are unfounded.61
The rumour and hearsay impacting on Howard’s remarriage are noted in 
Terracae’s poem. He refers to the trial as “so like a well-stor’d Act / (On Publique 
stage) (2V),” implying that the people involved are shaped as though they are 
characters in a drama, susceptible to social construction and invention, and implying 
that the rumours, like stage representations, belong to the realm of the imaginary.
61 This only proves that no physical relationship took place between Howard and Somerset. Certainly 
the Claimant and Somerset had met privately a number of times before the divorce (Lindley 68).
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Throughout his work, he attacks the “Beastes” of the multitude who spread the 
rumours that maliciously construct Howard as a fallen woman, and who “will know 
no more then Beastes, but so live still (3r).” However, and most importantly, despite 
his adamant wish to defend Howard, his writing reveals the bias of the extant 
opinions he tries to refute.
On the front page Terracae clarifies that his poem is meant “to setle the 
Desires of such, who setting aside Singularitie, Envie, or Passion to either Partie; ar 
willing to heare the Truth and Lawfulness of a Nullitie in Marriadg to be pronounced 
in Malificium quoad Haric or of particulor proved Impotencio (lr).” Throughout the 
poem he attacks popular opinion which had developed against Howard and Somerset 
during the course of the divorce proceedings. However, his representations buckle 
and become ambiguous under the pressures of extra-textual opinion.
On one reading, he is supportive of the new marriage - he wants to defend 
Howai'd’s divorce and the Howard / Somerset union; on the other, he freely alludes 
to the circulating rumours about a pre-annulment relationship between them. He 
asks his readers to ignore the “Singularitie, Envie, or Passion” of the parties, and to 
judge the case solely on legal merits. He also unwisely refers to the ruling in favour 
of witchcraft {malificium quoad hand) that places the blame for Essex’s impotence 
firmly with Howard and / or her associates. These rumours, and the social and 
political tensions surrounding the case, impact on Terracae’s literary subject. 
Although the court did decide in Howard’s favour, it reached its decision on the 
ground that Essex’s impotence was caused by supernatural conjuring by, if not 
Howard, then at least those associated with her (Lindley 96-8). The rumours about 
Howard and Somerset would only have been exacerbated by the implication that she
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used witchcraft to make her first husband impotent in order to divorce him and marry
someone else.
Terracae’s ambiguous representation of Howard’s innocence continues in the 
introduction to the poem when he addresses her directly:
And you (faire Maddam) in like Goddnes rest,
So shall you shyne with all those graces blest,
That star-like crowne the Truith; and shall obtrude
To shame, both Envie, and the Multitude.
As for those frailties, that may shake thy Presence,
Those adventitiall, not of thy true essence;
And wher is that Compusre framd of blood 
And flesh, that may make boaste of simple good.
Heaven will not.. .
. .. hide in Mistes Cimmerian
thy naturall Vertues, but quite opposite
The worst extinguishe, and the better light. (5V)
Whether Terracae refers to the rumours about Howard’s connection to Somerset, or
the way in which she oversteps her wifely boundaries by bringing a divorce suit 
against her husband when he cites her “frailties,” is debatable. Unarguably, the lines 
can be read as derogatory, particularly when shortly thereafter Terracae states again 
that his poem is written to support “Authorities, sacred, and authentique, gathered to 
satisfy, in the Lawfullnes of a Nullitie pronounced in the Case wher is apparent 
Hominem Malificium Esse Quoad Hanc (I1);” a case in which witchcraft was 
apparent, but the claim still lawful. Seemingly supportive, Terracae’s defence of the
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new marriage is undermined by both his reference to witchcraft and Howard’s
“frailties.”
Because her prior marriage had been declared null on the grounds of Essex’s 
impotence, the law declares that their marriage was never valid in the first place (a 
vinculo), and Howard would have the right to remarry. It is this valid legal process, 
and the jurisprudence behind it, that Terracae tries to use to sustain his argument. As 
he points out:
Whome God hath joyn’d, Let no man separate:
But here, then, what, or whome ... God hath so joyn’d must be the
Question:. . .
Those Duties to performe, & consummate,
Which his high plesure was often to command ...
namely he made land
to fill with People: Grow and multiplie,
Increase in fruiet, & fill the earth. (3r)
Procreation was for theologians the primary purpose of marital union. If Essex were 
unable to consummate the marriage, he would not have been a legitimate husband. 
However, although Terracae claims to support Howard, his argument undercuts his 
(and her) position. He acknowledges rumours of an affair with Carr, and almost 
confirms them when he writes: “whome . . . God hath so joyn’d must be the 
Question.” This is tricky rhetoric, and instead of cementing Howard’s remarriage on 
the ground that her first was not divinely ordained, he undermines her moral 
character by implying a liaison between her and Somerset before the divorce. 
Although Terracae quickly attests that Howard is “The Innocent, sought in the heate
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of Rage I To be devoured like Harpies foode (3V),” he again refers to the possibility 
of a Howard / Somerset connection two pages later.
He argues that Essex’s impotence is akin to adultery, because Essex “putts 
awaie / His wife (9r)” by his inability “to make good I The duties of the amorous Bed 
(10r).” Under such circumstances women like Howard, “the fair forsaken young- 
one,” “go / At length (betray’d by Importunite) (10r'v),” and “in due time doe 
addresse I In beds of truer Fate, and happiness (llr).” Here, Terracae’s legal 
reasoning is sound; theologians argue that
[t]hey are to be accounted impotent, and in that respect unable to 
performe the essentiall duties of mariage, who (to use the Scripture 
phrase) were borne Eunuchs from their mothers wombe\ or by an 
accidentall occasion are so made: as they who are defective, or closed 
in their secret parts: or taken with an incurable palsie: or possessed 
with frigidity, or any other such like impediment.
These ought not to seeke after mariage: for by those signes of 
impotencie God sheweth that he calleth them to live single. (Gouge 
180-1)
Although the jurisprudence is sound, when Terracae accuses Essex of metaphorical 
adultery, he obliquely accuses Howard of actual adultery because he implies she has 
sought recourse in another’s bed, albeit out of necessity.
He further clouds his textual representation of her as innocent when, after 
citing “her Modestie (12r)” and “her modestie, and womanish honour (12v)” as the 
reasons she took so long to come forward with her petition (which was launched 
seven years after her wedding), he concludes on the same page, that her “dutious 
spousal love, unto her lord, / That noble Earle; compel’d her to accord / The
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manifesting of her . . . cause (12v).”62 Thus, it is not her “modesty” which kept her 
from petitioning, but rather her “spousal love” for Somerset that finally forced her 
hand. As the Mariam section made clear, one duty of spousal love is to engage in 
sexual intercourse. Thus Terracae’s description of the Howard / Somerset 
connection as a form of marriage raises the possibility that they have had sex, as 
spouses who love each other dutifully should, and as court rumour was convinced to
be the case.
He continues the line of argument that Howard and Somerset are divinely- 
ordained spouses, despite her first marriage, using theological marital doctrine and 
analogies to rationalise and justify the second marriage. He likens the Somerset / 
Howard relationship to “A figure twixt Christ and his Holy-One / Of the high 
spirituall conjuntion (3V).” As discussed in section IC, the analogous connection 
between Christ and the Church, God and the people, is a commonplace metaphor for 
marriage in the early-modern period, and gives sanctity to the marriage bond.
In the lines that follow, however, ambiguity again arises. Terracae argues 
that the relationship is sanctioned by God because it is like
the first worck too of paradise:
As the most perfect; thereby to express
How far this sacred Act was from the blame
Of an imposture coupling, and the shame
Of those Defects, which Sinn, and Satan, can 
Bring by permission, on the fall of Man. (3V)
His metaphor uses the biblical precedent of Adam and Eve to validate the Howard /
Somerset union. As God made Eve for Adam, so He made Howard for Somerset.
62 The definition of “accord” and its origins, in the COD, indicate that the “Earl” Terracae refers to is 
Somerset, not Essex.
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However, such a metaphor subtly disparages Howard whilst it attempts to vindicate
her.
The Expulsion, as I have illustrated in earlier sections of this chapter, was 
seen as the first instance of marital discord, brought on by the wife working in 
conjunction with Satan. Therefore, any reference to this episode in Christian 
mythology firmly binds female dissent, marital disharmony and sin into a tight 
connotative knot. Francis Osborne’s Advice to a Son, published in 1656, describes 
Terracae’s Edenic precedent in a very different light. He argues that women, 
responsible for the Fall, are
the fruit of that Tree, the kernell of that Apple, which first destroyed 
us all, faire to sight, to of fatall and dreadful consequence to the 
taster, rendering him subject to slavery, that was born free, and Her to 
command, who ought in righter reason to serve and obey.63
It is highly improbable that Terracae was completely ignorant of this other version of 
Eden, in which the woman (and the sexual power she wields over the innocent man) 
caused Original Sin and spiritual death. Thus, his use of the Eden metaphor 
dangerously alludes to the way in which Howard overturns conventional notions of 
hierarchy by suing her husband for divorce on the emasculating grounds of his 
inability to perform sexually, and would certainly raise the spectre of dangerous 
female sexuality for a number of Terracae’s readers.
Adding to the representational tensions in Terracae’s text was public 
skepticism about Essex’s impotence. Certainly some believed that Howard was 
lying about her first husband’s inability. During the hearing it was reported by
Abbot that
63 If this was Osborne’s attitude towards women in general, it is no surprise that his textualisation of 
Howard in The True Tragi-Comedie, discussed in the next sub-section, is less than sympathetic.
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Essex . . . having five or six captains and gentlemen of worth in his 
chamber, and speech being made of his inability, rose out of his bed, 
and taking up his shirt, did shew to them all so able and extra­
ordinarily sufficient matter, that they all cried out shame of his lady, 
and said, That if the ladies of the court knew as much as they knew, 
they would tread her to death. (Qtd. in Lindley 95)
Howard’s argument is considerably unseated by this evidence, and if it were 
generally known that Essex were not impotent, then Howard’s position would have
been indefensible.
Her role as a woman and a wife, the person “to whom subjection was 
injoyned: before there was childe or servant in the world, it was said to her, thy 
desire shall be subject to thine husband (Gouge 25),” demanded that her duty was to 
Essex and to him alone. As his wife she “must submit her selfe to an husband, 
because he is her head: and she must doe it as to the Lord, because husband is to her,
as Christ is to the Church ... As an head is more eminent and excellent than the
body, and placed above it, so is an husband to his wife (Gouge 29-30).” The anti- 
Howard sentiments which grew out of public skepticism could very well have 
contributed to the double-edged character representation in Terracae’s poem.
He continues his unsustainable defence of Howard when he describes the
mid-wives’ examination to ensure that Howard was virgo intacla, the evidence 
which effectively counters Abbott’s statement. He says that even “had she not bene 
a virgin found (21v),”
A maid, who for a virgin bargain’d is 
So sold, so bought, yf after she be found 
No maide, yet shall not that be lawfull...
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To make the covenant void, or be repaid 
The monies .. . layd out for her; so said
The Roman Justice: and the Reason was
Why should Reddition be in such a case 
Where such her fault was no Impediment
Unto that use, for which the Patron ment 
To buy her for. (22r)
Terracae’s legal reasoning is problematic, to say the least. His statement, “had she 
not bene a virgin found,” reveals his own dubiousness about the validity of her claim 
and the midwives’ findings. It is certainly not an iron-clad defence of a woman who 
was pronounced a virgin by her examiners. Secondly, a husband would have been 
able to divorce his wife for not being a virgin, if he had married her thinking, in good 
faith, that she was. It is precisely this legal tenet for which Morose is able to divorce 
in Epicoene in Ben Jonson’s play - he married someone thinking she was one thing, 
when in fact she was another. Furthermore, after seven years of marriage to Essex, it 
is most likely, had Howard not been intact, that the midwives and court would have 
assumed the responsibility lay with her husband, not with some unnamed, 
undisclosed liaison prior to her marriage.
Importantly, Terracae’s argument reduces the marriage to a purely business 
venture - if she were not a virgin that is no matter because it is “no Impediment” to 
“that use, for which the Patron ment to buy her for.” She can still be a wife, still 
procreate, whether she is a virgin or not. More shocking is how he likens her to a 
chattel in the lines of a poem purporting to defend its female recipient against the 
barbs of the multitude. In marriage writing of the early-modern period, Terracae’s 
language is unusual - while, in practical terms, upper-class marriages were a
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business venture, using women to cement family connections or wealth, marriage 
tracts tended to emphasise the joys of companionate marriage rather than the 
lucrative gains that could be made by a union. Terracae’s statements do not deny 
Howard’s lasciviousness, all they do is try to raise sympathy for her by highlighting 
her position as a commodity and her lack of choice in her marriage to Essex. His 
arguments only serve to draw attention to the possibility that she was a “loose” 
woman even prior to her first marriage. The fact that he would use such far-fetched 
rhetoric to defend Howard displays uncertainty that he can successfully defend her 
against notoriety, and implies that he is trying to defend her from within the 
notorious subjective position that stains her character, rather than illustrating an
effective defence from outside it.
In the end, Terracae’s political affiliations are overshadowed, and indeed 
overcome, by empirical stereotypes, ideologies and rumours. Howard oversteps her 
wifely boundaries to bring the petition; she is subsequently associated with 
witchcraft; and her remarriage shortly thereafter to Robert Carr causes a public 
scandal. Under these circumstances, although he sets out to defend Howard, 
Terracae’s poem succumbs to the same ambiguities apparent in Donne’s 
Epithalamion. His representation cannot escape empirical influences. Deliberate or 
not, his references to a possible Howard / Somerset connection before the divorce 
and to the charges of witchcraft only undermine the legal subject he tries to stabilise 
by basing her character on court findings.
His representation of Howard is thus symptomatic of the destabilisation the 
female legal subject endures in a system that places conflicting demands upon her - 
in Howard’s case, that she become a wife and reproduce, with the ability to separate
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from her husband if he fails in his husbandly, but which paradoxically also vilifies 
her for leaving the home and publicly dishonouring her husband in a court of law.
Despite rumours and opposition, the annulment was controversially granted 
because James packed the Commission with two judges bound to vote in Howard’s 
favour (Lindley 120). Thus, the law, as the normalising engine for the status quo 
found her innocent and Howard should have been accepted as existing safely within 
legally normative boundaries, immune to any public denunciation of her character. 
However, in Terracae’s poem, where he tries to sustain the literary representation of 
Howard by adhering to the court verdict, that she is an innocent wife with an 
impotent husband, such a representation is unsustainable. It continually buckles 
under the empirical pressures of scandal, rumour and general outrage (not the least of 
which was James’ involvement in the case). His early assertion about “the Truth and 
Lawfulness” of the annulment appears to be nothing more than a superficial 
reference to the legal subject which the ruling has created. If Terracae genuinely 
accepted the ruling to be the truth about Howard’s character his poem would be far 
less ambiguous. Provocatively, if the legal definition of a subject is “the truth” about 
that person, then no contrary rumours would exist in the first place.
However, this is clearly not the case. Rumours did abound about Howard 
and Somerset’s relationship, and about the validity of Essex’s impotence, suggesting 
that the law does not have the power to define or constrain subjecthood in the face of 
contrary public opinion. Terracae’s defence is undermined to the extent that his 
dedicatory address to the “virtuous” Howard comes to seem ironic. Because his 
representation of her is so ambiguous, the legal finding on which he bases his sole 
reasonable defence of her innocence is challenged and destabilised. The tensions 
that exist between Howard, the legal subject defined by court ruling, and Howard,
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the wayward wife defined by public opinion, reveal that the legal system does not 
always sustain the dominant discourse, and suggest the arbitrariness of law. 
Although the judgment in Howard’s favour meant that she, as a legal subject, was 
innocent and correct to bring forward her suit, public opinion did not accept that 
legal subject as valid.64 Certainly, there will always be cases where legal outcomes 
and verdicts are at odds with public opinion, for many reasons. The public outciy 
against the divorce between Howard and Essex, however, is a distinctly gendered 
reaction. It is based on the construction of the female legal subject that exists outside 
this specific court ruling.
Although Howard was right to bring her suit forward (her intact virginity and 
the verdict in her favour prove this), the backlash falls to her, not to Essex who, 
according to law, should not ever have married because he could not fulfill his sexual 
responsibilities. Ironically, by adhering to one aspect of her legal subjecthood (her 
ability to annul her marriage because of her husband’s impotence) she subverts so 
many others (she challenges him in a very public way on extremely emasculating 
grounds, she is not silent or submissive, she does not reverence him) that she is 
unredeemable, despite being entirely within her legal rights. What lies behind the 
extra-textual, and subsequent literary, vilification of Frances Howard is male anxiety. 
The charges of witchcraft make this more than evident, even if she was not punished
for them.
For the court to consider, and to put forward for public consideration, that 
Essex’s impotence was no fault of his own, but rather due to his wife’s connection 
with the Devil, sustains the belief that the responsibility for marital problems lies
64 This is a problem the law has yet to rectify. The same thing happened over 300 years later in the 
United States’ O. J. Simpson murder trial, and the disparity may lie in the fact that there are two 
“systems of law” at work in society: one “is geared to dishonor, that is, to the effects of public 
opinion (Foucault, Ethics 28),” which is often at odds with the other, legislated statutes that protect 
the interests of status quo specifically, and sometimes fail to take public opinion into account.
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only with the wife. As Chapman writes in A Free and Offenceles Justification, in 
defence of Howard,65 patriarchal society simply cannot accept responsibility for 
unmanly traits:
O barraine Malice! was it ever sayd 
A man was barraine? or the burthen layd 
Of bearing fruite on Man? if not, nor this 
Epithete barraine, can be construed his 
In least proprietie: but that such a one 
As was Andromeda; in whose parts shone 
All beauties, both of bodie and of minde
The sea dame to a barraine rocke should binde
In envie least some other of her kinde
Should challenge them for beauty any more. (123-32)
The witchcraft charge protects the masculine virility mocked in Chapman’s lines, for 
the simple reason that impotence, under these circumstances, is not a physical 
shortfalling of the husband.
Howard’s inability to fulfill the requirements of her legal subject because, 
ironically, she openly challenges her husband in a court of law whilst exercising her 
legal right; and the connection between her and witchcraft (for the most part, a 
female-dominated profession in the early-modern period) that absolves Essex of any 
“unmanliness,” are the terms by which Howard is undone. Despite the court ruling 
in her favour, she cannot escape the dominant discourse that requires wives to be 
silent, chaste and submissive, and she is therefore easily slotted into the stereotype of 
an evil, demonic woman.
65 Like Donne, Chapman’s reasons for defending the marriage were also most likely political - Robert 
Carr was Chapman’s patron at the time of the marriage (Solve 24-9).
218
These factors cause the empirical world to impinge on Terracae’s literary 
representation to the extent that he cannot uphold his original intent; he cannot 
confirm the validity of Howard’s second marriage by proving her innocence through 
law. Her case is a rare legal occurrence - too rare to create a social atmosphere in 
which divorcing wives could be accepted as legally normal. Extant reactions to 
Howard’s suit are more in line with the upside-down world described by 
Constabarus in Cary’s play, than with equity or legal judgment, and Terracae’s 
literary representation of her cannot resist empirical condemnation, despite her legal
innocence.
VB. FAMILY-AS-STATE, WOMAN-AS-DEVIL: DENIGRATING FRANCES HOWARD
Francis Osborne’s play, The True Tragi-Comedie, exposes the same 
empirical censure as Terracae’s poem. His representation, however, is overtly anti- 
Howard. As early as the play’s character descriptions, he makes his position clear: 
he writes that “noe Sinn below the girdle is mortall; yet an afect of it may be so, as 
exparience did manifest in This Lady, who Died of a Disease in Those parts (5r).” 
He immediately connects Howard’s supposed lasciviousness with her death from 
uterine cancer in 1632.66 Osborne makes no attempt to defend her, and stands firmly 
in the ranks of those who openly vilified her for her court action and remarriage after 
the murder trial of 1616. To effectively dispar-age her, he draws a close analogy 
between civil unrest and marital unrest, playing on the early-modern family-as-State 
paradigm. His play supports the constructed social hierarchy, the ideological 
underpinnings for marriage law, and the dominant definition of the acceptable
66 The author’s sentiments echo those of her “post-mortem report that survives among the papers of 
her first husband,” which say that the derogatory statements in the report “are for the Glory of God, 
who often makes his punishments (in the ballance of his Justice) of equal weight with our sins (Qtd. in 
Lindley 191).”
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female legal subject. For him, a woman who successfully asserts her legal rights 
figures the destruction of the State, embodies chaos and evil, and causes dangerous 
hierarchical upheaval. It is important to remember that Osborne’s play was written 
after the 1616 murder trial, and it therefore bears the mark of those proceedings in its 
attitude toward its subject matter. Howard, ambiguously unsympathetic in 
Terracae’s poem, is vilified in Osborne’s work to the point of demonisation.
Throughout the play, Howard’s annulment suit represents the divisive unrest 
in James I’s kingdom at the time the divorce hearing took place. This connection is 
given weight by James’ own rhetoric early after his ascension to the throne, which 
attempted to unify the formerly disparate kingdoms of England and Scotland. In his 
speech to Parliament in 1604 he stated: “What God hath conjoyned then, let no man 
separate. I am the Husband, and all the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife; I am the 
Head, and it is my Body; I am the Shepheard, and it is my Flocke {King B2r).” The 
unrest and in-fighting between English and Scottish court factions, referenced in 
Osborne’s play, thus becomes an even more effective commentary on divorce than 
the family-as-State paradigm alone could be.67 Although James had dreams of a 
united kingdom, the animosity between the Scots and English at court made that 
dream an unattainable reality. Howard’s divorce is situated in this potentially 
explosive historical context and Osborne makes good use of it to draw an analogous 
connection between the personal problems of marital unrest and the civic problems 
created by political unrest.
The trial itself is never the focal point of the play (all the legal proceedings 
take place off-stage), but Howard and her allies appear for interchanges about its
67 James was followed from Scotland by a number of courtiers upon whom he conferred lavish 
favours. This angered the English, who feared that James would ignore them in favour of those from 
his home country, causing animosity between the different power bases early in his reign. I am 
heavily indebted to Dr. Ritchie, of the Department of Scottish History, for her time spent with me 
discussing the political repercussions of James’ ascension to the English throne.
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circumstances in ways that draw the audience’s attention to ideological assumptions 
about the State and family, the hierarchical role into which women are legislated, and 
women’s close connection to the devil (which requires their strict policing). 
Matthew Griffith, in 1633, described the hierarchical degrees of God’s law. He 
states that a well-ordered family is
j Head.
[t]hat which hath orderly | Members (Alr),
with the wife firmly situated within the “members” category. This divinely ordained 
formula is undone when the wife rejects her position, as Howard does when she sues 
her husband for divorce. Early-modern ideology assumed that if the primary unit of 
the well-ordered State were destroyed, then the issue from that union would be less 
able to take part in civil and ecclesiastical affairs, and thus the social structure would 
disintegrate. Osborne’s treatment of Frances Howard addresses the jurisprudence 
behind marriage law in the early-modern period, particularly playing on the 
metaphor that ties family and State together as parallel political structures.
In Act I, Scene i, King James I talks about Scotland and “the plague of Civil 
war” that he fears is about to strike (19r). When he speaks to Cecil, the English 
Treasurer about his concerns, Cecil “humbly implore[s]” him “to retaine the love of 
the English,” for which James castigates the Treasurer’s presumption in trying to 
advise him about “that befitts the ceare of the commonealth [sic] (19r).” What is 
apparent in this early exchange is the King’s lack of control. He is unable to hold his 
kingdom peaceably together, as a good sovereign should.68 Furthermore, he is 
unable to maintain absolute power even in his own court - Cecil is quick (though 
polite) to point out that James needs to strengthen his English alliances. All the King
See Bodin 9-10.
221
can do is respond in anger and exit the scene, leaving Cecil alone to ruminate on the 
woeful state of the kingdom, and the role James has played in its collapse (19r'v). 
The hierarchy, even before Howard appears on stage, shows signs of disintegration 
and destabilisation. The head of State does not control his body politic.
The “Scotch man” who enters in Scene ii signifies the extant political unrest 
between the English and the Scots who followed James to his new seat of power. He 
makes the connection between unruly women and the Devil that will continue 
throughout the play, declaring to the Lord Treasurer: “I have heard of a secritary 
that coold neither wright nor Rede but not a Tresurer . . . whoo shall lett his wife ride 
. . . the staff, with ull har children behind har (as they say witches rune a hegging) 
(19v).” While, initially, his reference to the Treasurer’s wife and witchcraft seems 
out of place, it foreshadows the Howard sub-plot and connects, quite succinctly, both 
the domestic (the wife and children who rebel) to the political (he mocks the 
Treasurer’s authority, implying that Cecil cannot even keep his family in check), as 
well as women to the Devil. Once Osborne has set this civic background for the 
Howard case, Frances Howard, “the Day after har mariag with Essex (22r),” and her 
sister, Lady Cranborn, appear onstage.
Howard immediately refers to the difficulty she is experiencing in her new 
marriage. In her first sentence she announces: “you know I am no vergin though I 
might live and Die on[e], for any acount Essex is able to make to contradickt it 
(22r).” Two important themes surface in the interchange between Howard and her 
sister, which will haunt her character for the remainder of the play. First, Osborne’s 
stance on her moral worth is clear: she is “no vergin,” and it is not her husband who 
has deflowered her. Secondly, her relationship with Essex is off to a bad start - he is
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unable to consummate the marriage, and both these factors will lead, later in the 
play, to her involvement in the dark arts.
Howard’s talk of marital dissatisfaction takes place directly after discussions 
about State discontent, suggesting, by juxtaposition, that the unrest of the kingdom is 
reflected in Howard’s marriage. James’ “lawfull Wife,” Britain, is as unhappy as 
Howard is. The appointed “head” of the relationship, her husband Essex, is not 
given the respect he is entitled to as her superior; Howard says he “is not able to 
spoyle a Dormouse or violet the chastity of a sho-flea (22r),” dangerously 
overstepping the bounds that require her to honour and reverence him. The 
metaphorical rebellion her words suggest challenges the symbolic source of 
phallocentric power as a whole. Not only does she rise against her husband, but she 
does so by implying that he cannot rise at all. Her challenge to her husband’s 
authority echoes the Treasurer’s open distrust of the King’s favours to the Scots and 
the Scots’ denunciation of the Treasurer’s power. Both instances suggest chaos in 
the “natural order” because the authority of the monarch and the quasi-monarch 
husband is questioned by those on lower social strata.
Frances says that her dissatisfaction arises from “Exxes [sic] proving barren 
as a Rock which produseth nothing but moss and pumice (22v),” and she envies her 
sister whose husband “hath yet sumthing to venture with for a child (22v).” Her use 
of the word “barren,” like Chapman’s “barraine” in the previous section, to describe 
male impotence, is significant. Women, not men, are described as barren, and the 
word effectively emasculates Essex, echoing the “unmanliness” that would have 
been attached to an impotent man in the early-modern period.
In her speech, she suggests it is her desire for a child, and her husband’s 
inability to provide her therewith, which is the source of her unhappiness. Shortly
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thereafter, however, she admits to her feelings for Somerset, saying she has “long 
since neade his Embraces The full circumfurance of all Desires (22v).” The real 
motive for her marriage annulment, according to Osborne, is quick to surface: not
because she will remain childless, but rather her desire for another man makes her
union with Essex disagreeable.
After Frances’ sister tells the Earl of Northampton that “the pore wench ... is 
wrapt up in a man of misery & situated under a frigid pole . . . Essex has neither 
Redpece, nor Codpece (24v),” the women leave the stage to be replaced by a Jesuit 
who discusses international relations and English foreign policy with Northampton 
(25r). He refers to a plot to overthrow the monarchy, saying that if the plot had 
succeeded, “the parliments splene had bin eveporated by words, and Laws, nothing 
coold have folowed by confusiaon, and ruine (25v).” This sudden plot shift is less 
abrupt when read within the family-as-State paradigm, and carries on the themes
established in the first scene.
The unhappy, restless wife is replaced by an unhappy, restless citizen, and the 
illegal plot to overthrow the monarchy is thus connected to the interchange between 
Howard and her sister - her desire for separation becomes an illegal uprising against 
her husband, her head. This plot shift suggests that the “confusiaon and ruine” 
which would arise if there were a revolt against the king is like the “confusiaon and
ruine” that will arise from Howard’s domestic situation. Such a connection makes
Howard’s actions akin to a treasonous uprising - the lower strata challenging the 
supremacy of the higher,69 and darkly hints at the ruinous effects the trial will have 
on James’ own political career.
69 Frances Dolan’s Dangerous Familiars: Representations of Domestic Crime in England 1550-1700, 
draws the parallel between high treason in the home, when women murder their husbands, and high 
treason in the state, when someone plots to kill the monarch. The law thus recognises the parallels 
between state and home in the extreme.
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When the Jesuit and Northampton exit the stage, Howard and her friend Mrs. 
Turner (who was executed as an accomplice in Overbury’s murder [Lindley 9]), 
enter disguised, at Mr. Foreman’s house, trying to obtain a spell or potion which 
will help Howard rid herself of Essex. She tells Foreman’s assistant that “Though 
my Lords Chillness is constru’d a disese & my no less hott affetcion to the other 
[Somerset] a scarr to my honore: yet the First suits so well with my ockesions & the 
Later is so becuming to my affecions I shuld curse the hand that endevour’d thair 
Cure (27v-28r. My addition).” She does not want to cure Essex’s “disese” because 
she is in love with Somerset, so she obtains from Mr. Foreman two potions. The first 
is for Somerset, and Foreman promises that
[i]f he doe not leve his presant honor & love of the King, and future 
fortune to the gidance of those Constellations which, like Castor & 
Polluse twinkle in the fermement of your beauty Lett me be Duckt for 
a water witch & have my powre confin’d to the Charmings of frogs & 
blowing wind in the noysum taile of Lapland. (29v)
The second is for Essex, to ensure he does not regain potency, “[t]o preven[t] which, 
take this image, created out of a mass of expeareance & informed with the most 
active spiret of a simpathising imagination so as nothing cann be applied to it that 
incite to Lust . . . [and it] shall worke upon Essex (29v. My addition).” This early 
alignment between Howard and witchcraft drives home the demonic nature of 
women who overstep social boundaries, a quality attributed to Howard when she 
arrives at Mr. Foreman’s and his assistant says: “You see madam the Devil knows 
you (28r).” It also fictionally fills in the reasons for the charge of malificium quod *
70 Also tried and found guilty for his involvement in the Overbury case.
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hanc at her divorce trial and makes a potentially damning legal finding even more so 
with its lurid, imagined, details.
Howard’s connection with the Devil is an easy extension of the ideology that 
kept women legally bound. Stephen Geree, in his eulogy to M. Elizabeth Machell of 
1639, stated that wives “that want grace, and the [feare] of God, are matched and 
lincked by sinne unto Satan, and so shall partake of his shamefull miseries (36-7).” 
Gouge, in his treatise on domestic duties, argues, “how monstrous a thing it is to sow 
any seeds of discord and stirre debate betwixt man and wife. The devils instruments 
they are therein, and a diabolicall spirit is in them. For Satan most laboureth to 
unloose those knots which the Lord knitteth most firmly (116).” Osborne’s 
imagination makes Howard guilty of both these charges: if she feared God she 
would respect the divine ordinance of her marriage and honour her husband; she 
does not, and is therefore “the devils instrument.” How Howard’s dealings with 
Foreman impact on the female legal subject is apparent in the action that these 
interchanges frame. The scenes in Mr. Foreman’s house surround a drama in which 
Howard’s mother begins the legal process which will lead to her daughter’s marriage 
annulment. Such framing draws obvious connections between women who engage 
in the legal process and women who engage in the dark ails.
Kate, Howard’s mother, asks Davis, a Procter71 for legal advice about her 
daughter. He replies: “uppon this Conjuration I will be true to you . . . where Purses 
are giveth, against fees & delayes, the cause of defect is inquired into as whether it 
relates to a naturall, or Diabolical Caues [sic] (28r).” His words cany strong echoes 
and impressions left by stories about demonic conjurations. Like the practice
71 A professional lawyer who specializes in civil law and is licenced to practice in the courts (Stone, 
float/195).
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whereby a demon is summoned into a magical circle to answer questions, Kate 
“conjures” the lawyer who “will be true” in his responses.
While her daughter actually uses the dark arts, Kate does so by implication. 
There is a strong connection between Frances employing a “diabolical cause” to 
ensure Essex’s impotence, and her mother’s “conjuration” of the Proctor. Both 
relationships are described with demonic imagery, and sustain the belief that women 
who disrupt the happiness of marriage (and in this Kate is as guilty as Howard, 
because she hires the lawyer who will bring the suit) are in league with the Devil 
because they do not show respect for the divinely-ordained “natural order.” By 
railing against their positions in society and by actively trying to change their lot in 
life, they rail against God’s will and God’s laws.
The reason, under man’s law, that Howard will inevitably bear the brunt of a 
situation in which her husband is impotent and should not, therefore, have presumed 
to marry in the first place, is explained by the Proctor. When Kate tells him that “the 
invalidity respects the husband (28v),” he replies:
[ijndeed that’s most frequent; weomen being oftener able . . . But to 
say truth, ther is more partiality showne in the Legal discussion of 
masculine Infermitys then Hirs; the Old Judges voting any remnant 
sofficiant; so as of Ladys had not a vast Freedum they might suffocate 
for want of — which maks it hard for a wife to recover what belongs 
to har unless he, she mi stoke for a husband be so ingenious as to 
confes his difect. (28v)
The “Old Judges” are the enforcers of the status quo, the signifiers of the law that 
dictates women’s social role, the legal gatekeepers posted to keep women out of the 
realm of legal action and safely within the home under a husband’s rule. They are
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the defenders of a gender norm that dictates women cannot successfully legally 
challenge their husband’s inability to perform sexually, the “partiality” of the judges 
toward the husband being what it is. As Lindley points out: “in challenging 
potency, Frances Howard triggered a more general male anxiety which was bound to 
produce the hostile reaction to her that has been enshrined in all subsequent accounts 
(100).” She attacks the very root of patrilineal inheritance, the signifier for legal 
prerogative, and thus stands on very shaky legal ground when facing a patriarchal 
legal system.
The law represented by these “Old Judges” is not an impartial institution 
which will help Howard to secure an annulment, but rather an adversary, because of 
her gender, with which she will have to battle in order in order to win her suit. The 
social outcry against Howard before the 1616 murder trial was due more to her 
gender - a wife seeking divorce - than the divorce itself; “by suing for divorce at all 
Frances Howard flouted the doctrine of wifely obedience, and by charging her 
husband with impotence she raised the fearful spectre of male inadequacy (Lindley 
104).” When faced with this devastating spectre, the judges would, as the Proctor 
explains to Kate, rule in favour of the husband. That was not the case in the Howard 
trial, but it is convenient, from a male perspective, that the annulment granted by the 
Commission was on the face-saving grounds of witchcraft. Howard won her case, 
but in effect lost the war - Essex’s impotence was not his responsibility, but was 
induced by her alliance with demonic powers.
The connection between female power, the Devil and marital disharmony in 
all scenes of Act II would likely conjure for the audience Eve’s connection with the 
Devil in the Garden of Eden, and male problems caused by a wife’s close 
relationship with Satan. By IV.i Somerset has fallen under Howard’s spell and
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Turner says to Howard: “I could not but smile to see how like a serpent you wrigled 
about him whilst he stood gaping at the apples of your Eyes not seming to value 
pariadice in Comparisun of them (39v).” Her speech not only connects Howard’s 
sexuality with The Fall (in which serpents, apples and women played a major role), 
but conflates the independent figures of woman and Devil into one. Howard is not 
just Eve the temptress, but also a wriggling serpent, for whom Somerset will 
willingly sacrifice paradise.
This conflated image of woman and serpent is a familiar trope in the early- 
modern period. Salkeld’s Paradise sermon describes why this is so:
the reason why our first mother was not afraid to approach and talke 
with the serpent, was, because the devill had chosen such a serpent, as 
which (in face at leastway) represented a woman, yea and one most
beautifull like unto her selfe . . . hee deemed it most fit for the
accomplishing of his desire in the temptation and fall of the woman, 
to accommodate himselfe, as much as possibly hee could, to the 
feature and naturall disposition of the woman. (216)
He goes on to explain that the serpent was able to tempt Eve because
it maketh men stay to behold her beautie, insomuch that whom she 
cannot overtake by reason of her slow creeping, she taketh them as
amazed at her wonderfull beautie; not unlike unto the common and
powerfull temptation of women, to whom nature hath denied the 
force of the body, yet hath permitted her to overcome by her beautie, 
those who are most powerfull and vigorous in body. (218-9)
The serpent Salkeld describes is female, and not a snake at all, but a human woman. 
Because the snake / Devil shares so many attributes with women, by association
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women share many attributes with the Devil, particularly in terms of their beauty and 
sexuality. Osborne’s imagery carries the woman-as-Devil theme throughout his 
play, and only serves to highlight how important it is (both politically and spiritually) 
for women to maintain their “natural” place in the hierarchy.
Given the doctrinal connection between female power and demonic ends, the 
law was unlikely to support women over men in petitions for divorce. Indeed, “there 
is little doubt that Frances Howard was only able to bring the suit because of the 
eminence of her own family and the political position of her intended husband 
(Lindley 121).” In fact, the bishops did not grant the annulment in the interests of 
justice. James I was the sole cause of Howard’s success. In the first stages of the 
trial, Howard was accused of plotting against Essex and the divorce was not going to 
be granted (Lindley 50). However, because of Somerset’s position in court and his 
favour with James, “the King promotse the nullity, by all the arts he cane haveing 
procur’d the consent of most of the Bishops (Osborne 40v).” The way in which he 
promoted the nullity was to assign to the Commission judges who were bound to 
vote in his (and Howard’s) favour.
Although Howard was found to be virgo intacla by the midwives who 
examined her during the trial and therefore could prove Essex’s inability to 
consummate their marriage, initially this was not enough for her to secure an 
annulment. Her position as a woman suing for divorce is quite clear: the 
intervention of the King alone was able to push her case through the Court of High 
Commission, but as a consequence she was subsequently (and concurrently)
demonised.
Frances Howard’s early notoriety was a product of her divorce suit; although 
she is declared legally innocent, in some ways this is a false ruling, she would have
230
been legally disparaged as a bad wife had it not been for James’ intervention, and it 
is for this reason that her legal subjecthood as a wronged wife cannot be sustained. 
The bias of the King is corrected by the bias of public opinion, which stands firmly 
behind the dominant definition of the female legal subject. The general precept 
which dictated that “[tjhe woman is bound by the lawe to the man while hee liveth, 
but shee which is bounde by the lawe, shall be an adultresse by the lawe, if shee 
leave her husband, notwithstanding a thousand Bills of divorcement (Dove 34),” 
seems to have won out in this particular case.
Osborne’s play shows the effects of the 1616 murder trial - the character is 
not Howard newly-divorced, as in Terracae’s poem, but Howard recently-confined- 
to-the-Tower. However, his scenes connect women who engage in law with 
witchcraft, as Terracae’s did, and support constraints on the female legal subject. 
His work suggests that because Howard and her mother overturn the divine hierarchy 
they are in league with the Devil. As wives, they should be femes coverts, without 
legal rights or recourse; they should not enter the public sphere, particularly not to 
upset the hierarchy and challenge the patriarchy by actively engaging in a system 
legally debarred to them.
If Essex were impotent, Howard would have been right to claim a marriage 
annulment safely and with legal justification; despite this, the representation of her in 
Osborne’s play does not support that legal right, nor would the initial ruling of the 
Commission, had James not stepped in. The subject who is declared innocent is 
undone by the literary representations that reflect overwhelming public opinion, 
particularly after her imprisonment in 1616.
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VC. CONCLUSION: HOWARD CONSTRAINED
The implication of both the works discussed in this section is that despite 
Howard’s innocence in the courtroom the broader parameters of the female legal 
subject overcome the Commission’s final decision. The reasons for this are clear in 
an early-modern context:
if there bee such, as cannot end this controversie without the Law . . . 
then this I must say, The wrong and burthen will light upon the 
womans backe. By wrong I meane not injustice, but as we say in our 
proverbe, the wrong end of the staffe will be her parte; that is, it is in 
vaine (in this case) for the wife to strive with the husband, which is, 
the weaker with the stronger; the horse (pardon mee good wives to 
use so base a similitude) the horse (I say) with him that hath the bridle 
and is able to be fast. (S. B. 55-6)
The literary representations of Howard agree more with jurisprudence that joins the 
wife to the husband and constrains female power and agency, than with her rights as 
an individual. They show that the condemnation Howard receives in descriptions of 
her divorce are gendered; that she, as a woman who oversteps her social and 
theological role, can be considered dangerous, and vilified as such, even if the law 
decides she is innocent. This presumption horribly played itself out in the extreme 
three years later when she was convicted of the slow poisoning of Thomas Overbury 
during his imprisonment in the Tower.
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VI. THE TEXTUAL INTERACTION OF THE FEMALE LEGAL SUBJECT WITH 
DIVORCE LAW IN JACOBEAN ENGLAND
This chapter has explored the jurisprudential underpinnings that construct
women’s relationship to divorce law in the early-modern period. Although the
canons are straightforward in their written form, the clarity they suggest is undone by
multiple, often oppositional, discourses. The canons and moral tracts alone do not
reveal this, however, and it is only by using literature that the confusions, tensions
and contrary social ideals which were impacting on divorce law and women are fully
comprehensible.
Peter Goodrich argues, in Law in the Courts of Love, that “literary analysis 
politicises law, in the academy and in practice, by questioning its values and 
transgressing its limits as a discipline and so also as a practice (6).” In this way, the 
otherwise static values represented in the laws and tracts of the period take their 
place alongside other competing, sometimes challenging, discourses. The law is 
firmly placed within the cultural parameters that produce it, and that it affects in 
return. The female legal subject represented in the literary works of this chapter
reveals the tensions and torsions women underwent when the law moved from the
printed mandates of canons and statutes to practical application and interpretation. 
Cary’s play challenges the law in one way, Terracae’s and Osborne’s works in
another.
As the Tragedy of Mariam makes clear, the female legal subject defined in 
canons, statutes and moral treatises is insufficient given women’s lived experience. 
Iwanisziw states that “Cary empowers both Salome and Mariam: each reveals, albeit
in moral antithesis, the range of female agency and women’s active involvement in 
‘divorsive’ engines (119)” (although she does not mention Doris, Herod’s ex-wife 
also figures female agency in the confines of her legal subject), illustrating how the
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play challenges the assumption that women are “naturally” subservient and incapable 
of entering the public sphere of the legal arena.
Cary rewrites the traditional female legal subject, demonstrating how 
“[literature suggests other possibilities for law, other means of expression of law 
and more profoundly conceptions of value and of justice that draw upon a wider 
variety of experiences of gender (Goodrich 6-7).” Her work opens up realms of 
possibility and urges change in women’s legal position. Her characters refigure and 
reinvent a wife’s relationship to her husband. They do not conjoin, they are neither 
silent nor hidden, and their various predicaments suggest that the frustrations women 
experience at law are a product of the ways in which society defines their 
relationship to the man they many. Unable to acceptably adopt another role within 
that relationship (because another role is simply not available to them), Caiy’s wives 
fulfill criteria that makes them socially reprehensible.
The implication is that if the law allowed them different relationships to their 
husbands (if Mariam could speak in public without being accused of adultery, if she 
could divorce a man she despises, if Salome could divorce, if Doris were not made 
socially illegitimate by divorce) they would be able to redefine their subjective 
positions without having to break the law. Caiy’s play shows how the law creates 
the veiy sort of wife it tries to eliminate by leaving women impossibly stranded in 
unhappy marriages, unable to divorce but easily put aside by their husbands, with no 
legal redress. In this way, Mariam provides “an expansive method for 
reinterpretation and revisioning of legal relationships (Goodrich 7),” and illustrates 
that the legally defined female subject does not exist simply because the law dictates
she should.
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This is the same problem that surfaces in the Frances Howard material, albeit 
from an entirely different, male, perspective.72 When Edward Parry asserts that 
“[tjrials are the raw material of drama {Drama 18),” he sums up the production of 
the Howard literary canon. Literature, in this case, also attacks the formation of the 
female legal subject, but unlike Cary’s work, it accepts the dominant formation of 
that subject as necessary and right. Court decisions that run contrary to the dominant 
subjective legal definition of women come under attack in the Howard material.
Like Cary’s play, Terracae and Osborne comment on the inadequacy of the 
legal system. The latter two, however, indicate how “[t]he recourse to aesthetics, to 
literature, to social theory, to philosophy or ethics have in common the desire to 
reconnect the discipline of law to questions of conscience and more broadly to the 
politics and causistic indeterminacies of judgment (Goodrich 4).” The corruptibility 
of the legal system, and how that leads to verdicts that do not sustain the status quo,
comes under attack in the Howard literature.
That these materials all argue that the law does not adequately reflect social 
values and public opinions, and yet stand firmly opposed to each other in their 
representations, further illustrates the range of cultural discourses that are generally 
absent from written canons and statutes. As I pointed out in the Introduction to this 
thesis, law will protect society over the individual by silencing, for the most part, 
oppositional voices and contradictory value systems. In doing so, it tries to impose a 
universality on subjects that simply does not exist. This chapter illustrates how these 
literary works about women and divorce law undermine the illusion of universality 
that law attempts to create. They also effectively challenge the authority law has to 
govern all people effectively, by illustrating that different people react to different
72 One difference in perspective is fictional writing by a woman and “historical” literature written by 
men.
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legal situations in different ways, and that for the purposes of this thesis, those ways 
can be significantly gendered.
Furthermore, the juxtaposition of these works illustrates the debates about 
divorce law that were occurring extra-textually. Debates which led to Cranmer’s 
Reformatio and its subsequent disappearance from potential legislation; debates 
which caused some writers to lambast women who tried to use the legal system, and 
some lawyers and judges to allow those women into the courtroom. It is little 
surprise that under these circumstances the legal definition of the female legal 
subject in its relation to divorce is found wanting by more than one social group. 
The next chapter explores women, adultery and the law. Like this chapter, it 
considers the formation of the female legal subject as it relates to adultery 
jurisprudence and then analyses representations of that subject in literature and a 
tract based on a real adultery case, in order to better understand the broader culture in 
which early-modern adultery law is situated, and to examine how the stereotypes and 
myths that are often used in the courtroom to maintain social order are sustained and 
/ or undermined by literature.
Chapter three, adulterated marriage: the female legal subject, 
INFIDELITY AND COURT PRACTICE IN EARLY-MODERN 
ENGLAND
[W]e must be convinced of the greatnesse and foulnesse of the sin of 
adultery; it gives a deadly blow to the knot it selfe; it is cried out of 
exceedingly in the Word, it cuts a-sunder the sinews of families, we 
must judge of it by the Word; not by the world.
(Capel, Tentations: Their Nature, Danger, Cure)
But there are many hold it as their creede,
That all [women] are false, if they be tried:
If some seeme chast, it doth of this preceede
They have the wit to doe, but not be spide;
And know by deep dissembling & good heed,
With sober lookes their wanton lust to hide.
(Anonymous, Asylum Veneris, or a Sanctuary for Ladies)
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Adultery is the most uncontestable reason for divorce in the early-modern 
period, and is set out in the canon law as a straightforward legal matter: “You shall 
not commit adultery (Exod.20.14).” The seventh commandment applies equally to 
husbands and wives. However, the previous chapter reveals more than women’s 
legal rights, or lack thereof, in divorce and marriage. The textual evidence of the 
Howard trial and Cary’s play makes it clear that a strong connection exists between 
women’s agency and women’s concupiscence.1
Although no hard evidence exists that Frances Howard and Robert Somerset 
were having an affair before her separation (she was virgo intacla}, and the divorce 
was not brought by Essex because of infidelity on her part, rumours of an affair 
destroyed her reputation and marred the social validity of the High Commission 
verdict years before the public outcry could be justified by her connection with 
murder. In Cary’s play, Salome is an open adulteress, and the most persistent 
character to call for women’s legal rights, and Mariam dies because Herod interprets 
her speech as an adulterous act. William Whately typically asserts that women who 
show disrespect for their subordinate position in the home by going public, are 
“[sjtaines of woman-kinde, blemishes of their sexe, monsters in nature, botches of 
humane society, rude, gracelesse, impudent, next to harlots, if not the same with 
them {Bride-Bush 39).” The evidence in the divorce chapter and Whately’s work 
suggests that any foray into public proceedings casts suspicion and aspersion on 
womens’ reputations. It comes as little surprise, then, that in practice the laws 
governing adultery itself were much harder on women than men.
No mention is made of adultery in The Lawes Resolutions, implying that an 
adulteress enjoys no legal rights whatsoever. Significantly, there is also no mention
1 Jean E. Howard and Phyllis Rackin argue that “Renaissance women who transgressed in any way, 
even by excessive gossip and railing, were often characterized as whores (63).”
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of how a woman may seek legal recompense against an adulterous husband (the 
implication being that such affairs are to be borne as part of married life), or how 
women can defend themselves against a false accusation of adultery (the even more 
sinister implication being that there is no viable defence against such an accusation). 
Even though the written law asserted that “extra-marital sexual activity of whatever 
kind was in social theory abhorred as hateful to God and a threat to the well-being of 
the commonwealth (M. Ingram 125),” many men took mistresses in the early- 
modern period.
A. F. Pollard, writing about Henry VIII’s divorce from Anne Boleyn, argues
that
[t]he gravamen of the charge against Henry is not that he seduced the 
ladies of his court, but that he married them. The Papal Curia itself 
was lenient to mistresses; it was, indeed, as Mr. Hilaire Belloc has
noted, ‘a common practice’ for his ‘greater ecclesiastics’ of that time 
to take a mistress, and Anne Boleyn only encountered Papal censures 
when Clement VII discovered that Henry really meant to marry her. 
(24)
This situation, in which men could take mistresses without detriment to their honour,
remained unchanged from the time of Henry VIII to that of James I, as the evidence 
in this chapter will show. Thus, the extra-marital activity which could disrupt the 
very foundation of society was not that of a socially-sanctioned, rapacious, mistress­
holding husband, but rather, a wife’s illicit infidelity.
Popular belief, as Alain Chartier wrote in 1566, held that men have “more 
libertie then women to love in moe places then one” because “[t]ake modestie,
shamefastnes, and feare from women, and ye take awaie their life, which chaunceth
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not to man (8V).” This attitude could, and did, filter into the court system affecting 
the interpretations of adultery law. Thus, husbands were far more successful 
bringing adultery charges against their wives than wives were against their husbands, 
simply because the ideological pressures evidenced by Chartier and Pollard exerted 
themselves on the otherwise egalitarian canon law.
Such pressures led to a situation in which the courts worked to the benefit of 
husbands, who, as noted in the previous chapter, “would sometimes pretend their 
former wives to be false to their beds, and so be divorced, and marry again such 
whom they fancied (Strype, Memorials 2: 182).”2 The difficulty for women arises 
because adultery is in many ways an “unprovable” (and equally indefensible) act, 
unless the parties involved are discovered. In the courtroom, often without hard 
evidence of innocence or guilt, it was a husband’s word against his wife’s, and the 
male legal prerogative, which controlled women’s bodies as “spaces in which 
masculine activity reigned (Fissell 440),” gave him the upper hand. Therefore, 
although “a wife being sued for divorce could debar the action if she could show that 
her husband had also committed adultery (Sommerville 145),” this was veiy hard for 
women to prove, given a legal system that supported the husband’s claim, and that 
generally accepted male infidelity as harmless.
During this period men used adultery accusations to rid themselves of 
unwanted wives so frequently that it led to a debate about the right to remarry after 
divorce for adultery.3 As for the women involved, Edmund Bunny argues that
2 John Rainolds, writing in 1609, also cites this practice (1).
3 Some, like William Whately, who asserts that the party “being wrongfully forsaken by his or her 
yoke-fellow, may lawfully then many another, as being disburdened of the former yoke, without any 
sinne, on their parts {Bride-Bush 5),” and John Dove, who argues that “with a restraint from a second 
marriage, men and women are caused to burne in lust (A7r),” believed that remarriage after adultery 
should be allowed; others, however, adhered to the canon law which defines divorce for adultery as 
separation a mensa et thoro, “which dissolveth not the marriage . . . for it is subsequent to the 
marriage (Coke I6v-I8r),” thus barring the parties from remarrying pursuant to Article CVII of the
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remarriage after divorce for adultery falls hardest on wives: “[tjhose that are 
blemished thereby, are both those second wives of theirs, and the children that by 
them they have: the former of them being accounted no wives but only adulteresses 
by law; and their children illegitimate also {Divorce 161).” While Bunny freely 
admits that women are hardest hit by divorce and remarriage,4 he does not criticise 
the husband for bringing disrepute onto all the women involved, and his omission 
reflects the social attitudes that affected the jurisprudence of his time.
The fact that men were able to use the court system so easily in their favour 
in matters of adultery indicates that the patriarchal interpretation of social relations 
was manifesting itself through seemingly objective (and objective as written, in the 
sense that adultery law applied equally to both men and women) legal strictures. 
Thus, early-modern married men found themselves in a position
[wjhereas that, which heretofore came (lightly) no farther, but only to 
be disputed among the learned, is now growne to so common a 
practise with many, namely to prosecute divorce for adulterie and to 
marrie againe . . . because manie themselves being given to that 
fleshly libertie, doe neverthelesse shrowd themselves under the 
judgement of those learned that favour the same. (Bunny, Divorce 1­
2)
The early-modern hierarchical system which relegated women to a subordinate role 
“was enshrined in institutions, from Parliament down to the humblest family
canon law, which states that after a separation a mensa et thoro, a bond is to be taken to not remarry 
while the other person is still alive. The tension between these two factions was such that Whately 
was called before the court of High Commission in 1621, when the Bride-Bash came to their 
attention. He was charged with heresy and his book placed under censorship. He renounced his 
position on remarriage after divorce on May 4, 1621, signing a formal recantation. The republished 
edition of 1623, however, still contained the offensive text, which he dismissed, rightly or wrongly, as 
a printer’s error (Auchter 51).
4 NB: See Doris’ attitude towards Mariam in Cary’s play.
241
(Mendelson 2),” so that although “wives accused their husbands of adultery almost 
as often as husbands accused their wives (Stretton, Women 195),” a double-standard 
existed in the law courts governed by those who “favour the same” practice as the 
accusing husbands - other men - making it near-impossible for a wife to 
successfully contest her suit.
A husband’s reasons for falsely accusing his wife were in part financial. 
John Rainolds explains that “the woma[n] being putt away so, doth lose her dowry 
too by law,” because “[w]hich pu[n]ishme[n]t as God hath threatned by his law to 
men that goe a whoring fro[m] him, though they have not any dowrie of their owne 
neither, but of his gift: so the Civil Law hath i[n]flicted it on adulterous wives, & the 
Canon Law i[n] looser tymes also (86).” By divorcing a wife for adultery the 
husband gains the right to her dowry, and frees himself from making alimony 
payments (Stone, Road 159).
Why the law, for the most part, applies penalties to women alone in adultery 
cases, is explained by gendered cultural constructions, and is established by the 
early-modern “[patriarchal legality [that] conceives of female sexuality as criminal 
(Loomba 107. My addition).” As the anonymous author of The Court of Good 
Counsell explains:
though the husband offend God as much as the wife, in violating the 
sacred band of Matrimony: Yet the wife ought firmely to print this in 
her hart, and to remember alwaies, that where the husband by his fault 
doth but a little blemish his credit, the wife altogether looseth her 
good name, and remaineth spotted with such infamy, that she can 
never recover her honour againe. (D2r)
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As I argued in the previous chapter, one of the reasons a wife is treated differently at 
law than her husband is because of the analogous connection between Christians and 
the Church. This analogy is especially telling when adultery is involved.
If the wife pursues extra-marital activity, her actions are akin to people 
pursuing extra-Christian devotions.5 The analogy simply does not allow for a 
husband’s extra-marital pursuits to be interpreted in the same way. As John Dove 
preached in 1601, “when a man or wife askelh counsell of the Lawyer how they may 
be divorced, the man so doing is unhonest; the woman so doing, is adulterous 
(A6v).” Responsibility for a schism between the church / husband and the people / 
wife rests solely with the errant flock, and although a husband may be deemed to be 
“unhonest,” his reputation is not as badly affected as that of his “adulterous” wife.
Such belief led to a legal situation for women in which
[m]en might evade allegations of adultery, but women usually could 
not. The power of the accusation of female adultery was such that a 
single instance of alleged infidelity could provide grounds for 
separation and the denial of maintenance (Stretton, Women 195-6);
a situation that ran contrary to the written precepts of canon law which treated 
husbands and wives as equals in matters of adultery. Extra-marital sex was, in the
written law, as heinous in the man as in the woman.
The traditional canon law was cited by some early-modern writers as a 
counter-balance to court (and husband) practices that generally relegated blame only 
to the wife. Bunny argues that
5 This metaphor is not unique to Christian theology; it finds its source in Judaism, wherein the 
“Hebrews used a woman’s sexual deviation as a central metaphor for religious apostasy; falling away 
from the worship of Yahweh alone is described as ‘harlotry’ in several biblical passages (Clarke and 
Richardson 29).”
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[t]hat other out of the fift of Numbers, is that lawe of Jealousie, which 
(being an harder course than this, and a great deale more busie; and a 
peculiar remedie ordained when a man hath his wife in suspition of 
adulterie, or when as it was so indeed, but without any witness; and 
not allowing the man to go any farther, but to hold himselfe co[n]tent, 
if she in such sort as there is set downe, should make her purgation) 
doth eveiy way, me thinke, insinuate, that then there was no so easie a 
way for this, for a man (for lighter matters) to be rid of his wife when 
he would, and the same to stand good by the word of God. (Divorce
36-7)
His argument suggests that court trends do not reflect the canon law as written, but 
are rather an interpretation of the law through social constructions and pressures; 
pressures which exerted influence, because “although marriage be the ordinance of 
God: yet for the circumstances thereunto appertaining, it hath diverse things that are 
to be governed by the positive laws (Bunny, Divorce 12),” and is, therefore, 
susceptible to the interpretations of positive law.
Cranmer’s Reformatio attempted to address the false accusations and double­
standards practised by husbands and the courts. It proposed that men, in pursuit of 
“a succession of fresh marriages,” and
a constant change of wives . . . will devise slanderous charges of 
adultery and other crimes of that kind against the innocent, unless the 
punishment for their offenses is made sufficiently severe to act as a 
deterrent. Therefore, if a man shall charge his wife with adultery or
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poisoning,6 and if subsequently the case fail, then the half of his 
property is to be assigned to the wife. Nor shall he in any 
circumstances have any right of selling, dividing, bequething, 
exchanging, giving, or alienating that property unless the wife consent 
thereto. (104)
Furthermore, “the marriage shall be maintained (105),” with the husband in a 
financially subordinate position. Although, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, 
the Reformatio was not legislated, this passage proves that influential people in the 
legal system, such as Archbishop Cranmer and others, were not blind to the 
inequitable treatment of women and were attempting to reform legal practice in order 
to discourage husbands from making false accusations.
Recognising this legal shortcoming was not exclusive to Cranmer and his 
fellow reformers. Throughout the early-modern period disquiet about the sexual 
double-standard between men and women arise time and again. In 1617, years after 
Cranmer’s proposed reforms were quashed by rival factions, Sowernam’s Esther 
hath hanged Haman, a pamphlet in the well-known “Swetnam debate,” arguing 
against Swetnam’s Araignment of Lewd, Idle, Froward, and Unconstanl Women, 
cites the different treatment of men and women who engage in illicit sexual
encounters:
if a man abuse a Maid and get her with child, no matter is made of it 
but as a trick of youth, but it is made so heinous an offense in the 
maid that she is disparaged and utterly undone by it. So in all 
offenses, those which men committ are made light and as nothing,
6 The link between adultery and murder is familiar in the early-modern period. See for example: 
Arthur; A True Relation of the Most Inhumane and Bloody Murlher, of Master James', The Unnaturall 
Wife', and A Warning for All Desperate Women. For an extensive critical discussion, see Dolan, 
Dangerous Familiars.
245
slighted over, but those which women do commit, those are made 
grievous and shameful (24);
in 1624, Whately agrees that if “the adulterer, that having a lawfull wife at home, 
shall give his unlawfull lusts scope to range abroad, to the wives and daughters of 
other men, [he] is worthie all sharpenesse of punishment, as a man that hath 
hearkened to the oration of foolish folly {Care-Cloth 39. My addition);” and later, in 
1633, Richard Capel argues that although a husband’s infidelity “is amongst too 
many but for a tricke of youth, ye for such tricks, God the just will damne men in 
hell, unlesse they repent (386).” These examples indicate that the legal system 
which generally gave men the freedom to sexually transgress and severely punished 
the women who did so was not accepted whole-heartedly by the society it attempted
to structure.
Obviously many discrepancies existed both socially and jurisprudentially 
with regards to adultery law and its courtroom interpretation. This chapter attempts 
to explain why, when the written law treats men and women equally, the law in 
practice does not do so, and to illustrate how the oppositional arguments surrounding 
adultery law construct the female legal subject. I will first explore the theological 
and social underpinnings of adultery laws and court practice, giving essential 
historical and legal context to the Jacobean female legal subject. I will then turn to 
written representations of women in order to examine how forms of literature define 
or subvert the female legal subject’s relationship to adultery law, and work to firmly 
place that subject within extant cultural constructs. I have chosen contrasting 
representations in order to examine the ways in which women and adultery law 
interact, how this reflects, or challenges, ideological and theological trends, and how
these texts work within a cultural criticism of law and literature.
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The first selections represent women justly accused of adultery. Henry 
Goodcole’s pamphlet, The Adultresses Funerall Day, 1635, relays a real-life case in 
which an adulteress is condemned to death for murder. Of its genre, Goodcole’s 
pamphlet is unique - unlike so many other accounts of adulterous women who were 
executed for committing concomitant murder, Alice Clarke never confesses to killing 
her husband, and maintains her innocence throughout. This pamphlet is important 
evidence of how one discourse impacts on another. The strong connection between 
adultery and murder in the early-modern period decides Clarke’s guilt, not her case 
history, evidence, or plea.
Although it is not strictly a “literary” work, the reshaping, reinventing and
reconstruction of Alice Clarke that occurs in order for Goodcole to be able to
represent her not just as an adulteress, but a murderess as well, makes her a near­
fictional character by the time her plight is printed for distribution. In this way, 
Goodcole’s pamphlet evidences the same conflict between written representations 
and extra-textual constructions so apparent in Terracae’s poem and Osborne’s play.
His treatment of Alice Clarke reveals how the social construction of women affects
court decisions.
The second woman chosen for this section is Isabella of Swevia from The 
Insatiate Countess, a play attributed to John Marston and others, ca. 1607-8.7 The
7 It is important to note that there are significant problems with the text, not the least of which is the 
inconsistency of the characters’ names in the different quartos. Giorgio Melchiori, the editor of the 
1984 Revels Plays edition, explains that the first quarto of the text, on which Q2 and Q3, published in 
1616 and 1631 respectively, are based, “is not the final text acted at the Whitefriars: it is a fairly early 
‘treatment’, by William Barksted, Lewis Machin and perhaps other hack writers in the pay of the 
short-lived company of the Children of the King’s Revels, of a veiy incomplete draft of the play left 
by John Marston (1).” Melchiori’s research concludes that the first layer of the play was drafted by 
Marston, who wrote “Act I, part of II.i, some speeches and outlines of the rest, particularly II.ii, Il.iv 
and, to a lesser extent, Ill.iv, IV.ii and V.i (16),” the second layer was completed up to V.ii by 
Barksted and Machin, and the third layer, V.ii, by “either a new hack writer or one who had already 
worked on the play (16).” Martin Wiggins, the editor of Four Jacobean Sex Tragedies, published in 
1998, agrees “broadly” with Melchiori’s analysis (xxv), but uses the names assigned to the characters 
in Q2, changes he attributes to Barksted and Machin (xxvi). He also attributes the play “primarily to
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contrasting representations of the female legal subject I then discuss are women 
unjustly accused of adultery, the virtuous wives, Abigail and Thais, also from 
Marston’s play. Their plight underscores the real problem for early-modern women 
- being falsely accused of adultery in an unsympathetic legal system, and the 
constraints that stereotypes produced to make it very difficult for women to plead
innocent.
The Insatiate Countess is an ideal play for a cultural criticism of adultery and 
the female legal subject. Extant criticism has tended to pass over this play in favour 
of Marston’s other dramas.8 For the purposes of this thesis, however, the stories of 
the insatiate Countess and the virtuous wives, and how those women can (or cannot) 
use the law in matters of adultery, makes a worthwhile contribution to the law and 
literature movement I discuss, specifically because, in many ways, Marston’s 
characters break down the stereotype of the evil, lascivious woman so evident in 
Goodcole’s pamphlet (and Cary’s play). As Scarr agues, “in the sheer quantity of 
puns and innuendoes that emanate from his female characters, [Marston] boldly 
stakes a claim for feminine equality in sexual desire in those who are objectified and 
demonized, which other writers only hint at (96-7).”9 Like Cary’s Tragedy of 
Mariam, The Insatiate Countess is a variant of the revenge tragedy. It is an Italianate 
court tragedy, a genre which utilises revenge tragedy motifs while stressing “the
Barksted and Machin rather than Marston (xxvi).” He freely admits that “conventional editorial 
techniques cannot hope to produce a version of the text which corresponds with the finished play that 
was staged in the early seventeenth century (xxvi-vii).” For the purposes of this thesis 1 have used the 
Melchiori edition, which uses the Q1 and Q3 character names. 1 also adhere to scholarly tradition that 
generally attributes the play to Marston, simply because Marston’s outline worked as the blueprint for 
the play’s action, to which Barksted and Machin contributed, and that blueprint would have sustained 
the themes he establishes in the early parts of the play, particularly those with respect to female 
sexuality and the masculine response to it. I cite Marston alone for ease of reference, whilst 
acknowledging that Barksted and Machin had a large part to play in the play’s production.
8 See, for example: Colley; Finkelpearl, John‘, Finkelpearl, “John Marston’s;” Finkelpearl, “The 
Use;” Geckle; R. Ingram; and Morse.
9 Original text read “he.”
248
corruption of the great (Melchiori 33),” and it is thus well situated to criticise the 
extant legal system. Furthermore, Marston himself was one of the playwrights I 
discussed in section IIIB, Chapter One, who was embroiled in the Inns of Court 
during his writing career, a member of the Middle Temple from “1570, and during 
the legal term he lived there for the rest of his life in chambers which he had built for 
himself (Finkelpearl, John 84).” He would therefore have been exposed to the 
cultural interactions between those institutions and the playhouses, a fact which 
lends legal authority to his work as well as underlining the point that dramas were 
used as early forms of teaching tools at the Inns.10 11
That this play borrows plot devices from Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure 
(most notably the appearance of a Duke in Friar’s clothing acting as a deus ex 
machina in the final court scene, and a bed trick to save female honour), another 
decidedly “legal” play of the period,11 suggests that Marston could have been writing 
with an eye to the connections or fractures between the empirical legal world and the 
imaginary world of the drama. When the female characters of The Insatiate 
Countess become involved in the legal system at the end of the play, they explore 
themes of gendered justice and women and adultery, suggesting that Marston was 
indeed attempting to address legal philosophy, questions of justice, and the workings 
of the legal system. Before examining representations of the female legal subject in 
the literature, however, it is crucial to lay the theological and social groundwork to 
show how such representations condone or condemn the prevailing early-modern 
attitudes towards women and adultery.
10 For further discussion with regards to some of Marston’s other plays, see Finkelpearl, “John 
Marston’s,” and “The Use.”
11 For extensive discussions see for example: Bradshaw 164-7, 174; Eisaman Maus 2023; Kornstein 
37-8, 42, 46-54, 62-3; and Muir 102.
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I. THOU SHALT NOT: ADULTERERS V. ADULTERESSES IN THEOLOGY AND THE 
CANON LAW
Theology is the appropriate place to begin any examination of courtroom 
attitudes towards women and adultery. Like divorce laws, adultery laws remained, 
in principle, under the jurisdiction of the church courts after the Reformation 
(Harding 160). As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the canon law 
governing adultery is based on the seventh commandment of the Decalogue, which 
ensures “the just propagation of mankinde (Ainsworth P21).” Adultery is specifically 
outlawed by God because
it breakes the covenant of marriage, whereby married persons bind 
themselves not only one with another but to God himselfe (who hath 
appointed the Ordinance of Marriage) that they will faithfully and 
truely keepe their faith plighted one to the other ... it brings pollution 
into the Ordinance which God hath sanctified for the propagation of 
an holy seede, and makes confusion in Stocks and Families through 
bastardy: and many times brings the child of an Adulterer into 
another mans possession, to his great wrong and indignity. (Elton
249-50)
The above arguments against adultery are the dissolution of the joined flesh 
(illustrating that adultery carries with it the same theological problems divorce does), 
the question of patrilineal succession and the notion of property - through adultery, a 
man is forced to possess something which is not his, children born from an 
adulterous union, and loses something which is his, the sole right to his wife’s body.
12 As with divorce cases, church courts were losing jurisdiction to the court of High Commission and 
secular courts of equity throughout the early-modern period.
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The first of these three concerns is theological, the second and third are 
socioeconomic. As seen in the previous chapter, the dogma transforming the 
husband and wife into the same flesh is persistent. Adultery, like divorce, separates 
the bound couple in a way seen as unnatural, even murderous. The reason “the 
Commandement that forbids Adultery, [is] next to that that forbids Killing or 
Murder” is “because next after injurie done to the person of man or woman, there is 
none greater then that which is offered or done to the joynt person: as the wife is to 
the Husband, and Husband to the Wife, they two being but one flesh (Elton 249. My 
addition).” This argument treats man and woman equally. The rhetoric implies that 
the person coming into the relationship from the outside “murders” the married, 
conjoined body, and is to blame for the breakdown of the physical bond between
husband and wife.
The latter two concerns in the argument reflect social and economic 
practices. In economic systems of inheritance it is important that the family “stock” 
remain pure, or unadulterated. Thus, if the children in a family are the offspring of 
someone who is not the wife’s husband, the patriarch has been duped; his 
“possessions” are not his own. With this shift away from theology toward social 
practice, the onus for bad behaviour falls to the woman. What is significant, for the 
purposes of this section, is that when adultery is discussed from a purely theological 
standpoint, man and wife, as one body, share equal responsibility for maintaining a 
chaste marriage.
Dod and Cleaver, explaining the seventh commandment, exhibit the same 
lack of gender prejudice in their theological arguments. They assert that adultery is a 
great, indeed a mortal, sin,
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for if he be eitheir [sic] joyned by mariage or contraction, that 
commits the act, then it is adulterie. This is a verie high breach of this 
commandement. For when they have beene either married or 
contracted, then they breake the covenant of God ... if one be so 
audatious as to breake the covenant of God, though it be a thing much 
neglected of men, and they will not cut him of according to Gods law, 
(for by the law of God the adulterer is as culpable of death as the 
willfull murderer) yet God meetes with him, and by filthie diseases 
brings him to his death. {Treatise 53r'v)
“He,” in their Treatise, refers to both the man and the woman, not the woman alone.
In general, adultery in early-modern theology is seen as a sin against nature, 
which “breaketh out so grossely that nature cries shame of it (Capel 57).” It 
“deprives a man not onely of religion, but of the free use of reason (Capel 344).” It 
“weakens the body, and pines away that, darkens ones senses, shortens ones life, and 
then comes in a huge cry, that wee have rotted away our life (Capel 350-1).” No 
distinction is made between the sexes in theologically-based interpretations of the
seventh commandment.
Both the husband and the wife are responsible for the sanctity of the marriage 
bed, which “must with all care be preserved in all purity; the tentation is strong to 
fornication, stronge to adultery; for the worser a sin is, the stronger is the impulsion 
of Originall lust unto it: and Satan is more eager to make men adulterers after, than 
fornicators before (Capel 388).” For women, the danger of an adulterous husband is 
embedded in the ideology that relegates the sexes to separate spheres. The man can 
leave the safety of the home and “become uncleane and filthie . . . given to 
whoredome, imbracing the bosome of strangers, and bringing home unto [her] the
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feare, if not the feeling of loathsome diseases (Whately, Care-Cloth 47).”13 The wife 
is neither absent nor silent in Whately’s work, and her health and safety are taken 
into account by theological teachings which do not see the husband as blameless.14 
In theological discussions about the Decalogue, the wife’s position is viewed 
sympathetically. Women are neither invisible nor silenced in anti-adultery 
theological arguments, but can expect their husbands to maintain the marital bond.
This is because the ecclesiastical law is egalitarian in its wording, and its 
penalties affect both men and women. Canon Article XXVI, which polices 
Communion offenders, reads: “[n]o Ministers shall in any wise admit to the 
receiving of the holy Communion, any of his Cure or Flocke which bee openly 
knowne to live in sinne notorious without Repentance (Church of England);” and 
Article CIX, dealing with crimes and scandals, states:
[i]f any offend their brethren, eyther by Adultery, whoredome, Incest, 
or Drunkennes, or by swearing, Ribaldry, Usury, or any other 
uncleannes & wickednes of life, the Churchwardens or Questmen and 
Sidemen in their next Presentments to their Ordinaries, shall faithfully 
present all and every of the said offendors, to the intent that they and 
every of them may be punished by the severity of the Lawes, 
according to their defects. (Church of England)
In both these mandates no distinction is made between the treatment of men and
women. The sin affects the soul of both parties equally - they “lose the inherita[n]ce 
of the kingdo[m] of Heaven, & purchase to the[m]selves the chaines of darknes for 
ever (Rainolds 91-2),” despite gender.
13 Original text reads “me,” as the wife asks the author a question.
14 An anonymous author writes: “at what time the married man determyneth to keepe a harlot, even 
the same houre, doth he set lyre to his honestie, destruction to his house, and losse of all, that ever he 
hath (Brzef B8v-B9r).”
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A husband must thus take responsibility for his actions inside and outside the 
marriage bed because the role of sexual intercourse within marriage is yet another 
factor that contributes to the theological condemnation of adultery. A discussion 
between King James I and his clergy illustrates that, like the marriage debt a wife
owes to her husband, a husband needs to fulfill his wife’s sexual needs as well. At
the conference,
D. Reyn, tooke exceptions at those wordes, in the Common Prayer 
Book, of Matrimony, With my body I thee worship. His Majesty 
looking upon the place; I was made beleeve, (saith he,) that the 
Phrase, did import no lesse then divine worship, and adoration, but by 
examination I finde, that it is an usuall English terme, as a Gentleman 
of Worship, &c. and the sense agreeable to scriptures; giving honor to 
the wife, &c. But turning to Doctor Reyn, (with smiling saith his 
Majesty), Many a man speakes of Robin Hood, who never shot in his 
bow, if you had a good wife your selfe, you would thinke, all the 
honour and worshippe you could doe her, were well bestowed. 
(Barlow L2r‘v)
James’ insinuation suggests that a husband bears a (not unwelcome) sexual 
responsibility to his wife, and that that responsibility is an integral part of marriage, 
indeed, of worship, because through it God’s will is manifest.15 Thus, sexual 
intercourse “must be a satisfying . . . and drinking away our thirst at our owne 
Cesterne, lest wee hanker after a strange fountaine (Capel 394),” and must be done 
only within marriage, to save the parties from deadly sin and to cany out God’s will.
15 This is perhaps another reason why James was so willing to involve himself in Howard’s divorce 
suit against her husband, which was for impotence.
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These arguments find their source in the teachings of Paul (I Cor.7.1-39), and 
later, the writings of St. Augustine, who explains in “On the Good of Marriage” that 
intercourse “for the sake of begetting hath not fault . . . but adultery or fornication 
hath deadly fault (402),” because
married persons owe one another not only the faith of their sexual 
intercourse itself, for the begetting of children, which is the first 
fellowship of the human kind in this mortal state; but also, in a way, a 
mutual service of sustaining one another’s weakness, in order to shun 
unlawful intercourse. (401)
The marriage bed “which the holy ghost honoureth with a very seemely title, calling 
it, The bed undefiled {Office 28),” is the safe haven for sexual desire. Whately 
argues that
[i]f God, having planted in man that naturall inclination which hee 
hath planted, for the increase of the world, should have debarred him 
matrimonie, it had been doubtlesse an unjust rigor in God, and would 
have much extenuated mans offences in that kind. {Care-Cloth 37)
The jurisprudence behind adultery law is simple - it is impossible for people to live 
without experiencing lust, and marriage is the only appropriate place for people to 
assuage their desire.
John Aylmer explained in 1559 that sexual urges are an unavoidable part of 
human experience after the Fall, when Original Sin, tellingly described by Daniel 
Rogers, as 'ft] he Old man; The flesh, Lust, Concupiscence, The law of the members, 
the Law of sinne reigning in the members, The Old husband, who hath the wife in 
subjection (55),” was introduced into the world. He argues that “[f]or like as a man 
inhabiting a stinking, filthye, and unholsome house, situate in a corrupt and unclean
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aire, can not be but subject to that contagion; so these mindes of ours, beinge lodged 
in so impure an harborowe, must neades be defiled with the filthe (A2V).” Richard 
Capel argued, in 1633, that, “out of sinne comes nothing but sinne: Lust is sin and 
cause of sin, and nothing but sin (11),” and marriage is the only social space, 
ordained by God, that sins of lust can take place without further tarnishing peoples’ 
souls. As Whately demands:
why shouldst not thou (O man) be satisfied with thine owne wife, and 
thou (O woman) with thine own husband? By taking Gods gift in 
marriage, thou neither rebellest against him, nor woundest thy 
conscience, nor defilest another, nor pollutest thy selfe, nor bleakest 
thy covenant, nor wrongest thy family, nor transgresses! the Lawes of 
men, nor dishonestest thy name, nor procurest any other evill: But in 
imbracing a stranger, thou bringest infamie one thy name, a curse 
upon thy posteritie, a sinne upon thy soule, and wrongest at once, 
God, the Church, the Commonweale, thy yoke-fellow, thy selfe, and 
many others moe. {Care-Cloth 38)
The husband, in all these treatises, is not immune to charges of adultery.
As a result of the Decalogue’s straightforward condemnation, Cranmer’s
Reformatio proposed to deal swiftly and harshly with both men and women who let 
lust reign outside the marriage bed. According to his proposals, the man who 
commits adultery “is to restore his wife’s dowry to her. He is also to give up to her 
the half of all his goods. Furthermore, he is either to be condemned to perpetual 
banishment or committed to prison for life.” Offending wives,
if the crime of adultery be proved against them and the judge give his 
decision against them, shall be deprived of their dowries and of all
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benefits which might accrue to them from the property of their 
husbands, either under any law of our realm, or by custom, or
contract, or covenant; and shall, moreover, either be condemned to
perpetual banishment or imprisoned for life. (100)
As for private separations for adultery, Cranmer condemns them outright (101). He 
further recommends that the innocent party, “if desirous shall be allowed to proceed 
to a fresh marriage. For the innocent party ought not to suffer for another’s crime to 
such an extent that celibacy should be forced upon him against his will (100).” If 
both parties are guilty of adultery “the equal guilt of each party shall involve equal 
punishment, and the former marriage between them shall remain valid (105).” His 
proposals address a number of jurisprudential and social debates: the question of 
remarriage after divorce for adultery, the attempt to constrain the number of false 
accusations brought against women, and a more equitable approach to penalties. 
However, while his propositions highlight the difficulties women were experiencing, 
they were never legislated, and women were left unprotected by law in the 
courtroom and the social construction of the female legal subject.
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II. CHALLENGING THE CANON LAW: SOCIAL ATTITUDES TOWARDS ADULTERY 
AND ADULTERESSES IN EARLY-MODERN ENGLAND
The previous section demonstrates that the written law governing adultery 
did not differentiate between men’s and women’s guilt, and that Cranmer’s proposed 
reforms attempted to ensure more equality in legal practice. Because these reforms 
were not legislated, however, the onus of guilt continued to be placed, for the most 
part, on women, despite the obvious recognition by some that many guilty verdicts 
were misplaced. Evidence in this section suggests that the different treatment of men 
and women in matters of adultery was driven more by social mores and patriarchal 
fears than commands in the Decalogue. Although theological tenets, particularly the 
belief that man and woman become one after marriage, did affect law to a limited 
extent in favour of women (39 Eliz., c. 9 makes the man who “entices her away” 
guilty of “forcible abduction”),16 this legislation did little to change the way in which 
women were treated in the courtroom. Courts punished wives more readily and 
severely than husbands because early-modern ideology touching on matters of 
adultery - women’s subordinate legal position in the “natural” hierarchy, 
representations of cuckoldry, and a socioeconomic system based on patrilineal 
succession - paradoxically creates the potential for female sexual power which 
consequently threatens male social control.
The Office of Christian Parents states that adultery is grievous in both sexes, 
but the anonymous author’s rhetoric reveals the social bias that rewrites the canon 
law: “Christians know, that their bodies are the members of Christ: should we then
take the members of Christ, and give them to an harlot (23)?” Although he addresses
16 It works from the jurisprudential assumption that in a legal situation where the wife is conjoined to 
her husband, she is seen to be legally incapable of committing adulterous acts - her will is not her 
own, but her husband’s. This rhetoric can just as easily be used to argue for the husband, however. 
As Bullinger states, “if the losse of a good thing soulde be valued after the estimacion of the owner / 
then (as touching this life) ther is no greater dammage I then a man to lose his owne body. Now is it 
certayne / that both the parties maried / art but one body (xxxvii1).”
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“Christians” in general, it is the “harlot,” a word with overtly feminine connotations, 
who destroys the marriage. Capel describes enticement itself as feminine: “[f|or 
Lust is such an enticing harlot, as will undoe the party enveagled for ever, and leave 
him nothing but shame and misery, loocheth [sic] him from his right master, and 
makes him a slave of slaves (23).” The feminisation of lust in these examples 
demonstrates the perception that the responsibility for sexual transgression lies 
firmly with women.
A woodcut from Sebastian Brant’s Ship of Fools, entitled “Of Adultery”
Fig. 5. [“Of Adultery”], woodcut from Sebastian Brant,
Nauis Stultifera a Domino ([Basle], 1406 [actually 1506])
Fiiv.
exemplifies the social attitude towards women’s “natural” role as adulteresses. The 
foolish husband covers his eyes, blinding himself to his wife’s activities, while she
feeds him fruit. The text of the modern translated edition clarifies the scene,
asserting that “If all those people should be beaten I Who e’er adulterers’ fruit have
eaten, / As Sallust for his crimes once suffered, / Many be welts would now be
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covered (137).” The visual metaphor of the cat chasing the mice beneath the table 
suggests that women’s nature drives them to hunt and devour as many men as they
can.
Brant’s illustration, which appeared at the beginning of the early-modern 
period and the later writings of Capel and the anonymous author of Office show that 
despite the wording of the Decalogue historically there are strong social 
undercurrents which place the responsibility for adultery with the wife. As the 
anonymous author of the Flower of Friendshippe writes, “the happinesse of 
matrimonie, doth consist in a chaste matrone (D4r),” not a chaste husband, and 
ironically, given the equal onus of the seventh commandment, Christian dogma 
about the Fall strongly contributes to social attitudes about women’s sexuality in the 
early-modern period, and bears heavily on the construction of the female legal 
subject, despite the Decalogue.
IIA. EVE AND ADULTERY: THEOLOGY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE 
ADULTERESS’ PRECEDENT
The Eve myth taught that woman’s “foundation was a crooked rib . . . And
from hence a crookednesse both in manners and behaviour hath ever since descended
by way of propagation, from hir to hir posteritie {Asylum 8).” Eve the temptress, 
God’s transgressor and Satan’s ally, is the precedent and prototype for all women, 
and Whately illustrates how she is interwoven into the social beliefs of his time:
some women are proud, arrogant and scornefull; some, violent, 
headstrong, and masterfull; some, sullen and dogged; some, scolding 
and snappish; some, talkative; some, tongue-tied; some, light; some, 
coy; some, sinish; some, sluttish; some, over-spending; some, over­
sparing; some, lewd and unchaste; some, raging and jealous: yea, an
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hundred, and a thousand faults, doe lie hid in the painted box of the 
bosome of everie of Evahs daughters. {Care-Cloth 44)
The notion that every one of Eve’s daughters carries with her the same hypocritical, 
vain, lascivious traits, means that all women, without exception, are dangerous to
their husbands’ souls.
When Eve joined Adam, she undid the good of all women for all time: “it 
was not long of her husband that she proved naught, but that she drew her evill 
imediatly, from the di veil, and, her husband from her; which may be (I thinke) a 
good reason, why, a bad woman so farre surpasseth a bad man, in devilish condition 
(Wing G3V).” Wing’s attitude illustrates how stereotypes about the female sex-drive, 
women’s potential demonic power, and masculine innocence and weakness play 
themselves out in the legal sphere. Women, because they are responsible for the 
Fall, are more legally culpable for social wrongs. As he argues:
[tjhe wicked woman draw’es downe ihe hill, for she draw’es downe to 
hell, (and that descent is more easy, then any downefall on the earth) 
and how soone is presuming man, pull’d into perdition irrecoverably .
. . What man, or son of man, that will come neere her, can hope to be 
out of her gun-shott and battery? considering, he is but a naked 
defendant, against her deadly darts, and she, (through Satan) as 
politike and prevayling an adversely as ever. (M4r)
The familiar tropes of female evil and demonic sexual power hearken directly back 
to the serpent and Adam’s temptation. The wicked woman in Wing’s writing is an 
aggressive, armed, militant vanquisher; the “naked” man, defenceless and innocent, 
is helpless before her (and Satan’s) onslaught. Wing’s work, with its images of war, 
male vulnerability, and Satanic power, describes one of the strongest underlying
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factors affecting decisions against women in adultery cases of the time: male anxiety 
about female sexuality.
Thus, although when the wife marries “shee voweth to forsake all other men, 
and to keepe her selfe wholy & onely to her Husband, here is the effect and end of 
her love, to be chast, pure, and without spot (Carter 73),” in the general vilification 
of Eve’s daughters, Carter can argue that society need
[l]ooke but into one of their actes ... I meane their breach of
wedlocke, those Adultrous workes, and then where is this love? how 
many forsake their Husbands unto whom they have made this vow of 
Love and chastity, and yet live adulterously with other men: oh how 
many have their secret friends & loves as they terme them at home in 
their Husbands absence, or meeting them abroad in private places! 
nay, haunting common brothell houses, so insatiate, that even whores 
in stewes are not more common: and what is the cause of this, but 
their disobedience unto the Commandement of God. (74-6)
Eve, the wife who disobeyed the first law commanded by God, who tempted her 
husband, who did not meekly follow hierarchical mandates, and who brought 
Original Sin into the world, is the prototype for the lawless, dangerous, tempting 
woman, and this stereotype is used in the early-modern period to women’s extreme 
legal disadvantage in adultery cases.
In its most severe manifestations, the stereotype of the temptress leads to 
arguments such as those found in Chartier’s Delectable Demaundes. In it, he asserts 
that women’s subtlety lies “[i]n that that [sic] they seme to love one alone, and 
neverthelesse doe gyve them selves to many (5r);” that they are not content to love 
one person “[b]icause a woman is nothing but Lecherie, insaciable. And for this
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cause she careth neyther for number, nor for any thing that is honest, so that he be 
able to cover her skinne, he is welcome (23v).” Even if men are involved (and in acts 
of adultery in the early-modern period, they undoubtedly are), “[fjor Women only is 
this Place ordain’d {Asylum A6V),” because, as daughters of Eve, they are considered 
to be the primary transgressors. By continually resurrecting Eve for careful scrutiny 
and rampant criticism, the patriarchy finds itself in the paradoxical position of 
creating and sustaining that which it most fears.
Ania Loomba explains that “[i]n patriarchal thought, the slide of woman from 
goddess to whore is premised simultaneously upon her potential for sexual activity, 
and upon her passivity as a receptacle for sin (102).” Masculine fear about female 
sexual power thus leads to the vilification of women in general - a pre-emptive strike 
against what is seen to be women’s inherent potential for sexual mastery and mass 
destruction. Under such circumstances, suspicion and rumour alone, as the Howard 
evidence in the previous chapter demonstrates, are enough to label women whores, 
and those who are singled out as lascivious only confirm male fears about women’s 
nature. Thus, male anxiety is provoked further, and the myth of the insatiable, evil, 
temptress continually sustains itself, becoming part of the social construction of 
women, and leading to male-dominated systems of female containment.
IIB. INSATIATE WIVES AND JEALOUS HUSBANDS: CUCKOLDRY AND CONSTRAINT
Because all women are defined as potentially unfaithful, the male fear of 
adultery leads to jealously constrained wives. The construction of women as wily 
hypocrites, however, suggests that men fight a losing battle when they try to contain 
their wives’ sexuality, as the illustration “Of Guarding Wives,” from Sebastian 
Brant’s Ship of Fools, suggests. The inscription below the illustration reads: “He
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guards grasshoppers ‘neath the sun, / Pours water into wells for fun, / Who guards 
his wife as ‘twere a nun (134),” implying that women cannot be contained, that the
Fig. 6. [“Of Guarding Wives”], woodcut from Sebastian 
Brant, Nauis Stultifera a Domino ([Basle], 1406 [actually 
1506])Fiv.
husband’s task is fruitless, and that men who try to keep their wives safely locked 
away indoors - try to keep them chastely within the home - are fools. As the text 
goes on to explain: “For e’en a padlock placed before / The entrance, be it gate or 
door, / And many guards about the house / Can't keep her honest toward her spouse 
(135).” The argument is cemented by the wife in the illustration, who, although in 
the house, leans through the window, smiling at the outside world.
Jealousy and gender constraints are an inevitable outcome of a system which
labels all women as potential adulteresses, making men's position as their “heads" 
precarious from the outset. Husbands who guard their wives, the anonymous author
of Asylum Veneris explains, are infected by “that adulterate & spurious brat of love 
and feare . . . and indeede this is a monster, which never looketh upon virtue, but
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with a forward and suspicious eye (28)” - specifically the “feare” of how the “love” 
a man has for his wife can make him weak and cause his downfall, as it caused 
Adam’s. This “feare” carries with it the fear of cuckoldry, of emasculation and of 
social chaos - the world turned upside-down, wherein women enjoy the sexual 
prerogatives of men and are no longer men’s possessions.
The idea that women are their husband’s chattels plays an important role in 
defining early-modern jealousy. An anonymous author writes that jealousy is “a 
certaine care of mans minde, least other shoulde possesse the thing, which he alone 
woulde enjoye {Flower C7r),” and Benedetto Varchi, in The Blazon of Jealousie, 
describes it as springing from “the Propertie or Right that wee [men] have, when we 
(enjoying our Lady or Mistresse) would have her soly and wholy unto our selves, 
without being able (by any meanes) to suffer or endure, that another man should 
have any part or interest in her, in any way, or at any time (5. My addition).”17 
These definitions indicate the importance of male control over women, the 
importance of maintaining one’s possessions as one’s own, and precisely why the 
construction of women as concupiscent works to both strengthen male power (by 
giving men a reason to keep women indoors, to deny them access to legal rights and 
public space) and to make men vulnerable (all women, as Eve’s daughters, have the 
potential to upset the natural order and undo their husbands’ reputations).
Alison Sinclair argues, in The Deceived Husband, that “as soon as a man 
establishes the situation - marriage - in which it becomes possible to have proof of 
manhood [fathering children], he opens himself to the danger of that union proving 
fragile (19. My addition).” Thus, female sexual activity is refracted through 
masculine fear, and the “adulterous wife” commonplace is only exacerbated by the
17 The emotion was thought to be caused by imbalanced humours.
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belief that adulteresses “emerge when men are womanish and fail to assert control 
over their wives and daughters (Howard and Rackin 72).” The frontispiece to The 
Merry Cuckold exemplifies the patriarchal fear of female strength and male 
weakness, the fear of a chaotic world turned upside-down. The wife described in the
Fig. 7. Wife beating her husband with a ladle, woodcut from The
Merry Cuckold ([London, 1629]) frontispiece.
pamphlet’s text never attacks her husband, yet this is precisely what the picture 
depicts, suggesting that cuckoldry gives women absolute power which they are then 
able to wield over weak, unmanly (and unmanned) husbands.18
This pamphlet is only one of its genre, and the husband in it is joined by 
cuckolded husbands in plays and poems, as well as in numerous moral tracts. 
Literary representations of the cuckold range from humorous to dishonourable. The 
brunt of jokes, the humorous and foolish cuckold is shadowed by the much darker 
cipher of the weak, easily-overpowered man who cannot control his wife and thus
18 See also, for example: The Contended [sic] Coucould.
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becomes her subordinate instead of head. Breitenberg argues that “the veiy copia of 
representations of cuckoldry and jealousy can be read as a response to the 
impossibility of certainty about” female fidelity (183). A husband only ever has his 
wife’s word that his children are his own, and by continually reviving the cuckold 
stereotype in bawdy jokes, men are able to cope with the unknowability of female 
sexuality by creating a discourse in which adultery becomes a joke amongst men, 
often against women, that works to cohere male camaraderie against women’s hazy 
and potentially indecipherable sexuality.
Thus, representations of cuckoldry, which are used to mock weak men, also 
paradoxically work to silence and contain women. As Sinclair argues, although
[t]he cuckold represents a fissure in the presentation of hegemonic 
masculinity in the patriarchal society that produces him, and allows 
the possibility of failure to be glimpsed. In so far as this occurs, and 
the occurance is presented as an occasion for laughter, the cuckold 
and his fate are envisaged and accepted as possibilities. (56)
Despite the fact that “in the act of cuckolding ... it is the husband who is the silent 
and absent butt of the joke, while a woman takes the active and powerful role (C. 
Cook 80),” cuckold jokes by men, in literature or in dramas written and performed 
by men, become a safety-valve for cuckoldry anxiety. Such representation “restores 
the male prerogative: it returns the woman to silence and absence, her absence 
authorizing the male raconteur to represent her in accordance with particular male 
fantasies, and produces pleasure through male camaraderie (C. Cook 80).” The 
woman, safely silenced, once again becomes “a cipher, the target of unconscious 
fantasies and fears, and is dangerously vulnerable to the representations and
267
misrepresentations of men (C. Cook 80),” a definable object within the patriarchal
system.
While cuckoldry anxiety is spurred by loss of honour and power, the word 
itself reveals what is ultimately at stake: “[t]he Cuckow hatcheth her eggs in other 
birds nests, & the eggs she findeth of theirs, she devowreth;” it is
drawne in many languages fro[m] the Cuckows name to note their 
calamity, or (if they suffer it willingly) dishonesty, who receive other 
men into their bedds & foster up their childrejn], may be a sufficient 
leso[n] for a father what co [m] fort & benefit his childrefn] are to 
looke for by having such a mother to feede & oversee them. Beside 
to omitt suspicio[n] of bastardy, where by his children also may be 
discouraged & stained) himselfe shal be cou[n]ted a bawd unto his 
wife. (Rainolds 88)
Rainolds’ argument demonstrates how cuckoldry is perceived as masculine weakness 
- the husband is his wife’s pimp, not her head. An epigram by John Owen makes a 
telling distinction between adultery and cuckoldry, and suggests that despite the 
jokes, behind cuckoldry always lurks the phantom spectre of dangerous adultery - 
there cannot be an adulterer without a cuckold, and vice versa’. “Th’Adult Ter and
the cuckold, different bee, / As Comedy is from a Tragedy (No. 73).” While 
adultery can be likened to comedy because it is an activity men are free to pursue 
with little or few social repercussions, the cuckold must bear the full tragic weight of 
social ridicule and the demise of his public honour.
Thus, ironic though the use of cuckold jokes may be, they do establish a 
masculine containment system for what the early-modern patriarchy seems to fear 
most - female sexual indecipherability which potentially leads to illegitimate
268
children inheriting the “nest” - and bolster homosocial bonds. False adultery 
charges, within the early-modern climate of male fear, are a direct result of the 
masculine anxiety that produces cuckold jokes; a “husband’s accusation functions to 
pre-empt and thus compensate for the impotence and dishonor he seems to have 
regularly feared as a result of anticipating his own cuckoldry; in short, he exercises 
discursive power in advance of the disempowerment he anticipates (Breitenberg 
183).” Men who guard their wives out of jealousy or fear of cuckoldry do so in 
order to protect their marriage and their progeny from being adulterated, or rendered 
“poorer in quality by adding another substance (COP);” but what “pure substance” is 
corrupted by the new element an adulterous wife introduces to the marriage? The 
first, is the marriage itself. When a woman marries she vows “the love shee must 
performe unto her Husband must bee pure, holy, and chast, it must allow no mixture, 
no copartner in this fellowship (Carter 68).” If she breaks this vow, the sanctity of 
the marriage-bed is defiled and the marital union is rent and destroyed. The second, 
is the children of the marriage, and it is to progeny and systems of inheritance that I
will now turn.
IIC. PATRILINEAL SUCCESSION AND THE GOOD OF THE COMMONWEALTH
The previous sections argued that the fear of cuckoldry is primarily a fear of 
unknowingly raising illegitimate children. Paternal legitimacy is vital in a 
patriarchal society. Thus, inheritance is the reason that the rhetoric spawned by the 
Eve myth which defines women’s sexuality as dangerous, perseveres.19 The Office
19 See, for example: Bullinger xxxixr'v; Howard and Rackin 63; Rainolds 87-9; Sommerville 148; 
Whately, Care-cloth 48. For those who did not have to concern themselves with rightful lines of 
succession, financial concerns constrained women in a different way. The pastoral care of the parish 
system meant that if a woman had an illegitimate child, the village bore the economic brunt of raising 
it (Quaife 50).
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of Christian Parents inquires how a man with an adulterous wife can “hope to have 
lawfull children, hopeful heires, and a blessed issue (23)?” Adulterous acts, Capel 
explains,
do pervert, the order and course of man-kinde irregulating the right 
succession of families; and in the point of adultery, and that kinde of 
bastardy, it doth put a strange bird to inherit the nest, and weare away 
the feathers, which is unspeakable theft, and to be confessed of the 
adulteresse; lest to her foule adultery she adde horrible theft that the 
child of a stranger carry not away the goods or lands of the family. 
(345)20
The primary social concern is for succession - for “lawfull children,” legitimate 
heirs, and the rightful transference of material property and land.
Succession, of necessity, is refracted through the wife who bears the children; 
and, like the Eve myth, the early-modern inheritance system ironically gives women 
social power by ensuring that a man’s economic and social position must literally be 
born(e) by women. Thus, the social discourses that often vilify women are a direct 
response to patriarchal uneasiness about adulteresses and filial purity. Phyllis Bird 
points out that “[t]he wife’s primary contribution to the family was her sexuality, 
which was regarded as the exclusive property of her husband . . . Her duty was to 
‘build up’ his ‘house’ - and his alone. This service was essential to the man in order 
for him to fulfill his primary role as pater-familias (5 l).”2t Maintaining a pure
20 The idea that a wife and her children are a man’s possessions, so that his material possessions can 
be properly handed down, causes many writers of the time to describe adultery as theft. See, for 
example: Ainsworth P3r; Dod and Cleaver, Treatise 54'; Whately, Care-cloth 38-9. This concept is 
certainly evidenced in Terracae’s poem when, as 1 discussed in the previous chapter, he tries to defend 
Frances Howard’s remarriage by describing it in economic terms.
See also Sommerville 141-2.
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system of inheritance was such an integral part of early-modern economics that 
woman’s primary role as childbearer was evidenced in both the social attitudes and 
the name Adam gave the First Woman - “HEVAH, a name .. . of her fruitfullnes . . . 
because (saith Adam) she was the mother of all living (Wing B2V).” Theological and 
social discourses thus confirm the corporeality of the female subject, and bind her 
definition in relation to her physiology. It comes as no surprise, then, that female 
honour, and the honour of the family is often defined by a wife’s sexual conduct. 
Because a wife’s social role is physiologically determined, her body becomes the 
focal point of masculine anxiety, and husbands therefore have more power at law (in 
a legal system created and interpreted by men to protect male interests) to punish 
their wives for any act they deem to be adulterous.
The cohesion of the family, as I argued in the previous chapter, was seen to 
be of the utmost importance to society. According to Bodin, the family is the 
foundation of the commonwealth, and no family is complete without a wife (9). 
Families provide the moral and social coding which sustains the status quo. If a 
family is ruptured by adultery, the commonwealth is affected, “[lfike as sicke or 
feeble bodies cannot abyde any great panges or fittes, or old cracked shippes anye 
great waves or windes: so disturbed and maymed common wealthes are sone 
overturned and cast under foote, by soden and straung mutations (Aylmer Blr).” 
Strange mutations, in a society based on hierarchical order and patrilineal succession, 
are social transgressions that generate marginal elements in society.
The Office of Christian Parents agrees that “the wickednesse of mans 
corruption hath brought in a bastardly broode, and so some by dishonouring their 
owne persons, and sinning against their owne bodies, become parents of such as are 
called base children (2),” who lead to the destabilisation of social values, because
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“the ignomenie thereof is a blemish, & that blemish bredeth basenes of courage; & 
bastards are not brought up so well by their parents as lawfull children use to be: 
neither are they priviledged a like; & preferred to place of publique government, or 
Benefit of inheritance, by Lawes divine or humane (Rainolds 87).” Thus, 
illegitimate children are marginalised and seen as a potential threat because - by the 
very act of their exclusion - they are anomalies best ignored in a system of 
patrilineal succession. Masculine fears of cuckoldry and succession aside, wives 
who produce marginalised elements are seen to be simply not good for the
commonwealth.
IID. CONCLUSION: LEGAL IMPACTS OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTS
The three paradigms cited in this section by no means provide an exhaustive 
coverage of how ideology impacted on the female legal subject and adultery in the 
early-modern period. They are, however, the most common arguments used against 
(potentially) adulterous women, and lay the foundation for the courtroom 
interpretations of adultery law. All these social codes fall very hard on women. A 
wife who oversteps pre-subscribed social boundaries is labelled “a home-rebell, a 
house-traytor” and warned, “that, wherein her matrimoniall King may not, or cannol 
touch her, in case of her delinquence, the King of Kings, the Lord God almighty, will 
reach her, and (in his just wrath) be avenged on her (Wing S2V).” Sommerville 
points out that because “[ojnly the wife’s adultery posed a threat to lineal succession 
. . . for centuries her adultery seemed the most dangerous (148).” Thus, adultery 
could be proved by husbands in the court on conditions of, for example, “suspicious 
company” and “suspicious circumstances (Quaife 48).” In short, most of the social 
anxieties surrounding female sexuality are due to “the arbitrary and conjectural
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nature of patriarchal succession and the suppressed centrality of women to it 
(Howard and Rackin 130),” and the legal system responded to these fears in a way 
which would only strengthen their validity. Because male identity - whether or not 
their family is honourable, whether they are weak, whether they are cuckolds - in the 
early-modern period relies so heavily on “the act of reading and interpreting the 
signs of female chastity or adultery (Breitenberg 184),” signs which are prejudiced 
by the presupposition that women are naturally and inherently prone to adultery, it 
creates social codes that render suspicion enough evidence to vindicate an attack on a
wife as an adulteress.
The pressure on a woman to maintain acceptable social behaviour was a 
pressure to maintain her, and more importantly, through her, the family’s “good 
name.” The husband, although the head of the family, ironically relied upon his 
wife to maintain his honour. Thus, the groom-to-be in Whately’s Care-Clolh, can 
legitimately wonder about his future wife: “[wjhat if she be loose and wanton, and 
discredit my family with an evill name (48),” while women can be warned that those 
who commit adultery ^dishonoured! hir father / hir mother & kynred: Hir children 
(even those that are laufull) must be ashamed of her / & be doubted of the worlde / 
whether they be laufully begotten or no (Bullinger xxxixr_v).” Surprisingly, the 
marginalised woman has the power to destroy everyone to whom she is connected.
For women, who are both the detenninant conduit for legitimate child-birth 
and the marginalised keystone of the family unit, social behaviour falls under 
rigorous evaluation and harsh legal controls. Law, one of society’s most powerful 
control mechanisms, steps up to condemn the errant wife if she is unlucky enough to 
enter through its gates. In the courtrooms, as Lawrence Stone explains, “a single act
22 See, for example: Ames 137; Flower E2V; Brathwait 29; Breitenberg 12; Capel 53; Dusinberre 33; 
and Sommerville 141-2.
of adultery by a wife was an unpardonable breach of the law of property and the idea 
of hereditary descent ... It was also seen as a breach of the moral order, since it 
involved an invasion of a husband’s property rights on his wife’s body {Road 7).” 
Equal in canon law, but condemned outright (sometimes even when innocent) by 
popular belief, women found themselves time and again in impossible legal
situations.
The Adultresses Funerall Day and The Insatiate Countess represent two sides 
of the female legal subject embroiled in adultery charges - unjustly and justly 
accused women. Popular writing that relegates all women to the position of potential 
adulteresses implies that there should be no real distinction between the treatment of 
the two in the courtroom. The next sections of this chapter demonstrate whether or 
not that is true, and define the female legal subject in matters of adultery more fully 
than legal or moral writings do, by contrasting literary representation with the non­
literary discourses already discussed.
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III. INNOCENT OR GUILTY? ADULTERY AND THE FEMALE LEGAL SUBJECT
In the first two sections of this chapter I have shown that in matters 
regulating women’s sexuality, social opinion held sway in the courts. The law is 
very clear in and of itself, but its clarity is confused by social beliefs that assume that 
women are “naturally” more prone to adultery than men, the early-modern 
inheritance system, and male anxiety centring around the “unknowability” of a 
marginalised yet paradoxically centralised female sexuality. It is important to bear in 
mind that court orders came down to the interpretation of those hearing the case. If 
the judges trying cases of adultery shared the popular view that women were 
inherently lascivious, or that female sexuality in marriage was much more important 
to succession than was a husband’s (the wife’s adultery creates illegitimate heirs, 
whereas the husband’s does not disrupt the system in the same way), then they were 
apt to find in favour of the husband. Such was the case of Alice Clarke, burned at 
the stake on May 20, 1635 for committing adultery with Henry White and allegedly 
poisoning her (rather unfortunately named) husband, Fortune Clarke.
IIIA. MURDERING FEMALE AGENCY: THE CASE OF ALICE CLARKE
The representation of Alice Clarke in Henry Goodcole’s pamphlet reveals the 
social prejudices surrounding women and adultery that were impacting on all forms 
of discourse, including literature and law, in the early-modern period. As I have 
already mentioned, by the time Alice Clarke’s story was printed for public 
dissemination, the facts of the case and Alice herself had been so distorted by
Goodcole’s bias as to make her almost fictional. Goodcole takes the same liberties
in his representation of Alice Clarke that Terracae and Osborne take with Frances 
Howard in the previous chapter, transforming a real woman into a stereotype, a 
cipher of male fears and fantasies.
Henry Goodcole was Alice Clarke’s confessor, and his pamphlet, The 
Adultresses Funerall Day, purports to contain confessions “taken from her owne 
mouth (Alr)” on May 18, 1635, and at the time of her execution on May 20. 
Although Alice Clarke was sentenced to die for committing a murder she swears she 
did not commit, “[f]or which being arraigned, convicted, and condemned, shee 
suffer’d by Fire (A2r),” adultery, as the pamphlet’s title suggests, is her most notable 
character flaw. What the pamphlet reveals about attitudes towards adulteresses, 
women in general, and how the legal system prioritises one sex over the other, while 
at the same time it professes to be a true account in Alice’s own words, is telling.
Goodcole condemns Alice for committing adultery early on, stating: “how 
much more horrid appeareth it in [God’s] eyes; when the husband and Wife, who in 
the matrimoniall Contract, are no more too, but one flesh, shall barbarously and 
treacherously insidiate one anothers life (A2V).”23 4 Goodcole describes adultery as 
worse than “so many nefarious acts, equalling, if not farre surpassing these 
perpretated [sic] in former ages” because it shows “contempt of the feare of God, and 
the neglect of his Sabbath (A3V).” His attitude sets the tone for the remainder of the 
pamphlet, and his attacks on Alice for her “Godlessnes” and “barbary” are acerbic.
There is little doubt that Alice Clarke was guilty of adultery: “she confessed,
because she often companied with White, that stirred up her Husbands just anger 
against White and her selfe (B2V),” and
her Husband finding her and White shut up together privately in a 
Chamber in the house, on Ascension-day last in the afternoone, was 
thereat so with fury enraged, that hee did beate White going out of the 
doores, and after that, freshly fell foule upon her, and so cruelly added
23 This issue heavily impacts upon the Howard trial and Cary’s Mariam and Salome.
24 Original text reads “his.”
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blowe upon blow upon her body, that the markes thereof were very 
visible on her body at this present. (B2V)
However, as I have indicated, there is some doubt that Alice murdered her husband, 
and she herself never confesses to killing him - in fact, she vehemently denies it. 
The rhetoric Goodcole uses, however, to define Alice’s behaviour within complex 
female stereotypes erases her individuality, private motives and possible innocence 
and rewrites her in generic, misogynistic terms which easily make her a murderess as 
well as a confessed adulteress, despite the facts of the case. His arguments show 
how the individual woman (and her plight) are easily contained by early-modern 
tropes that construct women as evil and lascivious. Her adultery overshadows any 
pleas of innocence in the murder charge.
Goodcole writes that Alice committed adultery because “unto selfe-will shee 
to be so addicted, disobediently to frequent the company of one While, of whom 
oftentimes her Husbands hand had interdicted her his society and familiarity (B2r).” 
He relies on the early-modern assumption that women’s agency is connected to 
concupiscence, Alice’s “self-will” makes her disobedient and lascivious. Lisa 
Jardine argues that early-modern female independence is “inevitably represented . . . 
as adultery and sexual rapaciousness {Harping 38-9),” thus linking any public action 
by a woman to dangerous sexuality. In Alice’s case, her actions unfortunately do 
lead to adultery, and it is easy for Goodcole to make the connection between 
women’s will and infidelity.
To Goodcole’s credit, he recognises that Clarke’s abuse is partly to blame for 
Alice’s rebellious “self-will:” “the smart whereof she feeling, incontinently begot in 
her heart dislike, and resolution of revenge on her Husband Clarke for the same, a fit 
humour for the devill to worke on (B2V).” Instead of sympathising with her plight,
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however, Goodcole focuses on her “incontinent,” unreasonable anger which makes 
her, unsurprisingly, a target for demonic influence (B2V). Alice’s amenability to evil 
influences, not Fortune Clarke’s attacks, is thus her motive for murder. Goodcole
draws on two social truisms when he describes Alice as an easy receptacle for the 
Devil: the first is that a wife must bear the hardship of a violent husband because she 
is subject to him; the second is that all women, because their prototype was Eve, are 
easily swayed to evil, Satanic impulses.
When Goodcole expounds on Alice’s claim that her husband, in fact, killed 
himself (B3r), he comments: “[wjhether this be not a lame excuse, or strange 
delusion, I referre it unto the censure of the Judicious (B3r).” His editorial comment 
refers to one of the underlying early-modern assumptions about adultery and sin. 
Capel explains in his treatise on temptation that “lust hath in it all sins; and when it is 
so great and breaketh out so grossely that nature cries shame of it, why then wee call 
that sin an unnaturall lust a sinne against nature (56-7).” Alice can be nothing but 
guilty of murder because her adultery marks her as culpable of all sins; one lust leads 
to another. It is therefore inconceivable in Goodcole’s representation, rooted in 
these extant teachings, that Alice’s husband might have killed himself, despite her 
assertion that he had “violently attempted to drowne himselfe (B31)” earlier on the 
day he died.
Having assigned Alice to an indefensible position, Goodcole begins his
attack. He describes her as an “obdurate Malefactor . . . who in Adultery was so
Rooted, and insensible of the heavy burthen, and most intolerable plagues insuing for
it (B4V),” and declares that her evil nature is so all-encompassing “[t]hat at the first
and second times of my visiting of her, little or no Repentance I found in her, or her
25 Thomas Goodwin, in Aggravation of Sinne, argues that “the least sinne virtually more or lesse 
containes all sinne . . . And so every sinne in us by a miraculous multiplication inclines our nature 
more to every sinne than it was before (C2v-C3r).”
278
heart to be touched for her most horrid clamorous crimes (B4v-Clr).” He describes 
how, on the day of her execution, none of the “multitudes of people” who came to 
see her successfully got her to repent “for shee was of a stout and angry disposition, 
suddainly inraged (Clr),” and how “[l]ike my selfe, they stood as men amazed, to 
perceive that none of theirs, or any other serious perswasions could for a great while 
prevayle with her, joyned in opinion with me, that she was no fitting guest for the 
Table of the Lord Jesus (Clr).” Goodcole does not attempt to understand why Alice 
would be “angry” and “inraged” by those trying to make her see the error of her 
ways. He represents her as an evil adulteress-cww-murderess, a transgressor of all 
laws, and within such a representation she is irredeemable.
He is only satisfied when suddenly “it pleased God, so to mollifie her heart, 
that teares from her eyes, and truth from her tongue proceeded, as may appeare by 
this her ensuing Confession at the very Stake, where she was executed (Clv).” The
Fig. 8. Alice Clarke burning at the stake, woodcut from 
Henry Goodcole, Adultresses Funerall Day (London, 1635) 
frontispiece.
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illustration on the frontispiece depicts her hands in an attitude of prayer, reflecting 
the penance she sought in her second confession, whilst waiting for the executioner’s 
torch to light the inferno beneath her. I will, for the moment, gloss over the fact that 
Alice breaks down in tears when tied to “the veiy Stake” about to be set fire to 
execute her, or that in her second (more acceptable in Goodcole’s terms) confession, 
she still asserts that her husband accidentally consumed the poison that killed him 
because he was drunk (C2r). Instead, I will analyse Goodcole’s representation of 
Alice’s case and confessions, to illustrate how the facts are misrepresented by 
Goodcole’s stereotyping. Despite claiming to relate her confessions as they were 
given “from her owne mouth,” his account is so full of biased, leading comment and 
condemnation that Alice remains effectively silent. When her arguments do find 
their way into the tract, as when she asserts that her husband killed himself by 
mistake, they are dismissed.
The case histoiy for Alice Clarke, based on the information she gives to 
Goodcole in her confessions, is as follows: she and White, her lover, had a 
relationship prior to her marriage, which made it difficult for her to forget, or “shake 
off’ as Goodcole writes, “such former ancient entertainments (B2r);” one year prior 
to her arraignment she had been “gotten with Child by her Master (B3r);” her Master, 
“perceiving the same, with a small summe of money, matched her unto Fortune 
Clarke her Husband,” despite her claim that “she could not love” him (B3r); her 
Master persuaded her to agree to many Clarke, “payed the costs thereof, and further 
promised her maintenance during her life, if she did condescend unto his desiers 
[sic], which were most unlawfull, dishonest, and unchaste, before and after her 
Marriage with Fortune Clarke her husband (Clv);” her master, having made her 
“promises for the same” maintenance, failed to fulfill those promises (B3r); she
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continued to see her lover, White, despite “admonitions or threats to either parties” 
from her new husband (B2r'v); her husband beat her so “that the markes thereof were 
very visible on her body (B2V);” she was arraigned and condemned for the murder of 
her husband, despite protestations of her innocence, and burned at the stake for 
murder (A2r). In a modern courtroom it is likely the findings of the jury would have 
been very different.
Goodcole, again to his credit, does not completely disregard the role Alice’s 
master plays in her downfall, stating that it was only after he failed to supply her 
with the promised maintenance that Alice fell “into folly and wickednesse (B3r).” 
He quickly downplays the impact the master’s decisions have on her fate, however, 
stating directly afterwards: a “great clog unto such a mans conscience, if it be true, 
to seduce a woman unto his will, and so leave her (B3r. My italics).” He 
undermines Alice’s position as a victim of the patriarchal system which binds her
first to her master and then to the husband that master chooses for her after he has
impregnated her, by openly questioning whether or not her claims are true. Because 
Alice is clearly a servant, she faces twice the social prejudice before the law: she is a 
woman and she is lower class. Her master’s conscience may be bothering him, but 
she is the one burning at the stake.
The question this case poses to a modern reader is obvious: why is it that a 
woman impregnated by her employer, married off by that employer to a man she 
does not love (instead of the man she does), denied the maintenance promised by that 
employer and beaten by her new husband, is not worthy of any sympathy when she 
denies poisoning her husband so that (as Goodcole attests) “she should live more 
quietly and contentedly with” White who “would marry with her (Clv. My 
addition)?” Evidence of the early-modern period suggests that there is a glimmer of
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sympathy for women in Alice’s situation; if a woman marries a man and “hate him, 
and dispise him, she is in danger everie day, to be defiled (Dod and Cleaver, Treatise 
55r),” because she is more open to the attentions of other men. Goodcole admits that 
a “just cause, all persons may conjuecture, was given on [Alice’s] part, of great 
dissensions likely to arise betweene her Husband and her selfe (B2r),”26 thus putting 
some of the onus on her master and the arranged marriage to an husband she does 
not love. However, the responsibility of the men involved is ignored by the court - 
she is the one who ultimately suffers.
The reason the court and Goodcole reject any sympathetic view of Alice is 
simple: despite some voices of dissent, the majority of writing makes it obvious that 
Alice Clarke, as a woman, would have been latently inclined to any manner of sexual 
transgressions and evils; secondly, the treatment of her case clarifies how male 
anxiety about adultery is so extreme that it is the highest priority in trials against 
women who are charged with a number of crimes. Her adultery is proof enough of 
her guilt in all charges. Alice’s case history shows sufficient motive for wanting to 
be rid of her husband, but she also protests her innocence, even when tied to the 
stake in her second confession, and relates that when her husband drank the mercury 
that killed him she “was thereat so perplexed, that she uttered these words unto her 
Husband, that he had undone both him selfe and her (C2r).” Despite these factors, 
the female legal subject is enveloped and refracted through masculine systems of 
anxiety and containment in such a way as to erase Alice’s experiences and motives 
entirely.
Thus, the fact of her adultery is enough to brand her as a murderess, despite 
her assertions to the contrary. Her case history is dismissed in Goodcole’s pamphlet
26 Original text reads “her.”
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and the court in favour of a reading which makes Alice solely responsible for the 
murder. Her voice is continually edited and undermined by Goodcole who claims to 
be relating the story “from her owne mouth (Alr),” in her own words, in order to 
make it clear that the woman represented in the pamphlet is a malefactor at worst and 
delusional at best (particularly when she protests her innocence).
Goodcole’s pamphlet suggests that for the female legal subject embroiled in 
matters pertaining to adultery, there is little hope. The legal and social systems show 
extreme bias in favour of masculine fears about woman’s potential for evil, despite 
evidence of overwhelming hardship, as in Alice’s case. It seems that the court 
system is prepared to protect the rights of the patriarchy to possess women, and to 
treat them as possessions (which can be bought and sold, as Alice’s employer buys 
and sells her), and to control female sexuality. Goodcole’s editing is a product of 
social views that label women as possessions, describe their transgressions in terms 
of female agency, assume that they are latently capable of all evil, that they are a 
“beaste unperfecte, geven to ten thousand passions and pleasures, abhominable to be 
thought wel of (Chartier 23v),” and which therefore give no quarter in cases of 
perceived female sexual transgression.
In the social climate these attitudes create, it is little wonder that Alice, 
despite the fact that she was obviously treated poorly by the men who had power 
over her, is the villain in this specific case. Her sexual transgressions against her 
rightful head are signs of her dangerous “self-will” and clear indicators of her guilt 
as a murderess, despite her protestations of innocence. She is the one who must pay, 
in a legal sense, for the troubles in her life, because her adultery cuts too close to 
patriarchal fears and uncertainties. The court is therefore in a position where it must 
contain that most dangerous of social elements - female sexuality - by killing it.
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Goodcole’s pamphlet reflects a purely masculine perspective, and forces the woman 
into the reflexive Other defined by that perspective. Like his pamphlet, “[tjhe 
masculine, in the world of the play, is the place of speaking and reading subjects, of 
manipulators and interpreters of signs (C. Cook 76),” and it is to representations in 
the world of the Insatiate Countess, equally affected by extra-textual bias, to which I
will now turn.
IIIB. ADULTERY, FEMALE STEREOTYPES AND THE COURTS: THE INSATIATE 
COUNTESS OF SWEVIA AND THE VIRTUOUS WIVES OF VENICE
John Marston’s Insatiate Countess is a tour-de-force of stereotypical women.
These stereotypes, as hyperbolised norms, go a long way to outlining women’s
position vis-a-vis adultery law, in the same way that the recurring stereotypes in
Alice Clarke’s trial proved to be her legal undoing. There are three plotlines in the
play: the main plot deals with the Countess, her many lovers, and her indictment; the
sub-plot I will discuss in this thesis involves a comedic bed-switch by virtuous wives
who are then falsely accused of adultery; and a third plotline, a love story of the
Count Mendosa and Lady Lentulus, which acts a foil to the characters’ attitudes in
the other plots. Because the quartos on which modern editions are based are so poor,
the third sub-plot disappears completely by the end of the play, the anticipated
reconciliation and marriage between the Count and widow, as with the characters
themselves, failing to materialise. Although potentially useful in examining the
female legal subject (when the widow, Lady Lentulus, is last heard from in IV.iv, she
and the two virtuous wives, Thais and Abigail, are going to the court to reprieve their
respective men), because she drops out of the play completely I will not be
addressing the third sub-plot in this thesis.
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The Countess’ and the virtuous wives’ stories, however, cany through to 
legal fruition in the final Act, and both reveal the extent to which early-modern 
assumptions about the “nature” of women colour men’s interpretation of events, 
even, as in the sub-plot, when the women are innocent. Morse Allen points out that 
“Marston’s attitude toward the bar is interesting, as his father was a lawyer, and he 
himself tried law-studies for a time (109).” The trial scenes in the play are complex, 
and ultimately (unambiguously, despite Allen’s wording) condemn the legal system, 
suggesting that Marston, like Cary, is questioning the validity of a discourse that 
attempts to homogenise the female legal subject into easily-codifiable stereotypes.
This approach breaks with most extant criticism of Marston’s work. His 
reputation in the Jacobean period “seems to have been as a satirist and a malcontent 
(Geckle 18),” and historically critics have been happy to view his characters as the 
broad brush-strokes of the satirist which challenge social conventions through the 
use of “exaggerated character types, ludicrous contrasts and absurd juxtapositions 
(Colley 1),” in which “[t]he characters play ‘roles,’ they are types, and are as one­
dimensional as Marston can make them (Colley 181).” Thus, R. Ingram can describe 
Marston’s temptress in The Dutch Courtesan as “a caricature of a villainess (118),” a 
charge which is easily attached to Isabella in The Insatiate Countess, and Allen and 
Wiggins can dismiss Isabella as a nymphomaniac (157, xiii).27 I will argue,
27 Senapati soundly, and convincingly, rejects any critical assumptions that Isabella is simply a 
nymphomaniac driven by insatiable sexual desires; “[ujnlike a nymphomaniac she does not move 
from one man to another after sexual encounters that leave her insatiate (thereby causing male sexual 
anxiety), but falls in love before the relationships are consummated (138).” The Countess is not, in 
fact, sexually “insatiate”, rather she falls in love too often. The play thus becomes less a satire about 
“lust and women (Allen 156),” and more a satire of conventional courtly love, particularly the “love- 
at-first-glance trope that dominated Elizabethan romantic comedies (Scarr 94).” Gniaca, in the play, 
compares true love to passion when Isabella first tries to seduce him, arguing: “Your love is violent, 
and soon will end. I Love is not love unless love doth persever, / That love is perfect love that loves 
forever (III.ii.81 -3).” He creates the blueprint against which all the play’s relationships can be 
measured and found either sufficient or lacking. See also Axelrad 202-4 for a discussion about 
Isabella as a satire on women and courtly love conventions.
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however, that while Marston’s satires do use stereotypes, and undoubtedly “the 
demonizing of female attractiveness is a theme fully pursued” in The Insatiate 
Countess (Senapati 136), he is a much more able and complex playwright than the 
man described by Morse Allen, whose “plays show that he lacks almost entirely the 
lyrical gift of the Elizabethan age (125).” Stereotypes are important in The Insatiate 
Countess, but not because they are only the “exaggerated types” common to satire.
The representations of these women as legal subjects caught in the 
stereotypes that both the law and society propagate, lends itself to a better 
understanding of how stereotypes of women who enter the court system (like those 
evident in Mr. Justice Harman’s alleged 1991 statement, highlighted in section II of 
my general introduction, in which he refers to all women as “mothers, wives and 
whores”) leave them open to charges of infidelity even if they are innocent, and 
without recourse to the mechanisms men had to protect themselves from adultery 
charges. These are misogynistic stereotypes, and Marston uses them to good effect; 
“misogyny is an important part of the social and cultural fabric of all his plays . . . 
One thing that is striking about The Insatiate Countess, however, is the range and 
variety of its female characters (Wiggins xii).” For a cultural criticism of law and 
literature, this range and variety become the cracks through which the stereotypes 
begin to slip, begin to melt away, and are made more complex, perhaps more 
dangerous as subjects because of that complexity, and ultimately work to deconstruct 
both generalised attitudes toward women and the easy categories of “good” and
“bad” which the law tries to create.
Marston’s play works to rewrite the traditional stereotypes that surround 
whoredom and chastity. This is not to say that Marston does not work, for the most 
part, from within the socialised dictates of the status quo. Allen Morse argues that
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“[l]ust is the most prominent subject of Marston’s literary work (96),” and within 
that theme “his principal interest is in men. He not only warns them in too forceful 
words from whores, but condemns them bitterly for their open lewdness (98).” In 
The Insatiate Countess, however, Marston appears to be most interested in women - 
in the end, it is the women who are given scope and depth while the men are reduced 
to stereotypes of homo-socially bonded, anxious masculinity.
Unlike the men, there are ruptures in the representations of the insatiate 
Isabella and the chaste wives which lead to questions about the validity of extant 
female stereotypes - specifically, stereotypes about women’s sexuality through 
which court decisions regarding adulteresses are often refracted. The play achieves 
this by carefully setting up the stereotype in which the women are to be encoded, and 
then giving the reader and audience glimpses of thoughts and actions on the part of 
these women which are not normally associated with the extant stereotypes they 
represent. In doing so Marston undermines the stereotypes, and suggests a 
multidimensional, unstable subject who, like Caiy’s Salome, Doris and Mariam, 
challenges the validity of the subjective female position which the legal patriarchy
tries to sustain.
Through these stereotypes, Marston’s play examines attitudes towards 
women and the law, women who use the law, and the interaction between what can
best be described as “private” law - what would have been defined in the early- 
modern period as natural law or God’s law - and “public” law - the statutes and 
courts - as it correlates to the private and public spheres thought best to be inhabited 
by women and men, respectively. The virtuous wives’ use of this “private” law and 
their juxtaposition with the “public” law used by the men in the Countess’ plot,
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raises questions about justice and gender, and how women and the law interact in 
“appropriate” and “inappropriate” ways.
That the Countess, who enters the public sphere of the courtroom in order to 
clear her name with brash arguments and attempted bribery,28 meets with a 
condemning wall of male camaraderie and death, whereas the wives are successful in 
clearing their names through their private, secret plot, their quiet, respectful words to 
Duke Amago, and, ultimately, the silent proffering of letters written in their 
husbands’ hands, suggests that if women were to try to defend themselves openly 
against adultery the stereotype that attaches itself to the Countess would be 
insurmountable. Juxtaposing the attitudes that surround these stereotypes in the legal 
world with the fissures the women constantly open with their words and actions, 
fractures the stereotypes the law and society try to create and ultimately, as in Cary’s 
play, questions the validity of the constraining generalisations law places on the 
female legal subject.
The play is full of the familiar social themes discussed throughout this 
chapter: jealousy; illegitimacy; female lasciviousness; and cuckoldry. Both plots 
show the degree to which women were felt to be culpable for male desire, and reveal 
high levels of masculine anxiety about female sexual power, illustrating how those 
fears can affect legal proceedings as they did in the cases of Alice Clarke, Lady 
Allan and Mariam of Jewry. The sub-plot broadens the scope of the attitudes in the 
main plot, undermining them and creating a space where women who are unjustly 
accused of adultery can experience female camaraderie and action. Like the 
stereotype in the main plot, the virtuous wives are also constrained by generic
28 Methods, it might be ventured, not far removed from those used by upper-class English gentlemen 
who did the same in the early-modern period to such an extent that Strype announces in his 
Memorials of Archbishop Cranmer, “the nation grew famous for this crime (182),” and that such 
divorces to avoid charges of adultery “became a great scandal to the realm, and to the religion 
professed in it, and gave much sorrow and trouble in good men to see it (184).”
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assumptions and social pressures which were exerted on the legal system, and it is 
the power these stereotypes hold, and the conclusions that can be drawn from 
Marston’s treatment of them, that makes this play a worthwhile juxtaposition with 
the Alice Clarke account, as well as a strong contribution to a cultural criticism of
law and literature. Like Thomas Dekker’s The Honest Whore and Ben Jonson’s The
Silent Woman, the play’s title sets the running stereotype for the main plot, and it is 
with this, its legal ramifications and its deconstruction, that I will begin my
discussion.
During the course of the play John Marston’s insatiate Countess, Isabella of 
Swevia hastily remarries after the death of her first husband, leaves her new husband
and takes three consecutive lovers. Duke Medina, in the final Act, accuses her of
having had “[fjhree earles, one vicount, and this valiant Spaniard . . . Besides her 
secret lovers, which charitably /1 judge to have been but few, but some they were 
(V.i.57-60).” Condemned from the title onwards, the Countess plays out her role, on 
one level, as a lascivious, murderous, dangerous woman. How she is reduced to this 
stereotype by the men she encounters throughout the play, and the ramifications that 
stereotype carries with it at her trial, are, as with the Alice Clarke account, indicative 
of the role allocated to the female legal subject in matters of adultery. However, she 
challenges the stereotype and the patriarchy which would constrain her.
Like Cary’s Mariam, Isabella of Swevia is a very vocal woman - Melchiori 
points out that she has “one of the longest female speaking parts in the whole of 
Jacobean drama: she has over 550 lines, while the longest male roles in the play 
(Claridiana in the comic and Guido in the tragic plot) do not reach 250 lines each 
(39).” Ninety-two lines of her dialogue are spoken during her trial, suggesting the 
negative truism used to attack women who went to law, that of “the transformation
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of articulateness into promiscuousness: ‘the woman of fluent speech is never chaste’ 
(Jardine, Harping 57).” Women who argue their case in a public courtroom, 
particularly in matters of adultery where promiscuity is foregrounded anyway, would 
easily fall into this commonplace.29 30 Isabella’s speeches during her trial and 
throughout the play serve a double purpose, however. While they do easily connect 
her to charges of lasciviousness they also give her “a defiant counter-voice” to the 
patriarchal paradigms in which she is constrained (Senapati 137).
When the play opens, Countess Isabella appears in mourning for her recently- 
deceased husband. She tells the Lords who tease her: “do not mock my grief: / 
Tears are as due a tribute to the dead, / As fear to God, and duty unto kings, I Love to 
the just, or hate unto the wicked (I.i.32-5).” Her words are sympathetic, but shortly 
thereafter she reveals her true feelings, and her true nature:
I mourn thus fervent, ’cause he died no sooner:
He buried me alive,
And mewed me up like Cretan Daedalus,
And with wall-eyed jealousy kept me from hope 
Of any waxen wings to fly to pleasure.
A A
But now his soul her Argos eyes hath closed,
And I am free as air. (I.i.46-52)
She quickly confirms that the late Duke was right to be suspicious, telling the
audience:
You of my sex,
In the first flow of youth use you the sweets
29 As in Osborne’s and Terracae’s accounts of the Frances Howard trial.
30 Actually Argus; the many-eyed herdsman sent to watch Io (Ovid 19-22).
Due to your proper beauties, ere the ebb
And long wane of unwelcome change shall come.
Fair women play: she’s chaste whom none will have. (Li.52-6)
Although she blames her husband’s jealousy for her unhappiness, she defines 
happiness as the “pleasure” she can get in his absence, a dubious pursuit she knows 
would make her fall from Heaven, as her allusion to Icarus, his “waxen wings” and 
over-reaching demonstrates. She also rejects the myth of female chastity (only the 
undesired remain chaste) and begins the process whereby she will claim her body as 
her own and do with it what she wants, despite patriarchal dogma which would have 
her remain a man’s possession. Far from making her sympathetic, her admonition 
confirms that men should jealously guard their wives, and shows that, from a 
patriarchal perspective, her late husband was right to keep her locked up.
By the end of the scene she seduces one of the Lords, Roberto, “a man of a 
most mild aspect, / Temperate, effeminate, and worthy love (I.i.57-8),” his 
“effeminacy” foreshadowing his inability to keep his wife in check.31 The hatred the 
Countess felt for her late husband comes from her sense of entrapment in a 
monogamous relationship, and Roberto unwittingly steps into her late husband’s 
shoes. She falls in love with someone else on the veiy day of their wedding, proving 
that he would have done well not, as he says, to kill off jealousy so early in their 
relationship (Il.i. 106-117).
This passion associated with having a wife, jealousy, frames Marston’s play, 
creating tension between men who must legitimately guard their wives (as the 
Countess’ husbands should) and those who are fools for not trusting them (like 
Claridiana and Rogero in the bed-switch sub-plot). After the first scene, jealousy is
31 As I discussed in section IIB of this chapter, one of the assumptions made about men who were 
cuckolded was that they were inherently weak and unable to control their female charges.
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not mentioned until Claridiana’s closing speech in V.ii, when he advises the
audience:
Now I see great reason why 
Love should marry Jealousy:
Since man’s best of life is fame,
He had need preserve the same.
When ’tis in a woman’s keeping,
Let not Argos’ eyes be sleeping.
Therefore, shouldst thou Diana wed,
Yet be jealous of her bed. (V.ii.223-236)
His advice, with its repetition of imagery from the Countess’ speech at the beginning 
of the play, draws attention back to the moment the first woman to appear onstage 
lived up to generalised male expectations of uncontrolled and uncontrollable female 
sexuality. Claridiana’s closing words reiterate the major underlying stereotype of the 
play: women, all women, even if they are goddesses like Diana, are the same; they 
are like the Countess whose husband was correctly suspicious of her sexual nature.
Jealousy, as I explained in section IIB of this chapter, is linked to fears about 
female sexuality, and Marston represents the Countess in such a way as to confirm 
those fears, making male suspicion an apt frame for the play’s action. Jealousy is 
also, however, closely linked to the representation of women as possessions - 
commodities on which are written the scope of masculine desire. The fear of female 
sexuality in the early-modern period is a fear of the loss of male power, but it is also 
the fear of upsetting socialised, hierarchical roles. Women, like those in Cary’s play, 
whose actions run contraiy to what their “natural” social roles are meant to be,
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dangerously reveal the artificiality of the early-modern social structure. Women who 
claim their bodies as their own, denying “patriarchal ideology to be inscribed on” 
them (Senapati 138), as the women’s parliament does, strike at the very core of the 
socialised teachings that pronounce women’s bodies belong to men alone. As 
Senapati argues, “[s]ince the female, sexual body is the site for the most intense 
patriarchal control, the transgression of it may be regarded as a deliberate and defiant 
challenge of patriarchal ideology (137-8).” The demonisation of women in this play 
has more to do with the shift in the power dynamic that sexually aggressive women 
enable, than with the Countess herself - by “[refusing to surrender control of her 
body to any man, she uses and abuses it to defy the controlling ideology of female 
(though not male) chastity (Senapati 138).” Furthermore, the men’s vilification of 
female sexuality is so sexualised itself that the double-standard is too glaringly 
obvious to be simply ironic.
Attacks on the sexual nature of women are frequent and fierce, and begin 
with the play’s first words. Mizaldus, one of the three Lords charged with teasing by 
the Countess, asks the other two, “What should we do in this Countess’ dark hole 
(I.i.l),” immediately setting the tone towards female sexuality, and women in 
general, which lasts throughout the play. His ribald remark is directed toward a 
woman who, by all accounts at the play’s opening, is genuinely mourning her 
husband’s death. It implies disrespect to her and her widowed state, and reduces her 
to nothing more than her “dark hole” and what men can “do in” it. In making his 
remark, Mizaldus connects women, sexuality and danger - the Countess possesses 
the unknowable “dark hole” of all women, which men struggle to possess and 
contain through social institutions like marriage and law. Flis innuendo suggests 
male confusion and anxiety about female sexuality, and reflects on the patriarchy’s
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need to “do something” about it, to fix it, or contain it in a way directly controlled by 
the masculine “we” to whom he refers. The suggestion is, as illustrated by my 
discussion about the unknowability of patrilineal succession or female sexuality in 
section IIC of this chapter, that the stereotype adheres to the Countess because it is in 
some ways unavoidable for women, whose physiology alone produces the male 
anxiety to which Mizaldus refers.
Once Isabella reveals her sexual drive, rhetorical attacks on her move swiftly 
toward imagery of the lascivious woman, and work to constrain her within that 
stereotype. Guido, Count Arsena, tells Mizaldus, “A player’s passion I’ll believe 
hereafter, I... I And think it a more worthy act to me I Than trust a female mourning 
o’er her love (I.i. 120-5),” when he hears about the impending marriage between 
Isabella and Roberto. The Countess, remarrying so quickly, confirms for him 
women’s lying nature; she represents the paradoxical role women play, acting as 
precedents for all women, and reconfirming what the Eve myth teaches men to 
suspect about women’s predisposition. Coming from Guido, however, this remark is 
somewhat hypocritical. He was one of the lords vying for her at the beginning of the 
play, and if she had chosen him instead of Roberto he would have welcomed her 
amorous attentions (Li. 112-5). His attack on women’s (not men’s) fickle desires is 
an ironic yet easy move because women are so easily slotted into extant stereotypical
constructs of lustful deceit.
Although the Countess is in no way redeemable - she is dishonest, lustful and
murderous, the representation of a lascivious women, who embodies all the negative
signifiers of the generic adulteress32 - she is not without self-reflexive, sympathetic
moments, and therefore is “a more complex figure than her bad reputation might
32 In the same way the rhetoric describing Alice Clarke’s case reduces her to nothing more than the 
generic “evil woman.”
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suggest. .. one who is allowed a degree of audience sympathy (Wiggins xiii).” Like 
Cary’s Salome, who would lead women to a new freedom, Isabella vows: “Then, 
queen of Love, a precedent I’ll be / To teach fair women learn to love of me 
(Il.i .222-3);” she vows to show women that they are able to exert choice and control
on
over the use of their own bodies. As she boldly declares when she falls in love 
with Guido’s friend, Gniaca, neither “Hell [the teachings of the Church] nor earth 
[social expectations] can keep love in subjection (III.ii.51. My additions).” 
Although for the most part she rejects the legal subject the law would have her 
embody - the silent and chaste wife - she is as much a part of the patriarchal system 
that binds her as the men are. Thus, “[conditioned by patriarchal ideology she 
nonetheless wrestles internally with it each time she falls uncontrollably in love with 
a man (Senapati 137).” When in Act II, Scene i, she falls in love with Guido at her 
wedding masque, she muses in an aside: “Was I not deep enough, thou god of lust, / 
But I must further wade (158-9);” and when she leaves Roberto for Guido (who said 
he would never trust women again when he heard she was marrying), she reflects:
did my lust beguile me of my sense?
Making me feast upon such dangerous cates,
For present want, that needs must breed a surfeit.
How was I shipwrecked? Yet Isabella think,
Thy husband is a noble gentleman,
Young, wise, and rich; think what fate follows thee,
And nought but lust doth blind thy worthy love.
I will desist. O no, it may not be. (II.iii.50-7)
33 Her pun on “queen” and “quean” makes it clear that this will make them whores in the eyes of 
society.
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Her private moment, punctuated by doubt and regret, is overcome by the stereotype 
she embodies - perhaps this is why “it may not be”. Another reason it “may not be” 
is perhaps due to the external forces she feels exert themselves upon her by the gods 
and fates, references to which resound throughout the play. Cupid stands often in 
her presence, “Disguised like a pretty torch-bearer, I And makes his brand a torch, 
that with more sleight / He may entrap weak women (II.i.87);” and she begs Desire 
“thou quenchless flame that burnest our souls / Cease to torment me (Ill.iv. 18-9). 
The connection she makes between Cupid and the Devil, another deity infamous for 
ensnaring weak women and leading them astray, indicates the conflict and torment 
Desire stirs within her - she knows what she is doing is wrong, but feels powerless to 
prevent it.
As Wiggins argues, Isabella is often “represented as someone powerlessly 
watching herself spin out of control: she regularly speaks of the forces which drive 
her - Cupid, Desire, Revenge - in personified terms which establish her sense of 
them as external (xiv).” While the gods are represented as working against her from 
the heavens, men work against her on earth. When Guido’s angry and condemnatory 
pamphlet against her falls into her hands she accuses men of “conspiring] to work 
[her] honour’s fall (IV.ii.34),”34 and when Don Sago, her last lover, woos her and 
begs her to set him a task so he can win her she demands:
You are a stranger to this land and me,
What madness is’t for me to trust you then?
To cozen women is a trade ’mongst men,
Smooth promises, feigned passions with a lie,
Deceives our sex of fame and chastity:
34 Original text reads “conspire” and “mine ”
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What danger durst you hazard for my love? (IV.ii. 186-91)
Thus, although certainly fickle, Isabella is not a one-dimensional “caricature” of the 
lascivious villainess. She is often sympathetic, and “a victim of her own sexuality 
(Wiggins xiv).” It is in this dual representation of meaning that the complexity in
Isabella’s character lies.
Although she declares she will not adulterate her marriage she does, thus 
confirming that women are ultimately weak, easily swayed, and cannot control their 
passions. She can, however, yearn for stability, can tell Gniaca that “My faith to 
thee, like rocks, shall never move, / The sun shall change his course ere I my love 
(Ill.iv. 102-3).” While these contradictions can on one reading be interpreted as the 
general unconstant nature of the adulteress, Isabella is not solely to blame for her 
actions - Guido, her first lover, who disparages her in his pamphlet “is hardly in a 
position to attack her when she rejects him in turn (Wiggins xi),” but the men’s 
responsibility, as the adulterers to her adulteress, is neatly swept away by the way the 
men constantly revert to female stereotypes.
When Roberto, her second husband, hears she has left him for Guido, he 
attacks all women for being weak, changeable and wavering, and his argument 
resurrects the tropes that dictate the lascivious woman stereotype:
Women, your eyes shed glances like the sun:
Now shines your brightness, now your light is done.
On the sweetest flowers you shine, ’tis but by chance,
And on the basest weed you’ll waste a glance.
Your beams once lost can never more be found,
Unless we wait until your course run round. (II.iv.36-41)
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He cannot know about the Countess’ unsure moment when she wonders why she is 
unhappy with him and blames lust for unsettling her affections. He does not attempt 
to understand her motives - she is a stereotype and he does not have to; nor does he 
take any responsibility for her leaving, a responsibility an early-modern audience 
may have assumed of an “effeminate” man.
Instead, he summons the rhetoric that makes adultery an inherent attribute of 
the female gender, and him an innocent. The masculine anxiety that refracts male 
honour (whether or not men can “Enjoy the noble title of a man [II.iv.44],” as 
Roberto puts it when he discovers the Countess’ infidelity) through female sexuality, 
while also defining all women as potential adulteresses, reduces the Countess to 
nothing more than the predictable generalisation on which Roberto can play. The 
audience, however, is aware of her indecision and her inner conflict, and the way in 
which Roberto over-simplifies the situation by drawing on misogynistic tropes seems 
incongruous with the psychological complexities Isabella has recently exhibited. 
The first masculine reaction to Isabella taking her first lover, which is voiced by 
Claridiana at the same moment he is on his way to cuckold his enemy, leaving his 
own wife at home, and reiterated by her first lover Guido when she leaves him in 
turn, is that she is simply going “to the devil (II.iv.7);” her actions are an intrinsic 
part of her nature, “where the devil has the fee-simple (IILiv. 149).”
The men in the play constantly and hypocritically rely on stereotypical tropes
to condemn her. When Guido discovers she has been unfaithful, he, like Roberto, 
leaps to generic female categories:
Farewell thou private strumpet worse than common.
Man were on earth an angel but for woman,
That seven-fold branch of hell from them doth grow,
Pride, Lust, and Murder they raise from below,
With all their fellow sins. Women were made
Of blood, without souls: when their beauties fade,
And their lust’s passed, avarice or bawdry
Makes them still loved; then they buy venery,
Bribing damnation, and hire brothel slaves.
Shame’s their executors, Infamy their graves.
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Then soulless women know, whose faiths are hollow,
Your lust being quenched, a bloody act must follow. (Ill.iv. 175-90)
He refers to the beliefs that cause male unease: Eve and the Expulsion at line 176; 
the seven deadly sins which suggest women’s connection to the demonic at line 177; 
and the association between adultery and murder at lines 189-90, thus sustaining the 
social truisms that define the Countess’ (and women’s) character.
The connection he makes between adultery and murder, so evident in the case 
of Alice Clarke and Salome, is an early-modern commonplace - Isabella the
adulteress easily becomes Isabella the murderess. When her second lover, Gniaca, 
comes to kill Guido on the Countess’ behalf, Guido asserts: “This curse pursues 
female adultery, / They’ll swim through blood for sin’s variety: / Their pleasure like 
a sea groundless and wide, / A woman’s lust was never satisfied (IV.ii.80-3);” Duke 
Medina, who sentences her, tells the court that “Murder’s the shadow of adultery / 
And follovys it to death (V.i.26-7).” As I have argued, these stereotypes, while 
prevalent, are continually undermined throughout the play.
Not only the Countess’ private doutbts and uncertainties, but sometimes the 
male characters as well work to undo the stereotype. Controversially, Gniaca, the
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Countess’ second lover, suggests that she is confined in her role as seductress and 
temptress simply because she is a woman. He tells her when she seduces him:
Thou creature made by Love, composed of pleasure,
That makest true use of thy creation,
This is the fate fixed fast unto thy birth,
That thou alone shouldst be man’s heaven on earth. (III.iv.41 -6)
He recalls the Eve myth for the audience, asserting at the same time women’s 
predisposition to evil transgressions. According to theological writings, woman was
created because God felt it was not meet for man to be alone. The Countess is
simply fulfilling the reason for her, and all women’s, existence - to provide pleasure 
and company to men. In his speech, Gniaca also alludes to the Fall, and Eve’s 
implicit role therein. Women are men’s “heaven on earth” because, paradoxically, 
men have been denied heavenly paradise by women. He suggests that the roots of 
dangerous female sexuality lie not only in the Expulsion, but also because it draws 
men’s minds away from the true heaven, which cannot be obtained by lascivious 
behaviour. For all women, “this is a fate fixed fast” by their birth as females. When 
he alludes to women’s role as the natural companions for men he evokes the male 
superiority and female subjection of the creation myth; that he refers to the Countess 
within this paradigm, a woman who is neither controlled by, nor subject to men (and 
not a particularly reliable companion, either) only emphasises the artificiality of the 
constructed female subject.
Every time Isabella transgresses, men invoke the generic, evil, socially- 
destructive woman. In doing so, they try to contain her within that stereotype - the 
stereotype associated with the “dark hole” Mizaldus refers to in the first line of the
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play - and render her rare moments of regret and self-reflection pointless. As with 
Alice Clarke, Isabella’s agency attacks the veiy foundation of early-modern 
masculine anxiety, and the men can only control her by controlling how they 
represent her. By describing Isabella as a stereotype, the men represent her in such a 
way that removes any responsibility that could fall to them.
Senapati argues that “in this play homo-social bonds lose their primacy and 
the gender hierarchy is reversed through sexual power, Isabella, the sexually potent 
woman responsible for this disruption, is destroyed (139).” While I do agree with 
her latter statement, and that at times homo-social bonds are disrupted, as when the 
Countess is able to set Gniaca against Guido and later Don Sago against both, I 
would argue that they are never in danger of losing their primacy. In fact, the 
disruption Isabella causes only strengthens the homo-social bonds of the men. Like 
the paradoxical camaraderie that cuckold jokes sustain, the men in this play set 
themselves as innocents against a malicious female Other, thus creating an “us” and 
“them” scenario which works to Isabella’s extreme detriment when she is finally 
arraigned.
Not surprisingly, as with Alice Clarke’s case, the law deals very harshly with 
Isabella once it catches up with her. She receives a pamphlet, written by Guido, that
reads:
Who loves Isabella the insatiate,
Needs Atlas’ back for to content her lust,
That wand’ring strumpet, and chaste wedlock’s hate,
That renders truth deceit for loyal trust,
That sacrilegious thief to Hymen’s rights,
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Making her lust her god, heav’n her delights (IV.ii. 12-7),35 
and in her shame she begins to plot the revenge that will finally bring her before the
court.
As a female legal subject, the Countess, like Alice Clarke, is well outside the 
acceptable norm. For all her sympathetic moments, she is an adulteress and her 
passions have led to Guido’s death at the hands of Don Sago. Her quick arraignment 
and condemnation are, based on the stereotype she personifies, just and right. 
However, as Morse Allen so ambiguously points out, the attitude expressed “toward 
the bar” in Marston’s plays “is interesting (109),” and it is the legal hypocrisy and 
the disruption of justice in the case of the insatiate Isabella that makes this play a 
perfect vehicle for a cultural criticism of adultery law.
There are two Dukes in The Insatiate Countess. The first, Duke Amago of 
Venice, is connected to the virtuous wives’ sub-plot. The second, Duke Medina of 
Pavia, tries the Countess. Like the main plot and sub-plot themselves, these Dukes 
stand juxtaposed. Both are personifications of law in the play, but they represent 
different styles of governing and justice. The first to appear onstage is Duke Amago 
who defines what justice should be and highlights the importance of objectivity and 
equitable judgment:
Justice that makes princes like the gods,
Draws us unto the senate,
That with unpartial balance we may poise
The crimes and innocence of the offenders.
Our presence can chase bribery from laws:
He best can judge that hears himself the cause. (IV.i. 1 -6)
35 That he, as an adulterer, is also “chaste wedlock’s hate” is conveniently ignored.
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This is the jurisprudential foundation for the play, and the ensuing trial scenes are 
meant to be filtered through the definition of “unpartial balance” that Amago gives to 
his senators. It is the framework within which the law, and the rulers who control 
that law, exist. Importantly, it only works to undermine the first trial scene of play, 
in which Duke Medina handles the Countess’ case. Thus, it deconstructs the violent 
backlash born out of the prevalent double-standard that exists against adulteresses as 
a whole, and questions the validity of the stereotypes into which the Countess is so 
easily slotted by the legal system. Medina is self-consciously neither equitable nor 
just, and a gendered legal double-standard runs rampant in his court.
Isabella intends to evade punishment by using “the marker of power in 
patriarchal society - wealth - to buy off both men . . . and their laws (Senapati 
139).” She is, however, unsuccessful, and is brought before the court to pay for her
crimes:
Messenger. The countess comes, my lord, unto the death:
But so unwillingly, and unprepared,
That she is rather forced, thinking the sum 
She sent to you of twenty thousand pound
Would have assured her of life.
Medina. O Heavens!
Is she not weary yet of lust and life?
Had it been Croesus’ wealth, she should have died;
Her goods by law are all confiscate to us,
And die she shall: her lust
Would make a slaughter-house of Italy. (V.i.46-55)
36 Much like the upper-class men I discuss in chapter two, who pay for a Parliamentary bill to put 
aside their wives and remarry, thus avoiding charges of adultery or bigamy.
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Medina suggests that it is not the Countess’ adultery which leads to her arraignment, 
but the murder that has sprung from that adultery. Indeed, the murderer, Don Sago, 
stands before the Duke on trial as well, before Isabella enters the court. However, 
although the Duke swears he will see justice done, even to his “father’s daughter 
(V.i.lll),” he gives Don Sago, a confessed killer, a “free pardon . . . / On this thy 
true and noble penitence,” and reinstates him as colonel of the horse (V.i.29-30), 
because he assumes Sago has been bewitched by Isabella, “the serpent’s jaws, I That
vild adulteress, whose sorceries / Doth draw chaste men into incontinence, / whose 
tongue flows over with harmful eloquence (V.i. 10-3).” In fact, Isabella only tells 
Don Sago to revenge her after he begs her for twenty-one lines to set him a task in 
which he can violently prove his love to her (IV.ii. 174-202).
Duke Medina does not consider this, however, and the stereotype of the 
dangerous, lascivious woman is enough to blind him; thus he frees a confessed 
murderer before beheading Isabella onstage for her lust. As Senapati points out, 
“[t]he disparity is too grotesque to be without irony (137),” and it completely 
ruptures any faith the audience might have in the justice Medina is supposed to 
represent. Justice is not served in his court - a confessed murderer walks free - and 
his condemnation of Isabella, disguised as the impartial working of the law, reveals 
that it is not justice but gender, and the stereotyping of women as devils, against
which law raises its double-standard. Furthermore, what is most notable about
Isabella’s entrance to the court is her absolute guilt. Don Sago was given the chance 
to repent and mend his ways (V.i. 16-22); Isabella’s death sentence is announced, by 
a messenger no less, before she even appears.
During her hearing, the Countess is unrepentant until her husband, Roberto, 
dressed in Friar’s clothing, reveals himself to her. As I have already argued,
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Isabella’s verbosity during her trial acts as a strong counter-point against the 
patriarchal institution she faces. She constantly refuses to give Medina’s court the
reverence the law deserves. When she enters and is told that she is in “the castle
green” she declares “There should be dancing on a green I think (V.i.67-8),” 
belittling the power the location should hold for her. When the Cardinal responds 
“Madam: to you none other than your dance of death,” she tells him: “Good my 
Lord Cardinal do not thunder thus, / I sent today to my physician, / And as he says he 
finds no sign of death (V.i.69-72).” She mocks the power of the law, refusing to 
accept it as an harbinger of doom. She refuses “to be dictated to, shamed, or 
frightened by patriarchal representatives who break the same rules but blame her 
only for the transgressions (Senepati 137),” thus highlighting the hypocrisy of the 
men (and the system) before whom she stands.
When she turns to the Duke and asks: “May we not be reprieved (V.i. 104),” 
the audience is reminded of the clemency the Duke showed Don Sago only moments 
before. His reply in this case, however, is quite different: “Mine honour’s passed, 
you may not (V.i. 105),” and when he immediately commands, “Up to the scaffold 
with her, ’tis late (V.i. 125),” she angrily responds: “Better late than never my good 
lord, you think: / You use square dealing, Medina’s mighty duke: / Tyrant of France, 
sent hither by the devil (V.i. 126-8).” She thus exposes the legal double-standard and 
biased, partial rulings of which Medina is guilty, openly accusing him of inequity.
The Duke himself seems somewhat uneasy about his decision. After Isabella 
is beheaded he remarks: “None here, I hope, can tax us of injustice: / She died 
deservedly, and may like fate I Attend all women so insatiate (V.ii.228-31).” The 
Duke can only defend his ruling by slipping into the patriarchal discourse that 
transformed Isabella into a stereotype, the “penchant for the necessary subjection of
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women (Senapati 136),” and the strong belief that female sexual transgression is 
demonic and far outweighs the same transgressions on the part of men.
This final word on the Countess, and potentially the female legal subject 
caught up in matters of adultery as well, explains the significant absence of legal 
advice in Dodderidge’s Lawes Resoultions for women accused of adultery. As I 
suggest in this chapter’s introduction, and as the evidence in Alice Clarke’s and the 
Countess’ case shows, there is no recourse to law for women so accused. They stand 
guilty before the patriarchal system - like Isabella who stands before the united front 
of male camaraderie at her trial - which reduces them to dangerous temptresses and 
unredeemable stereotypes. The Countess’ trial scene suggests that such women will 
be given no legal quarter; even if they are redeemed in Heaven, in society they never 
will be. Little use, then, for a section in a legal manual on how to defend accused
women in adultery cases.
The reason the Countess (and, Medina’s comment implies, all women) is so 
highly constrained in her legal subjecthood comes from the veiy stereotype she 
embodies, and the fears that female sexuality can produce in the patriarchal status 
quo. The Countess’ story touches on a number of the social views I raise in section 
II of this chapter. She represents uncontrollable female desire, and despite her 
complexity, is more often than not described by the men around her in damning 
generic terms that apply to all womankind; she is linked, implicitly like all women, 
to the Eve myth, and the way in which the men continually dehumanise her draws 
attention to masculine anxiety about being unmanned in the face of her 
transgressions. Their fears are fueled by social dictates which define male strength 
and honour, in part, by the power men hold over women and the construction of 
women’s bodies as men’s possessions. Finally, her trial reinforces what I argue in
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the early pail of this chapter, that women accused of adultery can in no way defend 
themselves - her death sentence is passed by a messenger before she arrives at court.
Although the Countess, unlike Alice Clarke, does not seem to have
sympathetic or clear motives for her actions, and therefore in a Jacobean framework 
deserves the charges brought against her, if not her punishment, Marston’s play is a 
very useful aid in defining the female legal subject. Specifically, through the way in 
which those in a position to exert power, the men of the play, use rhetoric that 
vilifies all women when they condemn the Countess. The Countess’ and Alice 
Clarke’s cases show that women charged with adultery cannot escape the masculine 
assumption that women are simply “like that” (the title of the play decrees that the 
Countess is morally doomed from the outset). There is no room in Alice Clarke’s 
case for the individual experiences that led up to her arraignment because she is 
represented as fulfilling the generalised expectations men have of female stereotypes. 
As in the Alice Clarke case, tirades against the Countess are attacks on all women 
because she meets the masculine preconception that all women cannot be trusted and 
must be jealously guarded.
These stereotypes show how social pressures exerted themselves on the 
otherwise egalitarian adultery law, placing women in strictly encoded roles if they 
did commit adultery, thus denying them motives, complexity and case history. 
However, both these works, despite being written in two very different genres, reveal 
how the stereotype is constructed. Goodcole’s assessment of Alice Clarke denies the
case history that can be gleaned from her confessions to him, and the fracture of the 
female subject in his pamphlet (we can also read her as a very unhappy woman who
is the victim of a lascivious master, denied the man she loves and married off
arbitrarily) is most likely unintentional.
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Marston’s Countess’ complexity, however, is deliberate and exposes the 
artificiality of the stereotype in which the men and the legal system categorise her. 
Thus Marston’s play suggests that the stereotyping of women (so evident in Alice 
Clarke’s case) is both a ludicrous fantasy and women’s ultimate persecutor in 
adultery trials. Unable to escape the shadow of the stereotype, the female legal 
subject in matters of adultery is doomed to guilt and association with all sins, 
particularly murder. Significantly, no hardship falls to the men who are the 
Countess’ co-conspirators and lovers (or the master who impregnates and then 
discards Alice Clarke). In the Countess’ trial scene they stand united, condemning
her.
Given this representation of women, the feminine state-of-affairs seems 
bleak. There is, however, another female stereotype at work in Marston’s play: that 
of the virtuous, chaste wife. Like the Countess, these women break down 
expectations of what their behaviour should be according to their stereotype, 
challenging ideas about female chastity and the construction of women as silent and 
submissive. As Wiggins points out, “[i]t is especially important that all the female 
characters are explicitly shown to be interested in sex (xiii),” and yet at the same 
time not all of them “would support the generalizations that are made about female 
depravity (xii).” Thais and Abigail are virtuous; when Thais warns Abigail “Sister, 
see you be constant now (I.i.286),” Abigail hotly responds: “Why, dost think I’ll 
make my husband a cuckold (I.i.287).” However, they are virtuous wives with a 
twist. In many ways they are “Truth telling a lie, / Virtue a bawd (II.i.87-8),” and 
ironically only in this way are they able to maintain their chastity. In doing so, they, 
like the Countess, create cracks in hierarchical constructs and implicitly demand that 
the social construction of women be renegotiated - redefined - and suggest that
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women’s relationship to their bodies and their husbands can exist in a different form 
than the extant dominant discourse of adultery laws would allow.
While it is true that, “[w]hen Marston deals with two wives employing the 
bed-trick in the comic subplot of The Insatiate Countess ... he is less concerned 
with exploring the issues the convention raises than with exploiting the possibilities 
for comic satire (Desens 71),” it is also apparent that the united front Thais and 
Abigail form to perform the bed-switch is a female foil to the united male front in the 
Countess plot, and the way these women use the law “privately” contrasts with the 
open, public, legal space that the men in the Countess’ plot are able to occupy.
The husbands who wrongly believe they have cuckolded one another parody 
the masculine assumptions about women so evident in the main plot. This parody is 
driven to extremes because the husbands in the sub-plot are complete fools - a 
charge which could easily be laid on the men who get involved with the Countess 
thinking she will be faithful and then being surprised when she is not (she is, after 
all, the insatiate Countess). The plot’s action begins when the foolish husbands, the 
sworn enemies Claridiana and Rogero, make the mistake of marrying the best friends 
Abigail and Thais, and separately plan to cuckold one another to get revenge for past 
grievances.
On their wedding day, Claridiana vows he will “Strumpet [Rogero’s] wife, 
branch my false seeming friend, / And make him foster what my hate begot, / A 
bastard, that when age and sickness seize him, / Shall be a cor’sive to his griping 
heart (I.i.453-6).”37 Rogero, meanwhile, sets his sights on Abigail, Claridiana’s 
wife, and tells her rather unconvincingly that “It is your love, and not the odious 
wish / Of my revenge, in styling him a cuckold, / Makes me presume thus far
37 Original text reads “his.”
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(I.i.410-12).” The plot is easily discovered by the women, who exchange the letters 
they have received from one another’s husbands (II.ii.1-40).
This alone complicates their subjective position as chastity and virtue 
personified. Truly virtuous women would not have accepted love letters from 
another woman’s husband. Thais and Abigail, however, are not strictly bound to the 
stereotype they are meant to embody; they are flirtatious, they banter with each 
other’s husbands at the Countess’ wedding masque and they make bawdy jokes. 
They even go so far as to make arrangements to meet the men privately (in jest, most 
likely, given that they are quick to bring their respective husbands’ overtures to each 
other’s attention [Il.i. 101-146]).
They are highly sexualised women, and are aware of the role the men play in 
sexual politics. When Abigail reads her husband’s overly-passionate and verbose 
letter to Thais, she declares: “Three such words will turn any honest woman in the 
world whore: for a woman is never won till she know not what to answer; and 
beshrew me if I understand any of these (II.ii.24-7).” Like the Countess, they refuse 
to let sexual fault lie with women alone and are quick to point out the role that men 
play in seduction. These lapses in character make the women worthy adversaries for
the husbands who would undo them.
The wives, as Abigail asserts, take the law into their own hands to save their 
honour, perhaps because they know they will not be successful if they bring a plea 
against their husbands in court (II.ii.35), and they successfully manage a bed-switch 
so that the husbands unknowingly sleep with their own wives (II.iii.70-121).38 The
38 Desens argues that bed-switch plots play an important role in reconstructing early-modern 
perceptions of women. Like the highly sexual, virtuous wives in Marston’s play, a discovered bed- 
switch unites the man’s fantasy of the idealised woman he would have in secret with the sexual 
woman in the wife (71). Both suggest that wives can be chaste and virtuous but, importantly, also 
sexual people.
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language the women use to arrange the details of their plan is important in their
deconstruction of the chaste wife.
Like their flirtations and jokes, their words are highly sexualised and the 
arrangements for the men’s “entry” into the women’s “chambers” is a drawn-out 
double entendre of the sexual act itself. Thais asks “But you mean they shall come 
in at the back-doors,” to which Abigail replies: “Who, our husbands? Nay, and they 
come not in at the fore-doors, there will be no pleasure in’t. But we two will climb 
over our garden-pales, and come in that way (II.ii.68-71).” The women not only take 
control of the situation in which they find themselves, but the sexual act they will 
perform with their husbands as well.
They will “climb over” their “garden-pales,” which Scarr explains is “a 
euphemism for their husband’s penises, which the wives, by climbing over, will 
straddle (Scarr 91),” to “come in that way.” The wives thus assert their physical 
primacy over the men and ensure that they will enjoy themselves as well. In this 
way, they doubly undo their husbands; “[i]f sex, like marriage, is based on power, 
then the notion of the wives atop their husbands in a physical sense enacts their 
intellectual and moral superiority (Scarr 92).” Therefore these wives, who do 
embody virtuous women and act as a foil to the Countess’ lust, do not embrace the 
stereotypical traits of female virtue - they are not submissive, subordinate, meek or 
silent - either in bed or without, and this adds complexity and discord to the virtuous 
wife stereotype.
Like their positions in the sex act, the women turn power relations upside 
down. When Rogero sets his plan in motion to sleep with Abigail and tells Thais to 
“get [his] breakfast ready,” informing her that he has to go “into the country to a
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farm” and thinks he “Shall not come home tonight (ILiii. 109-112),”39 she angrily 
says after his departure:
So, there’s one fool shipped away: are your cross-points discovered? 
Get your breakfast ready! By this light, I’ll tie you to hard fare; I 
have been too sparing of that you prodigally offer voluntary to 
another. Well, you shall be a tame fool hereafter.
The finest sleight is when we first defraud;
Husband, tonight ’tis I must lie abroad. (Il.ii.l 15-21)
She soundly denounces him and makes reference to how she will “tame” him by 
taking the position of power in the relationship. As Desens correctly surmises, “[t]he 
two wives see this bed-trick as a future means of controlling their husbands (72).” 
The wives, like the Countess, control their bodies, even at the expense of then- 
husband’s power. The only difference lies in the fact that the wives use that control 
to ensure that only their husbands have access to them.
The deceit they use against their husbands, a trait reviled in the dominant 
discourse (wives are not to plot behind their husbands backs), is justifiable in their 
situation. When Lady Lentulus comments, “O you’re a couple of trusty wenches, to 
deceive your husbands thus,” Abigail pragmatically replies: “If we had not deceived 
them thus, we had been trussed wenches (IV.iv.7-10).” The men, however, think 
that they have been cuckolded because they are arrested “in their shirts and night­
gowns (IILi.direction)” in each other’s houses for a murder they did not commit 
(IILi. 125-7). At this point, the sub-plot takes a distinctly comic turn, revealing the 
extent to which male anxiety can obscure all other social concerns.
39 Original text reads “my.”
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Both men freely admit to committing murder, because, as Claridiana says, 
“I’ll confess anything since I am made a fool by a knave. I’ll be hanged like an 
innocent, that’s flat,” and Rogero concurs, “I’ll not see my shame. Hemp instead of 
a quacksalver, you shall put out mine eyes, and my head shall be bought to make 
ink-horns of (IILii. 149-53).” For the husbands, the shame of cuckoldry is more 
horrible than death. Thais and Abigail, however, know the foolhardiness of the 
men’s stance - they know that they, too, were in each other’s houses the night the 
men fulfilled their secret trysts, and they mock the absurdity of their husbands’ 
positions. Thais tells Abigail, “Our husbands will be hanged, because they think 
themselves cuckolds,” to which Abigail responds, “If all true cuckolds were of that 
mind, the hangman would be the richest occupation, and more wealthy widows, than 
there be younger brothers to marry them (IV.iv.l 1-5).” Despite their wry assessment 
of the situation, the wives set out to save Claridiana and Rogero from certain death.
Thais and Abigail are finally able to confront them at their arraignment 
before Duke Amago of Venice - a trial held more for the Duke’s entertainment than 
the men’s sentencing, because he knows that his nephew, the alleged murder victim, 
is alive and well, and that Claridiana and Rogero had nothing to do with his injuries 
(IV.i.15-8). The men, however, refuse to believe that their wives are innocent, and 
openly accuse them of adultery. Claridiana rails to the Duke:
to our quondam wives, that makes us cry our vowels in red capital 
letters, I O U are cuckolds: O may bastard-bearing with the pangs of 
childbirth be doubled to ’em: may they have ever twins and be three 
weeks in travail between, may they be so rivelled with painting by 
that time they are thirty that it may be held a work of condign merit 
but to look upon ’em, may they live to ride in triumph in a dung-cart
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and be crowned with all the odious ceremonies belonging to’t: may 
the cucking-stool be their recreation, and a dungeon their dying 
chamber: may they have nine lives like a cat, to endure this and 
more: may they be burnt for witches of a sudden: and lastly, may the 
opinion of philosophers prove true, that women have no souls. 
(V.ii.24-37)
When Abigail tells Rogero she is pregnant, he responds: “A bastard, a bastard, a 
bastard! I might have lived like a gentleman, and now I must die like a hanger on 
(V.ii.51-2).” Duke Amago becomes exasperated with Claridiana and Rogero’s 
persistent accusations, and when he passes sentence on the men their reactions are as 
dogged as ever:
Duke. In God’s name then, on to the death with them;
For the poor widows that you leave behind,
Though by the law their goods are all confiscate,
Yet we’ll be their good lord, and give ’em them.
Clari. Oh hell of hells. Why did not we hire some villain to
fire our houses?
Rog. I thought not of that, my mind was altogether of the 
gallows. (V.ii.92-9)
The men are removed from the court, and the wives kneel and beg the Duke’s 
pardon, asking him to recall their husbands so they can be proved innocent; “the 
comic knitting up,” of which, the women attest, “Will move your spleen into the 
proper use / Of mirth, your natural inclination (V.ii. 120-2).” This is a strong visual 
echo from Measure for Measure, first performed in 1604, and would perhaps have
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awakened in Marston’s audience memories of Mariana and Isabella kneeling before 
Duke Vincentio, begging clemency for Angelo’s life (V.i.422-446).
Associating Thais and Abigail with Mariana and Isabella is an important 
representation - the former are very chaste women who do not, like the wives in 
Marston’s play, overstep the boundaries of the “good woman” stereotype. Thus this 
scene can be read as either a parody of the sort of virtuous words and actions that 
Mariana and Isabella employ, or as a way of evoking sympathy for Thais and 
Abigail, implying that like Mariana and Isabella, these virtuous wives of Venice are 
good, chaste women despite their lapses into sexual language, cunning self-devised 
plots and bawdy puns. Perhaps, the scene suggests, women can be chaste and 
virtuous without having to be the stereotype of a submissive, meek and weak
woman.
The Duke recalls the men, to which summons Claridiana queries: “Now 
what other troubled news, that we must back thus? Has any Senator begged my 
pardon, upon my wife’s prostitution to him (V.ii. 133-5)?” When the Duke tells them 
that their wives are innocent Claridiana’s response is driven by the underlying 
assumption that all women, even his wife, are incapable of chastity: “Who? My 
wife? Chaste? Has your grace your sense? / I’ll sooner believe a conjurer may say 
his prayers with zeal, than her honesty (V.ii. 150-2).” Significantly, the wives do not 
openly argue their innocence, instead they silently give their husbands the letters 
they have received, which convince the men that the women are not adulteresses 
(V.ii.159-97).40
40 The husbands’ abrupt forgiveness of their wives is somewhat confusing here - the letters would 
only confirm that the wives have been speaking amorously (or at least receiving amorous letters) with 
a man outside wedlock, thus confirming adultery. This scene, however, is attributed by Melchiori to 
the “hack” writer responsible for the play’s third layer of production, and it may be because of this 
that its conclusion is confusingly hasty.
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Despite their wives’ innocence, however, the final speeches given by Rogero 
and Claridiana continue to focus on cuckoldry and the evils of women, perhaps in an 
attempt to justify their mislaid suspicions by reminding the audience of the horrors 
associated with cuckoldry and the female stereotype so evident in the main plot. The 
men’s speeches suggest that they reached the conclusions they did about their wives 
because of the extant social tropes that paint all women as wavering and weak. That 
they have painted innocent women with this brush, demonstrates the danger the “evil 
woman” stereotype holds for all women, and the extent to which that stereotype 
colours female subjecthood.
Again, however, the stereotype is undermined by the interactions in this trial 
scene. I would suggest that the echo of Measure for Measure in this play is meant to 
cast the wives firmly in the “virtuous wife” paradigm - they are chaste and their 
husbands are made to seem fools. Thus, Claridiana and Rogero’s closing speeches, 
instead of teaching an important moral and social message about the potential evils 
of women or their own mistakes, only undermine the ludicrousness of the evil 
woman stereotype on which they and the law in the Countess’ case so heavily rely. 
They are not cuckolds, but they are fools.
Rogero tells the audience:
What is a cuckold learn of me,
Few can tell his pedigree,
Nor his subtil nature conster,
Bom a man, but dies a monster.
Yet great antiquaries say,
They spring from our Methuselah,
Who after Noah’s flood was found,
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To have his crest with branches crowned.
God in Eden’s happy shade,
This same creature made:
Then to cut off all mistaking,
Cuckolds are of women’s making.
From whose snares, good Lord deliver us (V.ii.205-17),
firmly placing responsibility for sexual transgression with wayward woman, and 
citing Adam as the original cuckold because of Eve’s relationship with the serpent. 
Claridiana agrees with him, and gives the play’s final speech about a husband’s need 
to be jealous, which I discussed earlier in this section.
Their words are made absurd by the fact that their wives have not cuckolded 
them at all, and the plots to undo the women’s and each other’s honour were hatched 
by the men themselves. There is a clear implication in these later speeches that men 
will never accept that women can be honest; that they will always cast their own 
foibles onto the “weaker sex” and use women as a scapegoat for their own dishonest 
actions. Claridiana and Rogero’s final speeches highlight the grip that the “evil 
woman” stereotype has on women (and, importantly, men) in matters of adultery, 
even though that stereotype does not apply to the majority of the women in the play,
who are chaste.
Overall, the bed-switch sub-plot expands on the themes of the main action. It 
is concerned with the effects of adultery on the man, showing particular care to 
patrilineal succession and social position. The husbands would rather die than live 
out their lives as cuckolds. Their extreme position, while the source of much 
humour in the play, acknowledges the very real masculine fear which would have 
existed in an early-modern audience about the wife’s role in maintaining the family
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bloodline, the wife’s power to adulterate that bloodline, and the husband’s 
vulnerability because he simply cannot know that his children are his.
Sworn enemies at the beginning of the play, by the end Claridiana and 
Rogero exhibit male camaraderie in the face of their fears (“why did not we”) and the 
trick their wives have played on them. They invoke the stereotypical lascivious 
woman who is responsible for all mens’ downfalls in order to strengthen their 
positions as wronged husbands. When the wives speak, the husbands ignore them, 
and it is only their own letters that convince the men that Thais and Abigail are 
innocent, implying that only a husband’s testimony can save a woman accused of 
adultery.
The sub-plot reveals how ineffectual women’s voices are to erase the fears 
engendered by masculine anxiety. It also suggests that the only effective way for a 
woman to avoid adultery charges is to use private, secret manoeuvres to avoid 
adultery in the first place. The virtuous wives cannot openly use the law to protect 
their honour, but must first use subterfuge and counter-plots, like a sympathetic 
tragic-revenger, against their husbands to save themselves, and later respectful words 
on bended knee when they do enter the public sphere of the courtroom.
IIIC. CONCLUSION: THE ADULTEROUS WOMAN
These texts illustrate how women’s experiences and voices are publicly 
erased by a system that generalises and dehumanises them in order to protect the 
status quo. Although the Countess speaks extensively throughout her trial, her 
arguments are ignored by the men in power; although the wives speak openly and 
bawdily throughout the play, finally they approach the Duke on bended knees to 
plead for their husbands’ lives; and Alice Clarke’s confessions are interpreted for the
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reader by Goodcole so that her testimony is effectively over-written by the 
stereotype that constrains her. While the Countess and Alice Clarke did commit 
adultery, and as such are rightly punished at law within the early-modern legal 
system, the extent of Alice Clarke’s punishment, given her case history, shows the 
extremes to which the social norms that are defined by masculine anxiety affected a 
supposedly “objective” application of the adultery law, despite the pressures from 
reformers to make men equally accountable.
When the Countess is unable to bribe the Duke, a distinctly gendered division 
is made between the way she can interact with law and the way both Don Sago and 
her empirical male counterparts can. As I discuss in the general introduction to this 
thesis, law is created and sustained to support, among other things, social power 
relations. It does so by defending what the law-makers believe to be the foundations 
of traditional social order, such as the family and patrilinear inheritance, at the 
expense of the individual.
Within the early-modern ideology that puts women in a subordinate position 
but at the same time defines masculine honour, in many ways, through a wife’s 
fidelity, law dictates that in matters of adultery, the female legal subject is closely 
bound by her construction as a receptacle and a conduit through which men can 
ensure future generations. In this way, wives are often not tried as individuals, but as 
generic home-wreckers because female infidelity has the power to undo traditional 
social institutions in ways that male infidelity does not. This is, of course, a cultural 
construction that relies heavily on stereotypes. The power wives have to undo the 
family and the commonwealth is a power given to them by an ideology that supports 
a patrilinear economic system and thus labels female agency and sexuality as evil. 
By throwing into doubt the cultural construction of women, and the evils associated
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with female sexuality, the representations I discuss in this section all challenge the 
assumption that law works as an objective, extra-human discourse that is in some 
way a “natural” guardian of traits inherent in men and women.
The men in the Alice Clarke and Countess cases do not suffer at law. The
women do because they are part of a social system that makes their transgressions 
political rather than personal. The two women in Marston’s sub-plot are falsely 
accused of adultery by their husbands and the way they cope with those accusations 
shows a distinct difference between the way men and women are able to use the law 
to their advantage. Simply put, women linked to adultery, even those who are 
innocent, cannot successfully enter the public arena of the courtroom to argue their 
case, but must work privately and respectfully if they want to clear their names. The 
deconstruction of the stereotypes that sustain this legal system in Marston’s play 
only helps to throw into question whether or not such a system is valid or right. As 
the Alice Clarke case proves, the law will adhere to stereotypes in order to justify the 
culture it both works to sustain and is created by.
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IV. GENDER, ADULTERY LAW, AND REPRESENTATIONS OF THE FEMALE LEGAL 
SUBJECT IN EARLY-MODERN ENGLAND
In the third section of this chapter, I have shown that literary representations 
of the female legal subject in matters of adultery suggest that for women, whether 
innocent or guilty, the prospect of a sympathetic verdict is unlikely. Interpretations 
of the seventh commandment vary between writers, but most agree that it refers to 
“uncleanliness,” which can take the form of thoughts or physical acts.41 Edward 
Elton, writing in 1625, asserted that the law commands “thou shalt not thinke, will, 
speake, or doe any thing whereby thine owne chastitie, or the chastitie of another or 
others may be hurt or hindered (249),” and John Brinsley, in 1637, explained that the
seventh commandment forbids
[n]ot onely those monstrous kindes of uncleannesse, which ought not 
to bee named amongst Christians, as fornication, adultery, incest, 
rape, Sodomy, and the like; which the veiy light of nature condemns;
but even,
1. All wantonnesse alonely, or with others ...
2. Noctumall pollutions, coming of excesse ...
3. Voluptuous abuse of the marriage bed. (85)
Adultery signifies any number of other “unclean” actions, and in the early-modern 
period is not confined solely to extra-marital sex, as Mariam’s dilemma in the 
divorce chapter suggests.
The works analysed in this chapter reveal that often simply being a woman is
enough to link innocent people to lasciviousness, deviousness and untrustworthiness.
41 Although all writers of the period agree that adultery is a mortal sin, there are differing opinions as 
to what constitutes adulterous behaviour. The definition of adultery in the early-modern period was 
much more changeable than it is today, and could encompass all acts of lust and unruly behaviour, 
including overeating, rude songs and speech, whorehouses, idleness, immodest apparel, etc. See for 
example: Ainsworth P2V; Bullinger A lr; S. Crooke 114-116; Dering A4r v; Dod and Cleaver, Treatise 
52v-53r; Downame I3v-I7r; M. Perkins 31; and Polanus 58-60.
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Frank Whigham, in Seizures of the Will, argues that “[pjlays about powerful or 
sexually uncontrolled women may sometimes address interdicted matters of class or 
kinship authority (15),” as those social concerns manifest themselves through 
varying degrees of masculine anxiety. Fears about female sexual power stem from, 
as I argue in the earlier sections of this chapter, fears about patrilineal succession. In 
short, “the direct connection between romantic marriage and sexual jealousy (Belsey, 
Shakespeare 104)” is unavoidable in a system that paints women as inherently 
lascivious and places on them the responsibility of pure issue.
Thus, the personal relationships on trial in the courtrooms of these works “are 
never, except in appearance, individual-to-individual relationships, and . . . the truth 
of the interaction is never entirely contained in the interaction (Whigham 16).” What 
is really on trial is the power that men project onto women by placing them at the 
centre of patrilineal succession and relying on a wife’s chastity to uphold the public 
name and honour associated with patriarchal family structures. The women in these 
works are confined by gender boundaries which “[i]n early seventeenth-century 
England . . . were as fundamental to the ordering of everyday life as those dictated by 
class (Mendelson 1).” Such gender boundaries define women as adulteresses and 
create a situation in which any self-will on their part can be interpreted in sexually
deviant terms.
As the anonymous author of Asylum Veneris writes, “[i]f Women have 
immodest lookes, it will availe them little for avoiding the worlds censure, to have 
honest hearts (38).” By defining the legally acceptable female norm as chastity and 
the necessary absence of female sexuality, when sexuality is present it questions the 
social validity of the legal subject. Furthermore, active female sexuality deconstructs
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what a man is in relation to the passive female receptacle, thus suggesting that the 
hierarchy of wifely subordinance is nothing more than a constructed fantasy.
Marston’s play emphasises the artificiality of the constructed “good” and 
“bad” woman by constantly revealing contradictions and tensions within those 
subjects. The Countess is a “bad” woman, but her character is not limited to the 
broadly-painted strokes of caricature - she has moments of doubt, she can be 
sympathetic and the men who lambast her are, for the most part, hypocrites. The 
wives are “good” women - they keep their bodies for their husbands’ use alone and 
successfully manage to remain chaste despite masculine attempts on their bed­
chambers - they are also, however, bawdy flirts who enjoy the sexual act as much as 
men do, and do not hesitate to take power from their husbands in order to protect
themselves.
Sexualising the “good” wives is an important component of the 
deconstruction that occurs in this play; “in making its overtly good women sexual 
creatures too, the play undermines the assumed distinction between good and evil 
female behaviour on which [the Countess’] condemnation rests (Wiggins xiii).”42 
Thus the audience is forced to question the validity of the stereotypes that condemn 
women for their sexuality or would constrain them to an impossibly one-dimensional 
lived experience. As with Cary’s Mariam, the audience is confronted by women 
who fulfill a stereotype but also broaden the perception of that stereotype; who 
represent the very multi-dimensionality that divorce and adultery laws try to reduce 
and contain in the female legal subject.
Law works in this way because if a society constructs women “as an opaque, 
unreliable body of signs requiring interpretive regulation, if she is by the same
42 Original text reads “her.”
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construction already ‘known’ as adulterous (Breitenberg 186),” then that 
construction must be upheld at all costs. If it is not, it implies that the social 
structure (created by the patriarchy) is at fault for creating false signifiers in the first 
place. Because [pjatriarchal discourse ... is heterogenously [sic] composed, 
unevenly imposed and subject to conflicts with the lived reality of the oppressed 
subject (Loomba 94. My addition), it is necessary for legal interpretation to 
constrain the lived reality of female subjects by homogenously adhering to verdicts 
which support precedents and extant social constructs. The female legal subject in 
matters of adultery is often defined by verdicts which interpret her as dangerously 
guilty because women’s precedent is Eve.
The early-modern audience would have understood “[a]ctive female sexuality 
[as] not merely a breach of decorum but also a flagrant breach of the public and 
political order (Loomba 107. My addition),” for reasons such as succession, fear of 
cuckoldry, the centrality of women’s sexuality to a family’s honour, and fear of 
perceived male weakness. It is thus female sexuality, in general, and all the dangers 
the status quo associates with that sexuality, that is on trial in the works of this 
section; a trial born out of “an a priori fear of disempowerment and loss of identity 
that derives from two forms of male dependence - erotic and matrimonial - on 
women (Breitenberg 194).” Thus, “women are thwarted, not merely within the 
family, but ... by public authority, by all the institutions of feudal and mercantile 
patriarchy; their transgression evokes a political disarray, even a chaos of cosmic 
proportions (Loomba 106).” These literary works show how “deep structural and 
ideological tensions in society are conveniently located and addressed in the figure 
of the unruly or disobedient woman (Breitenberg 23),” and how the law works to
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sustain those tensions by making woman the primary transgressor in the dominant
discourse.
If adultery exists at all, it challenges assumptions that the hierarchy is 
“natural,” and the whole social structure is then called into question. If a woman 
fulfills her role as a chaste wife, she fulfills her pre-subscribed “natural” role 
according to the social and religious theory which create the social hierarchy. If a 
woman is adulterous, she fulfills the evil, antisocial role also paradoxically “natural” 
to her. In this binary system of female stereotypes, “a wife’s chastity functioned to 
secure and preserve actual economic interests (patrilineal inheritance and the 
avoidance of bastardy), but... it also functioned symbolically as a more generalized 
guarantee of social order and cohesion (Breitenberg 24),” as well as the latent 
potential women had to destroy that social order.
What makes Marston’s play so important is that the chaste wives upset the 
hierarchical structure as well. They, like Salome and Doris can be seen as 
representations of the real-life women who were also playing with the hierarchical 
structure by usurping traditionally masculine power-relations (like the position the 
wives take in bed) and claiming for themselves a space in which they can control 
their relationships. They thus challenge the patriarchal assumption that women’s 
uncontrolled sexuality is, “by definition an anarchic force constantly besieging the 
gates of collective order and individual self-control (Breitenberg 1);” that it 
challenges the very root of patriarchal assumptions about “natural” hierarchies and 
social structures, while at the same time it confirms what the patriarchy most fears: 
loss of power.
Social constructs that define women as the cause of male weakness, ensure
that women “need to be kept safely in a position of subservience, or rather, men for
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their own safety need to keep them in this position (Sinclair 58).” One of the ways 
women are kept subservient is through the legal system. The representations of the 
female legal subject and adultery in the works discussed in section three of this 
chapter clarify how systems of containment engendered by the masculine anxieties 
highlighted in section two, manifest themselves in the courtroom to women’s 
detriment. Thus, an otherwise egalitarian law is impacted upon by social constructs 
in ways which make it, in interpretive practice, prejudiced in the interests of men.
Alice Clarke burns for a murder she swears she did not commit because she is a
confessed adulteress; Duke Medina is happy to let a confessed murderer walk free 
whereas the Countess dies for her lust; the virtuous wives can only work privately 
and later, through Duke Amago and their husbands’ own letters to clear their and
their husbands’ names. Marston’s play, with its highly unstable female subjects, 
attacks the stereotypes that deny the female legal subject, such as Alice Clarke, an 
audible public voice and justice in matters of adultery.
Conclusion, culture, identity and gender in selected Jacobean law 
AND LITERATURE
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This thesis has set out to explore the historical, cultural relationship between 
law and literature in the Jacobean period with specific reference to the female legal 
subject in matters of divorce and adultery. Specifically, it has placed these
discourses within their broader cultural framework in order to better understand how
law and literature work to construct the female legal subject, and what literary and 
legal representations of that subject reveal about early-modern female identity and 
gender construction.
A cultural criticism of the law accepts that law does not exist as an extra­
human, objective institution, but is rather a product of culturally-specific ideology 
and theology. It supports this stance by using other discourses, specifically 
literature, to illustrate how law is not a successful dominant discourse standing free 
from public opinion and effectively controlling social subjects. Literature, with its 
imagined realities and possibilities, reveals law’s artificiality, how law often fails to 
meet the needs of social subjects, or how it does not adequately reflect dominant
social or cultural values.
Literature reveals that law is a cultural construct, with specific, political 
purposes, and not a divine or natural sense of right or wrong inherent in all humans. 
Catherine Belsey argues that “[a]s a space of play, where some of the prohibitions of 
the symbolic Law are temporarily suspended, fiction can permit inconsistency 
without irritable reaching after resolution {Shakespeare 1).” In this way, literature 
illustrates how law works as an interpretive discourse and how that interpretation is 
controlled very much by the other discourses which surround it - specific to this 
period, discourses such as Christian theology, the notion of a natural social hierarchy 
and the role of the family in the Commonwealth. Literature suggests that law is not 
objective, equitable or just by proposing new ways of interpreting laws, or new
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systems of legal subjecthood, because the legal subject represented in literary texts is 
much more complex than the easily-codifiable subject law would prefer. However, 
literature, like law, does not stand in isolation to the discourses that surround it, and
it is necessary to understand law, and the role law plays in controlling social actions, 
and, certainly in this period with the close ties between the Inns of Court and 
playwrights, how law impacts on literature and vice versa, in order to understand 
how literature interacts with this most authoritative subject-forming social discourse.
Throughout this thesis, I have placed both law and literature with regard to 
divorce and adultery alongside discourses affecting them in order to better 
understand how they work to shape female identity and gender. This is necessary 
because, as the cultural criticism of law avers (and I agree), subjects are not formed 
by any one single social discourse, but are instead impacted upon and affected by 
multiple, sometimes contradictory, social beliefs, customs and attitudes. By placing 
these contradictions side by side, this thesis reveals why married women were 
supposed to have no legal rights under law in the early-modern period, but why there 
was also an unprecedented rise in litigation brought by women by the time of James 
I. Of course this makes any easy definition of the female legal subject difficult - the 
impacting discourses create a space where unstable identities can exist, and some 
women took advantage of that instability to carve a place for women in the 
courtrooms despite the legal mandate for coverture.
The law would have married women defined as femes coverts, women 
covered by, or absorbed into, their relationship with their husbands - the silent, 
chaste and submissive ideal female legal subject, who lives her life without public 
voice or action. Clearly, however, there are points of instability rupturing the 
dominant discourse. The belief that women were “naturally” subservient,
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“naturally” the property of their husbands, and were therefore, naturally, to be denied 
legal access which law attempted to protect led to a number of questions regarding 
women’s “nature,” her role in society and her right to legal recourse.
As I suggest in Chapter One, the points of crises in defining the female legal 
subject have to do with unstable social relationships: the relationship between law 
and the people, husband and wife, and authority and women. Jean Bodin argues in 
1606 that whatever “change or varietie of lawes soever in such diversitie of 
Commonweals, there was never law or custome that exempted the wife from the 
obeysance, and not onely from the obeysance, but also from the reverence that shee 
oweth unto her husband,” and furthermore that there is nothing “greater, better, or 
more necessarie for the preservation not of Families only, but of Commonweals also, 
than the honest obedience of wives towards their husbands (Six 19).” Despite 
Bodin’s strong distinction between women’s and men’s responsibilities to the 
Commonwealth, theories which were an integral part of the extant dominant 
discourse, the assumption that women had no right to law was successfully being 
challenged by the rising numbers of female litigants during the Jacobean period, and 
literary representations of the female legal subject illustrate how this could be - how 
the relationships referred to above are often the crux of any trials in which women
were involved.
Specifically at issue, in terms of divorce and adultery laws, is whether or not 
women legitimately have the right to define the parameters of their relationships in 
the legal realm; whether a wife is “naturally” subordinate to her husband; and 
women’s sexuality. While “in Renaissance legal tracts, the same underlying 
association of physical and mental weakness in the female sex can be detected as is 
in evidence in theology, medicine and ethics (Maclean, Renaissance 72),” in the
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literary representations of the female legal subject I discuss throughout this thesis, 
the suggestion is that, in terms of divorce and adultery, law fails to adequately reflect 
the needs and / or history of female litigants who were showing few signs of the 
weakness thought to be inherent to their sex. Even the virtuous wives in The 
Insatiate Countess overcome their predicament by canny plotting, and do not hesitate 
to mock their husbands’ foolishness. In fact, in the literary representations I discuss, 
it is this imaginary power relation between men and women that stands on trial, not 
just in the courtroom but throughout the plays. Thus, Cary and Marston, by 
redefining the female legal subject, offer radical texts that interrogate and pass 
judgment on the power dynamics so prevalent in the works of Terracae and Osborne, 
and also evident in Goodcole’s pamphlet.
Relationships of power are on trial in cases of divorce and adultery simply 
because, as I argue in the Introduction, law is created by those who hold power with 
the overt aim of maintaining status quo gendered power relations - if the family unit 
is the basic building-block of the Commonwealth, then the spousal unit is the mortar 
and sand that holds that block together. In the early-modern period this relationship 
was defined by patrilineal inheritance, the theological construction of women, the 
role Eve played in the Fall, public honour, masculine anxiety about the 
“unknowability” of women’s sexuality, and the fear of cuckoldry. All of these 
discourses impacted on both law and literature, and made the situation for the female 
legal subject difficult. Public opinion was swayed against her as soon as she set foot
outside the home.
The divorce chapter of this thesis demonstrates a power difference between 
male and female discourse. Law is affected by public opinion (as the texts on the 
Frances Howard divorce trial make clear), but only if that opinion matters within the
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socially-constructed power relations of the time. Women, who were excluded from 
law, did not have the social power to affect legal dictates or interpretations in the 
same way men could. In all accounts of the Frances Howard divorce trial, Howard’s 
voice is significantly absent. Given this discursive inequality, if women successfully 
use law against their husbands, the natural hierarchy is completely deconstructed.
As such, laws often work to the detriment of women in order to maintain an
otherwise artificial social construction as legitimate and right, or, as Peter Goodrich 
argues, to protect “the symbolic indicia, the signs or outward tokens of the legal 
institution’s spiritual past, its lineage and legitimacy as belonging to an order of 
judgment that somehow escapes the realm of secular rules or profane and political 
ends (6).” In other words, to give the social power structure the illusion of a
naturalism which does not, in fact, exist.
The frustrations that Salome, Mariam and Doris feel when faced with
women’s inferior legal position in matters of divorce support divorce reform and 
strongly suggest that women, like men, should be allowed to legally define their 
relationship to their spouse. When these women openly speak out against a wife’s 
legal and social subordination they challenge the “natural” subservience of women 
and imply, as do the number of women accessing the law during this period, that 
some women were trying to redefine the legal subject available to them in such a 
way as to give them more rights than those available to female subjects defined as 
femes coverts. The Frances Howard trial illustrates that while women could be 
successful at divorcing their husbands, male public opinion would condemn them for 
entering the legal sphere. Caiy’s play, written by a woman, and the Frances Howard 
accounts, written by men, show a distinctly gendered divide in perceptions about
women and divorce law.
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The majority of the female characters in Cary’s play denounce the law for 
giving women too little legal redress, whilst Terracae and Osborne, the male 
commentators on Frances Howard, denounce the law for giving her redress at all. At 
work in the juxtaposition of these texts are contrary male / female perspectives - the 
women feel constrained by laws which bind them irrevocably to men they hate, or 
that erase them from society after their husband divorces them; the men argue 
against female legal agency because that agency is a direct attack on the value 
system that places men in the seat of domestic power - it implies that the system 
which empowers the male of the species is not natural, but rather arbitrary, and does 
not provide for the needs of a multifaceted (and multi-gendered) society. The male 
response to female legal agency seen in the divorce chapter is fuelled by the 
masculine anxiety most apparent in cases pertaining to adultery which arise in 
Chapter Three.
In these latter cases, female sexuality stands on trial before the patriarchal 
legal system, and a woman’s identity is defined by her role as the familial child- 
bearer, thus reducing her to nothing more than the conduit through which patrilineal 
inheritance can securely pass. This reduction of the female legal subject to nothing 
more than a womb, and the male use that can be made of it, puts a husband’s word
well ahead of his wife’s in the law courts. The evidence in the Alice Clarke
pamphlet and The Insatiate Countess show that the law deals extremely harshly with 
women in adultery, whether they are innocent or guilty, because a woman’s sexual 
agency completely undermines the hierarchical myth that she becomes one with her 
husband after marriage, that she is “naturally” subservient, and that her husband 
alone has the right to her body.
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Adultery is complicated by patrilineal inheritance, which makes it an 
economic issue - by introducing an illegitimate heir into the household, the 
adulterous wife makes proper inheritance impossible - and by the stereotypes 
propagated by many discourses of the time that reduce women to weak-willed, 
malevolently-inclined potential homewreckers, or, alternatively, weak-willed, silent 
obedient virtuous wives. Marston’s play successfully challenges the stereotypes into 
which women are so easily categorised by representing unstable female subjects - 
women who are, and yet are not, part of the stereotypical paradigm the patriarchal 
discourse would have them embody.
In doing so, like Cary, Marston reveals the artificiality of the “bad” woman 
stereotype so prevalent in Goodcole’s pamphlet; he allows his female characters to 
redefine women’s sexuality as something which is not necessarily always linked to 
evil, adulterating lasciviousness; and he challenges the “justice” that immediately 
condemns all women simply because they are women. Essentially, adultery, like 
divorce, throws into question the ideological soundness of the early-modern social 
hierarchy, and assumptions about women’s “natural” role in the home. In cases of 
adultery and divorce the reconstructed, vocal, active female subject steps to the fore 
and denies the essentialised silent, chaste and submissive wife law would create, 
which is perhaps why such women are so quickly slotted into the “bad” woman 
paradigm.
This thesis reveals that while the law attempts to control the female legal 
subject in ways that work to maintain patriarchal power relations, literature explodes 
that same subject into plurivocity, depth and sometimes defiance. The women who 
appear on the page and stage in the works I have discussed, even when they are 
vilified by the playwrights or poets, all reveal law’s inability to adequately contain or
,-5a
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define the female legal subject. They illustrate how the dominant discourse, law, 
must contort and essentialise women into little more than stereotypes in order to 
effectively work against them. In so doing, law is shown to be artificial, a social 
construction that is often undermined by the veiy voices it would try to silence. 
When Salome declares she will show her sex the way to freedom’s door, she calls for 
a redefinition of women’s legal subjecthood - a redefinition which will take into 
account the fact that women are able to be legally active (as the many women going 
to court in the Jacobean period prove), that women should be able to play a part in 
defining their relationship to their husbands and the public sphere, and that women 
are not “naturally” silent, chaste or submissive.
Appendix, selected transcriptions from the lawes resolutions of 
WOMENS RIGHTS: OR, THE LAWES PROVISION FOR WOEMEN
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A
PREFACE TO 
THE READER.1
Various are the conceipts and Judgements of Men: Nature teacheth each to 
preferre his Owne; Hence it is, that the number of Bookes multiply, insomuch, that, 
according to the Wise-man; Thereof, is no end.
To expect new Matter, were to give the old Proverb the Lie; Nihil jam 
dictum, &c.2 It’s enough, if what was before, be now so changed by Method and 
Application, that it shewes as new, and becomes more ready for Use. Habit and 
Apparell alter the Shape, sometimes the Conditions of Men. An old Theame in a 
new dresse ingenuously contrived makes the Composer an Author. Why then should 
this Booke blush to shew it selfe? or doubt to bee servant to the Printer, whose
Master neverthelesse it is?
To give it as absolute, or free from faults, were to make it more then the
Worke of Man, whose incident is Error: Such as it hath, are rather accidentall then 
originall, and may bee fairly excused; Not to insist, That the Author’s dead, That it 
was long since collected, Alteration of some Cases by Moderne Statutes, Or this the 
first Impression. Goodnesse is the Parent of Confidence; The Act is crowned by the 
End, which was this, A publique Advantage and peculiar Service to that Sexe 
generally beloved, and by the Author had in venerable estimation. To implore their
’ Throughout this transcription I have regularized long ‘s’ and consonantal T’ and ‘U,’ but have 
otherwise maintained the spelling and punctuation throughout. As 1 pointed out in chapter one, The 
Lawes Resolutions of Womens Rights exists only in the 1632 black-letter edition. W. Johnson 
published a facsimile in 1979, which does not include notes. The most extensive,, edited, extracts 
appear in Joan Klein’s Daughters, Wives, and Widows, and focus mainly on the later chapters to do 
with rape. Kate Aughterson’s Renaissance Woman sourcebook includes three pages of extracts from 
throughout the work, which are simply transcribed with a short note introducing the text. A full, 
edited version of the entire text (which runs over 400 pages) is not as yet available. Although there 
are many references to the work in modern criticism, these are limited to footnote citations, short 
quotes from Section III, The punishment of Adam’s sin, and a sentence or two on the author. For a 
list of these, see footnote 29, chapter one.
There is nothing which has not been said already.
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Patronage, and prevaile, were to guard this Booke beyond Opposition. The strong 
neither needs nor desires a Champion; Meeknes protects it selfe: What here you 
finde reall and perfect, therefore accept; It will subsist; Remit the rest, the rather for 
that nor the Tract, nor This is peremptory, But onely proposed for your favorable 
sense and Approbation. I. L.3 4
TO
THE READER.
By whom this following Discourse was Composed I certainly know not, 
neither by what inducement the Authors paines therein was procured: But if for no 
other consideration then to make this scattered part of Learning, in the great 
Volumes of the Common-Law-Bookes, and there darkly described, to be one entyre 
body, and more ready, and clearer to the view of the Reader, his love deserves 
thanks, and his endeavours kind acceptance. The Worke hath been carefully, and 
with much labour and diligence collected: The Theame, as the subject, is The Lawes 
Resolutions of Womens Rights', which comprehends all our Lawes concerning 
Women, either Children in government or nurture of their Parents or Gardians,
Mayds, Wives, and Widowes, and their goods, inheritances, and other estates. It is 
profitable and usefull Learning to be well knowne. I am sure it will please all them 
whose actions are guided virtutis amore? and offend none but those ill manners, who 
can have no other antidote made them, then formidine pcence'.5 for it sets forth Law, 
and Justice, things honest, and things convenient. I had such a good conceit of the
3 These initials have not been attributed to anyone by any of the extant criticism on this work. They 
are neither the printer’s (John More) nor the seller’s (John Grove), and remain anonymous.
4 By love of virtue.
5 By terror of punishment.
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matter and frame of the whole Worke, that having a Copie thereof lying by me 
somtimes, within the Compasse of a Lent vacation, I pluckt my intentions from my 
own course of Studies, and cast them upon this. And those vitia Scriptoris, and 
Author is!" which I found, I amended, and have added many reasons, opinions, Cases 
and resolutions of Cases to the Authors store: wherefore those oversights or neglects 
that thou maist impose upon the Printer or mee, (which I suppose will be some (if not 
many) thou shalt have thanks to supply or amend, which is all I expected, and more 
then the Author, as I believe, had (or now being dead can receive:) and perhaps thou 
maist have a better reward; for the old Adage is true, prelium non vile laborisJ
Vale, 
T. E.6 7 8
***
LIB. I.
THE WOMANS LAWIER.
SECT. I.
All law, saith Justinian in his Imperiall institutions,9 10belongeth to persons, to 
things, or to actions: which division I acknowledge to bee good: and so in his 
method of the Civil Law, doth a Doctor and very learned man, Conradus Lagus J® 
yet the same Lagus saith, it is too strait for his purpose, and therefore not feeling
6 Writer’s and author’s errors. The meaning of this is somewhat unclear; in modern parlance a writer 
is an author. In this case, however, he could be referring to the contributors to this specific work: the 
original author and the “writer” who took it up over vacation to edit and publish it.
7 The price of [the] labour is not cheap.
8 Identified as Thomas Edgar by Prest (180).
9 Roman Emperor (527-565 A.D.). The Institutions, first published in 533, was a textbook for law 
students (Evans par. 50).
10 Conrad Lagus (d. 1546), wrote Juris Utriusque Traditio Melhodica, first published in Frankfurt, 
1543 (“Conrad”).
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himselfe at ease in so narrow a distribution, to drive the formes of Civill Law to
certaine heads, according to their materiall varieties, hee confesseth hee is compelled 
to constitute a pluralitie of Law members more then the very Law setteth down as 
appeareth in the 2. Part of his Method the 2. Chapter, yet a curious caviler11 12 13 14(I
perceive) might find in Justinians partition a very great redundance rather then any 
defect, for Res is a transcendente, comprehending actions, persons, and what not. 
And actions in the widest signification seeme alone to bee the theame and right 
subject matter of Lawes and all Humane Constitutions: as for persons they are so 
many, and so differing, that I thinke there is no use, Custome, Injunction or Decree, 
but it appertained! to some person, and that in some peculiarity of difference, either 
in state, age, sex, function, profession, merit, or some other like severall regard, so 
that in mine opinion, Law might bee dispersed into apt titles of this personall 
difference, in such sort as both Students, might come to the easier knowledge: the 
one of their learning generall, and the other of their particular duty. & though I bee 
farre unable to produce a perfect method of the Lawes of England, as Lagus 
following his owne artificiall project hath framed an excellent Deliniation of the 
Lawes of Rome, and though I bee unworthy to have the Marshalling of the titles of 
Lawe to bring all matter cohering under them, yet I will make a little assay what I am 
able to doe if I were put to it in a popular kind of instruction: following a frame by 
distinction of persons, chasing the primary distribution of them made before the 
World was seven daies old, Masculum & Fozminam fecit eos,x* of which division
" Someone who raises frivolous objections.
12 The / a thing
13 Law cannot be affected by people because it transcends, and therefore exists outside, social 
systems.
14 Male and female, he made them.
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because the part that wee say hath least judgement and discretion to bee a Law unto 
it selfe, {Women onely Women) then have nothing to do in constituting Lawes, or 
consenting to them, in interpreting of Lawes, or in hearing them interpreted at 
lectures,15 leets16 or charges, and yet they stand strictly tyed to mens establishments, 
little or nothing excused by ignorance, mee thinkes it were pitty and impiety any 
longer to hold them from such Customes, Lawes, and Statutes, as are in a maner, 
proper, or principally belonging unto them: Laying aside therefore these titles which 
include onely the masculine, as Bishop, Abbot, Prior, Monke, Deane and Chapter,17 
Viscount, Coroner, together with those which bee common to both kinds, as 
Hereticke, Traitour, Homicide, Felon, Laron,18 Paricide, Cutpurse, Rogue, with 
Feoffor, Feoffee,19 Donor, Donee,20 Vendor, Vendee,21 Recognisor, Recognisee,22 
&c. I will in this Treaty with as little tediousnesse as I can, handle that part of the 
English Lawe, which containeth the immunities, advantages, interests, and duties of 
women, not regarding so much to satisfie the deep learned or searchers for subtility, 
as woman kind, to whom I am a thankfull debter by nature.
15 Lectures at the Inns of Court; women are barred from legal education.
16 Leet (or manorial) courts.
17 Canon of a cathedral or other religious community or knightly order.
18 Robber.
19 One who conveys a freehold estate by a formal transfer of possession.
20 One who donates land to another.
21 One who sells land to another.
22 One under a magistrate’s bond to uphold a set condition.
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SECT. II.
The Creation of Man and Woman.
God the first day when hee created the World made the matter of it, 
separating light from darknesse: the second day hee placed the Firmament which 
hee called Heaven, betwixt the waters above the Firmament and the waters under the 
Firmament: the third day hee segregated the waters under the Firmament into one 
place, calling the waters Seas, and the dry land Earth, which hee commanded to 
bring forth fruitifying herbes, plants and trees: the fourth day hee made the Sun, the 
Moone and the Stares in the Firmament, to bee for Signes, Seasons, Daies and Yeres, 
and to give light upon the earth: the fift day he made by his Word the Fishes of the 
Sea, Whales and eveiy fethered foule of the ayre, commanding them to increase: the 
sixt day he made Cattle, creeping things, the beasts of the Earth: and now having 
made all things that should be needfull for them, hee created Man, Male and Female 
made he them, Bidding them multiply and replenish the Earth, & take the joynt 
soveraigntie over the Fishes of the Sea, the Foules of the Ayre, and over all Beasts 
moving upon the Earth, Genesis 1.
In the second Chapter Moses13 declareth and expresseth the Creation of 
Women, which word in good sense, signifieth not the woe of Man as some affirme, 
but with Man: For so in our hasty pronouncing wee turne the preposition with to 
woe, or wee,23 4 oftentimes: and so shee was ordained to bee with man as a helpe, & a 
companion, because God saw it was not good that Man should bee alone. Then 
when God brought Woman to Man to bee named by him, hee found straight way that 
shee was bone of his bones, flesh of his flesh, giving her a name, testifying shee was
23 2. Gen. 21-23.
24 (4Woe-man,” “with-man” or “wee-man.”
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taken out of Man, and he pronounced that for her sake man should leave Father and
Mother and adhere to his Wife which should be with him one.
Now Man and Woman are one.
Now because Adam hath so pronounced that man and wife shall be but one 
flesh, and our Law is that if a feofment bee made joyntly to John at Stile and to 
Thom. Noke and his wife, of three acres of land, that Tho. and wife get no more but
one acre and a halfe, quia una persona, and a writ of conspiracy doth not lye 
against one onely, and that is the reason, Nat. br. fo. 116 a writ of conspiracy doth 
not lie against baron & feme,25 26 7 for they are but one person,28 & by this a married 
Woman perhaps may either doubt whether shee bee either none or no more than 
halfe a person. But let her bee of good cheare, though for the neere conjunction 
which is betweene man and wife, and to tye them to a perfect love, agreement and 
adherence, they bee by intent and wise fiction of Law, one person, yet in nature & in 
some other cases by the Law of God and man, they remaine divers, for as Adams 
punishment was severall from Eves, so in criminall and other speciall causes our 
Law argues them severall persons, you shall finde that persona is an Individuum 
spoken of anything which hath reason, and therefore of nothing but Vel de Angelo, 
vel de homine,29 fol. 154 in Dyer,30 who citeth no worse authority for it than
25 Transfer of a freehold estate.
26 Because they are one person.
27 Husband and wife.
28 They cannot conspire because they are not regarded as separate individuals.
29 Either of an angel or of a man. NB: The Latin noun homine and its singular homo literally means 
“men” or “man.” During the Renaissance, however, writers were beginning to use it as the masculine 
generic to refer to both “man” (literal or woman) and “men” (literal or people) in accordance with the 
vernacular. This context, in which the author argues for woman’s powers of reason, infers that in this 
instance homine refers to people in the masculine generic. The syntax makes the meaning of the
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Callepinus^ own selfe, seeing therefore I list not to doubt with Plato, whether 
Women bee reasonable or unreasonable creatures,30 31 2 1 may not doubt but every 
woman is a temporall person, though no woman can be a spirituall Vicar.33
SECT. III.
The punishment of Adam’s sinne.
Retume a little to Genesis, in the 3. Chap, whereof is declared our first 
parents transgression in eating the forbidden fruit: for which Adam, Eve, the serpent 
first, and lastly, the earth it selfe is cursed: and besides, the participation of Adams 
punishment, which was subjection to mortality, exiled from the garden of Eden, 
injoyned to labor, Eve because shee had helped to seduce her husband hath inflicted 
on her, an especiall bane. In sorrow shalt thou bring forth thy children, thy desires 
shall bee subject to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee.
See here the reason of that which I touched before, that Women have no 
voyce in Parliament, They make no Lawes, they consent to none, they abrogate none.
All of them are understood either married or to bee married and their desires or
subject to their husband, I know no remedy though some women can shift it well
sentence obscure, but it can be understood as follows: when society defines “people” as individuals 
with reason, it can only be speaking about either angels or men and women - both of which were 
thought to be the only creatures capable of reason at the time the piece was written.
30 Dyer, James Sir (1512-1582), was a lawyer in the Tudor courts whose Abridgement des Reporles 
Seignior Dyer was first published in 1585 (Watt 1: 32).
31 Calepin, or Calepinus, Ambrose (d. 1510), published his dictionary, Lexicon, seu Dictionarium xi. 
Linguarum in 1506 (Watt 1: 184).
32 Greek philosopher (429-347 B.C.), whose Republic discusses in length the worth(lessness) of 
women (Hornblower 539 and Plato 159-89).
33 Every woman can be regarded as an individual capable of reason even if she is barred from holding 
office.
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enough. The common Law here shaketh hand with Divinitie, but because I am come 
too soone to the title of Baron and feme, and Adam and Eve were the first and last
that were married so young, it is best that I runne backe againe to consider of the 
things (which I might seeme to have lost by the way) that are fit to be knowne 
concerning women before they be fit for marriage.
SECT. IV.
The Ages of a Woman.
The learning is 35. Hen. 6. fol. 40. that a Woman hath divers speciall ages, at 
the 7. yeare of her age, her father shall have aide of his tenants to marry her.34 At 9. 
yeares age, shee is able to deserve and have dowre. At 12. yeares to consent to 
marriage. At 14. to bee hors du guard’?5 at 16. to be past the Lords tender of a 
husband.36 At 21. to be able to make a feoffement: And per Ingelton there in the 
end of the case, a woman married at 12. cannot disagree afterward, but if she be 
married younger, shee may dissent till shee be 14.
The age of 7. yeares, when Bract on37 38wrote this aide, for making the sonne a 
Knight, or marrying the daughter, was due de gratia & non de Jure, and pro
oo
necessitate & indigentia domini capitalist measured by the indigence of the 
Lord,39 and opulence40 of the tenants: But West I. Cap. 35. in the third yeare of
34 The tenants of a landlord must pay rent towards her dower.
35 Out of tutelage.
36 She can refuse her lord’s / guardian’s offer of a husband.
37 Henry de Bracton (d. 1298), wrote De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Anglioe, the first complete
printed edition of which was published in 1569.
38 Of grace and not of right and for the necessity and need of the feudal lord.
39 The financial need of the lord.
40 Wealth.
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Edward I. the Law was made certaine, the Lord shall have aide of his tenants, as
soone as his daughter accomplished 7. yeares age for the marriage of her. Viz. xx.s. 
of a whole knights fee, and xx.s. of xx.l. land in soccage,41 and so forth, according to 
the rate more or lesse.
The King shall have this aide according to this proportion, by a Statute made 
25. Ed. 3. and for this aide every Lord may either distraine42 or bring his writ de 
auxilio habendo43 at his election, but tenant by grand serjeanty, or petit, shall not pay 
this aide.44 Mich. 21. He. 4. fol. 32. no more shall coppy-holders,45 as seemeth by 
the writ, both in Fitzherbert46 and Bracton, for it is, Precipimus ut habere facias 
rationabile auxilium de Militibus, et libere tenentibus,47 48 49Now if the Kings writ runne 
for it before the Statute, how is it that Bracton saith it was due, but de gratia,That 
perhaps he meant but for the quantity, ipse videritf4 if the father dye, the daughter 
being unmarried, shee shall recover so much as was gathered and not paied her at the 
hands of the executor or heire, but this aide is only for the marriage of the eldest 
daughter, and not for no daughter, where many make but one heire:50 But see
41 A feudal tenure of land involving payment of rent or other non-military service to a superior.
42 Seize chattels to make a person pay rent or meet an obligation, or to obtain satisfaction by their sale.
43 On [the] help which should be had.
44 The tenant can, if he obtains a court order from a magistrate, refuse payment.
45 Person holding a tenure of land based on manorial records.
46 Sir Anthony Fitzherbert (1470-1538), wrote La Grande Abridgement, published 1514, and Diversite 
de Courtz et Leur Jurisdictions, published 1523, both important early works on English law 
(“Anthony” par. 1).
47 We command you to make available reasonable help from soldiers and freeholders.
48 Of grace.
49 He himself will have seen.
50 Any sums collected up to the death of the guardian may still be used by the eldest daughter as 
dower.
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Bracton fol. 36.b. Where he saith, primce genitce filice non dabitur auxilium tale, quia 
istud auxilium pertinet ad Cap. dom. sicut pertineret si non esset nisi unus hceres 
cum omnes sunt quasi unus hceres.51
SECT. V.
Of Woman compellable to serve.
The next age of a Woman is 9. yeares when shee is vowable,52 but wee will 
stay a while with the virgins, concerning whom, if they be in the power and 
governance of parents, masters, or prochein amies,53 or if they bee poore; the Law 
differeth little or not much from the common forme apperteyning unto males, unlesse 
it bee in cases of rape, which I reserve to the end of my discourse, where the poore 
have least need of subsidie, onely this I observe here, By a Statute made 5. Eliz. ca. 
4. Two Justices of peace in the Countrie, or the head officer and 2. Burgesses in 
Cities, &c. may appoint any woman of the age of twelve yeares, and under 40. being 
unmaried, and out of service, to serve and bee retained by yeare, weeke, or day, in 
such sort and for such wages as they shall thinke meet, and if she refuse, they may 
commit her to prison, till she shall be bound to serve.
51 Such assistance of this kind will not be given to a first-born daughter, because this help belongs to 
the feudal lord, just as it would belong if there were only a single male heir, since all are as if [they 
were] one heir.
52 Marriageable.
53 Close friends; guardians
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Lib. II.
THE WOMANS LAWIER.
The second Booke.
SECT. I.
Of Marriage, according to the Civill and 
Common Law.
Marriage is defined to be a Conjunction of Man and Woman, containing an 
inseparable connexion, and union of life. But as there is nothing that is begotten and 
finished at once, so this Contract of coupling man and woman together, hath an 
inception first, and then an orderly proceeding. The first beginning of Marriage (as 
in respect of Contract, and that which Law taketh hold on) is when Wedlocke by 
words in the future tence is promised and vowed, and this is but sponsio or 
sponsaliafA The full Contract of Matrimonie, is when it is made by words, de 
prcesenti54 5 in a lawfull consent,56 57and thus two be made man and wife existing 
without lying together, yet Matrimonie is not accounted consummate, untill there goe 
with the consent of mind and will Conjunction of body.
***
SECT. XI.
Impediment of Marriage by Kindred 
and Consanguinitie.
In the worlds infancie men were inforced by necessity to marry with owne 
kindred, propter hominum paucitatem,51 But that necessity is taken away and long
54 A pledge in the future tense, such as a betrothal.
55 A pledge in the present tense, such as marriage banns.
56 Both parties consent to the marriage without coercion or deception.
57 Because of the small number of people (it is obvious in this instance that homine is being used as 
the masculine generic - marriage in Christian terms usually refers to a man and a woman).
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since by the veiy voice of God, they which are in certaine degrees of bloud are 
forbidden to marry, Leviticus 18. And because Marriage is an aboundant seminarie 
of charitie and love, it is wisely and profitably ordeyned that it should be dispersed 
into many families.
Therefore by Naturall, Civill, and Common Law, Marriage is cleane
forbidden betwixt all those, which are as Parents or Children one towards another, in 
infinitum,5* and betwixt those persons, which are of kindred in the transverse58 9 line, 
Marriage is forbidden till the fourth degree60 bee past.
SECT. XII.
The impediment of Marriage by Affmitie.
There is further a certaine nigh alliance called affinity, quasi fines duarum 
cognationum conjungens,61 this riseth betwixt them which are married, and the 
kindred of one of them, as betwixt the husband and the kindred of his wife: now
affinity prohibiteth Marriage onely to the persons contracted, &c for the Cosins or 
Consanguinity to my wife, are of affmitie onely to me, and not to my brothers or 
children by a former Wife; and my bloud and consanguinity are kindred of affmitie 
onely to my Wife, and not to her brothers or former children: here is it that the 
Father and the Sonne may marry the Mother and the Daughter, and two Brethren 
may marry two Sisters in another Family: for the Consanguinity, of which one is of
bloud to the husband, and another to the wife, are betwixt themselves in no bond of
58 For all time; meaning, a man cannot many his granddaughter or great-granddaughter because the 
relationship is one of parent and child.
59 Brothers, sisters, cousins, etc.
60 The fourth degree of separation; therefore 3rd cousins and those further removed could marry.
61 As if conjoining the ends of two blood-lines.
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affinity: And observe that in what degree a man or woman is to one of them that are 
married, by Consanguinity, they are accompted in the same degree to the other in 
affinity: As the wives brother, who is in primo gradu^ to his Sister, is in the same 
degree to her husband, and their children in the second, &c. And so forth their 
Childrens Children, which after the fourth degree, are againe by all lawes permitted 
to marrie, contrahitur & affmitas per illicitum coitum.M
***
SECT. XX.
Wherefore Marriage ought to be made.
The causes of Matrimony principally are two: The first is susceptio sobolis,62 63 64 5 
increase of Children, for even by Plato every good man ought to desire that he may 
leave behind him worshippers of God, and propagators of piety: The second cause is 
the eviting of fornication and uncleannesse I. ad Corinth, ca. 7 Saint Paul biddeth, 
that to avoid fornication every man have his owne wife, and every woman her own 
husband, and whosoever marryeth for beautie, age, order, splendour of birth, or for 
riches, rather then for these two causes, doth very perversly, though it be not 
expressly disallowed, but Marriage may be for the other things also, and the Consent 
may be given for them.66
62 Accounted; understood to be.
63 In the first degree.
64 Affinity is also contracted through illicit sexual intercourse.
65 The obligation to bear children.
66 Marriages are customarily allowed for all these reasons, despite the lack of Biblical sanction.
350
SECT. XXL
The Consummation and individuitie of Marriage.
When to the Consent of minde, there is added Copulation of body, 
Matrimonie is consummate, the principall end whereof is propagation or procreation: 
But where the course after going is not observed, there riseth no lawfull Off-spring, 
the Children which are had, are not in power and commandement of them which 
beget or beare them, neither are they taken by Law for any other, then vulgo 
quesiti?1 Otherwise it is in lawfull Wedlocke, the knot whereof is so straight and 
indissoluble, that they which are yoked therein, cannot the one without the consent of 
the other, (neither was it ever permitted) abdicate themselves, or enter into Religion, 
for Saint Paul in the above titled Epistle and Chapter, saith plainely, that the husband 
hath not power of his owne body, &c. And there cannot chance any fedity or 
uncleannesse of body so great, as that for it a man and wife ought perpetually to be 
segregated, yea so unpartible be they, that law saith, they may not utterly leave 
conjugalem consuetudinem?* though one of them have the very leprosie it selfe.
AAA
SECT. XXII.
Of Divorce.
Pactis Poznarum cogi potest nemo ad Matrimonium contrahendum?9 And as 
no man can be compelled by any convention of paine or penaltie to contract
67 Children born out of wedlock or through adultery are illegitimate and not legal heirs. In common 
parlance, ‘questionable.’
68 Marital custom. Consuetudinem carries with it legally binding connotations as well, which makes it 
somewhat different than mere “habit” or “practise.” For example, in modern Scotland, a consuetude 
is a custom with legal force behind it.
69 No one can be compelled by means of punishments / penalties to contract a marriage.
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Matrimony, so it is impossible, when it is once lawfully and evidently contracted, to 
distract it by any partition, covenant, or humane traction,70 Quos Deus conunxit, 
homo non separet, yet there are Causes, for which divers are permitted: But 
Divorce, that onely separateth a consuetudine conjugali,2 taketh not away the bond 
of Matrimony, and therefore Divorces are sometimes perpetuall, as long as the 
parties live, sometimes for a season limited, and sometime, till reconcilement be had, 
and he that maketh Divorce with his wife being only separated a Toro is forbidden to
take another wife.
SECT. XXIII.
Causes of Divorce.
The Civill Law hath many causes of Divorce, but by Divine and Common 
Law, the onely sufficient cause is adultery and fornication, which by the Canons is 
carnall and spirituall: the spirituall is heresie and Idolatry: They dissolve 
Matrimony for spirituall fornication onely, where one of the parties is converted to 
Christian faith, and the other for hatred of his religion will not cohabit, &c. And this 
is taken also from Saint Paul I. ad Corinth. 7. where he saith, If the unbeleeving 
depart, let him depart, a Brother or Sister is not in subjection.
70 A treatise brought by either another person or one of the couple.
71 “Those whom God hath joined together, let no one separate.” The usual translation here is “no 
man,” but I have deliberately chosen to read it, again, as the masculine generic. No woman was 
allowed to separate a married couple either.
72 From marital custom. Again, this means more than the modern understanding of “custom” because 
it carries legally binding suggestions.
73 The author is here referring to separation a mensa et thoro, literally, a separation from table and bed 
(more commonly referred to in English as “bed and board”) wherein the marriage continues to be 
legally binding and no remarriage is allowed.
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SECT. XXIV.
Impotencie or Disabilitie of Procreation.
There is admitted also, in dissolution of Marriage, the complaint of 
impotencie: And Justinian very discreetly, willed that in that exploration or proofe 
of the defect there should be expected three yeares: but the Canons ordeine that 
Matrimony is dissolved by probation74 of impotencie, without mention or limits of 
time. And this is more then a bare divorce or separation, a Toro-?5 for it dissolveth 
Marriage, avoyding it as it had never beene:76 77so that he or shee whose fellow is 
convicted of impotencie, may choose a new friend, and presently marry againe.
But this is to be understood of impotencie which was before the Marriage 
made: for indeede where the impediment was so precedent, there could not any 
Matrimony exist or have being, &c.
Otherwise it is, when this disability betideth after Marriage perfected and 
consummate, for in that case, he or she which remaineth potent, shall not leave and 
depart from the impotent, but be compelled to beare the discommodity, as well as 
any other ill fortune. And that which is here taught of Conjugall impotencie, 
stretcheth to all impediments of Marriage which are perpetuall, ut per ea 
Matrimonium nunquam extitisse judicetur.
74 A period of testing the abilities of the person.
75 From the bed [a thoro].
76 The author here refers to divorce a vinculo, which assumes there was never a lawful marriage in the 
first place, and both parties are tree to remarry.
77 So that by these things the marriage is judged never to have existed.
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SECT. XXV. '
Marriages inter ascendentes & descendentes.
Those Marriages that are made betweene ascendentes and descendentes, are
so detestable, that by the Civill Law they deserve exile and confiscation of goods.
And there is a glosse that would extend this to all unlawfull Marriages: but by
Bartell and others, it is to be inflicted only upon those, which are contra jura 
80sanguinis.
SECT. XXVI.
Captivitie or long absence of one which 
is married.
It falleth out not seldome, the one of them which are married to be taken
captive, or otherwise so deteined, that it is uncertaine if he live or no.
Therefore because it is in some sort dangerous to expect long the incertaine
returne of an absent yoake-fellow, here the Civill Law did ordaine, that after a 
husband had beene gone five yeares, and nothing knowne whether he lived or no, the 
wife might marry againe, and so might the husband, that had expected his wife, &c. 
But the Common Law commandeth simply to forbeare Marriage till the death of him 
or her that is missing be certainely knowne. * * *
78 Between ascendants and descendents, such as parents and children, grandparents and grandchildren, 
etc.
79 This is a reference to a case.
80 Contrary to the rights of blood.
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SECT. XXVII.
That no crime dissolveth marriage.
Of old time, some Crimes were numbred amongst the Causes of Dissolving 
marriage: but Justinian changed the Law here in part, and the Canons upon the 
saying of Christ, Quos Deus conjunxit, &c. will not by any meanes that Matrimony 
rightly made and consummate, can bee dissolved, quoad ad vinculum Matrimonii*2 
though for fornication they suffer a parting, quoad Torum.81 82 3 84 85So that nodus legitimi 
Matrimonii*4 is never dissolved but by death, and the wife as long as she liveth is 
subject to the law of her husband by Saint Paul.
Yet saith Lagus, seeing that in Contracts of Wedlock we regard as well what 
is decent and convenient, as what is lawfull, I cannot tell why we be not bound in 
dissolving of it to follow the like equitie: and for example, if a Wife cannot dwell 
with her husband without manifest danger of death, because he is cruell and bloudy, 
why may not shee be separated judicis ordinarii cognitione precedent e*'
SECT. XXVIII.
The Authoritie of the or dinar ie 
Judge, &c.
For if Spousals of future Marriage cannot be dissolved without publike 
authority, it must needes follow, that without like authoritie, there can bee no 
repudiation when Matrimony is fully contracted and consummate: But in pursuing
81 Those whom God hath joined, etc.
82 As far as the marriage bond [is concerned].
83 As far as the bed (sexual intercourse) [is concerned].
84 The knot of a legal marriage.
85 By the previous cognizance of an ordinary judge.
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of divorce the strict order of Judiciall proceedings is not alwayes severely kept: for 
regularly production of witnesses before contestation of suite, non adjunctt 
producentem, yet if Cornelia sue a Divorce against Sempronius, causa 
consanguinitatis, and Sempronius being cited will not appeare, if now Cornelia 
bring her witnesses, the Judge may receive them.
Many this religious observation the Canons give him ever, when he commeth 
to point of Judgement, That the danger is lesse, in leaving men contrary to the 
Statutes of men, then in separating (contrary to the Statutes of God) those which are 
lawfully conjoyned.
Thus farre have I run my selfe in debt to Doctor Conradus Lagus, of whom in 
the third part of his Method, ca. 22. may be further learned the difference betwixt
oo
Scortum, pellex and Concubina, Our English comprehendeth them all in one 
word,86 87 88 9 90 *and I would they dwelt all in one House, beyond Seas, Concubinalus
speciem conjugii --------- habet, Et ex Concubinae natis concedilur beneficium
legitimationis™ If maid, wife or widow, aske what I meane to tell them so much of 
Civill and Canon Law, seeing they be none of those Country women, I pray them not 
to looke for the Regions in mappa mundif but for their owne Regiment in Christian 
dutie: The spirituall Law is here an Oracle to the temporall, which evermore sendeth
86 Does not help the person producing them.
87 Because of consanguinity.
88 A prostitute, seductress, and a concubine.
89 Whore.
90 Concubinage has the appearance of marriage, and the benefit of legitimacy is granted to the
children of a concubine.
91 On a world map.
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to the Ecclesiasticall Judge, viz. the Bishop, for certification of lawfulnes or 
unlawfulnes of Wedlocks when Accouplements come in question.92 93
SECT. XXIX.
Statutes concerning Marriage.
For it is true that New digate saith, 12. He. 8. fo. 6. that marriage and 
Divorcements with the circumstances of them be properly no parcell of Common- 
Lawes learning.
Yet it is veiy needfull here that I shew you here what the Lawes of England 
have needfully concerning Marriage established. 32. H. 8. ca. 38. declareth all 
persons lawfully to marry which are not prohibited by Gods Law. And it was 
ordeyned, that all Marriages contracted and solemnized in face of the Church, and 
consummate with bodily knowledge, should remaine indefeatable, notwithstanding 
any pre-contract, &c. Further, that neither dispensation,94 prescription,95 law, 
reservation,96 97prohibition, or any thing (Gods law excepted) shall trouble or impeach 
any Marriage made without the Leviticall Degrees, nor any man bee received in 
spirituall Court to processe, plea, or obligation, contrary to this Act. This Statute,
92 The author encourages women not to turn to worldly solutions to marital difficulties (such as 
adultery, desertion, etc.), but to the Bishop of the canonical court who will solve the case for them 
according to the law.
93 I can find no evidence for this reference, but it is likely to be either John Newdigate (d. 1528) who 
established “a long lasting tradition of engagement in the legal profession (Larminie 8),” or, because it 
is a comment on a Statute of Henry VIII, it may be his son John (d. 1545), who was “called to the bar 
at Lincoln’s Inn in 1518 (Larminie 8).” There is no reference to any Newdigate in Pollard and 
Redgrave or Watt.
94 Imposed exemption from marital duty.
95 Ordinance.
96 Express or tacit limitation or exception to the agreement; or, a right or interest in estate being 
conveyed, the estate, in this case, being the woman.
97 Within the proper degrees of consanguinity and affinity as stated in Leviticus.
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though it seemed to be made upon good and great considerations, (because pre­
contracts too too slenderly proved, and sometime but onely surmized, helped the 
Romish oppression, and separated those which were at quiet in an honest 
conjunction) yet many did after the making of it, very dissolutely come from their 
first vowes, and, as it were in spight of conscience and Ecclesiasticall censure, 
coupled themselves bodily with such as they newly fancied, slipperily leaving their 
former Contracts: it is repealed 2. & 3. Ed. 6. ca. 3. only in the points of pre­
contracts: And they are left in the validity which they were of, by the Kings 
Ecclesiastical lawes, immediately before the making of 32. with proviso that all the 
rest of the said Act standeth whole and in strength. So it is now againe by /. Eliz. 
cap. I. See also 5. & 6. Ed. 6. ca. 12. that the Marriage of Priests and Ecclesiasticall 
persons is lawfull, their Children legitimate, a Priest may be tenant by the courtesse,
and his Wife have Dower.
***
SECT. XXX.
With what persons Women may not marry.
Such are her Grandfather, her Father, her Sonnes Sonne, &c. her Brother, though it 
be but the one part her Fathers or Mothers Brother, her Brothers or Sisters Sonne, or 
her Sonnes Sonne. Brothers or Sisters Children (saith Ramus in his Commentaries of 
Christian Religion, lib. 2. ca.9.)98 99are forbiden to inter-marry, sed more, non lege 
Divina vel Romana?9 Christians, he saith further, which have abrogated the Law 25. 
of Deuteronomy, whereby a Brother might bee challenged to raise up the house of
98 Pierre de la Ramee (1515-1572). His De religione Christiana was first published in 1576 
(“Ramus”).
99 But by custom, not by divine or Roman law. Here, custom is used in the modern sense of the word.
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his deceased brother, have also constituted a prohibition, within certaine degrees of 
affinity, and therefore a man may not marry with the widdow of his Grandfather or
of his Father, or with the widdow of his owne Sonne, or of his Sonnes Sonne, or with
the widdow of his Brother, or of his Brothers Son, or of his Brothers Sonnes Sonne, 
&c. Nor with the Grand-mother, Mother, Daughter, Neece, great Aunt, Aunt or
Sister of his deceased wife.
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